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ABSTRACT 
The dissertation looks at the transformation of civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary, 
Russia and Ukraine between the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and the 
enlargement of NATO in March 1999. It presents new qualitative data based on 
approximately 120 elite interviews conducted by the author of politicians, military officers, 
defence analysts, and journalists in the countries in the study. 
In general, the focus is on the civilian side of the civil-military equation. Specifically, 
the work assesses the state of civil-military relations on the basis of three interconnected 
indicators: the making of security policy and defence reform as a test of civilian control, the 
role of civilians in the ministry of defence, and the strength of agencies of civilian oversight. 
It is argued that the differences observed in the state of civil-military relations among 
the states in the study can be explained by the interaction of three main factors. In Poland 
and Hungary, the external incentives to establish democratic control of the armed forces 
reform were positive, while in Russia and Ukraine the impact of external actors- of which 
NATO was by far the most significant- was negative or ambiguous. The attitude of the 
political and military elite in Poland and Hungary was more open to the adoption of new 
norms of civil-military relations than was that of the elite in Russia and Ukraine. And in 
Poland and Hungary the state of the polity and economy presented a less significant internal 
constraint on reform. 
The central finding of the dissertation is that in Poland and Hungary reformers tried -
with mixed success -to adopt the forms of democratic civil-military relations as part of their 
drive to integrate with Western politico-military structures without seeking to understand the 
logic behind them. The result was a "politics of mimicry", a process of imperfect copying of 
liberal-democratic norms of civil-military relations which, nonetheless, culminated in these 
countries being admitted to NATO in 1999 . 
In Ukraine and Russia, by contrast, in a time of profound budgetary exigency, the 
armed forces were left to solve their own problems absent much civilian control except that 
exercised infrequently and arbitrarily by the head of state. The result was a "politics of 
exclusion", the systematic denial of any role in civilian oversight of all political actors 
excepting the president. By the end of 1999, these countries were barely beginning to 
develop some form of democratic civil-military relations, and that only tentatively. 
In conclusion the work suggests that the problem of civil-military relations in the 
region has been more a matter of sound public administration of a vital state activity than a 
matter of preventing coups. As such, it may be best addressed from the perspective of 
public administration rather than from the traditional political science or sociological 
perspectives of extant theory. 
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Introduction 
The transition of the post-communist regimes of Eastern Europe 1 to democracy in the 1990s 
is one of the most consequential events of the 20th century. This work looks at an aspect of 
that change -- the transformation of civil-military relations in Poland, Hungary, Ukraine and 
Russia between the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and the enlargement of 
NATO in March 19992 - through the prism of in-depth interviews with the military, political and 
academic elite in each of the countries in the study. The dissertation is concerned with how 
these states have built, and are still building, qualitatively new regimes of civil-military 
relations during a time of great upheaval. The object is to come to a better understanding of 
why actors in this process have chosen various paths of reform and how and why they have 
accomplished, or failed to accomplish, the building of democratic civil-military relations. 
The issue has received comparatively less scholarly attention than have other 
aspects of transition such as the change from a planned to a market economy, the building 
of representative democratic institutions, the fostering of civil societies, and so on. Yet the 
issue is of great importance. As Christopher Donnelly wrote "defence transformation, good 
civil-military relations and democratic control are problems which must be solved ... or they 
will destabilize society."3 
The work aims to present new qualitative data on civil-military relations in transition. 
Although there are already a few case studies on these countries, there are no single-author 
country comparisons across the Central Europe-former Soviet Union divide from which to 
draw generalisations about post-communist civil-military relations. 
The dissertation looks at the period between the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the 
expansion of NATO because the analytical focus of the work is on the transition of Eastern 
European states to a model of democratic civilian control not as a single event but as an on-
going process. More practically, it allows comparison despite the fact that the collapse of 
communist authorities took place at different times in the states under review. 
Somewhat in contrast with conventional wisdom, the work proceeds from the 
understanding that the problems of transforming civil-military relations in the countries under 
1 For the sake of convenience, in this work the term Eastern European states is used 
when referring to all the states in the thesis; Central European states when referring to 
Poland and Hungary; and, former Soviet Union states when referring to Russia and Ukraine. 
2 Where necessary for explanatory purposes or in order to demonstrate particular 
trends, events prior to July 1991 and after March 1999 will be discussed. In general, 
however, every effort will be made to focus on the time period noted. 
3 Christopher Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A 
Framework for Tackling the Problem" NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 1997). 
review were very similar. In order to build democratic civilian control all the states under 
review have had to: 
1 I reform their obsolete armed forces, bringing them into line with the new economic 
and strategic realities of the post-Cold War world; 
2 
21 create new bureaucratic structures for their defence establishments in which civilians 
played the key policy-making roles; and, 
3/ strengthen political institutions tasked with oversight of the armed forces. 
Accordingly, the dissertation addresses each of these tasks in its three main chapters: 
Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform; Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence; 
and, Agencies of Civilian Oversight. 
These interconnected indicators of the state of civil-military relations were chosen 
because: first, they shift the analytical focus of the work to the civilian side of the civil-military 
equation which seems to be the main problem in the region; second, shifting the analytical 
focus adds to the originality of the work because traditionally studies of civil-military relations 
focus on the military; and, third, because taken together they are sufficient to draw 
generalised conclusions. 
A main reason for comparing these countries in particular is that they are emblematic 
of an emerging dichotomy in Europe between "outsiders" and "insiders".4 On the one hand 
are two countries- Poland and Hungary- which are returning to the "European fold" and 
whose comparatively successful transformations have been supported by the expansion of 
NATO and the prospect of inclusion in the European Union. On the other hand are two 
countries- Russia and Ukraine- whose problematic transformations have been 
complicated by NATO expansion and which seemed to be growing more and more distant 
from the "New Europe" by the end of the 1990s. 
The central argument of the work is that variation in the state of civil-military relations 
among the states under review is explained by the interaction of three factors. 
First, in Poland and Hungary the external incentives to reform were mainly positive. 
Establishing democratic control was intimately linked with their obtaining membership of 
NATO which, in turn, was connected to their aspirations to join the European Union. In 
Russia, on the other hand, the external incentives to reform were mostly negative. NATO 
membership was not a Russian goal in the period under review and thus meeting its 
4 These terms are taken from John Lowenhardt, Margot Light and Stephen White's 
research project entitled The Outsiders: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the New 
Europe (project grant L213252007) which is part of the ESRC's "One Europe or Several" 
Programme. 
3 
admission criterion was not a stimulus for change; on the contrary, the legacy of rivalry and 
confrontation with the West continued to inform the thinking of military policy-makers.5 
Ukraine's external incentives to reform were more neutral: building good relations with NATO 
was a main goal, but the nature of Ukrainian domestic politics constrained the capacity of 
policy-makers to openly seek membership. 
Second, the attitude of the political and military elite in Poland and Hungary was more 
open to the adoption of new norms of civil-military relations than was that of the elite in 
Russia and Ukraine. The Polish and Hungarian elite was more unified, had a stronger sense 
of a "return to Europe", was prone to emotional backlash against anything cognitively 
socialist, and desired to protect themselves from a resurgence of Russian influence. The 
Russian and Ukrainian elite was more fractured, suffered less emotional backlash against 
past practices, was not part of a "return to Europe", and, in Russia, had pretensions to great 
power status. 
Third, in Poland and Hungary the state of the polity and economy presented a less 
significant internal constraint on reform because the economic downturn at the beginning of 
transition was not as long or as pronounced as it was in Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, due 
to the greater degree of militarisation in the Soviet Union the problems of military 
transformation were of a greater magnitude 
THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL-MILITARY REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The context of the reform of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe differs from that of 
previous transformative waves such as in Latin America and Southern Europe. There are 
specificities of post-communist transition which make the transformation of civil-military 
relations in Eastern Europe different, including: its non-military and non-violent nature; 
the (despite appearances) non-revolutionary way in which the old regimes collapsed; the 
simultaneity and inter-connectedness of reform tasks which overcrowded the transitional 
agenda; and, the salient fact that, while not of a democratic type, civilian control of the armed 
forces was a characteristic feature of the old political order. 
The peaceful transition. The collapse of socialism in the states under review was 
relatively peaceful. The Polish and Hungarian armed forces neither tried to bring about the 
downfall of the old regime nor attempted to reverse its decline by putting down the reformist 
5 NATO and the European Union were not the only significant external actors for the 
Russian Federation. India, China, other former Soviet republics, and Soviet partners in the 
Middle East such as Iran and Iraq also impacted on their policy outlook. For reasons of 
brevity and clarity, however, the dissertation looks only at the Russia-NATO axis. 
4 
movements; they were either passive observers of events or played an instrumental role in 
negotiating communist retreat from power rather than being players in their own right. 6 
The Soviet military was more involved in the collapse of the old regime. Yet despite 
its participation in the August Putsch of 1991, it too tended toward a position of neutrality 
between opposing civilian actors who sought to use the military for their own ends. Although 
some of the coup leaders were prominent military men, including the minister of defence, 
Marshal Dmitri Yazov, ultimately the coup failed because the bulk of the army was unwilling 
to use force to prop up the failing Soviet state while a few military units appeared ready to 
oppose the putsch. 7 
Whatever the reason for restraint, the passivity of the armed forces was a 
characteristic feature of civil-military relations in post-communist transition. Transition theory 
suggests, however, that until 1989, regime change tended to coincide with defeat in war or 
bloody popular revolution. 8 The trauma of regime change, in turn, is thought to have been a 
force which generated powerful political and institutional transformative efforts. In the 
peaceful Eastern European transition, however, regime change was less traumatic and 
consequently evinced less energetic transformative drives. In short, the passivity of the 
military provoked a lesser sense of urgency on the part of new leaders for institutional 
innovation, particularly in the sphere of civil-military relations. Indeed, as Donnelly wrote "In 
many countries the problem is not appreciated, or its extent and complexity are not 
acknowledged. Sometimes it is denied that a problem even exists."9 
The non-revolutionary revolution. A second characteristic feature of post-
communist transition was its non-revolutionary nature.10 Strictly speaking, a revolution 
6 For an elaboration of the role of the armed forces in the collapse of the communist 
regimes in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, see Zoltan Barany, "East European 
Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond" East European Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 
1992), pp. 1-30. 
7 These included mainly the air forces under Marshal Shaposhnikov and the airborne 
forces under General Grachev. See: John W. Leppingwell, "Soviet Civil-Military Relations 
and the August Coup" World Politics (July 1992), pp. 539-572. 
8 Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986, passim. 
9 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
10 Timothy Garton Ash referred to it as "Refolution"; a term which was meant to refer 
to a process of political, economic and social changes that combines elements of structural 
reform and revolution. In essence, this means that the new regime did not totally destroy the 
5 
should have a target regime which defends itself and an organised counter-elite which 
opposes it. In the aftermath of revolt, the old regime is thoroughly discredited and the 
legitimacy of the revolutionary agenda is to a large extent signalled by its victory. Such was 
not the case in Eastern Europe. It is difficult to say that the almost completely unexpected 
collapse of communism- particularly in the USSR -was a result of the organised efforts of 
an internal actor; rather "The spectacular if short-lived popular mobilisation of the last months 
of 1989 and the first months of 1990 followed and confirmed the self-abandonment of the 
ruling powers, rather than being the cause of their resignation." 11 
In the absence of an organised, victorious counter-elite with a dominant political 
agenda, the result in Eastern Europe was political confusion. The old regime was dead, but 
who killed it and where to go from there was a matter of debate. Hence, transition was 
characterised by sharp political conflict amongst diffuse actors. In such a context, where the 
shape of the new system and the institutional patterns it would adopt were not agreed, the 
reform of civil-military relations was further delayed and complicated. 
Simultaneous, Massive Change. The sheer scope of the transformative agenda 
also distinguished post-communist transition. The new democratic states of Eastern Europe 
inherited a plethora of problems - dysfunctional economies and polities, weak civil societies, 
etc. Amongst the various reform tasks, incompatibilities and unwanted interactions inevitably 
occurred such as, for example, between liberalisation in the political sphere and economic 
reform. Conflicts over the speed and sequencing of reforms could not easily be resolved in a 
situation of sharp political struggle. A big problem was that no single actor was sufficiently 
powerful to impose its own agenda. Consequently, though it may have made sense to 
pursue economic reform before political reform or vice versa, in practice Eastern European 
elites did not have this luxury; all reforms were simultaneous, interacted with each other, and 
in some cases cancelled progress altogether. Military reform, for example, was an early 
casualty in the confrontation between presidents and parliaments for control of the defence 
establishment in all the states under review except Hungary. 
The extreme tightening of military budgets in Eastern Europe was also different from 
transitions elsewhere and greatly complicated reform. Managing comprehensive, well-
old system; rather, it is based on the old system- both in terms of structure and personnel. 
See: Timothy Garton Ash, "Refolution: The Springtime of Two Nations", New York Review of 
Books, 15 June 1989, pp. 3-10. 
11 Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-
Communist Societies: Building the Ship at Sea, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, pp. 7-8. 
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thought-out military reform in conjunction with severe budgetary restraint proved fiendishly 
difficult. Indeed, in Russia and Ukraine the tight fiscal straitjacket on spending caused by 
economic collapse all but completely derailed military reforms and radicalised increasingly 
shambolic, resentful and alienated armed forces. In Central Europe, balancing military 
reform with economic reform was somewhat more manageable due to better economic 
conditions than was the case in Russia and Ukraine. 
The legacy of "communist" civil-military relations. Though it was not a liberal-
democratic type of civil-military relations, communist armies were under firm civilian control. 
Zoltan Barany claims that the practice of civil-military relations during four decades of 
communism in Central Europe points to "periodic meddling by the armed forces in politics"12 , 
but most authors conclude that civilian control was secure throughout Eastern Europe and 
that communist armed forces were loyal to the established social order. Thus, in Eastern 
Europe, transition did not entail a military "return to barracks" because the military had never 
left the barracks. The problem was that communist armies were subordinated not to the 
state per se but to the national communist parties and by extension to the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Nearly all of the officer corps in Eastern European armies were 
communist party or communist youth league members; Party membership was a 
prerequisite for promotion and various inducements were employed to compel officers to 
identify their well-being with that of the regime. 
The effect of past politicization on reform of the military was extensive. Civil-military 
relations in transition were permeated by mutual mistrust: an emotional backlash by the 
military against politicisation engendered suspicion of the motives of civilian authorities to 
introduce civilians in defence 13; while especially in Central Europe where the new elite were 
often former dissidents, there was a tendency to mistrust the military because of its 
perceived close connection with the old regime. 
Another way in which the past system impacted on the transitional period was in the 
distinct lack of civilians qualified in security and defence. In the Soviet system the 
compartmentalisation of civilian and military tasks had the effect of concentrating nearly all 
12 Zoltan Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990 : The Case of 
Hungary, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 147. 
13 Dale Herspring, '"Refolution' in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak and 
Hungarian Militaries" European Security, Vol. 3, No.4 (Winter 1994), pp. 664-690 (esp. Note 
6); and, Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army After 
Communism, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 82. 
7 
military/strategic experts in the general staff 4 and military colleges of the armed forces. As a 
result, Soviet-type states produced very few civilian experts on defence matters since civilian 
educational institutions were not designed for such work. 
CENTRAL ISSUES OF CIVIL-MILITARY REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 
The imperative of civil-military reform in Eastern Europe stemmed from a number of main 
issues. One of the main areas of concern was the problem of defence reform. James Sherr 
made the trenchant point that: 
... if armed forces are to be 'tools of policy', then they must be subservient to 
the country's political authorities. But in itself such subservience does not 
guarantee that armed forces will be able to fulfil the roles assigned and 
entrusted to them. For this they must be effective, and a military 
establishment controlled without understanding, knowledge and judgement 
will prove to be as much of a threat to national security as a military 
establishment which answers only to itself. 15 
In other words, armed forces must be effective and effectively managed. It is no good 
saying "we have good civil-military relations" if infantry soldiers are not trained to fight, if pilots 
do not fly, if sailors do not sail, if the equipment is obsolete and badly maintained, if the living 
conditions for soldiers and their families are squalid, and so on. 
The second area of concern was the manner in which the ministry of defence was 
organized and manned. Military policy, as any policy, has three stages: policy design, 
followed by preparation, and then action. Ultimately, civilian politicians are accountable for 
policy outcomes and so the onus for decision-making has to be theirs. Execution is the 
responsibility of the military professional. But the preparation of plans and the long-term 
support for their execution is a mixed civilian-military responsibility, and that should take 
place in an integrated ministry of defence. In effect, relations between civilians and the 
military become more important as work on security matters moves from general to 
executive to administrative policy and then to action: As the saying goes, the "devil is in the 
details" and, indeed, it is at this level that friction between military and civilian is most 
14 Throughout the paper, for the sake of convenience, the term "general staff" is used 
although national practice may be to refer to the institution by another term, such as "defence 
staff' or "joint staff". Unless otherwise indicated, the term refers to the general staff of the 
armed forces as a whole, not to service staffs such as the army, in particular. Similarly, 
"chief of general staff" is used generally though national practice might be to have a different 
title, such as "chief of defence staff". 
15 James Sherr, "Civil-democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces: To What End? 
By What Means?", in David Betz and John Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Post-
Communist Europe, London & Portland, OR: Fran Cass, 2001, p. 65. 
8 
apparent. This points to the problem discovered by Eastern European civilian and military 
authorities that practising democratic civil-military relations involves a lot more than having a 
civilian minister of defence but also having a considerable number of civilian experts within 
the ministry. In the states in the study this was a grave problem because civilians were 
never trained in defence and security issues; this fact alone represented one of the main 
barriers to democratizing civil-military relations. 
The third area of concern was the institutional capacity of civilian agencies outside of 
the ministry of defence to provide effective oversight of the armed forces. In the Eastern 
Europe these institutions were comparatively inexperienced and ineffective. Parliamentary 
control of the military budget and of its implementation, for example, is a function of 
government of which the post-communist states had no previous experience whatsoever. 
For such control to be effective, for members of parliamentary defence committees to be 
capable of making a balanced contribution to discussions on defence matters, parliaments 
needed to have access to defence and security expertise. Procedures of consultation had to 
be established between parliamentary committees, research institutions, departments of the 
ministries of defence and the government. All of this proved difficult indeed. 
In short, parliamentary oversight was ineffective, with defence committees simply too 
overburdened with responsibilities to do their job effectively and often filled with politicians 
who had no experience with, or interest in, military issues. Moreover, in many cases they 
were actively shut out of any role in the exercise of oversight by a powerful presidency 
jealously guarding its prerogatives in defence. 
Overall, it can be said that the problem of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe 
was not a matter of preventing direct military intervention in politics; rather it was a problem 
of how democratically-elected civilians could exercise efficient management, direction and 
oversight of their armed forces. In this respect, as Donnelly noted, " ... there is not a single 
Central and East European country which has a civil-military relationship which it can 
consider satisfactory ... "16 Nevertheless, two broad patterns are evident in how civil-military 
reform has progressed in Eastern Europe. In Poland and Hungary, there has been a slow, 
difficult and still incomplete process of adopting new norms of civil-military relations which 
has culminated in their admission to NATO. In Ukraine and Russia there has been a 
stagnation of liberal-democratic reform and even a regression from the admittedly 
undemocratic, but stable, norm of civilian control which existed under the old system. 
16 Christopher Donnelly, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Democracies", in Betz 
and Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State ... , p. 9. 
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Chapter 1: Approaches to Civil-Military Relations 
In the case of post-communist transition, where "little or nothing in the theories of academic 
literature provides a guidebook for the re-making of military-civilian relations"17, it pays to be 
wary of theory. Bearing this in mind, this section aims to summarise the main theories 
which inform the work and draw out recurrent themes and variables which appear to be 
relevant to the somewhat un-theorised case of post-communist civil-military relations. 
CONCEPTUALISINGCIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS:AUTONOMYANDINSTRUMENTALITY 
Armies in all societies exert political influence; they are the ultimate defenders and symbols 
of state sovereignty, they embody the virtues of discipline, honour and patriotism and, 
uniquely in most states, they possess arms and the means to employ them effectively. 
Given their monopoly over the use of force, armies have always represented a latent threat to 
the societies they are raised to preserve. Such is the civil-military dilemma: Who will guard 
the guardians? Or, as Samuel Finer put it in The Man on Horseback: 
Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask 
why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the 
military vis-a-vis other civilian groupings are overwhelming. The military 
possess vastly superior organisation. And they possess arms.18 
Civil-military relations is a very old subject about which many ancient authors have written. 
The great Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu, for example, said more than two millennia 
ago: "Generals are assistants of the nation ... when their assistance is complete, the country 
is strong. When their assistance is defective, the country is weak"19 ; and "the ordinary rule 
for use of military force is for the military command to receive the orders from the civilian 
authorities, then to gather and mass the troops, quartering them together."20 
Niccolo Machiavelli was another important figure in conceptualising civil-military 
17 Daniel Nelson,"Civil Armies, Civil Societies and NATO's Enlargement", Armed 
Forces and Society, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Fall 1998), p. 137. 
18 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd 
Edition, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976, p. 4. 
19 Sun Tzu (Thomas Cleary trans.), The Art of War, Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, 1998, p. 78. 
20 Ibid., p. 114. Imperial Chinese civil-military relations broadly approximated the 
liberal model of civilian control: "rule by the pen [the civilian bureaucracy] rather than the 
sword formed the ideal, if not always the reality of Confucian political reality." See Claude E. 
Welch, "Civil-Military Relations: Perspectives From the Third World", Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 11, No.2 (Winter 1985), p. 186. 
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relations. He was the first to grasp the competitive nature of the emerging state system and 
underscore the relationship between political and military power in the state saying that "the 
chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good 
arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that 
where they are well armed they have good laws.21 
By far the most important thinker on civil-military relations, however, was the 19th 
Century Prussian luminary Carl von Clausewitz. His dictum, "War is nothing but a 
continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means'122 , is the well-spring for 
most of civil-military relations theory. Clausewitz explained that war was both autonomous 
(i.e., a unique activity with its own logic and methods) and instrumental (i.e., an activity 
subordinate to the policy which determines its ultimate ends): "Is not War merely another 
kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but 
its logic is not peculiar to itself."23 If war is both autonomous and instrumental, the same can 
be said of warriors: military officers must possess autonomy in the sense that they be 
permitted to perfect their martial expertise independently of civilian interference; but they 
remain instrumental in the sense that the determination of the ends to which their expertise is 
employed is not within their remit. On this point Clausewitz was clear: 
... as Wars are in reality, they are, as we before said, only the expressions or 
manifestations of policy itself. The subordination of the political point of view 
to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared 
the War; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the 
reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, 
therefore, the only thing which is possible.24 
Clausewitz's thoughts on the nature of war, its duality and the role of the warrior in society 
are indispensable in later theories of civil-military relations. As Samuel Huntington wrote, 
given an understanding of these concepts "all the other aspects of [military] professionalism 
must follow."25 
21 Niccolo Machiavelli (W.K. Marriott trans.), The Prince, London: E.P. Dutton and 
Co., 1920, p. 97. 
22 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 402. 
23 Idem. Clausewitz also wrote: "If in the next place, we keep once more to the pure 
conception of War, then we must f!,ay that the political object lies out of its province ... " (Ibid., 
pp. 122-123). 
24 Ibid., p. 405 
25 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 56. 
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THE LIBERAL MODEL OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Although it has been forty years since they were published, Huntington's The Soldier and the 
State, and Morris Janowitz' The Professional Soldier still represent the most theoretically 
exhaustive treatments of the liberal model of civil-military relations. At its core, Huntington's 
thesis contends that civilian control all boils down to one prime essential: 
... the minimising of military power. Objective civilian control achieves this 
reduction by professionalising the military, by rendering them politically sterile 
and neutral. This produces the lowest possible level of military political power 
with respect to all civilian groups. At the same time it preserves that essential 
element of power which is necessary for the existence of a military 
profession. A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the 
wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the 
state. In effect, this sets definite limits to military political power without 
reference to the distribution of political power among the various civilian 
groups. 26 
Huntington claimed that there were two ways in which the civilian leadership could maintain 
control over the armed forces: objective or subjective control. According to Huntington, "the 
essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military 
professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent 
military sphere.'m Objective and subjective civilian control are thus antithetical to one 
another; the former achieves its objectives by "militarising the military", making them the tool 
of the state; the latter achieves its objectives by "civilianising the military", making them the 
mirror of the state.28 Objective civilian control, it is argued, is the optimal model of civil-
military relations because it simultaneously maximises military power and minimises military 
political involvement while subjective control, though it can also be quite effective, is sub-
optimal because it impedes military efficiency, and it is characteristic of communist civil-
military relations. 29 
Morris Janowitz's sociological portrait of the American officer corps in The 
26 Ibid., p. 84. 
27 Ibid., p. 83. 
28 Idem. 
29 Ibid., pp. 83-85. Some analysts of Soviet civil-military relations would have strongly 
disagreed with Huntington on this point. Timothy Colton argued quite the opposite: "On 
balance, the Main Political Administration [of the Soviet army] has probably made a positive 
contribution to military efficiency.'' See, Colton, "A Participatory Model", in Dale R. Herspring 
and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1978, p. 59. 
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Professional Soldier might be read as a rejection of Huntington's thesis. He thought that war 
was so altered by the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons that armed forces had 
become more police-like than military. This radical adaptation of the military profession to 
what he called a "constabulary force" was said to occur when "it is continuously prepared to 
act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather 
than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture."30 A constabulary 
army, however, by definition, makes political decisions. Therefore, contrary to Huntington's 
view, Janowitz put forth that civilian control calls for the imposition of civilian oversight at 
various levels of military activities rather than the explicit recognition of an autonomous 
military sphere.31 
In the end, however, Janowitz and Huntington are not that far apart. Ultimately, 
political control, in Janowitz's model hinges on the answer to the question why do officers 
fight. .. 
The constabulary force is designed to be compatible with the traditional goals 
of democratic political control. The constabulary officer performs his duties, 
which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-
esteem and moral worth.32 
Thus Janowitz, like Huntington, saw professionalism as the main pillar of civilian control, 
though he added the element of common values between military and society to the liberal 
concept of civil-military relations. 
Limitations of the Liberal Model. Rebecca Schiff in elaborating her "concordance" 
model of civil-military relations noted a longstanding criticism of the liberal model: the 
Huntingtonian standard of military professionalism assumed too much conflict and 
necessitated too much separation between civilian and military authorities. In her view, civil-
military institutional separation was not the only possible form of stable civilian-dominated, 
civil-military relations which may involve institutional separation, integration of elites, or a 
variety of other forms. 33 
30 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe, 
IL: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, p. 418. 
31 Specifically, he points to three "major devices" of control: civilian budgetary control, 
civilian discretion on the allocation of military roles and responsibilities, and the provision of 
independent (non-military) advice to the executive on security aspects of international 
relations. Ibid., pp. 363-366. 
32 Ibid., p. 440. 
33 Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of 
Concordance", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7-24. Schiff argued 
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Earlier, but in a similar vein, William Odom made a salient observation about the 
practical limitations of the professional ethic as an explanatory factor in the neutralization of 
the military's political influence, noting that at the top level of military management the line 
between a political decision and a military one is ambiguous: 
In truth, almost any decision within the military has domestic political 
implications; deep commitment to the most admirable social ethic may at 
times soften or alter those implications, but it will not remove them. Thus, 
Huntington's concept of a professional military ethic tends to obscure the fact 
that an apolitical military establishment is a mythical convention concocted in 
the parochial minds of Europeans and later embraced in the United States.34 
Samuel Finer, in his work The Man on Horseback, was a prominent skeptic. He pointed out 
three ways in which professionalism, in fact, could thrust the military into collision with civilian 
authorities: 
1 I The military may see themselves as the servant of the state rather than of the 
government in power "which may lead them to contrast the national community as a 
continuing corporation with the temporary incumbents in office."35 
21 The armed forces may fall prey to "military syndicalism", the idea that as specialists 
only they are qualified to make decisions about defence. 36 
3/ The military may object to being used for the "sordid" domestic purposes of the 
civilian leadership because it sees itself as the guarantor of the nation's external 
security, not as a body of heavily-armed policemen.37 
Professionalism could not be, therefore, the principal force inhibiting military intervention in 
politics. 
that: "under certain cultural conditions, civilian institutions or the very idea of 'civil' may be 
inappropriate. Therefore, the specific type of civil-military relationship adopted is less 
important than the ability of the three partners [military, political elite and society] involved to 
agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-
making process, recruitment method and military style." (pp. 7-8) 
34 William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique", in Dale R. Herspring 
and Ivan Volgyes (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1978, pp. 35. 
35 Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 22-23. He quotes as an example General 
MacArthur who said in 1952: "I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and 
dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty 
to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government 
rather than to the country and its constitution which they are sworn to defend." (p. 23.) 
36 Ibid., p. 23-24. 
37 Ibid., p. 23-24. 
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN (NON-POST-COMMUNIST) TRANSITION 
In the 1980s a few analysts began to study the process of military withdrawal from politics as 
military regimes in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Latin and South America began slowly to give up 
rule to civilian politicians. The literature they generated contains some useful insights into 
how civilian control is consolidated in formerly authoritarian states which has some 
relevance to post-communism. An excellent example of this type of work was Alfred 
Stepan's study of civil-military relations in Latin America, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil 
and the Southern Cone. He laid out a useful framework for how civil-military relations should 
work in a democratising state. Of central importance in this framework was the definition of 
three "arenas" in which military politics takes place: 
1/ civil society, where "manifold social movements ... and civic organisations ... 
attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can 
express themselves and advance their interests ... "38 ; 
2/ political society, where the "polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation 
to gain control over public power and the state apparatus", which encompasses 
political parties, political leadership, intra-party alliances and legislatures, "through 
which civil society can constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic 
government. .. "39 ; and, 
3/ the state, the "continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that 
attempts not only to manage the state apparatus but to structure relations between 
civil and public power and to structure many crucial relationships within civil and 
political society."40 
Within the scope of civil society, he wrote, it is extremely important to forge new "political 
institutions that have increased strength, autonomy, and legitimacy."41 Civil society must 
work toward building at least a few civilian institutes as repositories of capable, independent 
advice to government on defence matters so that there is 
... a cadre of citizens who are masters in their knowledge of the force 
structure, organisational style, budgetary issues, doctrinal questions and the 
specific details of weapons systems ... [they are] indispensable for the 
38 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Publishers, 1988, p. 3. 
39 Idem. 
40 Ibid., p. 4. 
41 Ibid., pp. 128-129. 
fulfilment of the military and intelligence oversight functions of political society, 
especially in the legislative branch.42 
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Political society must have a "deliberate strategy for the empowerment of legislatures so that 
they are in a position to carry out their military and intelligence oversight functions in a 
mature, democratic fashion."43 Legislatures should have permanently standing committees 
devoted to the routine (not ad hoc) oversight of the army and these committees must be 
staffed by a permanent body of professional advisors. In this way mutual fears and 
ignorance of each other will be minimised (i.e., ad hoc commissions are inherently 
adversarial while standing committees are more collegial). 44 
The state must limit the scope of military decision-making to only the military sphere. 
If the military and the state disagree on their conception of democracy and the legitimate role 
of the military in it, then the new regime must either impose its view, or abdicate certain 
areas of government to the military. If it takes the latter option, it will have undermined its 
legitimacy and, therefore, its long-term viability. 
Negotiation of the scope of the military's role in politics in a new democracy requires 
a careful, but forceful executive who plays the role of persuader and directs his attention to 
building "professional, not personal, allies within the military."45 
A passive executive who abdicates responsibility would probably mean that 
any effort to 're-professionalise' the military would be militarily led. A purely 
negative executive, who devotes all his efforts to eliminating military 
prerogatives but neglects to play a leadership role in attempting to formulate 
and implement an alternative model of civil-military relations would probably 
be locked in dangerous conflicts with the military. An executive who is 
positively involved in forging a new role for the military that narrows their 
involvement in state regulation of conflict, builds effective procedures for 
civilian control, seeks to increase military professional capacities and lessens 
the risks -for the polity and for the military - of further military intervention is 
what the theory and practice of democratisation would seem to indicate.46 
Stepan also wrote that the leadership of the national security councils which serve as fora for 
high-level discussion of security and defence matters must be civilian: "The very point is that 
such a council be democratically controlled by civilians, and that the military participate as 
42 Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
43 Ibid., p. 133. 
44 Idem. 
45 Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
46 Ibid., p. 139. 
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advisors to the civilian leadership."47 Building effective civilian control of the military entails 
efforts by the civil and political societies as well as the new state to empower themselves to 
increase their own capacity for control; it is not merely a matter of the military withdrawing 
from politics, civilians must step into leadership roles and equip themselves with the 
knowledge and expertise necessary to oversee and monitor the military establishment. 
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
With relatively few exceptions, after Huntington and Janowitz the literature on civil-military 
relations was static. For the most part, debate tended to be concentrated so much on solving 
or preventing military coups that discourse on civil-military relations degenerated to a state 
which Bacevich characterised as "No coup? No problem, and so no further discussion is 
required."48 This concentration on coups, admittedly an important problem, tended to overlook 
the other, more common, problems in civil-military relations which confronted all states, even 
democratic ones. In the 1990s, however, there was somewhat of a renaissance in the field 
caused in no small part by the perceived need in the West to assist the democratisation of 
post-communist Eastern Europe. 
As Eastern European elites began to try to reform their civil-military relations they 
sought to answer some fundamental questions: How exactly is the military controlled by civil 
authorities in a democracy? What specific policies and structures lead to civilian control? 
What kind of civil-military relations best serve democracy in the long-run? What exactly is 
democratic civil-military relations? 
There are two approaches to answering this question. First, there are the official 
versions of international organisations such as the OSCE and NATO which are rather general 
and vague. Second, there is a small but growing body of literature which is searching for a 
more detailed resolution of the problem. 
The OSCE, NATO and Civil-Military Relations. All the countries under review are 
parties to the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security which states 
clearly that the participating nations bind themselves to an explicitly democratic regime of civil-
military relations. The document calls for the participating states to: establish clear legal and 
constitutional lines of legitimate civilian authority over the armed forces; clearly define the 
responsibilities and authority of the main players in defence, to provide legislative oversight of 
47 lbid.,p.141 
48 A.J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era", National 
Interest 48 (Summer 1997), p. 17. 
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the armed forces; ensure transparency in decision-making such that the public has access to 
information on the activities of the military; and, foster military political neutrality.49 
NATO planners faced a difficult task in defining explicitly the specific pattern of civilian 
control which would form a fundamental part of the accession criteria because there is great 
variation among the member states in how exactly civilian control is instituted. Eventually, 
NATO did set out the kind of civil-military relationship which it expected from aspiring 
members. 5° States seeking to join the alliance were expected to implement both military and 
non-military reforms, while states not seeking membership at the time, as well as those to 
whom NATO membership would not be extended, were also encouraged to undertake similar 
reforms in the context of the Partnership for Peace Programme. 
In terms of political criteria, NATO's accession requirements included: a demonstrated 
commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic 
disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means ... ; a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by 
economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility; appropriate democratic and 
civilian control of the defence forces; and, a commitment to ensure that adequate resources 
are devoted to achieving the obligations described in section A [political expectations of new 
members] and C [military expectations of new members]. 51 
In other words, new members were required not only to adopt the norms of NATO as 
a defensive politico-military alliance but, more importantly, they were expected to subscribe to 
Western political, social, and economic values- which entailed the implementation of 
democratic civil-military relations. 
Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations. In the mid to late 1990s a few 
analysts began to tackle the issue of democratic civil-military relations more concretely. A 
general consensus emerged among specialists that certain features were distinctive of civil-
military relations in democratic states. These features include: 
1 I A civilian minister of defence. "It is the function of knowledgeable civilians to represent 
the military in political disputes."52 The role of the military is to advise civilians on 
49 OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, Chapter VII, 
Paras. 20-23. 
50 Study on NATO Enlargement, (Brussels: NATO Integrated Data Service, 
September 1995), Chapter 5, Parts A-D, Sections 68-78. 
51 Ibid., Chapter 5, Part B, Section 72. 
52 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
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defence issues and to voice the needs of the military in government, not to make 
policy - only elected civilians have that right. Society needs to be protected from overt 
military involvement in politics; the military, at the same time, needs to be protected 
from the efforts of politicians to employ them in partisan disputes. The minister of 
defence and the civilian staff of his department are a crucial buffer between the armed 
forces and society which works to the advantage of both sides. 
21 Clear and unambiguous lines of legitimate authority. It is essential that the military 
should have no doubt as to what constitutes legal authority and to whom they are 
responsible. Civilian control requires "a constitutional and legislative structure with 
clearly defined responsibilities and appropriate checks and balances among state 
institutions."53 
3/ Integrated civilian-military ministries of defence. If there are no civilian experts with 
managerial roles in defence, then the military is able to dominate defence policy 
formulation because there is no other expert voice on military matters. Moreover, the 
ability of civilian authorities to effectively monitor the activities of the armed forces will 
be highly limited. "If all advisors to defence policy-makers are military, and policy-
makers are ignorant of military realities, then the army, not the government, is 
controlling defence policy."54 
4/ Parliamentary role in the oversight of defence. Legislatures must exercise their 
authority over the armed forces through defence and budgetary committees at least. 
Moreover, parliamentary oversight of security policy and military spending must be 
"substantive and detailed, not just perfunctory. A parliament which is limited, or which 
limits itself through lack of interest, to a rubber-stamp role in the oversight of defence 
is a clear indication of poor civilian control."55 
51 Non-partisan armed forces. That the military must be sheltered from political abuse is 
obvious. The army is the agent of the elected government, whatever party might form 
it. Nor should military officers be allowed to use their official position to support any 
particular party or to try to influence the votes of their subordinates. Optimally, 
according to one author "the soldier should be a citizen wearing a uniform and, as 
53 Marco Carnovale, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," NATO Review (March 1997), pp. 32-35. 
54 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
55 Carnovale, p. 33. 
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such, an organic part of democratic politicallife."56 
6/ Public capacity for informed debate on defence matters. A final and salient feature of 
democratic civilian control is the role played by civilian experts on defence in media, 
government, academia, political parties and by independent sources of advice such as 
research institutes. Without public awareness of defence issues effective civilian 
control is difficult to maintain. There is no interest for parliamentarians if the electorate 
is not interested in civilian oversight. "Democratic control brings a responsibility for the 
military to educate civilians in the government, parliament and media on military 
affairs, and it is incumbent on civilian military officials to be prepared to learn, so that 
civilian and military can collaborate effectively."57 
On a more abstract level, theorists have started to look for a wholly new model of democratic 
civil-military relations. These theorists are all intellectually grounded in the liberal model of 
civil-military relations but seek to address the limitations noted above. The various 
approaches include: a model of civil-military relations based on the problem of political 
agency58 ; a model of shared military-civilian responsibility59 ; and, a "civil army" model based 
on the civil societies literature. 60 
Peter Feaver argued that there are two fundamental and conflicting principles which 
underlie all problems in civil-military relations. The first principle is that nearly all societies 
need militaries in order to defend themselves against threats from the outside or to provide a 
deterrent against aggression, but armed forces can also threaten the society they were raised 
to protect. From this first principle, Feaver argued that a number of features of an ideal-type 
military could be deduced: "it is tasked with defending the body politic; it is ready for extreme 
emergencies or for lesser tasks as required; and it is sufficiently strong and properly oriented 
56 Idem. 
57 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
58 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the 
Question of Civilian Control", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 
149-178. 
59 Douglas Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", Armed Forces and 
Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 7-26; Bland, "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-
Military Relations", European Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 25-43; and, Bland, 
"Discovering Westminster: The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe", 
in D. Haglund, S. McFarland, and J. Sokolski, eds., NATO's Eastern Dilemmas, Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994. 
60 Nelson, "Civil Armies, Civil Societies ... " 
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to meet the peculiar threats facing that particular society."61 
The second basic principle which Feaver noted was that "just as the military must 
protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy the 
society it is intended to protect."62 From this second principle several other features of an 
ideal-type military were suggested: "it is subordinate to the political authority of the state; while 
it should be large enough to protect against threats, its size and draw on society's resources 
must be bounded."63 
In democratic states the over-arching norm of civil-military relations is quite simple: the 
prerogatives of the civilian authority supercede those of the military in every case. As Feaver 
described it, the problem of civil-military relations is an extension of the problem of political 
agency. Society designates through the electoral process political agents who, in turn, control 
designated military agents. It follows that regardless of how strong the military might be, 
civilians remain the political masters: 
In the civil-military context, this means that the military may be best able to 
identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat for a given level 
of risk, but only the civilian can set the acceptable level of risk for society ... 
The military quantifies the risk, the civilian judges it. Regardless of how 
superior the military view of the situation may be, the civilian view trumps it. 54 
Douglas Bland's "unified theory of civil-military relations" is somewhat more nuanced than 
Feaver's though the two are not incompatible. Bland suggested that there are four problems 
of civil-military relations. The first- because it is the most obvious - is the problem of 
praetorian ism, or military coups. He proposed, however, that usually democracies need to 
concentrate on the problem of effective management of the military rather than on curbing its 
potential to intervene in politics. The second problem is ensuring that the armed forces 
behave in ways that safeguard the state without bringing harm -through indiscipline, 
misadventure, or the exaggeration of threats- to government or citizens. 55 
These two problems closely approximate Feaver's two principles, but Bland pointed 
out two other problems of civil-military relations. The third problem, which is particular to 
democracies, is that "controlling the armed forces. . . means more than the simple, 
61 Feaver, p. 152. 
62 Idem. 
63 Idem. 
64 Ibid., p. 154. 
65 Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", p. 13. 
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unquestioning obedience of the military to the government of the day because it entails 
protecting the military from politicians who would use their authority over it to enhance 
partisan interests and their own power."66 Finally, he posed the fourth problem as a question: 
"How are ministers to control the armed forces when they (usually) lack the necessary 
knowledge and experience to do this effectively? Furthermore, what real control exists when 
ministers are dependent on the advice and council of the 'trade union of the generals'?"67 
The key to controlling the armed forces in Bland's formulation is through the "sharing 
of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil 
authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military officers 
are responsible and accountable for others."68 The theory rests on two assumptions. The 
first is that the term "civil control" means that outside the defence establishment civilians are 
the only legitimate source for the direction of the military. This suggests that the forum for 
shared responsibilities is only within the defence establishment and hence it follows that the 
ministry of defence should be an integrated military-civilian one while political direction should 
be wholly civilian. The second assumption is that civil control is a dynamic process which is 
susceptible to "changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues and personalities and to the 
stresses of crises and war."69 
Bland's model of civilian control puts a heavy burden on the existence of an integrated 
military-civilian ministry of defence. The central problem of civilian control is what Bland 
called "managing the expert problem", the relationship between the military expert and the 
civilian minister.70 In his view, 
The institution best suited to serve the minister's multifaceted duties is the 
integrated defence ministry. This type of ministry combines the minister's 
office, the civil service bureaucracy, and the military high command and their 
separate but linked responsibilities in one establishment. An effective 
integrated ministry facilitates the exchange of ideas and information between 
these branches and aids in consensus building. 71 
66 Idem. 
67 Idem. 
68 Ibid., p. 9. 
69 Ibid., p. 10. 
70 Bland, "Managing the 'Expert Problem ... " p. 25. In fact, the "expert problem" in 
civil-military relations was a notion of Huntington (Soldier and the State, p. 20) which Bland 
developed further. 
71 Ibid., p. 38. 
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In his "civil armies" model, Nelson pointed out that although armies can never be democratic-
their hierarchies of rank and seniority predetermine a command system, without which 
armies cannot function - neither are they necessarily anti-democratic. He suggested that the 
"democratic quotient of any army is judged by its institutional relationship with civil authority 
and the behavioural conformity of the armed forces to external norms."72 Nelson's proposition 
is fairly straightforward. It says, essentially, that armies in a democracy behave according to 
the rules and norms of the society of which it is a part, i.e., "civilly". This means that: 
Senior officers or defence ministry civilians cannot merely speak the language 
of democracy. A behavioural pattern must develop in which key decisions are 
made through plural and open debate, adherence to broad constitutional 
patterns, responsiveness to public concerns and preferences, and obedience 
to elected civilian authorities.73 
Nelson argued that in the post-communist states there are a number of key "testing grounds" 
of democratic civil-military relations: the articulation of military doctrine, the allocation of 
resources within the army and when army needs are juxtaposed with those of society, the 
degree of criminal activity within the army, the treatment of minority ethnic, religious or cultural 
groups within the army, the treatment of conscripts, the criteria for promotion, dismissal and 
assignment of the army's officers. When there are problems in these areas over a long 
period of time, or transgressions of one or more aspects frequently, there is a clear indication 
that the country's military is not a "civil army".74 
72 Nelson., "Civil Armies ... ", p. 143. 
73 Idem. 
74 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
1.1: Putting it all Together- Indicators of Civil-Military Reform 
in Eastern Europe 
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The study of civil-military relations, like the post-communist states themselves, is in a state of 
transition. The theoretical basis of the field- accepted largely without question throughout the 
Cold War- has been found wanting by scholars looking at the problems of civilian control in 
Eastern Europe. A few authors have begun steps towards a new formulation of civil-military 
relations. Nonetheless, the field remains in flux with the crucial concept of democratic civilian 
control still undefined and a matter of debate. 
The dissertation takes as a starting point the position that the problem in Eastern 
Europe is not how to prevent the direct intervention of the armed forces in civilian political life; 
rather, it is a question of how armed forces in a democratising state can be effectively 
managed in ways that do not undermine the wider on-going political, economic and social 
transition. That is to say, the problems of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe are largely 
problems of sound public administration and may be best approached from a public 
administration perspective focussed on management structures and the role of civilians in 
them. 
Another basic starting point is that, as Donnelly has written, "democratic control is a 
two-way process between army and society, not one where politicians simply dictate to 
soldiers."75 Either directly or indirectly the literature on democratic civil-military relations points 
to the crucial role of civilians in this process. It cannot be said that civilian control exists 
simply because the state leadership is civilian. It is incumbent on the civilians to actually 
educate themselves in defence issues if they are to really have control of defence policy. 
Richard Kohn wrote that "there exists no set of standards by which to evaluate civilian 
control".76 We see, however, from the various theories and descriptions of democratic civil-
military relations that this is not exactly true. The problem is that there are no commonly 
accepted standards from the multitude of approaches. The present work takes the view that 
the concept of civilian control can be disaggregated into three interrelated themes each 
concentrated on critical civilian responsibilities: 
1 I civilian control requires that civilians take responsibility for directing military policy 
decisions; 
75 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
76 Richard H. Kohn, "How Democracies Control the Military", The Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 4 (October 1997), p. 141. 
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21 civilians must actively participate in the formulation of defence policy and monitor its 
implementation in the ministry of defence; and, 
3/ civilians must provide substantial and detailed oversight of the military through various 
legally-constituted bodies of civilian control including, strong civilian-led parliamentary 
committees on defence and the defence budget, national security councils bringing 
together the state leadership, the heads of key ministries and the military in a forum for 
the resolution of important defence issues, and other bodies depending on the national 
political context. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To what extent do civil-military relations in Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine conform 
to those of the democratic model? The study assesses this on the basis of three indicators in 
three main chapters: Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform, Civilian Integration in the 
Ministry of Defence, and Agencies of Civilian Oversight. 
Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform: A Measure of Civilian Direction. 
"The best way", wrote Kohn, "to understand civilian control, to measure its existence and 
evaluate its effectiveness, is to weigh the relative influence of military officers and civilian 
officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defence, and military 
policy (that is, the shape, size, and operating procedures of the military establishment)."77 
These are precisely the issues that the Eastern European states have been tackling in the 
context of defence reform. 
Feaver, Bland and Nelson pointed out that as a first rule of good civil-military relations 
the armed forces, to paraphrase, must do no harm to its society. Harm, however, can be 
inflicted in various ways. The military could take direct control of the state, or more 
commonly, it could harm society through indiscipline, misadventure and the exaggeration of 
threats, or simply by consuming too much of the nation's finite economic resources. It could 
harm society by abusing conscripts, by involvement in crime or through repression of 
minorities within society. The post-communist states of Eastern Europe inherited armed 
forces which were in all or some of these respects harmful to society. As a matter of first 
order then, all the countries under review have had to conduct fundamental defence reform. 
The present work asks whether civilian elites in Poland and Hungary, Russia and 
Ukraine have reformed their armed forces to the point that the military is not too great a 
burden on the domestic economy, does not waste the human resources of society through 
77 Kohn, p. 143. 
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abuse and misuse of the soldiery, does not undermine society through involvement in crime 
and other non-sanctioned activities, and is capable of performing its assigned tasks with 
efficiency. In a state where the answer is yes, it is argued that civil-military relations are in a 
better condition than states where the answer is no. 
Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence: A Measure of Civilian Monitoring. 
Forty years ago, Janowitz emphasised the importance of civilian involvement at various levels 
of military activity to the maintenance of civilian control. 78 Nowadays, in most Western 
countries civilians are at the heart of the defence establishment. It is ever more difficult to 
draw a line between civilian and military: civilians perform tasks that previously were the 
preserve of the uniformed military and vice versa. Defence management in a democracy has 
come to be about integrating civilian and military decision-makers. As Donnelly wrote "it does 
not matter how good in theory the democratic structures for control are if there are no 
competent civilians to man the ministry of defence or who can talk to the military on equal 
terms"79 
In the dissertation, the ministry of defence is considered to be a crucial locus of 
civilian control. As Bland argued: 
Defence ministries are the instruments governments use to control the armed 
forces and the broader defence establishment. Weak or incomplete structures 
usually reflect poor control of civil-military relations. It is a mistake to think of 
defence ministries simply as necessary nuisances concerned with the 
'outpouring of menial clerks'. The business of ministries is making choices 
about national defence and cannot be separated from the 'central business of 
government'. Therefore, the efficiency of their ministry as a controlling 
instrument should be a primary concern of ministers.80 
The present work asks whether the states in the study have managed to build an integrated 
military-civilian ministry of defence. In states where the answer is yes, it is argued that 
civilians have a greater capacity to monitor the defence establishment and better civilian 
control than in states where the answer is no. 
Agencies of Civilian Control: A Measure of Oversight. Bland contended that the 
real test of whether civilian control is exercised is when 
civilians can require the military officers to account for their fidelity to the 
regime, for what they say they will do and for what they do. Therefore, the key 
to civilian direction of the military is an effective accountability mechanism that 
enables the civil authority to hold military officers to account and to scrutinise, 
78 Janowitz, pp. 363-366. 
79 Chris Donnelly, "Defence transformation ... " 
80 Bland, "Managing the 'Expert Problem' ... ", p. 40. 
interrogate, and, ultimately, to commend or sanction their behaviour against 
agreed-upon standards. Where the accountability mechanil5m is strong and 
effective, control is strong and effective.81 
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From one state to another the accountability mechanisms will vary in terms of institutions and 
their relative powers - depending on factors such as whether the political system is 
presidential, parliamentary or mixed -and can be quite complex. In essence though, the 
mechanisms of accountability in democratic systems are based on a simple premise, "The 
army is accountable to the government, the government is accountable to the army and to 
parliament, and parliament is accountable to the people."82 
The present work asks whether the states in the study have instituted pro-active, 
civilian-led agencies for oversight of the defence establishment imbued with sufficient legal 
rights to investigate policy implementation and supported by expert civilian and military staff. 
In states where the answer is yes, it is argued that there is a greater capacity to provide 
substantive and detailed oversight and better civilian control than in states where the answer 
is no. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Three independent variables- external incentives, internal attitudes toward reform, and 
systemic restraints on reform - have impacted on the development of democratic civil-military 
relations in the states under review. 
External Incentives: Support for Reform. The dissertation looks at the way 
external institutions like NATO influenced civil-military reform in Eastern Europe. 
Fundamentally, it is argued that the desire to enter NATO, the EU and the West generally, 
exerted a positive influence on civil-military reform in the Central European states. Whether 
or not the NATO aspirant states internalised the necessity and rationale for change in their 
systems of civil-military relations, institutions like NATO provided some objective 
requirements that could be fulfilled, at least formally if not always in substance. 
In the former Soviet Union states, by contrast, external influences were negative or 
ambiguous. Since NATO membership was not an open objective, meeting its criterion was 
not a major imperative. Moreover, particularly in Russia, Western blandishments about the 
81 Bland, "A Unified Theory ... ", p. 20. 
82 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
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desirability of civil-military reform were often seen as "mentoring, patronising, and arrogant"83 
by many in military circles. Democratic civil-military relations were taken to mean Western 
civil-military relations, a notion that carried the unspoken meaning of better civil-military 
relations. In short, the terms themselves were value-laden, but interpreted in different ways in 
different countries. 84 
Internal Attitudes Toward Reform: Why Reform? The full story, however, did not 
depend only, or even mainly, on external influences. The work also addresses the question of 
whether the state under review wanted to change. In the present work it is argued that Central 
European elites were more open to reforming their civil-military relations systems to 
democratic norms than were elites in the former Soviet Union. 
Fundamentally, civil-military relations reform cannot be effected if elites do not want it 
to be. In Russia especially, but also in Ukraine, it appears that neither military nor civilian 
elites were particularly committed to building a liberal-democratic civil-military relations 
regime. For civilian elites in an uncertain political environment it is sometimes preferable to 
have a partisan military- provided it is partisan in your favour. For military elites similarly, it is 
preferable to build personal relationships with civilian decision-makers as that is seen as a 
more effective way to guarantee budgetary allocations than going through formal channels. 
Systemic Restraints: Limitations on Reform. The quality of democratic functioning 
in the state is itself a limitation on the degree to which democratic civil-military relations can 
exist. To this fundamental restraint on reform can be added the restraints of finance and the 
willingness of society to shoulder the monetary and social costs of defence. Indeed, 
especially in the Eastern European context where financial constraints were very high, a 
conducive political atmosphere and a modicum of societal will and support were absolute 
requirements of reform. In short, the state of the economy, the nature of the political system 
and the mood of society all constituted potential restraints on reform. As Kahn stated: 
The first requirement for civilian control in democracy is democratic 
governance itself: the rule of law, civil liberty, a stable method for peaceful 
succession in power, workable practices for electing officials, and a 
government and governing process (perhaps spelled out in a written 
constitution) that are legitimate in the eyes of both key elites and the general 
83 Directorate of International Military Cooperation interview (R 1 ), Ottawa, Canada, 
March 1998, & Moscow, January 1999. 
84 A plausible explanation for this might be the very different experiences of 
Russians, as opposed to Central Europeans, in the Warsaw Pact. The non-Soviet former 
Warsaw Pact countries were accustomed to receiving political directives from abroad which 
were expected to be implemented without question. Russians were not similarly 
accustomed. On the contrary, they were conditioned to the reverse: issuing directives 
public. Civilian control can reinforce democracy, but civilian control is only one 
aspect- necessary but not sufficient- of democratic rule. Without a stable 
and legitimate governmental system and process, the military may interfere in 
order to protect society from chaos, internal challenge, or external attack-
even when intervention may itself perpetuate instability and destroy legitimacy 
in government. The tradition of legitimacy in government acts on the one hand 
to deter military interference in politics, and on the other hand to counteract 
intervention should it occur.85 
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There was a demonstrable need in Eastern Europe to reduce defence spending or at least to 
obtain more value for money in defence, mainly through down-sizing and professionalising the 
armed forces. Obviously, if the condition of the economy did not allow for financial support for 
reform then the ability to implement reforms was highly limited. Poland and Hungary had 
more latitude in this respect than Ukraine and Russia. 
It is also clear that the political system had to be conducive to building democratic 
civilian control if there was to be success. If the state was incompletely or imperfectly 
"democratised" then it stands to reason that civil-military relations would also be incompletely 
"democratised". One can see this most evidently in Russia and Ukraine where the divided 
political scene and an unsure commitment of elites to the rules of a "democratic game" 
undermined democratic reforms in all spheres not excluded to civil-military relations. 
Lastly, the element of societal will and support for reform is a factor in whether 
transformation can be achieved or not. Without pressure from society to reform there was 
less reason for elites to make the painful choices required. Indeed, in Donnelly's opinion, 
"There is no doubt that neglect by political leaders is the single biggest obstacle to defence 
reform in Russia and several other Central and East European countries."86 
The countries in the study which had the greatest success in civil-military reform were 
those which had success in consolidating democracy itself, which had economies that 
allowed a reasonable level of defence spending, and which had consistent societal will and 
support for defence reform. 
85 Kohn, p. 144. 
86 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation ... " 
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1.2: Methodology 
The specific methodological technique of the dissertation is structured, focussed 
comparison. Essentially this is the case because the alternate social science techniques -
experimental and statistical- are inappropriate for the data. As Lijphart said, the experimental 
method "can only rarely" be used by social scientists - and civil-military reform is not one of 
those rare instances.87 The statistical method, as an "approximation of the experimental 
method"88 , is also not suitable for this study because of problems of quantification and small 
data sets. 
STRUCTURED, FOCUSSED COMPARISON 
Alexander L. George's method of structured focussed comparison lies somewhere in the 
middle of the social sciences methodological spectrum between the extremes of the large N 
statistical method and the more ideographic method of history.89 The method has three 
distinct phases: 
1/ research design; 
21 case studies; and, 
3/ comparative conclusions. 
In the first phase, the researcher must set out the research problem and its objectives by: 
describing the phenomena under investigation, reviewing the existing theory and determining 
how it bears on the research question, and singling out what aspects of existing theories will 
be assessed in the study. The researcher must also consider which variables are dependent, 
independent or constant and discuss how they are to be operationalised. In the second 
phase, the case studies are done. In the third phase comparative conclusions are drawn and 
their implications on theory are elaborated. 
In practical terms, the methodology translates into a common set of questions 
concerning the evaluation of each variable in the conceptual framework which the investigator 
applies to each case. It is particularly appropriate for qualitative data. 
The dissertation could also be called a modified "binary comparison" because 
87 Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (September 1971 ), p. 684. 
88 Idem. 
89 See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of 
Structured, Focussed Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New 
Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1979, pp. 43-68. 
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although it deals with four countries, it collapses those countries into two distinct categories in 
the third, or comparative phase. 
QUALITATIVE VS QUANTITATIVE DATA 
As noted above, the research does not lend itself well to a quantitative approach. This is not 
only because of the inherent limitations of quantitative methodology in social sciences 
research but also because of the low quality of the quantitative data available. In all of the 
states under review data on the armed forces is often secret or at least protected from 
academic scrutiny; what is available was often designed with a specific purpose in mind (eg., 
convincing NATO planners of a nation's military readiness for membership) and is best taken 
with a grain of salt by non-insiders. At a more basic level, there is a gap between the way 
things are supposed to be officially and the way they are in actuality which the researcher 
must observe. 
Take, for example, the question of parliamentary oversight. It is a truism that the 
nature and limits of parliamentary oversight in any state are determined by the constitutional 
and political structure unique to that state -which can be quantified, or at least established 
relatively clearly by looking at legislation. That is to say, a state's constitutional and political 
framework of legislative oversight ultimately constrains the extent to which its 
parliamentarians may regulate their defence establishment. 
It does not follow, however, that the constitutional and political framework necessarily 
determines the actuality of parliamentary oversight. Quite often, as in the cases under review, 
there is a considerable gap between the way things ought to work and the way that they 
actually do. In other words, the nature of the research defies easy quantification and places at 
a premium the qualitative evaluation of the effectiveness of civilian control by the researcher. 
This means outlining the formal structures of the systems of civil-military relations, while at 
the same time concentrating most of the analytical effort on understanding the informal 
networks which have more importance. 
Sources. The main way this can be done is through semi-structured elite interviews. 
Approximately thirty interviews were conducted of military officers, civilian defence officials, 
politicians and their advisors, civilian academics and various independent defence policy 
advisors from each of the countries under review, both in their national capitals and at various 
international gatherings. Some interview transcripts from a collection of approximately 200 
interviews conducted by various researchers (including the author) throughout Eastern 
Europe in 1998 and 1999 as part of the Canadian Department of National Defence's 
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Democratic Civil-Military Relations Programme were also made available to the author.90 
In some cases, interviewees are not identified by name. This is due to the fact that 
one of the author's research partners in Russia was arrested by the federal internal security 
service (FSB) in October 2000 and charged with espionage. Although some interviewees 
prior to the arrest consented to be identified, it seems prudent in light of the arrest that these 
sources remain unattributed now. In other cases, officials asked not to be attributed for 
unspecified reasons of their own. All interviews are noted, at least by position, date and place 
of interview, in the appendix. 
Written sources for the dissertation include a broad range of sources from 
government documents and legislation, newspapers, to secondary sources. Both Russian-
and English-language sources were consulted. Translation services including FBIS, JPRS-
UMA, BBC Monitoring Service and a variety of other sources were used for the Polish and 
Hungarian languages. Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz (Carleton University, Canada) provided 
numerous citations to Polish articles and summaries of articles. Nicholas Sarvari (Budapest), 
provided the same assistance in Hungarian. 
90 The annual Democratic Civil-Military Relations Programme (DCMRP) was 
established by the Department of National Defence in 1997 to encourage the development of 
a democratic security studies communities in selected Central and Eastern European 
countries. The primary goal of this programme was to expose both military and government 
officials to the principles and practice of democratic control of the military in a Canadian 
setting. The programme involved briefings from various areas within the Department of 
National Defence/Canadian Forces, other government departments, NGOs, members of 
parliament, academics, and the media. All briefings focussed on one or more of the 
programmme's central themes: the organization of Canadian defence; the role of civilians in 
defence establishments; armed forces and society: media, academics, the public and 
NGOs; military education and professional development; and regional issues and defence 
reform. See: http://wvvw.dnd.ca/admpol/org/dq coord/d pub/dcmrp e.htm 
The present author was the Programme Officer for DCMRP in 1998-1999. 
Chapter 2: Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform 
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, because of its broad remit it acts as a background 
for the following chapters which are more narrowly focussed on structures and personnel 
rather than policy. Second, it aims to gauge the effectiveness of civilian control and direction 
of the defence policy process in the Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. 
The main objects of analysis are national security concepts, defence policies, military 
doctrines and reform plans. Briefly put, the differences between these key documents are as 
follows. The security concept lays out at the highest level the security concerns of the nation; 
all other documents are subsidiary to it. Defence policies and reform programmes address 
the force structures required to fulfill the assigned missions of the military and how to attain 
them. Military doctrine explains how those forces will be employed. 
At the conceptual level, the responsibility for decision-making is entirely civilian. 
However, in the process of policy formulation the integrated ministry of defence is usually the 
main workhorse preparing various proposals and policy options, working out logistical, 
financial and political details with other ministries and passing proposals on to higher civilian 
authorities for refinement and approval. In general, custom and law tend to ensure civilian 
control by placing matters of finance, politics and administration under the control of civilians 
in the ministry of defence; operational command and control of the armed forces under the 
military high command. In practice, military doctrine and defence planning is a shared 
responsibility. 
With the end of the Cold War, the countries under review were faced with three main 
tasks in the security sphere. First, defence policies had to be altered in order to reflect the 
new security environment in Europe. Second, new doctrinal concepts had to be developed in 
accordance with altered notions of security. Third, very tough reforms had to be carried out in 
order to turn outdated, Soviet-type armies into more streamlined forces with new types of 
weapons, training and personnel. All of this had to be achieved with reduced defence 
budgets. 
Examining how the countries under review dealt with these tasks tells us a lot about 
the nature of their civil-military relations. For example, a security concept which is drafted 
without transparency suggests poor civil-military relations. Poor civil-military relations would 
also be indicated if the security concept lacked internal consistency, or if the objectives it set 
out were not reflected in other policies. In other words, was the concept really an effective 
policy guideline? 
Moreover, a reform programme that goes unfunded is worthless. The failure of 
civilians to develop realistic reform plans (in consultation with their military advisors) based on 
rational political and economic calculation and to carry them out is a strong indicator of poor 
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civil-military relations. Finally, problems of lack of reform such as squalid living conditions for 
military families, burgeoning crime in the armed forces, military pay arrears, hazing of 
conscripts, and so on, are also symptoms of inadequate civil-military relations. 
Notwithstanding that Russia and Ukraine, from the beginning, faced a bigger job than 
Poland and Hungary with regard to the reform of their defence establishments, all of the states 
under review encountered similar dilemmas in re-examining their security needs and creating 
or adapting structures to manage them, of finding sufficient financial means to build their 
armed forces, and of figuring out how to go from a Soviet-type army to a more flexible, 
deployable, professional one. At an even more fundamental level, all the countries under 
review have had to come to terms with the fact that there is no point having armed forces if 
they are not effective. As Donnelly pointed out, a country without effective armed forces 
cannot either assure its sovereignty or make the necessary contribution to an alliance. 1 
None of the countries under review had totally solved this problem by the end of the 
1990s. However, the Central European states had made more progress than those in the 
former Soviet Union. 
THE SOVIET-TYPE DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT 
To appreciate the difficulties of reform in the former Soviet bloc countries it is useful to 
understand first how defence policy was made under the old system as well as the type of 
armed forces that obtained in the Soviet-bloc. 
Defence decision-making. Governance in the Soviet Union was based on a dual 
Communist Party-government structure, consisting of two parallel hierarchies linked in a 
multiplicity of institutions. Policy was formulated in these institutions which could be 
government-based, party-based or mixed. Overwhelmingly, however, the authority to 
formulate policy and to oversee its execution was preserved by the central organs of the 
Communist Party. 
At the top of the Soviet decision-making chain, for defence as for all other areas of 
policy, was the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which contained only party 
functionaries. For the determination of Soviet defence policy, however, the Defence Council 
was probably the most important state body. Whereas the Politburo included members from 
a wide variety of backgrounds, the Defence Council was composed only of the leaders of the 
power ministries, plus selected members of the military. In effect, the Defence Council 
1 Christopher Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies", NATO 
Review, Vol. 44, No. 6 (November 1996), p. 5. 
worked as a sub-committee of the Politburo, which tended to confine itself to confirming 
propositions of the council on military matters.2 
34 
The General Secretary of the CPSU was the most powerful individual in the system as 
he headed both the council and the Politburo and was commander-in-chief of the army. But 
the general staff of the Soviet army was the main defence policy-planning organ of the 
ministry of defence and for the state in general. In theory, the chief of the general staff was 
the subordinate of the minister of defence. In practice, the minister of defence and the chief of 
the general staff were broadly equal in power; in fact, a strong minister of defence was only 
marginally stronger than was the chief of general staff and a weak minister could be easily 
overwhelmed. The major levers of the general staffs power were its control of policy-planning 
and its strong hand in setting the agenda for Defence Council meetings. As they had few 
other reliable sources of defence expertise outside of the military, the Defence Council 
essentially reviewed the policy options provided to them by the general staff, and chose the 
preferred course. 3 
The structure of the Soviet-type defence establishment gave rise to two distinctive 
areas of defence policy in which different players were dominant. In matters of military-
technical policy and strategy, "it was the general staff that designed policy options and pre-
decided issues, relying on its military science and main operations departments ... "4 In 
matters of military preparation and weapons procurement, on the other hand, the design of 
policy options was a long, drawn-out process to which both the military and military-
industrialists contributed. 
This structure was full of latent conflicts. For example, the general staff had a 
monopoly of military expertise that allowed it to advocate its preferred direction of armaments 
procurement, but it lacked strong leverage over the military-industrial complex. 5 The crucial 
point, for the purposes at hand, however, is that although the general staff had to collaborate 
with some other institutions with which it had overlapping interests, the Politburo lacked 
alternate sources of policy option formulation. Therefore, the political leadership could "only 
set the military-political and economic confines and had to leave more detailed policy design 
2 Steven Meyer, "Decision-making in Defence: The Soviet Case", in Carl G. 
Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power USA/USSR, London: Macmillan Press, 1990, p. 254. 
3 Ibid., p. 251. 
4 Gerald Snel, From the Atlantic to the Urals: The Reorientation of Soviet Military 
Strategy, 1981-1990, Amsterdam, Netherlands: VU University Press, 1996, p. 119. 
5 lbid.,pp.118-119. 
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to the military."6 
There was an additional twist to this system in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states 
because their security policy was decided by Moscow and dictated to them through the 
Warsaw Pact which, until Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev doctrine, was prepared to use 
force to prevent its members straying from the Soviet line. The impact of this situation on the 
Central European states after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was that neither their political 
nor military elite had much experience with strategic issues and, as a result of the backlash of 
the new elite against anything smacking of the old ways, their strategies came to be largely 
inspired by Western ideas. This is in contrast to the former Soviet Union states which had 
much more experience in strategic thinking and had less desire to adopt Western ideas in 
preference to their own, homegrown military traditions. 
The relative burden of defence. Comparing defence reform in former non-Soviet 
Warsaw Pact states with the successor states of the Soviet Union one must bear in mind that 
the USSR was far more militarised than any of the satellite states. As a consequence, the 
difficulties of reforming the armed forces were more substantial in Ukraine and Russia than 
they were in Poland and Hungary. 
For our purposes it is not necessary to revisit the controversial issue of estimating 
Soviet defence expenditure in great detail as a broad brush comparison is sufficient to 
illustrate the disparity of defence burden between the Soviet Union and the satellite states of 
Central Europe. Estimates of the share of defence expenditure as a percentage of Soviet 
GNP in the 1980s range from a low of 10 percent to a high of 17 percent_? By contrast, 
defence spending in Hungary in the 1980s averaged only 3.5 per cent of GDP8 - relatively high 
by Western standards but still a fraction of the Soviet outlay. 
The problem, according to a former planner in the general staff, was that the Soviet 
economy was not simply militarized, as was the US economy which had a large defence 
industry inside a much larger and generally more efficient civilian economy. The Soviet 
economy was structurally militarized. Defence industry was the core and substance of the 
economy, to which the civilian sector was merely an adjunct, inefficient both in a free-market 
6 Ibid., p. 120. 
7 See Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), The Soviet Defence Enigma: Estimating Costs and 
Burden, London: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
8 Sebestyen Gorka, "Hungarian Military Reform And Peacekeeping Efforts", NATO 
Review, Vol. 43, No. 6 (November 1995). 
36 
comparison and relative to the domestic defence sector.9 
To be sure, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Poland and Hungary found themselves in 
possession of over-manned, over-equipped armies that were largely obsolescent. The 
problem, however, was much greater in Russia and Ukraine. 
9 Shlykov interview (R30), Geneva, November 2000. 
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2.1: Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform- Central Europe 
The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies were not meant to be used for national purposes; they 
were simply agglomerations of basic units trained, equipped and employed according to 
Soviet doctrine, ready to be slotted into the Soviet order of battle, under Soviet operational 
command. That is, "they were bone and muscle, without heart or brain and without the 
capacity for independent action."10 Notwithstanding the powerful homogenising and de-
nationalising influence of the Warsaw Pact, however, it would be a mistake to neglect the 
differences between member states because national traits were still observable -
differences between Poland and Hungary that bear on the present research. Let us examine 
their impact before moving on to the detailed analyses of security policy-making in the 1990s. 
Traditions of political activism and their impact on the policy-process. During 
the Communist era, the Polish armed forces were not only insulated from civilian influence, 
after the imposition of martial law in 1981 Polish military officers began more and more to take 
over prominent positions in the state leadership, including General Wojciech Jaruzelski as 
first secretary of the Polish communist party. Arguably, the military's prominent role in 
politics, its long history of independence, and conception of itself as the defender of national 
integrity, pre-disposed the armed forces leadership to resist what they perceived as 
unwarranted civilian meddling in their internal affairs. According to one Western analyst, the 
prevailing attitude of the Polish officer corps in the aftermath of the revolutions of 1989 was 
that civilian control in the new regime need only amount to the armed forces answering "to its 
own internal chain of command and, ultimately, to the president as commander-in-chief."11 
The experience of Hungary was markedly different. To be sure, some Hungarian 
military leaders probably shared the proclivities of the Polish military toward a more 
independent role than would be acceptable in a truly democratic system. However, the 
historical basis of such an attitude was less strong, and the support of the Hungarian people 
for the military was less pronounced in Hungary than it was in Poland. It is reasonable to 
suggest, therefore, that the attitudinal barriers to civil-military reforms that involved diminishing 
the stature of the military in policy matters were probably less significant in Hungary than 
Poland. 
10 James Sherr, "Civil-democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces: To What End? 
By What Means?", in David Betz and John Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Post-
Communist Europe, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 69. 
11 Ben Lombardi, "An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 18. 
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"Red Eagle" vs. "Problematical Performer" According to Cold War stereotypes 
Poland was a "Red Eagle"more or less ready and willing to engage in offensive operations 
against NATO forces in conjunction with the Soviet army, especially if they had been targeted 
against German troops; 12 the Hungarian army, on the other hand, was a "problematical 
performer''13 whose reliability in the event of a confrontation with the West was considered 
minimal -in other words, Poland was more militarised. In and of themselves, these 
stereotypes of Poland and Hungary's potential reaction to an event that never occurred, based 
as they are on the limited information available to scholars twenty years ago, are of passing 
interest. That said, they are reflective of deeper differences between Poland and Hungary 
during the Warsaw Pact era that had effect into the 1990s. 
In all the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states the prestige of the military profession was in 
decline through the 1980s, but, according to Zoltan Barany, that decline was more 
pronounced in Hungary than in Poland. One symptom of this decline was the low quality and 
quantity of the arsenals of southern-tier Warsaw Pact states like Hungary which received less 
and more obsolete equipment from the Soviet Union than more strategically located northern-
tier states like Poland.14 To some degree this state of affairs was one created by the 
Hungarians themselves who in the 1980s deliberately tried to reduce the demands imposed 
by defence spending on the economy. A Hungarian participant in a RAND conference in 1990 
remarked: "Whenever Marshal Kulikov came to Hungary there was always a fear that he 
would demand something more. It was not a question of refusing altogether, but rather of how 
much we could bargain him down."15 
In some respects, however, the experiences of Poland and Hungary were more 
similar. Both armies sought, with limited success, a modicum of independence from the 
Warsaw Pact. In Poland this involved the development by military theorists of a concept of 
12 Ivan Volgyes, "Military Politics of the Warsaw Pact Armies", in Morris Janowitz 
(ed.), Civil-Military Relations: Regional Perspectives, London: Sage Publications, 1981, pp. 
211-212. 
13 Ivan Volgyes, "Hungary: Problematical Performer", in Volgyes (ed.), The Political 
Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier, Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1982, pp. 60-86. 
14 Zoltan D. Barany, Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: The Case of 
Hungary, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 129-130 & 152-153. 
15 Keith Crane, Steven Popper and Barbara Kliszewski, Civil-Military Relations in a 
Multiparty Democracy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-3941-RC, 1990, p. 47. 
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"defence of national territory" that had a distinctly national flavour. 16 Hungary, uniquely among 
the Warsaw Pact states, in the mid-1980s began to downsize its army, moving from the 
Soviet-style divisional structure to a Western-style brigade structure. 17 
The problem with gradual, elongated transitions. Moreover, the differences 
between Poland and Hungary should not be over-emphasised because in most respects their 
experiences have been quite similar. While it is true that the Hungarian and Polish militaries 
had quite different relations with political authorities in the 1980s, it is also true that in both 
cases their transitions were "gradual and elongated"18 and were characterised by the least 
direct involvement of military power. 
The absence of a dramatic, swift and complete turnover of power from the old regime 
to the new regime had both positive and negative effects on civil-military reform. On the one 
hand, it gave the armed forces more time to acclimatise to the ongoing democratic changes 
in society which probably enhanced the stability of the new regimes. On the other hand, the 
gradual handover of power generated political compromises between the old and the new 
elites which would continue to resonate into the mid-1990s at least. In civil-military reform in 
particular, it meant that reform tended to take the form of tinkering with the functions of old 
structures rather than wholly re-organising them or creating totally new structures. 
FROM THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 TO THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: RAPID 
DEMILITARISATION, LIMITED REFORM 
The Warsaw Pact warped the national strategic orientation of its member states according to 
the desires of the Soviet general staff and the Kremlin in Moscow. In practical terms, this 
meant that Warsaw Pact armies were large, conscript-based and tank-heavy, had logistics 
systems designed to support offensive operations on foreign territory, and were deployed in 
areas close to the West. The task of defence reform in Poland and Hungary has been to shift 
their military infrastructure from this denationalised, offensive, implicitly anti-NATO orientation, 
to a more defensive, deployable (particularly for multinational peace-support operations) 
orientation. Without doubt, the substance of the Polish and Hungarian armed forces required 
16 A Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev, East European Military 
Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier, New York, NY: Crane, Russak, 1980, pp. 
23-32. 
17 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
18 Stefan Sarvas, "Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern 
Europe", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall 1999), p. 103. 
changing, but to what, how, and by what means exactly was the question that reveals the 
salience of effective civilian management and guidance of the military. 
Objectives of defence reform prior to Partnership for Peace. On 1 July 1991, 
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after nearly two years of increasing irrelevance, the Warsaw Pact was officially disbanded. 
On 6 October 1991, in Krakow, Poland, the presidents of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland collectively announced their desire to accede to NATO. At a basic level then, the main 
problem of defence reform was plain: how to become compatible with NATO forces in the 
minimum time and at the minimum cost? 
For analytical purposes, however, this problem needs to be broken down. 
Tremendous changes were required across the board: in the way the armed forces were 
manned, in the type and sophistication of the weapons and equipment they employed, in the 
way they were trained and where they were deployed. Complicating matters was the 
enormity of the changes required in each area, especially when juxtaposed with the limited 
fiscal resources available. All these changes generated insecurity in the military. As a result, 
dissatisfaction and low morale, leaving the military service, and to a certain extent crime and 
corruption grew more prominent. 19 
Another major problem for the Central European states was that prior to the 
Partnership for Peace and the NATO Study on Enlargement, the intentions of the West 
towards the region were not clear and neither were the concrete requirements of NATO 
membership. This meant that the Central European states had no clear idea of what they 
should do, let alone how to do it. In the words of one Hungarian analyst: "Before 1994, we 
spent a lot of time and money creating a new military structure and a lot of effort was wasted 
because we did not know what type of structure to build and without a national security 
concept the army did not know what to do."20 Not knowing the ultimate political end, changes 
in the military structure initiated by the military leadership were often misguided. 
Poland1s security policy. The first public announcement of a new approach to 
defence doctrine in Poland came before the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, in February 1990, 
in the form of defence policy guidelines issued by the National Defence Committee, headed 
by President Wojciech Jaruzelski, which still included communists at that time. These new 
guidelines included only one sentence reiterating loyalty to the Warsaw Pact amongst a 
number of other propositions emphasizing Polish sovereignty over its defence affairs. 
Nonetheless, the National Defence Committee's guidelines were criticised in the Sejm (which 
19 Molnar interview (H 12), Budapest, 1-2 December 1999. 
20 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
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was not controlled by communists) as insufficient guidance for a full defence reform and also 
because they implied the continuance of the Warsaw Pact. 
A year later, the total collapse of the Warsaw Pact necessitated a more complete 
revision of military doctrine and a new programme called Armed Forces 1990 was initiated. 
According to a well-placed Polish observer, however, these early attempts at formulating new 
policies amounted to very little. 21 
The first serious look at reforming the defence sector was the Zabinski Report 
presented to parliament in October 1992 by the Commission for Reforming the Organisation 
of National Defence. The aspect of the Zabinski Report that most merits highlighting was its 
recommendation that the Polish defence establishment be divided up between a civilian-
military side responsible for administrative tasks and a strictly military side responsible for 
purely military tasks (the general staff). Duly enacted in April 1993, this division effectively 
endorsed the proposition that military expertise was exclusive to the military profession. 
According to Jerzy Milewski, one of the highest-ranking civilians in the defence establishment 
from 1991 to 1996, the approved model was faulty: 
The civil-military part of the ministry of defence was supposed to manage the 
armed forces, provide for them, oversee them, take care of the defence policy, 
social affairs, education, etc. The military part of the ministry is a general staff 
to which the whole of the army has been subordinated. Those two structures 
were supposed to cooperate. But this model, in spite of the good will of the 
subsequent ministers could not function properly and with time it has led to the 
increasing alienation of the civilian part of the ministry. Ministerial departments 
which do not have an independent access to the army must work through the 
respective directorates (which are parallel of ministerial departments) in the 
general staff. Necessarily the general staff has grown, the respective 
directorates have duplicated the ministerial structures and became 
independent. So they no longer need the cooperation from the partner civilian 
departments. 22 
In the early 1990s the topic of defence reform was discussed fairly extensively in Poland but 
really effective action was stymied by political conflicts. Nevertheless, some basic policy 
points were agreed and formalised in two documents: The Principles of Polish Security Policy 
and The Security Policy and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, both of which 
were signed into law on 2 November 1992. The policy line outlined in these documents boiled 
down to a relatively few core propositions: 
21 This brief history of the early Polish reform debate owes much to an interview with 
BGEN Stanislaw Koziej: Koziej interview (P16), Warsaw, 20 June 2000. 
22 Interview with Jerzy Milewski in Polityk, No. 25 (24 June 1995), cited by Agnieszka 
Gogolewska in The Restructuring of Civil-Military Relations in Poland, Ukraine and Russia-
A Comparative Study, 20 June 1998, NATO Fellowship Report, pp. 64-65. 
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1 I The mission of the Polish armed forces was the protection of the sovereignty and 
integrity of the Republic of Poland, not the preservation of the rule of a particular party 
or ideology; 
21 Poland saw no immediate threat to its security in the traditional sense. However, 
though it was not specifically named, Russia clearly remained a potential hard security 
concern; 
3/ In the meantime, the most immediate concerns were domestic security and possible 
soft security threats which might be posed by the outbreak of regional conflict in the 
former Soviet Union states; 
4/ Poland attached great importance to European integration and to future membership 
of NATO as a key strategic goal.23 
The logical consequence of these goals was that the Polish army would require 
modernisation if it were to qualify for NATO; while if it was going to protect the territorial 
integrity of the state there should be a balanced distribution of military forces throughout the 
country. The means to accomplish this, however, was more problematic. Various proposals 
were made from various quarters but very little was actually accomplished. 
One of the main constraints on a pro-active defence reform was the state of the 
military budget which declined from 1986 until 1994-1995. From 1991 to 1994 the military 
budget dropped from US$2.6 billion to a low of US$2.1 billion.24 Over the same time period, 
the size of the military was also cut drastically. Basically, reacting to the unstructured, 
spontaneous cuts was almost more than the military managers could handle: 
We cut our armed forces from 450,000 in 1989 to 200,000 troops by 1999. A 
lot of our problems are a direct result of this cutting process. The first is 
pensions. We have to pay those. The second is retraining officers for the 
civilian market. We have a high unemployment rate in general, but in the West 
and the North where the major military bases are located unemployment is 
even higher than the national average. There are a lot of problems employing 
former soldiers ... Many other sectors of reform also require money: 
administrative reform, pension reform, health reform and insurance. A lot of 
things require government investment and they take precedence over the 
military ... The public's awareness of why more money should be spent on 
defence is very general but uncommitted; they want money spent in a lot of 
areas.25 
23 Koziej interview (P16), Warsaw, 20 June 2000; Czarnecki interview (P5), Warsaw, 
19 June 2000; Czmur interview (P4), Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
24 The Military Balance 1992-1993, London: Brassey's for the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, p. 80, and The Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 92. 
25 Staron interview (P27), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
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Another major cause of the failure to reform was the ambiguity and confusion about means 
and ends that prevailed at the time, combined with the fact that defence reform was not a 
priority of government. 
Poland's post-Cold War defence policy began its evolution in an atmosphere defined 
on the one hand by the ending of the paradigm of East-West confrontation and the diminution 
of traditional security concerns; and, on the other hand, a feeling of uncertainty about its return 
to and eventual place in the new Europe, accompanied by continued apprehension about 
potential security threats from Russia, a traditional bete noire. Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski in 1991 argued in a speech to the Sejm: 
The whole of Europe should be treated as a homogeneous area of security ... 
From the point of view of security, Central Europe in particular cannot become 
a gray, buffer, or neutral zone. The area in such a situation, because of its 
geographical situation, will easily become the object of rivalry of stronger 
states.26 
Therefore, building connections to European institutions was considered important- the more 
the better. Yet, concerns that Russia would see their accession to NATO as a hostile step 
meant that they could not move too far or too fast toward the West. What emerged was a 
policy of pragmatic neutrality: Poland would be an independent, armed, Western-orientated 
country, but not a member of the Atlantic Alliance. In the words of defence minister Piotr 
Kolodziejczyk, Poland's defence posture "for today and for the next few years is armed 
neutrality in the middle of Europe."27 
A final problem was the lack of consensus on the direction of reform between military 
and civilian officials which was undermined by the faulty institutional design of the defence 
establishment, the power-grabbing tactics of President Walesa, and the determined 
independence of the chief of general staff, General Wilecki. The separation of the general 
staff and the ministry of defence had effectively preserved the monopoly of the military on 
military issues. This system allowed an anti-democratic relationship to develop between the 
president and the chief of general staff that excluded the civilian minister of defence from a 
major decision-making role. According to one interlocutor, 
The worst period was in the early 1990s when there was a strong conflict 
between the politicians and the military under a strong chief of defence staff 
[Wilecki]. The chief of defence was very jealous about having information and 
not sharing it. The military wanted money but did not want to have to explain 
26 From an address to the Sejm on security issues by Foreign Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, Warsaw Domestic Service, in Polish, 0833 GMT, FBIS-EEU-91-032, 14 
February 1991. 
27 RFE/RL Research Report, 15 February 1991, p. 49. 
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what they wanted it for. 28 
The problem, however, was not only on the military side. Among the civilian elite there was, 
and to some extent remains, a tendency toward a declarative approach to defence reform: 
demanding that changes take place but providing neither the resources nor guidance to make 
them happen. "It is a problem with our elites," reported the head of the NATO integration 
department. "There is a weak understanding of the fact that we must not only ratify NATO 
standards, but implement them."29 
Hungary's security policy. Hungarian post-Cold War security policy evolved in 
much the same atmosphere as Poland's. The added twist in Hungary was the rise in 
insecurity stemming from the appearance on its borders of five new states, in many of which 
resided a Hungarian diaspora. This brought Hungary a less stable security environment than 
it had before, though one with both positive and negative features since the appearance of 
Ukraine placed a buffer between it and Russia. The Yugoslav crisis, on the other hand, 
generated both a genuine military threat as well as a threat of refugees. 
As with Poland, Hungary's security policy prior to the Partnership for Peace was also 
based on pragmatic neutrality. The general policy line on security issues was set down a little 
later than in Poland in spring 1993 in two main documents: the National Security Principles of 
the Republic of Hungary and the Basic Principles of National Defence of the Republic of 
Hungary.30 
According to the National Security Principles, adopted on 2 March 1993, the aims of 
Hungarian security policy converged on a few key issues: protecting the state's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, maintaining its internal stability, preserving the undisturbed functioning 
of the market economy, and contributing to international peace and European stability. It took 
as a starting point that security could not be guaranteed in isolation but only in conjunction 
with other European states. There was no preconceived notion of major military threat from 
any direction. At the same time, real and potential conflicts in bordering nations posed 
credible security threats. Thus, the document concluded that despite the favourable 
international security situation created by the end of the Cold War, new threats had arisen that 
28 Piatkowski interview (P23), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
29 Osinski interview (P21 ), Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
30 Parliamentary Resolution 11/1993. "Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the 
Republic of Hungary", European Security, Vol. 3, No.2 (Summer 1994), pp. 352-358; "The 
Basic Principles of National Defence of the Republic of Hungary", Budapest: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Fact Sheets on Hungary No.9, 1993. 
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necessitated the preservation of reliable armed forces. 
The Basic Principles of National Defence of the Republic of Hungary was adopted on 
23 April 1993. It reflected the perception that Hungary bordered on a zone of insecurity and 
instability. In the short-term, Hungary had to rely on its own resources to defend itself on all 
azimuths. In the long-term, Hungarian elites placed high priority on achieving integration in 
NATO as the only credible guarantor of their security. Given this threat analysis and a 
consideration of available resources, the reform efforts focussed on creating smaller but 
more modern armed forces. 31 
Defence reform in Hungary began early under the transitional government of Miklos 
Nemeth which passed a reform programme in December 1989. This programme, however, 
created more problems than it solved, notably by creating an institutional division between the 
ministry of defence and the general staff, and between presidential and governmental 
authority over the defence establishment. The reform separated the command of the armed 
forces from the defence minister and placed it within the authority of the president- who the 
communists originally thought would be their reform leader lmre Poszgay. As a result, when 
Hungary's first post-communist civilian defence minister was appointed in May 1990, the 
commander of the army was not subordinate to him, but to the president. 
By 1994, the size of the army had been slashed from 91,000 to 51,100 conscripts, and 
from 30,500 to 22,900 officers and NCOs, while civilian employees fell from 33,300 to 26,000. 
The length of conscript service was reduced to twelve months.32 The army was getting 
smaller, but was it getting more modern and more prepared? The answer must be no. As 
one Hungarian planner recollected, 
I remember the first time I worked for the ministry of defence between 1990 
and 1993. In 1992 there was a plan for restructuring and reforming the armed 
forces. It cost a huge amount of money. I do not remember how much, but it 
was very expensive and also unreal. Of course that plan went nowhere.33 
It is clear that Hungary's new leadership was not interested in long-term security issues. 
Despite all the changes in the military, detailed analyses of how, why and what was being 
done to reform the military were lacking: 
31 Rudolf Joo discusses the goals of Hungarian defence reform in the changed 
geopolitical context of the early 1990s in The Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The 
Experience of Hungary, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 
Chaillot Paper 23, February 1996, p. 37. 
32 Zoltan Szenes, "The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-military Relations in 
Hungary", Betz and Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State ... , p. 83. 
33 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
The biggest problem of the last ten years is that many times we have changed 
the structure without any long- or mid-term plans. Every year we would 
receive from the parliament different orders - cut this and cut that. But you 
know if you are reducing the army you cannot just cut this unit or that unit 
without an idea of how to manage this very complex process. You need to 
keep those units which are very important and get rid of or change those which 
are not. You cannot just cut everything here and there and expect good 
results. So, we have not had any idea what we were doing.34 
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This reluctance of civilians to take a long-term view of what they wanted to achieve in the 
defence sphere was a grave problem. Consider, for example, the National Security Principles 
and the Basic Principles of National Defence. Logically, as the conceptual document the 
National Security Principles was drawn up by civilians, in this case the main workhorse being 
the ministry of foreign affairs. As the subsidiary document, the Basic Principles of National 
Defence was drawn up mainly by military experts in the general staff. However, although 
parliament approved the National Security Principles first, the Basic Principles of National 
Defence was actually drafted well before that in 1992. That is, the military doctrine guided the 
formulation of the security concept, not the reverse as would be expected had the civilian elite 
worked out their preferred approach to national defence. 
The problems of the Hungarian peacekeeping training centre illustrate the ways in 
which the dichotomy of power between the general staff and the ministry of defence thwarted 
some basic reform steps in the period prior to Partnership for Peace. In 1993, in order to 
enhance its prospects of NATO membership it was decided that Hungary would develop a 
peacekeeping training centre. 
Two plans were developed. The first was prepared by the department of multilateral 
relations of the ministry of defence. According to which, a small centre would play a 
coordinating role in the military, organising special training for officers and soldiers who had 
volunteered for peacekeeping duty. Ultimately, this would result in a pool of trained 
peacekeepers, some of them reservists, who could be mobilised in short order in units of 
varying size and type depending on the mission. The second plan was prepared by the 
general staff. Their approach was to create a dedicated, battalion-sized training centre which 
would train a new company of mechanized infantry for peacekeeping duties every six months. 
The overworked and understaffed department of multilateral relations was only able to 
present a general concept at cabinet meetings where the plans were discussed, while the 
general staff was able to work up its plan in considerable detail. With the announcement of 
the Partnership for Peace in January 1994, the establishment of the centre became an urgent 
34 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
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political priority and it was finally decided to go with the more detailed plan. 
Unfortunately, the weaknesses of the general staffs plan grew apparent. By 1996, 
when Hungary was tasked with providing an engineering battalion for I FOR in Bosnia, the 
number of personnel at the training centre was insufficient, and they lacked engineering 
training because the centre only trained mechanised infantry. The army had to call for 
reservists (which the general staff had not planned for). Eventually, under financial pressure 
and with the deficiencies of the centre become manifest, it was disbanded in spring 1996. In 
short, the lack of an effective system of civilian management, complicated by the separation 
and rivalry of the planning functions of the ministry of defence and the general staff, resulted in 
wasteful, ineffective policy choices. 35 
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE TO NATO: A MORE PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH TO DEFINING 
PRIORITIES 
The year 1994-1995 marked a turning point for Central Europe in defence and security issues. 
At the January 1994 Brussels summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council the Partnership for 
Peace programme was initiated. However generally, the Partnership for Peace Framework 
Documene6 and chapter 5 of the Study on NATO Enlargement set out the requirements of 
membership. With respect to the current analysis, the most salient of these requirements 
were: 
1 I transparency in national defence planning and budgetary processes; 
21 democratic and civilian control of the armed forces; 
3/ armed forces interoperable with NATO forces. 
According to the NATO Handbook, the Partnership for Peace is focussed on "defence related 
cooperation but goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership."37 For 
Poland and Hungary, whether or not this was NATO's original intention, Partnership for Peace 
was seen as the first step towards full membership. As such, in the words of a Hungarian 
35 This episode is covered by Zoltan Pecze in Civil-Military Relations in Hungary 
1989-1996, Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, Harmonie Paper 
2, 1998, pp. 24-26. 
36 Signing the Partnership for Peace Framework Document is the first step in joining 
the partnership. By signing the document countries reiterate their commitment to specific 
democratic norms of behaviour both in international relations and in respect to their system 
of defence management. 
37 The NATO Handbook, 501h Anniversary Edition, Brussels, Belgium: NATO, Office of 
Information and Press, 1998-1999, p. 87. 
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analyst, Partnership for Peace was perceived as a series of three waiting rooms: the first was 
for countries waiting to join NATO as soon as the first expansion was agreed by its member 
states; the second was for those preparing to join at a later stage; the third was for permanent 
Partnership for Peace states who would never join the Alliance. 38 Thus the object of reform in 
Poland and Hungary became more concrete: make sure of being in the first waiting room. 
Politics of Mimicry. Staying in the first waiting room for eventual NATO membership 
necessitated certain reform steps be taken in the Central European states. In the words of an 
interlocutor in the National Security Bureau of the Office of the President of Poland: 
NATO imposed a kind of discipline on us. We had to answer a lot of questions, 
to adapt our force structure, to prepare annual reports for NATO and to 
implement NATO's Strategic Concept. We had to adopt civilian democratic 
control of the armed forces if we wanted to be a member of the alliance.39 
The desire to enter NATO imposed on politicians the obligation to undertake specific 
normative changes in their defence establishment. At the same time, NATO and its member 
states offered specific assistance for reforms. The same interlocutor in Poland continued, 
You can say that they offered us much more help than we could accept. We 
received a lot of support from our NATO allies. We think it is our responsibility 
to take what we have learned and pass it on to our neighbours. We must 
export these lessons and take on a regional leadership role. 40 
These words, however, reflect the upside of the NATO coin; there was a downside as well. 
The desire to enter NATO forced politicians in Central Europe to pay more attention to 
questions of military significance. Yet, while they became focussed on NATO, politicians 
... recognised only the advantages of membership not the responsibilities. 
Civilians tended to look to NATO and EU to the detriment of national 
institutions. To be honest, Hungarian politicians just neglected the military 
most of the time. They were not interested or they had other things to do. 41 
In effect, there was a strong tendency amongst Central European reformers to try and simply 
adopt the forms of democratic civil-military relations without seeking to understand the logic 
behind them. As a result, reforms were designed without understanding, and they were 
implemented because NATO required them, not because they were seen as intrinsically 
necessary. Even worse, there emerged a "right answer culture" whereby officials learned to 
38 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
39 Staron interview (P27), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview P14, Warsaw, 
12 June 2000. 
40 Staron interview (P27), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview P14, Warsaw, 
12 June 2000. 
41 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
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declare that all the proper reforms had been undertaken.42 To a certain extent, the West was 
complicit in this phenomenon. NATO's Central European advisor wrote, 
We in the West have not actually been very good at analysing the situation, 
either in our own countries or in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore we 
have found it difficult to cross the cultural divide and lend a hand to the new 
democracies in their task of transformation. A lot of our well-meant effort has 
been wasted because it was inappropriate, inapplicable or just plain wrong. 
We overestimated the competence of Central and Eastern European 
governments to draw up and implement plans in this sphere. We 
underestimated the impact of corruption and vested self-interest as an 
obstacle to change. 43 
The result was a "politics of mimicry"44 : a process of imperfect copying of liberal-democratic 
norms of civil-military relations for a variety of non-exclusive reasons (as a form of 
reductionism, as an abstraction from the original, as a falsification of reality, and/or as a 
means of formal ising relations with other states). This resulted in systems of civil-military 
relations which were liberal-democratic in form but idiosyncratic and sui generis in practice. 
This is not to deny the positive impact of NATO on defence reform, which was 
considerable. Poland and Hungary wanted to join the Alliance and, therefore, they had to 
agree to its rules and take steps to harmonise their systems with it. At the same time, the 
approach to NATO was conditioned by the experience of the Warsaw Pact where policy was 
simply dictated by the alliance's hegemon. 
It was not a question in Hungary whether to have democratic civilian control of 
the military or not: military commanders wanted control more than the civilians 
did- we needed to know what kind of army the government wanted. That was 
the problem, the politicians did not have any idea and it is still the problem 
today. The idea was that NATO would tell us what we needed to do- but 
NATO is not the Warsaw Pact.45 
Learning that NATO was not simply a Western version of the Warsaw Pact, that Brussels 
was not going to hand down policy decisions cooked up in the Pentagon to be faithfully 
implemented as Moscow once did, and coming up with national solutions was the main task 
42 The "right answer culture" will be familiar to any researcher who has spent a day 
being briefed at the ministry of defence or ministry of foreign affairs being told one thing only 
that evening to be told over a glass of vodka (more likely, several) something quite different 
by the same people. 
43 Chris Donnelly, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Democracies", in Betz and 
Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State ... , p. 8. 
44 This idea was first elaborated to me by Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz, Carleton 
University, Ottawa, Canada, in Autumn 1999. 
45 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
of the period from Partnership for Peace to the invitation to join the Alliance. 
Poland's reform programme. As president, Lech Walesa set out for the military 
leadership the task to build an army that could, 
act as a deterrent and as an encouragement at the same time. It must deter 
potential aggressors ... and it must encourage potential allies, who must be 
made to realise that it is worth cooperating with us, that we are a responsible 
partner with whom it is worth developing close ties, and that we are strong and 
stable enough to consolidate international security.46 
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By the time of the NATO Madrid Summit in July 1997, despite budgetary pressures, faults in 
the design of its institutional structure, and political conflicts over its fate, the army had made 
some modest steps towards accomplishing Walesa's tasks. By no means was the 
transformation of the military complete, but there was a willingness to adapt the military and 
its management structures in order to bring it into line with NATO norms. 
A major contributing factor to this success was that 1994-1995 proved a watershed 
year for the Polish military budget. After eight years of decline the defence budget rose from 
US$2.1 billion to US$2.6 billion.47 Also, in February 1995 the Sejm passed legislation that 
placed defence spending on five-year planning cycles and committed the government to 
increasing defence spending to three per cent of GOP by 1997. These acts marked the end 
of uncontrolled military decline in Poland and the modest beginning of military reinvestment. 
If the main thrust of reforms up to 1995 was the separation of the administrative 
functions of the ministry of defence from the command functions of the general staff, the aim 
after 1995 was to reverse that trend. Given that the civilian bureaucracy in the ministry of 
defence was highly politicised and subject to a very high rate of turnover, the general staff was 
reluctant through most of the 1990s to relinquish its prerogatives in the policy-planning sphere 
and its operational control of the troops to the officials of the ministry of defence. Until 
Walesa's defeat in the presidential elections of 1995, the general staff proved very successful 
in playing the president and the parliament off against each other, and thus managed to retain 
considerable independence from the ministry of defence. 
With regard to specific changes in the armed forces, efforts continued to improve the 
46 Quoted in Dale Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Poland: 
Problems in the Transition to a Democratic Polity", Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March 2000), p. 71. 
47 See the Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 73. The Stockholm Institute for Peace 
Research (SIPRI) gives a somewhat different budget estimate. They show 1993 as the first 
year in which defence spending rose to US$ 2.77 billion, followed by a decline in 1994 to US$ 
2.67 billion. Sustained budgetary increases, however, began in 1995. Data is from the SIPRI 
military expenditure database: http://www.sipri.se/projects/Milex/expenditure/Poland.html 
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structure and quality of the forces, to redeploy units more evenly throughout the country and to 
modernize the arsenal of the military. Poland's long-term plan to reform its armed forces, 
called Army 2012, appeared in July 1997. The plan envisaged dramatic cuts in the size of the 
military from approximately 240,000 to 180,000 troops by 2004. Conscription was to be 
retained as the main mode of recruitment, but the number of soldiers serving on contracts 
was to be gradually increased and the length of obligatory military service reduced from 
eighteen months to a year. The percentage of officers in the military was to be reduced to 
thirty per cent of total manpower; at the same time, the percentage of professional NCOs 
would rise to forty per cent. 48 
Overall, by the time they were invited to join NATO the Polish armed forces had 
achieved some success in transforming the army it inherited from the communist era. 
NATO's basic military requirements amounted to five conditions: 
1 I an effective internal security system capable of protecting the Alliance's secret 
information; 
21 integration with NATO's air defence network; 
3/ infrastructure, such as ports, airstrips and bases for landing and deployment of troops 
and equipment; 
41 a minimum contribution of forces to Alliance operations; and, 
5/ compatible command, communications and information systems. 
According to NATO, these basic standards were met.49 
Despite its generally obsolescent equipment the army put intense effort into achieving 
a minimal level of interoperability with NAT0.50 A more even distribution of troops from their 
previous heavy concentration in the West to a more balanced deployment throughout the 
country was also executed. These successes, however, have to be considered alongside 
some persisting problems. A report of the Supreme Audit Chamber conducted in 1997-1998 
showed that the full reform of the army was still a long way off. Shortcomings in the ratio of 
officers to soldiers, the quality and sophistication of armaments, the generally low level of 
48 Henry Plater-Zyberk looks at Polish defence reform up to 1998, including a detailed 
consideration of Armiia 2012, in Poland's Defence and Security: The Same Priorities, 
Different Approaches, Sand hurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military 
Academy, May 1998. 
49 Breffni O'Rourke, "NATO: New Members Had Military, Political Terms To Meet", 
RFE/RL Research Report, 12 March 1999. 
50 This matter is discussed in some detail in Report on Poland's Integration with 
NATO, Warsaw, Ministry of Defence, 1998. 
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expenditure on defence, and even hygiene (some units were held together "only by dirt", said 
the report), were pointed out.51 
To a certain extent the persistence of these problems can be attributed to inadequate 
financing. Changing the system of manning the armed forces from a conscript to a mixed 
conscript-contract system is an expensive project, as is modernising the military arsenal. 
The lack of money, however, cannot fully explain the problem. In the words of the director of 
the NATO integration department of the ministry of defence, "Of course, we have money, 
money, money problems. Well, mainly it is true we need more funds, but sometimes this is 
just an excuse."52 
In fact, although the military budget was on the rise after 1995 in dollar terms, as a 
percentage of GOP it declined slightly from 2.3 per cent in 1994 to 2.1 per cent in 1998 
(despite the 1995 commitment to raise the budget to 3.0 per cent of GOP by 1997).53 On the 
other hand, though the budget was tight it was also relatively stable. The problem, therefore, 
was not the level of resources per se; rather it was the discontinuity between the level of 
resources and the type of force structure it was supposed to sustain. 54 
This discontinuity becomes evident when the military budget is broken down to reveal 
the ways in which fiscal priorities were profoundly skewed by Western standards. For 
example, the Western norm for expenditure on procurement and personnel is approximately 
thirty per cent for each; in Poland, however, personnel expenditures averaged sixty-five per 
cent of spending from 1995 to 1997, while procurement averaged only fifteen per cent. 
Military research and development averaged less than one per cent of the budget and 
51 From an interview with Jerzy Szmajdzinski, Deputy Head of the Parliamentary 
Defence Affairs Committee and Romuald Szeremietiew, Secretary of State in the Defence 
Ministry, TV Polonia satellite service, Warsaw, in Polish, 0400 GMT, 17 August 1999, BBC 
Monitoring European - Political, London, 18 August 1999. See also, "Army Fails to Provide 
Basic Needs for Servicemen- Audit Body", Polish Radio 1, Warsaw, BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, as provided by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 15 March 1999. 
52 Osinski interview (P21 ), Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
53 SIPRI military expenditure database: 
http://www.sipri.se/projects/Milex/expenditure/Poland.html 
54 This problem is widely misunderstood both in the West and the post-communist 
states. James Sherr wrote: "The beginning of wisdom is to recognise that the principal 
problem is not resources - a constraint unlikely to change very soon - but the mismatch 
between resources and the force structure established." See Sherr's chapter on Hungary in 
Harald von Riekhoff and Natalie Mychajlyszyn (eds.), Report on Specific Problems of Civil-
Military Relations in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, Ottawa, Canada: Carleton 
University for the Department of National Defence, 1999, p. 84. 
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investment in infrastructure 3.6 per cent. 55 
Procurement of modern weaponry has been the most politically sensitive issue. 
Officials found themselves subject to conflicting pressures. On the one hand, they had limited 
funds for procurement. On the other hand, the military and a large domestic defence industry 
with strong labour unions were desperate for contracts on new weapons. At the same time, 
"in the minds of freedom fighters and democratic revolutionaries elected after 1989, there was 
still a nagging doubt that maybe the West in its heart of hearts really cared more about its 
financial interests than shared values." The result was that defence officials came to 
"exaggerate both the size of their pocketbook and the immediacy of their need for advanced 
military equipment."- particularly big ticket items like combat aircraft. 56 
The Army 2012 reform programme assumed further changes in the organisational 
structure of the army: reducing manpower to 150,000 troops, changing the personnel 
structure to 25 per cent officers, 25-30 per cent professional NCOs, the remainder conscripts; 
personnel costs to be reduced from over 50 per cent of the budget to 34 per cent in 201 0; 
maintenance costs reduced; and procurement raised to 30 per cent. 57 The procurement 
section of the plan was given positive reviews in a confidential report of the Supreme Allied 
Command Europe (SACEUR).58 
This is not to say that such changes had actually been accomplished; they had not, 
and how exactly they would be was not yet clear. Nonetheless, there was a shift in mentality 
among planners away from simply demanding more money to support a largely unchanged 
military structure to a more reasoned approach based on a calculation of desired ends and 
available means. 
"NATO does not want these countries to start a process of spending lots of money on 
55 Figures are calculated on the basis of data from a table in The Military Balance 
1997-1998, p. 37. Personnel costs were not broken down by categories: salaries, pensions 
and allowances. Polish figures for 1999-2000, however, show pensions and allowances 
accounting for 45 per cent of total personnel costs. See, Basic Information on the MoNO 
Budget for 2000, Warsaw, Ministry of National Defence, Budget Department, 2000, pp. 13-
14. 
56 Bruce Jackson from the Lockheed-Martin aerospace company quoted in Jorgen 
Dragsdahl, "NATO Resists Pressures to Militarise Central Europe", BASIC Paper 28 (July 
1998). 
57 Firlej interview (P9), Warsaw, 13 June 2000, and Sodolski interview (P26), 
Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
58 Both an excerpt of the SACEUR report and a summary of the procurement plan 
are found in Dragsdahl, "NATO Resists ... " 
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re-equipment," said a NATO spokesman in 1999. "What is more important is that the 
equipment they have represents investment which is bearable for their weak economies -
let's be frank, they are in transition, their economies are weak- so that we can work 
together."59 During a visit to Poland in March 1998, NATO SACEUR General Wesley Clark 
allegedly made the point that "I have no need for modern fighters with pilots having only 40 
hours of flying time."60 On the eve of its accession to NATO, more and more Polish defence 
officials were beginning to grasp the wisdom of this statement. 
Hungary's reform programme. Like Poland, Hungary's joining up to Partnership for 
Peace coincided with the first increase in the military budget since 1988 from US$556 million 
in 1994 to US$641 million in 1995. In contrast with Poland, however, the budget increase was 
not sustained, falling both in absolute terms to US$520 million in 1996 and US$511 million in 
1997, and as a percentage of GDP from 1.6 per cent in 1994 to 1.3 per cent in 1998 (the 
lowest of the three new NATO members). Only in 1998 did the budget begin to rise again to 
US$648 million after the government committed itself to raising the defence budget by 0.01 
per cent of GOP annually until reaching a level of 1.8 per cent of GDP. 61 
The Hungarian budget exhibited dysfunction in the way it allocated resources among 
spending categories. Personnel costs from 1995 to 1997 averaged 49.9 per cent of total 
spending; 37 per cent was devoted to operations and maintenance; and only 4.9 per cent to 
procurement (only 2 per cent by 1997).62 To make matters worse, the ministry of defence 
was required to generate up to twenty per cent of its budget for itself (through a variety of 
commercial ventures and sale of surplus equipment) in what were called "predesignated 
expenses". If the military failed to generate the required money no new funds from the state 
budget would be applied to make up the difference. 53 In short, the defence budget was as 
skewed as the Polish budget in terms of its allocation of resources, but it was even more 
unstable. 
With procurement spending so low, military modernisation was proving to be a 
59 Quoted in O'Rourke, "NATO: New Members Had Military ... " 
60 Ibid. 
61 The Military Balance 1995-1996 shows an increase in spending from 1994 to 1995 
(p. 87). The SIPRI military expenditure database shows only a slowing of decline. Both 
agree that spending began to rise in 1998. 
62 Figures are calculated on the basis of data from a table in The Military Balance 
1997-1998, p. 37. 
63 Szenes interview (H20), Glasgow, 20 March 2000. 
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fantasy. In 1993, 113 units of an American-made identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) system and 
a small number of French-made Mistral and Atlas missiles were purchased. Otherwise, most 
procurement was of used equipment, mainly from Russia, Belarus and GDR stocks.64 
The military was, in essence, being de-modernised. All in all, the defence budget 
between 1994 and 1998 was insufficient and produced a crisis in the military. The ministry of 
defence could only keep its equipment operable through the cannibalisation of assets freed up 
by the execution of its CFE Treaty obligations. Stocks of fuel, spare parts and so on grew 
smaller. At the same time, the renovation of barracks and other installations on military bases 
had to be put off which, in turn, made the recruitment of professional soldiers even more 
complicated. New systems were not being created, while existing ones were allowed to 
disintegrate. Even the relatively modern MIG-29s acquired from Russia proved a double-
edged sword since the cost of one flight hour in a MIG-29 was five times the cost of that in the 
old MIG-21.65 
As with Poland, however, the state of the budget explains only part of the problem. At 
a more basic level, the problem was that politicians had not decided on a concept of security; 
because of that they had no clear ideas about the resolution of the problems of the military 
and could not provide real guidance. What emerged was a conflict of military vs civilian 
psychology: 
... the military mind wants to be doing something, to be active, to make plans 
and to put them into action. But in Hungary, civilians did not know what to do. 
They had so many problems that giving guidance to the military was not a 
priority. So, the military did things for itself without seriously checking in with 
political or societal opinions. Some units were relocated (which cost a lot of 
money) only to be cut the next year. There were lots of examples like that, a lot 
of money was wasted. 66 
The politicians lacked experience in the defence sphere and failed to recognise their 
responsibilities. On the other side, the thinking of the military was very narrow, focussing on 
the problems of the military, not on the troubles in the country that limited the capacity of the 
state to modernise the armed forces: 
1997). 
It was a really big problem that the civilian side did not have enough experience 
to say how to reform and modernise the military structure, how to modify the 
system and make it work better and so on. And they did not want to believe the 
64 
"NATO Papers Belie Modest Expansion Cost", Defense News 8-14 December 
65 Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, The First Decade of the Independent 
Hungarian Security Policy, 1989-1999, Budapest: October 1999, p. 84. 
66 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
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suggestions of the military.67 
Things began to improve with the second large military reform in Hungary in 1996-97 under 
the MSZMP government which was straightforward: "to create smaller and modern armed 
forces with deterrence value and capable of integration into the military organisations of 
NAT0".68 The defence command was converted to a NATO-type joint staff structure in 
September 1997. The numerical strength of the army was reduced between 1994 and 1998 
by forty-five per cent from 97,800 troops in 1994 to 53,150 in 1998. The percentage of officers 
rose from 16 per cent of personnel to 18 per cent, while NCOs rose from 11 to 18 per cent 
over the same period. 69 The length of obligatory military service was also cut back to 10 
months in February 1996. 
On the eve of its accession to NATO, Hungary was lagging somewhat behind Poland 
in coming to grips with the problems in its defence establishment and designing solutions 
from first principles. The budgetary crisis was deeper and longer than in Poland; while elites 
allowed the situation to drift without direction for longer. As a result, defence reform made 
less progress from 1994 to 1998. To its credit, the ministry of defence had made efficient use 
of the meagre resources allotted to it in trying circumstances, but estimable crisis 
management skills could not mask the obvious decline of the armed forces. That said, the 
pressure of looming accession was beginning to have an effect on Hungarian policy-makers: 
Until last year [1998] the government never paid any attention to the military. 
But when it was clear we were getting into NATO it changed things. Before, 
because the civilians had no experience and no interest in defence issues they 
did not want to spend any money or to plan anything. And the military could not 
push them. They could not say 'hey guys, look at the future!' Every new 
government had a different policy. Now with NATO, the military can say 'OK 
gentlemen you wrote this and this in your document, so what about the 
practice?' Its harder for the politicians to say they have no money for that now. 
There is a common interest now, the civilians realise they have to do 
something in the military because otherwise within two years there will be 
nothing. 70 
67 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
68 Parliamentary resolution 88/1995 (VII.6), cited in The First Decade of the 
Independent Hungarian Security Policy, p. 72. 
69 Ibid., p. 7 4. Figures from the Military Balance for the same period are slightly 
different (presumably due to different ways of categorising personnel) but show roughly the 
same 45 per cent decline over four years. 
70 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
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THE FIRST YEAR IN NATO: IMPLEMENTING REFORMS, PERSISTING PROBLEMS 
After the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 there were reports in some Western media that 
one or another of the new members were militarily not fit for NAT0.71 Such reports were true 
in a sense and, at the same time, quite unfair. The fact is that almost no member states' 
armed forces were ready for the future roles and missions envisaged in the latest NATO 
Strategic Concept. Nonetheless, the deficiencies of the Polish and Hungarian armies were 
quite evident: 
1/ Major changes in the personnel structure of the armed forces were required. 
Crucially, they lacked a corps of professional NCOs -the essential linchpin of 
Western-style armed forces. Within the officer corps there were far too many senior 
officers and not enough junior officers. 
21 Attracting high quality recruits for the military profession and retaining them required 
improving barracks and housing for servicemen and their families, raising salaries, 
and increasing the prestige of military service. 
3/ Efforts to improve interoperability with NATO forces, especially in the area of 
command, control and communications systems had to be intensified. 
4/ Education and training had to be improved, not only in the technical sense such as 
increasing the flying hours of pilots, but also in language and military professionalism. 
5/ Modernisation of military equipment had to be undertaken, especially systems required 
for more flexible and deployable forces such as support, transport and logistics 
systems. 
It was clear from the beginning that the transformation of the armed forces would not be easy. 
Considering the position from which they started, the progress achieved by the new members 
by March 1999 was considerable. In the words of a Hungarian analyst speaking in late 1999: 
We know very well that the technical level of the Hungarian military is not good 
enough for NATO. That is no secret to anyone. In many respects it does not 
meet basic requirements and there are some basic policy documents which 
are still not ready. But the way of thinking in the military from the sergeants to 
the generals is changing. In this way, joining up to NATO has definitely been 
beneficial. 72 
A more reasonable concern was that having achieved the goal of acceding to NATO, elites 
would be tempted to ignore defence reform and that a new period of stagnation would set in 
as the pressure for change lessened. The fact that defence spending in Poland, for example, 
71 The Guardian, 7 July 1997, gave an especially harsh assessment of the military 
fitness of the prospective members. 
72 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
began to fall again in 1999 prompted a Polish interlocutor to remonstrate, 
Everybody understands that we have some difficulties with the military budget 
and some of the politicians try to say, 'OK, now we are in NATO so it is not our 
problem anymore. It is the problem of the army to figure it out.' But if our 
military has certain obligations, standards, or requirements stemming from the 
Alliance then it has financial requirements. That is the problem of the Polish 
parliament. Unfortunately, some Polish politicians do not understand this and 
they do not want to take responsibility. 73 
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However, such indicators need to be put in the context of the August 1998 economic crisis 
which hit hard in Eastern Europe. Membership of NATO inevitably produced stress and 
confusion in the Polish and Hungarian armed forces to which they showed signs of adapting, 
learning by doing. But were their politicians following along? In the first year of membership 
there were contradictory signs of both progress and persisting problems. On the one hand, a 
complex understanding of NATO and the responsibilities of membership was not common in 
political circles: 
... the majority of people in politics and in society think of NATO in the old 
terms- like a pre-1991 alliance. In the media that is the way it is discussed. 
But NATO is quite different now and that is not widely recognised. The 
common view of NATO is as if it were a superstate. You know in the papers 
we see articles talking about cooperation with NATO but there is no realisation 
that we are NAT0. 74 
On the other hand, there were signs of progress. Poland managed to work out a new 
Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and armed forces development programme 
while Hungary updated its 1993 Basic Principles of Security Policy and launched a Strategic 
Defence Review. These steps marked the beginning of serious steps in both countries to 
define their defence goals rigorously and to work out reasoned policies for their realisation. 
Poland's new Security Strategy and National Defence Strategy. On 4 January 
2000, a new Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland75 was adopted by the Council of 
Ministers and a National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland was adopted on 23 May 
2000.76 The first document described in some detail Poland's strategic goals, the perceived 
threats to its security, the various national security instruments and the types of activity they 
73 Jazwinski interview (P12), Warsaw 12 June 2000. 
74 Osinski interview (P21), Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
75 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 4 January 2000, can be found in 
English at http://www.msz.gov.pl/english/polzagr/security/ 
76 An informal English translation of the National Defence Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland, 23 May 2000, was provided to me by the Ministry of National Defence. 
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would engage in, the impact of Poland's alliance commitments on its defence, the 
fundamentals of the defence strategy and the roles and organisation of the armed forces. The 
second document reiterated the general propositions of the first and then elaborated in more 
detail the concept of national defence, the organisation of the defence establishment and 
plans for defence preparation. 
Basically, the Security Strategy described the dangers for the country and, roughly, 
what would be done to meet them. The National Defence Strategy contained the mobilization 
plan for the army and described how the army would be manned, deployed, equipped and so 
on. The ministry of foreign affairs was mainly responsible for drafting the Security Strategy, 
while the ministry of defence handled the drafting of the National Defence Strategy.77 
The differences between the 1992 and 2000 versions of the Security Strategy and 
National Defence Strategy stemmed from membership in NATO. The new Security Strategy 
began, 
Membership in the Atlantic Alliance in a significant way has changed Poland's 
geopolitical and geostrategic position. Poland has become a part of an 
effective allied defence system guaranteeing security and providing conditions 
for stable development.l8 
At the same time, the Security Strategy reiterated the threat to peace and stability posed by 
non-traditional factors, such as: ethnic conflicts, economic crises, political instability, human 
rights violations, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organised 
crime. 79 One of the most interesting aspects of the Security Strategy is the declared 
aspiration of Poland to play a "significant role- commensurate with its potential and needs -
in shaping and implementing NATO's politico-defensive strategy towards Eastern Europe." In 
particular, it noted Poland's interest in NATO-Ukrainian cooperation, strengthening its 
independence, democratic institutions and links with European structures.80 
Generally speaking, the Security Strategy and National Defence Strategy are 
considerably more refined and detailed than the 1992 versions they replaced, betraying a 
77 Staron interview (P27), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P14), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
78 Introduction to the Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 3.2.1 "Role of the Atlantic Alliance". 
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more mature analytical approach to defence in Polish military and political circles. 81 
Nonetheless, not all was well with the process of their formulation. The 1992 documents 
were drafted under and approved by the president as the head of the National Security 
Committee. The 2000 policies were drafted under the direction of, and approved by, the 
Cabinet of Ministers. According to the cabinet, the Security Strategy and National Defence 
Strategy were state policy. According to the president, who had not signed them by June 
2000, they were not. 82 
1999 also showed continuing signs of difficulty meeting obligations to NATO. The 
Army 2012 reform programme was coming under severe criticism from Bronislaw 
Komorowski, then chairman of the parliamentary national defence committee, who told Polish 
Radio on 27 December that the plan was based "on financial hopes rather than realities" and 
that owing to low defence spending efforts to modernise and adapt the armed forces to NATO 
standards would have to be cut back.83 
Hungary's new Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy and the 
Strategic Defence Review. Hungary's 1993 National Security Principles and the Basic 
Principles of National Defence were updated in 1998. The principal motivation for reworking 
the documents was to bring policy into line with the implications of NATO membership. The 
preamble to the Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy of the Hungarian Republic84 
reads much the same as the Polish Security Strategy, noting that the attainment of full NATO 
membership drastically changed the security environment of Hungary for the better while also 
pointing out a broad range of non-traditional threats to security. The problem with the Basic 
Principles is that they were only meant to provide a framework for the development of a much 
more detailed National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy which were supposed 
to have been approved in the summer of 1999 but have not yet been approved as of April 
81 Measured against analogous Western documents such as Canada's 1994 
Defence White Paper, Britain's 1996 Statement on Defence Estimates or its 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review, Poland's efforts still seem rather general. However, compared with the 
1992 documents they represent considerable progress. 
82 Staron interview (P27), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P14), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
83 
"NATO's 1999 Targets Not Achieved", RFE/RL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 1 (4 January 2000). 
84 Basic Principles of Security and Defence Policy of the Hungarian Republic, 
Parliamentary Act 94/1998, 29 December 1998. An English-language synopsis of the 
document was provided to me by Nicholas Sarvari. 
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2001. Without a security strategy, however, there can be no reasoned basis for the 
development of the armed forces; without a military strategy, force requirements and unit 
designs cannot be worked out properly. Detailed work in any functional area runs the risk of 
being misdirected if it is not based on the objectives and tasks set out in these crucial 
documents. Nonetheless, in July 1999 the government ordered that a steering group led by 
the administrative state secretary of defence and made up of senior civilians and military 
leaders conduct a Strategic Defence Review with the purpose of creating modern, NATO-
compatible armed forces. 
Specific weaknesses of the Hungarian defence forces that were highlighted in the 
Strategic Defence Review included: force structure and doctrine, force design, military pay, 
personnel management, recruitment, leadership training, base infrastructure, equipment and 
training. Inter alia, the table of organisation and equipment of units were judged to be in quite 
poor shape, being essentially based on Soviet models with inappropriate authorisations of 
officers, NCOs and men. The pay system was found to favour position over rank and to 
reward officers serving in higher headquarters more than officers in command of operational 
forces. The facilities found on military bases were in extremely poor shape since most were 
built in the 1950s and had suffered from a decade of essentially no maintenance throughout 
the 1990s.85 
The Strategic Defence Review was hardly an unqualified success. It identified many 
of the problems of the military, but how exactly the ministry of defence was going to address 
specific problems such as the creation of a corps of NCOs, the unbalanced structure of the 
officer corps, or the essential unattractiveness of the military profession in society was not 
spelled out. Moreover, as soon as the review was announced it came under fire from 
opposition politicians, military officers and academics. In the opinion of a senior Hungarian 
officer, the government was misguided in conducting the review "in a strictly top-down 
manner with the involvement of very few senior military personnel. Not only was the 
involvement of the military missing during the review but opposition members of the 
parliamentary defence committee were also not included."86 
Nonetheless, at the end of their first year in NATO there were tentative signs that the 
Hungarian government was taking stock of its desired ends and available means in the 
85 I am indebted to MAJ GEN Wayne Knudsen for ·'w$lking me through" the Strategic 
Defence Review and detailing to me his firm's recommendations to the Hungarian 
government: Knudsen interview (H9), Budapest, 1 January 2001. 
86 Szenes, in Betz and Lowenhardt, Army and State ... , p. 92. 
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defence sphere. Heretofore, defence reform had been driven mainly by unstructured cuts. 
Shortly after the Strategic Defence Review, the government committed itself to raising 
defence spending to 1.61 per cent of GOP by 2001. It also eliminated the "pre-designated 
expenses" which had reduced the military budget throughout the 1990s. The ministry of 
defence was permitted to transfer obsolete military equipment to the State Privatisation 
Corporation which meant that it would not have to waste time and resources storing and 
guarding redundant equipment. Additionally, in 1999 the ministry received a one time financial 
injection from the government in order to pay debts to banks that had been accumulating 
since the purchase of the Mistral/Atlas rocket system in the early 1990s.87 
87 Ibid. 
2.2: Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform - Former Soviet 
Union 
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In the normative sense of deliberate, orderly, change for the better it is reasonable to say that 
neither Ukraine nor Russia accomplished much reform of their defence establishments in the 
period under review. To be sure the armed forces of both countries experienced profound 
changes, but changes for the better were few and far between in a time characterised by 
crises and looming disasters. Before we look at the reasons behind this failure to reform, 
however, it is worthwhile noting in some detail the unique factors in Russia and Ukraine that 
figure into the analysis. 
From January 1654, when the Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky swore 
allegiance to the Russian Tsar Alexis I at Pereyeslavl, until the Ukrainian Declaration of 
Independence in August 1991, Ukraine and Russia existed as separate states for only a few 
short years (1918-1921 ). Given this history it is no surprise that the similarities between 
Russia and Ukraine outweigh the differences by a large margin. Nonetheless, as with Poland 
and Hungary there are crucial differences which bear examination. 
Relative maturity of the defence establishment. Ten years after the collapse of the 
USSR it is easy to forget that the huge arsenal of the Soviet forces based in Ukraine made the 
nascent Ukrainian army, on paper, one of the strongest in the world. Yet the raw numbers 
belie a deeper reality: what Ukraine inherited was not an army as such; rather, it simply laid 
claim to the parts of the dismembered Soviet army that happened to have been based on its 
territory, minus the bureaucratic structures needed for its management and control which 
existed only in Moscow. It had no ministry of defence, no general staff, no central command 
structure nor any other administrative apparatus for its defence establishment in 1991. 
In the early 1990s, Russia's military existed in a kind of administrative limbo. Initially, it 
was intended that the Soviet armed forces would be preserved in some form by the creation 
of the CIS Joint Forces to which the armed forces of the successor states would be 
subordinated. This implied that much of the bureaucratic structures of the Soviet ministry of 
defence would remain at the supra-national CIS level. However, as it became obvious that 
most of the newly independent states, notably Ukraine, were unenthusiastic about belonging 
to a unified CIS armed forces headquartered in Moscow and directed by the Kremlin, a 
Russian Federation ministry of defence was created in May 1992.88 With this act, most of the 
bureaucratic structures of the CIS (effectively Soviet) ministry of defence and general staff 
88 The text of the 7 May 1992 Presidential Decree creating the Russian armed forces 
was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 May 1992. 
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were appropriated by the Russian ministry of defence.89 
Relations with the West. The main differences between Russia and Ukraine lie in 
the contrasting attitudes of their political elites to the West in general and to NATO in 
particular. In Russia, the spectrum of foreign policy views have been seen by some as 
including "liberal westernizers" at one extreme, opposed by "fundamentalist nationalists" on 
the other, with"pragmatic nationalists" occupying the middle ground. Liberal westernizers, 
broadly speaking, were democrats in favour of the free market and believed in maintaining 
friendly relations with the West. Pragmatic nationalists also professed admiration for 
democratic principles and capitalism, but stressed the necessity that they be adapted to 
Russian conditions. They favoured good relations with the West, yet they also did not shy 
from putting Russian national interests ahead of any international agenda. Fundamentalist 
nationalists believed in a unique Russian (or Eurasian) approach to economic and political 
development which entailed preservation of many elements of authoritarianism. They tended 
to view the West as implacably hostile and favoured restoring Russia's regional hegemony.90 
In the early 1990s, particularly when Andrei Kozyrev headed the foreign ministry, 
Russian policy tended to reflect the liberal westernizing view. In 1994 Russia joined 
Partnership for Peace (though amidst heavy domestic opposition). In the mid- and late-
1990s, however,- attitudes toward the West began to harden. The NATO-Russia Founding Act 
of 27 May 1997 did not assuage Russian fears of increasing exclusion from the centre of 
European security decision-making. 91 A few Russian analysts voiced cautious support for the 
Act, suggesting that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council which it established might 
allow Russia a voice in European security issues. 92 But the majority of analysts and political 
89 For an overview of the security policy landscape in the fSU states in the early 
1990s, see: Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Oxford, UK: 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 280, 1993. 
90 The terms are a widely used convenience for categorising foreign policy views in 
Russia first coined in Neil Malcolm et al., Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
91 According to the NATO Handbook: "The NATO-Russia Founding Act is the 
expression of an enduring commitment, undertaken at the highest political level, to work 
together to build a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. It creates the 
framework for a new security partnership, as one step among others which are being taken 
to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. It allows the Alliance and Russia to forge a 
closer relationship, not only in their own interests, but also in the wider interests of all other 
states in the Euro-Atlantic area." The NATO Handbook, p. 87. 
92 For example, Sergei Rogov, head of the USA/Canada Institute in Izvestia, 28 May 
1997. 
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figures saw it as symbolising Russia's powerlessness to resist the advancement of NAT0.93 
By 1999, under Vladimir Putin pragmatic nationalism had become the order of the day in 
foreign and defence policy. 
As in Russia, a variety of Ukrainian foreign policy camps with opposing views have 
been pointed out. Light and L6wenhardt noted the diverging views of those favouring a "Slavic 
choice" or a "European choice" as significant.94 The "Slavic choice" camp called for 
deepening links with Russia and Belarus with the end goal of creating a federation of the 
Slavic successor states of the USSR. In general, their views were similar to Russian 
fundamentalist nationalists about the essential malice of the West toward the Slavic nations. 
By contrast, those in favour of a "European choice" believed strongly in defending Ukrainian 
sovereignty. To this group, Ukraine's future as a democratic state lay in strengthening links 
with the West, and in particular NATO, as this would help guarantee Ukrainian independence 
from Russia while at the same time stimulate the economy and stabilise democratic 
transformation. On the other hand, they recognised the imperatives of having good relations 
with Russia which necessitated maintaining a tactful policy of official non-alignment.95 
Whereas in Russia liberal westernizers, pragmatic and fundamentalist nationalists 
alike were united in opposition to the enlargement of NATO, Ukrainian authorities did not 
consider NATO a threat. Indeed, Ukraine eagerly joined Partnership for Peace and has been 
by far its most active CIS participant. The July 1997 Ukraine-NATO Charter on a Distinctive 
Partnership was highly esteemed by many Ukrainian analysts who saw it as a potentially 
effective mechanism for counterbalancing the influence of Russia. 96 
In addition to its participation in Partnership for Peace activities abroad, Ukraine hosted 
a number of joint exercises on its territory. 97 Since 7 May 1997 Kiev has hosted a NATO 
Information and Documentation Centre actively disseminating materials on the Alliance to the 
93 For a synopsis of the Russian debate see J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO 
Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000, 
section 1. 
94 Margot Light and John Lowenhardt, "Russian and Ukrainian Elite Attitudes to a 
Wider Europe", paper for the BASEES Conference, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, 1-3 April 
2000, pp. 6-7. 
95 Light and L6wenhardt, p. 6. 
96 Ibid., p. 7. 
97 Eg., "Peace Shield" manoeuvres in 1995 and 1996, "Sea Breeze" 1997 and 
"Guards Partnership" 1998) -often despite Russian objections 
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public and press. As of May 1998, NATO has permanently staffed a formal Liaison Office in 
Kiev in order to facilitate Ukraine's participation in Partnership for Peace. And in November 
1998 a State Programme for Cooperation Between Ukraine and NATO Up to 2000 was 
presented at NATO headquarters which included provision for joint defence planning and 
operations. 
In short, political and military elites in Kiev were much more open to NATO than those 
in Moscow. In 2000 there were more than 500 bilateral and multilateral activities between 
Ukraine and NATO and its member states. In particular, the Ukrainian ministry of defence 
sought to put defence reform under the Partnership for Peace planning and review process 
(PARP). And a NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform was established in 
1999.98 
Unlike Ukraine, Russia made only limited use of training assistance programmes 
offered by NATO or by its member states individually. Military to military contacts were 
hesitant, politically-charged and characterised by considerable mistrust on both sides. 99 No 
officers from the ministry of defence were permitted to attend programmes at the US Army 
Marshall Centre in Southern Germany, for example. The ambivalence of the ministry of 
defence towards participation in Western outreach activities turned to open distrust in 1999 
during the Kosovo conflict. All Russian military personnel training in NATO countries were 
recalled. At the same time, the newly opened NATO Documentation Centre on European 
Security Issues in Moscow was closed down. 
FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WAR IN CHECHNYA: REFORM 
BY DECLARATION 
Under the terms of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, between them 
Russia and Ukraine were entitled to maintain in the European part of the former USSR up to 
79 per cent of the tanks, 85 per cent of the artillery, 88 per cent of the combat aircraft and 71 
98 This contrast of Russian and Ukrainian views is based in part on interviews in Kiev 
at the NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine, the NATO Information and Documentation Centre, 
NATO's Russia/Ukraine Branch, and members of the Joint Working Group on defence 
reform, as well as the NATO Documentation Centre for European Security in Moscow: 
Bachman interview (U9), Kiev, 25 January 2001; Melnyczuk interview (U21 ), Kiev, 24 January 
2001; Greene interview (U14), Kiev, 25 January 2001; Wenmakers interview (U31), Kiev, 25 
January 2001; and, Parkhalina interview (R29), Moscow, December 1998. 
99 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich looks at the impact of US-Russian military to military 
contacts in Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian 
Armed Forces, Ann Arbor, Ml: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
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per cent of the combat helicopters of the Soviet armed forces. In terms of manpower, Russia 
had an army of 2.72 million men and Ukraine had an army of 726,000 in 1992.100 
Table 1: Major Weapon Systems of the Russian and Ukrainian Armed Forces 1992t 
Main Battle Artillery Systems Combat Aircraft Attack 
Tanks Helicopters 
Russia 7,993 (6,400):j: 7,003 (11 ,480):j: 4,387 (3,450):j: 989 (890):j: 
Ukraine 6,052 (4,080):j: 3,602 (4,040):j: 1 ,650 (1 ,090):j: 74 (330):j: 
Totalo 13,150 18,240 5,150 1,500 
t Includes Russ1an forces west of the Urals only 
:j: Numbers in brackets indicate CFE limits as opposed to actual holdings 
o Total includes assets of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova which are not 
listed 
Source: Based on a table found in the appendix of Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet 
Successor States, London: I ISS, Adelphi Paper No. 280, 1993, p. 86. 
This legacy was both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the vast stockpiles of 
Soviet military materiel enabled both armies to endure the collapse of procurement in the 
1990s without having their forces fall into complete ruin for much longer than might have been 
expected. To these advantages must be added the benefit of having inherited a large number 
of well-trained professional officers accustomed to strategic planning in a way that officers in 
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states were not. 
On the other hand, what the division of the Soviet army's personnel and equipment left 
Russia and Ukraine with were disoriented, skewed, embittered and essentially rudderless 
militaries facing a myriad of crippling and inextricably linked problems.101 
Many of the forces Russia took over, for example, were third-rate cadre units manned 
at low levels and equipped with older equipment.102 The best units were the more than 
600,000 serving abroad. Unfortunately, repatriation of these forces represented a logistical 
nightmare for the general staff. Often depleted or fragmented - and with their dependents 
amounting to more than a million people -these military formations had to be absorbed into 
formerly second or third echelon military districts where no adequate facilities existed for their 
housing, training or upkeep. 
100 The Military Balance, 1993-1994. 
101 Charles Dick described the Russian military as a "hollow army". See, C.J. Dick, 
"A Bear Without Claws: The Russian Army in the 1990s," The Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 2. 
102 See, Roy Allison, "The Russian Armed Forces: Structures, Roles and Policies", in 
V. Baranovsky (ed.), Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press/SIPRI, 1997. 
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Moreover, inheriting the Soviet officer corps was also a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, the Ukrainian and Russian officer corps possessed a wealth of military expertise 
and experience in strategic planning. But this came at a price: the preservation of the old-
thinking, prejudices and blinkered conservatism of the old Soviet officer corps. 
A key feature of the Soviet military mindset which is still prevalent in the Russian and 
Ukrainian defence establishments is the distinction between the concepts of "military reform" 
and "reform of the armed forces". This difference was clearly demarcated by Russia's 
second minister of defence, Igor Rodionov, who argued that "military reform is the process of 
bringing the entire defence activity of the state into conformity with the new political, economic 
and social changes in the society ... [It] is not quantitative change in the armed forces but a 
fundamental qualitative reorganisation of the essence of the state's military system." As he 
saw it, this was the responsibility of the political leadership of the state. It was they who must 
determine the objectives of military reform and see that they were put into effect. "Reform of 
the armed forces," on the other hand, "is but a component of [i.e., dependent on] military 
reform." It is the responsibility of the ministry of defence under the guidance and supervision 
of the civilian government.103 
There is a certain logic to this intellectual approach to reform and the firm belief of the 
army that it should be the instrument of the state and not its master is admirable. 
Nonetheless, it is also true that this attitude prompted the Russian and Ukrainian military elite 
to adopt a dilatory approach to reform; without clear cut guidelines or leadership from their 
civilian masters the training and gut instinct of the military leadership in both countries was to 
see their duty as being not so much to build a new system as it was to preserve as much as 
possible of the old until the arrival of better times permitted more investment. 
The strategic context of defence policy. For Russia the main strategic reality to be 
confronted in the 1990s was the loss of its allies in the Warsaw Pact as well as the fourteen 
other former republics of the USSR. In the past, Russia faced potential conflicts to the east 
with China and to the west with NATO. While conflict on these frontiers was potentially 
dangerous to the point of nuclear confrontation, it was also stable and, to a large extent, 
predictable. By contrast, the 1990s was a time of open or latent conflict on almost every 
frontier. To the south Russian strategic planners perceived a growing threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism aimed at them from outside the borders of the USSR, from some of the CIS 
states, and from some areas of the Federation itself. From the east economically and 
103 Quoted in Michael Orr, Rodionov and Reform, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, C92, January 1997, p. 3. 
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militarily ascendant China posed a threat to the underpopulated, resource-rich far eastern 
regions of Russia. While from the West NATO bent on expanding eastward, perhaps even so 
far as to taking on former Soviet republics, was a gnawing concern to Russians of nearly 
every political stripe. 
By contrast, Ukraine had never had a "strategic context" of its own. It had none of 
Russia's aspirations to great power status nor did it harbour designs on the territory of any of 
its neighbours. Nevertheless, as the westernmost (Slavic) successor state of the USSR, 
situated at the crossroads between Europe and the mineral and oil resources of south Russia 
and the Caucasus, and occupying the northern coast of the Black Sea, post-Soviet Ukraine 
was also a country of exceptional strategic importance.104 
Crisis in the armed forces. Like Poland and Hungary, reform of the armed forces in 
Russia and Ukraine was driven by the need to adjust the size, composition and structure of 
the armed forces to reflect the new political and military situation as well as the economic 
potential of the state. To a much greater extent than in Central Europe, however, the 
problems of the armed forces in the former Soviet Union states grew to crisis proportions as 
military and political elites failed to reach any workable consensus on the ends and means of 
reform. 
In both Ukraine and Russia a clear institutional preference for mass armies was 
evident among the military leadership. Thus the desire in both armies was to preserve the 
organisational structure of the mass Soviet army despite the obvious lack of money which 
made such preservation practically impossible. The results of this disjuncture between the 
size of the military and its level of funding were made clear by Shlykov in 1997: 
If we were to begin to supply and pay and, most importantly, train Russian 
soldiers as the countries of NATO and China do we could afford an army of the 
following size: 100,000 men according to the American model, 120,000 
according to the English model, 180,000 according to the German model, 
170,000 according to the French model, and 360,000 according to the Chinese 
model.105 
104 For a fuller discussion of Ukraine's strategic location see Sherman W. Garnett, 
Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1997. 
105 Vitaliy Shlykov, "The Budget and the Army", Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 35, No. 
5 (September-October 1997), p. 72. Christopher Bluth cited general staff calculations that 
with realistic funding projections there were three alternatives for the Russian army: 1/ a well-
equipped army of at most 650,000-750,000 men; 2/ a poorly-equipped army of 1.5 million 
men; or, 3/ a substantial increase in the military share of national income. See, Christopher 
Bluth, "Russian Military Forces: Ambitions, Capabilities and Constraints", in Roy Allison and 
Christopher Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, London, UK: Royal 
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By 1998, however, the Russian army still had about 1.2 million men organized into 52 
divisions (active and reserve) and numerous independent brigades, as compared to the 22 
US army and marine divisions for a slightly larger force of 1.45 million men. In short, the army 
insisted on maintaining more divisions than it could effectively man and more troops than it 
could effectively train and equip. 
The basic problem facing both armies was that they absolutely lacked the financial 
wherewithal to maintain a professional military. In both countries financial obligations to 
retiring servicemen made disbanding units more expensive than manning them.106 For 
example, it was estimated in 1996 that it cost 14 billion rubles to maintain a motorised rifle 
regiment as opposed to 48 billion to disband it.107 
Thus the military leadership was faced with a dilemma: without the political will to 
make an extra-budgetary financial investment in downsizing, the ministry of defence could not 
release personnel. In both Ukraine and Russia the upshot of the situation was that service in 
the ranks of the armed forces quickly became applicable only to the lumpenised strata of 
society who either lacked the means to avoid service or who were so poor that military 
service still looked like an avenue for social mobility. 
Increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces was another broad and frequently 
stated main goal of reform. 108 The reality, however, was that in the 1990s both militaries 
slipped into deep decay. Effective training essentially ceased with exercises above battalion 
size growing exceedingly rare. Pilots logged flight hours less than a fifth of those considered 
by NATO forces as the minimum necessary to maintain proficiency. Ships ceased putting to 
sea for lack of fuel and parts. Equipment became unserviceable for lack of regular 
Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 81. 
106 In Russia discharged officers with more than five years of service were legally 
entitled to a severance package which included a pension, an apartment, and payment of all 
wage arrears and allowances. 
107 See, Michael Orr, The Deepest Crisis: The Problems of the Russian Army Today, 
Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Occasional Brief 
48, 4 October 1996, p. 4. The situation was much the same in Ukraine. See, report in 
Narodna Armiya, 2 April 1999, cited in "Military Reform in Ukraine: Start or Another False 
Start?" National Security and Defence, No 1 (2000), p. 22. 
108 Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's description of the state's reform objectives 
included developing a core of well-trained, well-equipped, and well-funded troops with high 
strategic mobility and operational readiness. Reported by lnterfax, 4 October 1996, FBIS-
SOV-96-195. 
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maintenance. And procurement of new equipment fell almost to zero. 109 
Grachev's reform programme and the 1993 Military Doctrine. In July 1992, 
shortly after his appointment, defence minister Pavel Grachev announced his plans for 
reforming the armed forces. He suggested that the military be reformed in three stages over 
a period of six to eight years. In the first stage (one to two years), a ministry of defence would 
be set up, plans for the numerical strength and structure of the armed forces would be made, 
and a system for controlling the sequence and time frame for defence reform would be 
established. In the second stage (two to three years), the total strength of the armed forces 
would be reduced to 2.1 million (by 1995), and a mixed manning system would be introduced. 
During the third stage (three to four years), the force reductions mandated by the CFE would 
be implemented, structural and organizational reforms would also be launched and the 
numerical strength of the armed forces further reduced to as low as 1.5 million troops. The 
only really novel element in Grachev's plan was its emphasis on the creation of "mobile 
forces". These mobile forces equipped with high-tech weapons would be based mainly on 
the five airborne divisions and three independent brigades Russia inherited from the Soviet 
Union. 110 
As their former commander, Grachev's favouring of the airborne forces was 
predictable. However, the logic of having smaller, more mobile forces equipped with high-
tech weaponry was not unsound. 111 Nonetheless, in view of the fiscal straitjacket placed on 
the state the plan was unmistakably utopian. How the ministry of defence was going to pay to 
109 The profound degradation of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces has been 
covered widely and in minute detail. A few excellent studies include: C.J. Dick, "A Bear 
Without Claws: The Russian Army in the 1990s," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 2; Benjamin Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military", Foreign 
Affairs (March/April 1995), pp. 86-98; and John Jaworsky, "Ukraine's Armed Forces and 
Military Policy", in Lubomyr A. Hajda (ed.), Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International 
Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian 
Research Institute of Harvard University, 1998, pp. 223-248. 
11° For more detail on the plan for developing mobile forces, see Roy Allison, "The 
Russian Armed Forces: Structures Roles and Politics", in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia 
and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 187-
188. 
111 Indeed, it was very much in line with the rhetoric about the "revolution in military 
affairs" which was growing increasingly vogue in the West. Some of the better examples of 
the vast literature on the revolution in military affairs are Colin S. Gray, "The Changing Nature 
of Warfare?", Naval War College Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 2 (Spring 1996), and Randall G. 
Bowdish, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth Generation", Military Review, 
(November-December 1995). 
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keep a large fraction of the massive military structure of the So.viet Union going while at the 
same time adding on high-tech mobile forces of a new type was never explained. In fact, 
according to Shlykov, no serious and organised discussion of military reform was really 
possible in the ministry of defence under Grachev.112 
It is not surprising then that the mobile force plan was never developed into a concrete 
state programme for reform backed by real political and financial means. In fact, according to 
one analyst, the general staff under General Mikhail Kolesnikov disagreed with Grachev's 
"high-quality/low quantity" army and quietly sabotaged the mobile force plans113 
Nonetheless, throughout the early 1990s, Yeltsin periodically proclaimed military 
reform to be on track. Speaking to the collegium of the ministry of defence in Moscow on 14 
November 1994 Yeltsin stated that the creation of the mobile forces was being completed, 
that a new concept for the development of the armed forces was drawing to a close and that 
Grachev was the best defence minister of the past decade.114 But the overt military campaign 
to reassert federal control over Chechnya which commenced on 11 December 1994 brought 
an end to the charade. 
During this time, the Russian government did take some formal steps to reform the 
military, to place it within a new legal and administrative framework, and to modify the military 
doctrine. But the new state was too disorganized to pursue a consistent and effective course 
in any area, and the president's attention was focussed not on creating a viable system of 
civil-military relations, but rather on assuring the army's loyalty in the bitter struggles for power 
-at a time when the military budget was being drastically slashed. Yeltsin's solution to the 
problem was to put the army under the command of people he trusted - and to grant the 
military a considerable autonomy in coping with the hard times from its own means as it saw 
fit; like in so many other areas of Russia's transition, Yeltsin's success was primarily in the 
destruction of the old system, rather than in the creation of a new one. 
Russia pronounced its first Military Doctrine on 2 November 1993.115 At the time the 
112 Shlykov interview (R30), Geneva, November 2000. 
113 Felgenhauer interview (R24), Moscow, December 1998. 
114 Quoted in Vitaliy Shlykov, "The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform 
and Creation of Mobile Forces", in Mikhail Tsypkin (ed.), War In Chechnya: Implications for 
Russian Security Policy, Monterey, CA: Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1996, web version at: 
http:/lwww.fas.org/man/dod-1 01/ops/war/docs/shl. htm 
115 The military doctrine was passed by the Security Council and issued as a Decree 
of the President of the Russian Federation (No. 1833) on 2 November 1993. Initially the 
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doctrine was issued the political power of the pro-Western elite in Russia was already 
beginning to wane. That said, the doctrine did not mark a complete about face to an anti-
Western stance; rather, there was a more subtle shift in emphasis and nuance. On the one 
hand, the doctrine was explicitly defensive in nature. Moreover, non-military means of conflict 
resolution were preferred over the use of force. It also presumed no threat from the West or 
imminence of a global war. On the other hand, neither was the possibility of conflict between 
Russia and the West ruled out. According to the doctrine, while the threat of armed 
aggression against the Russian Federation had diminished, it had not disappeared. The main 
danger was seen in local wars and regional conflicts exacerbated by "social, political, 
economic, territorial, religious, national-ethnic and other contradictions ... " But the "expansion 
of military blocs and alliances ... "was also noted as a threat to security.116 
The most significant aspects of the 1993 Military Doctrine were, first, its subtle 
differences from a draft doctrine published in May 1992 which was thought to have been the 
product of the general staff while the 1993 doctrine was reputedly the work of the ministry of 
defence.117 The 1993 Military Doctrine muted the prospect of confrontation with the West. By 
contrast, the 1992 draft strongly implied the hostility of the United States and NATO. This 
suggests that the general staff and the ministry of defence did not see eye to eye on the 
threats to Russia's security but that the view of the ministry of defence had more backing in 
political circles at the time. 
Second, the 1993 Military Doctrine had only the most tenuous connection to an 
overarching security concept. Presumably, there was some connection to the Basic 
Provisions of a Foreign Policy Concept which was adopted by the Security Council around the 
same time. 118 Nonetheless, at the time Russia had no formal security concept as such. As 
a result, both the 1992 draft and the approved doctrine of 1993 read very much as expositions 
doctrine was not to be published but detailed summaries were published by Izvestia, 18 
November 1993, and Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 November 1993. For a detailed summary and 
comment on the doctrine in English see Charles J. Dick, "The Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 7, No.3 (September 1994), pp. 
481-506. 
116 Quotes from the military doctrine are taken from Dick, "Military Doctrine of the 
Russian ... ", pp. 485-486. 
117 For a summary and analysis of the 1992 draft doctrine see: Charles J. Dick, 
"Initial Thoughts on Russia's Draft Military Doctrine", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 5, 
No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 552-566. 
118 This was never published. Pavel Baev discusses it in The Russian Army in a 
Time of Troubles, London: Sage, 1996, p. 31. 
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of the army's preferences for military development and reflected their world view of potential 
threats rather than the considered foreign and security policy plans of the state as a whole. 
In short, there was little sign in either document of a civilian influence. This suggests 
that the 1993 Military Doctrine was written by the military leadership in an attempt to lock their 
priorities into state policy before those of the politicians had clarified. 
The formal approval of the 1993 Military Doctrine despite its disconnection from any 
overarching foreign policy concept, its absence of any obvious civilian input and its calls for 
greater investment in the armed forces can only be understood in the context of the October 
Crisis of that year. Yeltsin's strong political instincts warned him early on in 1992-1993 that 
the military might be the decisive player in the rapidly escalating confrontation between him 
and the parliament. Accordingly, he took care that the generals were on his side by promising 
to give the army a higher priority in financing than the economic situation warranted. In 
essence, the Military Doctrine of 1993, which was enacted by presidential decree (No. 1833) 
just a few days after the bombardment of the White House by army tanks brought the 
parliamentary revolt of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov to an end, was part of the price Yeltsin paid 
for the army's support. 
Shortly afterwards, in answer to a reporter's question of what the army would do if the 
Duma amended his new military doctrine, Grachev replied "we shall amend the parliament."119 
In a normal country such a joke from the top military officer would have been his last official 
statement. In Russia at the time it simply reflected the reality of the balance of political power: 
the military had protected the president in return for which the president promised to protect 
the military's budget; the parliament could say nothing about it. In short, the 1993 Military 
Doctrine was not written with the purpose of defining the military crises with which Russia 
might be faced; rather, it was designed to justify the goals of the military leadership. 
It is easy to claim that essentially nothing was accomplished in terms of reforming the 
Russian military in the first few years of the 1990s. However, the general staff should be 
credited with carrying out determinedly and relatively efficiently four major tasks: the 
withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states; the withdrawal of 
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; the distribution 
of CFE quotas of conventional armaments between Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine; and, the consolidation of control over forces in a number of conflict 
119 
"Expert Sees Hawks Win on Military Doctrine," FBIS-SOV-EUR, 18 November 
1993. 
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areas (Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan).120 
Nonetheless, little else was accomplished and the war in Chechnya effectively brought 
to an end the implicit bargain between Yeltsin and the military- loyalty in return for priority in 
funding. Indeed, the war in Chechnya convinced many military officers of the essential 
malfeasance of the Yeltsin regime which sent an unprepared army into battle against its own 
citizens only to withdraw support and deny responsibility for the campaign when things went 
bad, leaving the army to "hold the bag".121 
The breakdown of the compact between Yelstin and the ministry of defence was 
evident in the fall in defence spending. From 1992 to 1994 the defence budget had been 
relatively stable. According to estimates of the IISS the budget even rose slightly from 
US$74.6 billion in 1992 to US$79.0 billion in 1994. More conservative estimates from SIPRI 
point to a decline in that period from US$47.5 billion in 1992 to US$40.5 billion in 1994. Both 
institutes, however, point to a sharp decline in the defence budget in 1995, to US$62 billion 
according to the IISS, or to US$25.7 billion according to SIPRI- a plunge of 22 or 27.5 per 
cent respectively in one year. In short, Yeltsin thoroughly cowed the parliament with the help 
of the military. But he and Grachev did little to actually reform the armed forces. Neither 
could he nor the military force the Duma to spend money it did not have on ill-defined 
schemes for military development in whose development it had been allowed no input. 
Ukrainian military reform and the Military Doctrine of 1993. Ukraine's 24 August 
1991 Declaration of Sovereignty announced the nationalisation of all conventional military 
forces on Ukrainian territory and the determination of the Ukrainian SSR to be a neutral, non-
nuclear state. On 11 October 1991, the Concept for the Defence and the Formation of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine was adopted, providing for a national security structure which 
included a ministry of defence, a Defence Council, and a general staff of the armed forces. 
On 22 November 1991 the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine declared its intention to create a 
national armed forces and a law on the armed forces was passed in December 1991. A 
presidential decree of 5 April 1992 directed that all military formations and troops on Ukrainian 
soil (except strategic nuclear forces) be put under national command and authorised the 
formation of a navy. Finally, in July 1992, a three-year plan to introduce a new military uniform 
120 Pavel Baev, Russian Military Development: 'Muddle Through' From 1992 to 1998 
and Beyond, Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, FFI/Rapport-
99/01229, 1999, p. 10. 
121 Belkin interview (R22), Moscow, December 1998. 
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and insignia was announced.122 
The boldness of Ukrainian authorities in building their own armed forces reflected their 
desire to extricate themselves from the Soviet Union and to avoid any military entanglements 
with Russia either bilaterally or through the CIS. For the most part, however, beyond changes 
on paper and changes in uniform and insignia, very little reform of the armed forces took place 
in the early 1990s. 
In hindsight, the reasons why are clear. Two of the most prominent Ukrainian defence 
analysts, Anatoliy Grytsenko and Leonid Polyakov, highlighted a number of economic, political 
and organisational reasons. They noted that even if the military had enjoyed political and 
funding priority in the first two years of independence, by 1994 in the face of GOP figures 
showing a nearly 50 per cent decline since 1991, the condition of the military was at the 
bottom of the public agenda. According to figures of the I ISS the defence budget plummeted 
from US$3.9 billion in 1993 to just US$881 million in 1994.123 The multitude of legal acts 
adopted concerning defence were all declarative, politicised and naive. What constituted the 
armed forces and its distinction from other military formations were not even defined in 
principle, while their functions were only vaguely specified in the Concept for the Defence and 
the Formation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Law on Defence and the Law on the 
Armed Forces. The result was the narrow-minded reduction of the discussion of national 
security issues to little more than turf wars between various security agencies each claiming 
a share of defence spending. 12-'~ 
Moreover, there was a battle for political power between the presidency and the 
parliament. Much as it was in Russia, in this struggle for power the issue of consuming 
importance to politicians was to whom the armed forces would be subordinated, not the 
planning and direction of its reform. Ukraine found itself in a contradictory situation wherein 
122 For a review of the early legislative acts concerning the establishment of the 
Ukrainian armed forces see: Stephen D. Olynyk, "Ukraine as a Military Power'' in Sharon L. 
Wolchik and Volodymyr Zviglyanich, Ukraine: The Search for a National Identity, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 71-72; Bohdan Psykir, "The Silent Coup: 
The Building of Ukraine's Military", European Security, Vol. 2, No.2 (Spring 1993), pp. 149-
155; and, John Jaworsky, The Military-Strategic Significance of Recent Developments in 
Ukraine, Ottawa, Canada: Directorate of Strategic Analysis, Department of National Defence, 
Report No. 645, pp, 79-80. 
123 Military Balance 1994-1995, p. 103 and Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 100. 
12 -'~ Interviews at the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies: Grytsenko 
interview (U15), Kiev, 1 February 2001, and Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
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the authority to direct reform in the military and the responsibility to fund and support it were 
possessed by different implacably opposed political players: the president had sole authority 
to direct the armed forces, but his responsibility for the state of the army was limited since he 
was not empowered to resolve financial issues; the Rada controlled the budget but it was 
excluded from the planning of military reform and, consequently, it felt no responsibility for its 
execution; while the Cabinet of Ministers also had no role in the resolution of strategic matters 
and so it too assumed no obligation to see that defence policy was wisely designed and 
faithfully enacted. Thus a paradox emerged: the military was under control but no one bore 
responsibility for its critical condition. 125 
With surprising rapidity the Ukrainian ministry of defence prepared a draft military 
doctrine in early 1992. However, the draft was twice rejected by the Verkhovna Rada before 
being adopted formally on 19 October 1993. The Rada's initial rejections of the draft hinged 
on two factors. One was that the first draft, in line with the July 1990 Declaration of 
Sovereignty1 26 , included a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons which many Ukrainian 
policy-makers were unwilling to support. The non-nuclear provisions of the Declaration of 
Sovereignty were meant as a gambit to achieving independence from the USSR and Russia. 
After independence, however, many of Ukraine's leaders began to have second thoughts 
about de-nuclearisation. Ukraine was being forced to renounce its nuclear defence at a time 
when it did not have any credible conventional alternative. Some members of the Rada felt 
that Ukraine was also not receiving from the West or from Russia just compensation for the 
loss of its nuclear assets. As a result, the military doctrine which was finally approved, while 
maintaining a long-term commitment to nuclear disarmament, laid down Ukraine's outright 
claim to the nuclear forces on its territory: 
Having become the owner of nuclear weapons through historical 
circumstance, Ukraine will never sanction their use and excludes the threat to 
use nuclear weapons from its foreign policy arsenal. In the future, Ukraine 
intends to become a non-nuclear state and links the reduction and destruction 
of nuclear weapons with appropriate actions by other nuclear states and by 
125 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. The same may be said of 
Russia, though perhaps the even more extreme concentration of power in the presidency 
made cohabitation with parliament even less relevant there. 
126 Article IX, "On External and Internal Security" of the Declaration of Sovereignty, 
July 1990 stated: "The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention to become in future a 
permanently neutral state, taking no part in military blocs and holding to three non-nuclear 
principles: not to accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons." 
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granting them and the world community of reliable security guarantees.127 
The doctrine's provisions on nuclear weapons were "confused (and confusing)"128; and there 
were many good political and practical reasons for Ukraine to de-nuclearise. On the other 
hand, balanced against these arguments there was a feeling that, as the defence minister 
pointed out to NATO colleagues in March 1993, "the West will take heed of what Ukraine says 
only as long as there are nuclear weapons on its soil."129 Eventually, Ukraine's leaders were 
forced to accept the logic of denuclearisation which was completed in 1996. But it was a 
difficult decision which at the time the military doctrine was written in 1993 was still 
unacceptable to much of the Ukrainian elite.130 
The second sticking point of the initial draft was its failure to specify what was meant 
by the "probable enemy" and also that it did not ban the basing of foreign troops on Ukrainian 
territory- both measures being aimed at Russia. The Verkhovna Rada, dominated by 
nationalists at that time, viewed Russia as an enemy - at least in potential - and wanted that 
made more plain. Ultimately, the approved doctrine stated that, "Ukraine will regard as a 
potential enemy any state whose policy consistently threatens its military security, interferes 
in its internal affairs, or aspires to control its territory or infringe its national interests."131 In 
other words, the unspoken but unmistakable background to the doctrine was fear of Russia. 
Aside from the influence of the Rada on the wording concerning nuclear weapons and 
the identification of the main threat, the impact of civilians on the drafting of the doctrine was 
minimal. The draft was prepared by the general staff and reflected their interests and 
priorities. In the military economic section of the doctrine a few words were said about the 
need to create a reliable defence capability in the context of "reasonable" defence expenditure. 
But then the doctrine presented a shopping list including precision weaponry, advanced 
reconnaissance capabilities, air and space defence, electronic warfare equipment, missile 
127 Quoted in Roman Wolczuk, "The Evolution of Ukrainian Foreign and Security 
Policy, 1990-1994", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No.3 (September 1999), p. 31. 
128 Charles J. Dick, "The Military Doctrine of Ukraine", Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol. 7, No.3 (September 1994), p. 513. 
129 Economist, 3 April 1993. 
13° For more discussion of Ukraine's denuclearization see: Roman Wolczuk, "The 
Evolution of Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy, 1990-1994", Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, Vol. 12, No.3 (September 1999), pp. 18-37; and J.F. Dunn, The Ukrainian Nuclear 
Weapon Debate, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, 
March 1993. 
131 Dick, "Military Doctrine of Ukraine", p. 509. 
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forces and aviation, air mobile units and future oriented ocean-going ships and submarines.132 
For what purposes such armaments were required or how they could be paid for was 
not explained. Indeed, independent Ukrainian analysts estimated that satisfying the army's 
demands for high-tech weaponry would have cost between US$80-200 billion, at a time when 
the defence budget stood at less than a US$1 billion! 133 In other words, the 1993 Ukrainian 
Military Doctrine was hopelessly unrealistic- "Ukraine needs to be more modest; it shouldn't 
make the world laugh at such documents ... "134 - as such, it could not form any coherent 
basis for a military reform programme. 
In the early 1990s there was a tremendous amount of activity in the Ukrainian defence 
sphere which showed that the building of national armed forces was seen as being integral to 
the building of an independent state- first in the assertion of Ukraine's de facto independence 
from the USSR and later in the maintenance of its distance from the CIS. The possession of 
strong armed forces was key to President Kravchuk's nation-building strategy: "Ukraine needs 
an army as a guarantor of democracy and independence", he stated.135 Indeed some 
scholars have argued that in the early 1990s Ukraine prioritised the construction of its military 
forces at the expense of much needed efforts at social reconstruction, economic reform, and 
political institution building. 136 Nonetheless, despite the powerful political rhetoric about the 
building of capable national armed forces, Ukraine's leaders did not launch a comprehensive 
reform of the armed forces in the early 1990s. Rather than creating effective armed forces 
that might embody Ukrainian national pride and independence they allowed the army to 
degenerate to a point that it came to symbolise all that 'Nas wrong in the country. 
132 Ibid., 510. 
133 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
134 Oleksiy Havrylenko, "Does Ukraine Need a New Military Doctrine", National 
Security and Defence, No. 1 (2000), p. 45. 
135 Quoted by Taras Kuzio in 1Lkraine_:_ The UrJ.fjJJ.L'?hed_Rev91ution, Exeter: SR Press, 
Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, No: 16, ·J992, p. 31. 
136 For example, Andrea Chandler in "Statebuilding and Political Priorities in Post-
Soviet Ukraine: The Case of the Military", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 22, No.4 (Summer 
1996), pp.573-597. 
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FROM THE WAR IN CHECHNYA TO THE REFORMS OF 1996-1997: HOLDING ON TO 
EVERYTHING, SAVING NOTHING 
By 1994 the extreme debasement of the Russian and Ukrainian armies was manifest. The 
abysmal state of morale in both armies found reflection in numerous ways, notably in the 
explosion of crime and indiscipline in the ranks, the inability of the ministry of defence to 
recruit new junior officers of high calibre or retain the old ones, and the disintegration of the 
conscription system. 
By 1994 derisory references to the criminality of the security services- eg., "mafia in 
shoulder boards" -were commonplace. Of course corruption was not a new phenomenon. 
Nepotism, theft of state property, abuse of one's rank and so on, were all part of Soviet 
military life.137 Nonetheless, the scale of criminal activity as well as the implication that 
corruption in the higher ranks was to some extent sanctioned by the authorities in order to 
keep the upper echelons of the military loyal was alarming. 
In 1995, while the overall crime rate in Russia was said to have risen by 5.6 percent, in 
the military the crime rate rose by 30 percent.138 The range of illegal activity of Russian army 
officers was extremely broad, much of it being rather minor and brought on simply by 
economic exigency. Yet large scale corruption at the highest ranks was also evident. By the 
end of 1997, 21 Russian generals, including the former deputy minister of defence and head 
of the main military inspectorate, General Konstantin Kobets, were under investigation for 
corruption. 139 As Graham Turbiville noted: 
Endless variations of business ventures involving the sale of miscellaneous 
military property abound. The incident in which senior officers of a unit 
engaged in developing 'new military technologies' melted down and sold the 
silver, gold and other precious metals in their equipment is one innovative, but 
by no means unique case, of selling anything that might bring a good price. 
Overall, the range of military business intended for personal profit- irregular, 
semi-legal, patently criminal - is integral to the domestic operations of the 
Russian Armed Forces ... 140 
137 As the Soviet joke went: "Question: Why can't the son of a general become a 
marshal? Answer: Because the marshal has his own son." Quoted in T.R.W Waters, Crime 
in the Russian Military, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military 
College, C90, November 1996. 
138 Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Rotten Army," Jane's Intelligence Review (March 1996), p. 
99. 
139 Kommersant Daily, 21 May 1997. 
140 Graham H. Turbiville, Mafia in Uniform: The Criminalization of the Russian Armed 
Forces, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Foreign Military Studies Office, July 1995, p. 15. 
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Crime in the Ukrainian military was similar in extent. Socioeconomic conditions resulted in a 
serious decrease in military discipline. In 1994 breaches of service regulations increased by 
47 per cent over the previous year while the increase in criminal proceedings rose by more 
than 50 per cent. 141 The theft of military equipment, exploitatio!l of conscripts' labour, 
moonlighting and so on, all grew in prevalence. Regulations for two new penal battalions, one 
in Kiev and one in Crimea, were published in June 1994 in an attempt to deal with the growing 
problem.142 The "Main Control Inspectorate" was also created in March 1993 to look into 
corruption in the armed forces while the commercial centre of the ministry of defence was 
ordered shut for "serious violations of economic and financial discipline."143 Over the course 
of 1992-1993 a total of five generals were dismissed for corruption, including the head of the 
personnel directorate of the ministry of defence. 144 
In a 1997 memo the acting Prosecutor General Oleg Litvak noted that the number of 
petty crimes committed in the army had soared by as much as 100 per cent, while the 
number of "grave" crimes committed by officers had increased by 200 per cent since 
independence. Reportedly the most common crimes were: abuse of power (77 cases in 
1997 compared to 33 registered in 1992), embezzlement of state property (72 compared to 
24), bribery (17 compared to 3). The memo went on to specify the rather obvious causes: 
delayed salaries, the cost of housing (65,000 officers lacked living accommodation of their 
own), and job shortages (almost 70 per cent of all officers' wives were unemployed). In other 
words, by reducing the military budget year by year the state was ensuring that "non-budget 
financial sources" would be employed -and officers employed them indeed, using all the 
assets and property to which they had access in order to generate income.145 
Due to the appalling conditions of military service both the Ukrainian and Russian 
armies faced extreme difficulty in recruiting and retaining officers. By 1995, the Russian army 
was reported to be facing a shortfall of officers as high as 25 per cent with the biggest 
141 According to a report of Taras Kuzio, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces in Crisis", 
Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No.7 (July 1995), p. 305. 
142 UNIAN, 22 June 1994. 
143 Cited in Taras Kuzio, "Ukrainian Civil-Military Relations and the Military Impact of 
the Ukrainian Economic Crisis", in Bruce Parrott (ed.), StatebUIIding and Military Power in 
Russia and the New States of Eurasia, Armonk, NY: rvl. E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 179-180. 
144 Ibid., p. 180. 
145 Kievskie Vedomosti, 26 January 1998. 
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troubles at junior officer levels where the shortfall was as high as 45 per cent.146 Whereas in 
the Soviet system high rates of pay, social prestige and special housing ensured a steady 
supply of top-quality officer candidates, the situation was ut~erly reversed by the mid-1990s. 
By 1995 Moscow bus drivers were earning more than trained fighter pilots. 147 
Such examples of the degradation of service conditions might be cited ad nauseam. 
Equally galling for army officers was the knowledge that their pay was considerably less than 
that of their peers in both the border and interior ministry troops. The Military-sociological and 
legal research department of the ministry of defence reported in 1997 that 95 per cent of 
officers felt it was impossible to live on their pay. 148 
The situation was no better in Ukraine. In December 1997 it was reported that nearly 
70,000 Ukrainian military officers and their families lacked housing, while over 30,000 retired 
officers were on waiting lists for apartments.149 Ninety-three per cent of officers were 
unsatisfied with their financial position with many claiming that their pay was sufficient only to 
buy food and that they had to rely on family and friends for financial support. 150 According to 
figures published by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies in 1998 only 20 
per cent of officers felt satisfied with their service, 66 per cent felt no reason to expect positive 
changes in the near future, and 66 per cent would oppose their own children pursuing careers 
in the armed forces. 151 
The upshot of this situation was that the best young officers began leaving military 
service as quickly as they could. In turn, the movement of young officers into the civilian 
sector lead to the skewing of the officer corps. Both armies came to possess large numbers 
of officers with fifteen or more years in service at one end of their personnel profiles, a fluid 
cadre of officers with less than three years service on the other, but a yawning gap among the 
middle ranks. 
146 M.J. Orr, The Current State of the Russian Armed Forces, Sandhurst, UK: 
Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military College, D60, November 1996,p. 7. 
147 Lambeth, "Russia's Wounded Military", p. 91. 
148 Kommersant Daily, 15 March 1997. 
149 John Jaworsky, "Ukraine's Armed Forces and Military Policy" in Lubomyr A Hajda 
(ed.), Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a 
Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 
1998, p. 231. 
15° Kuzio, Ukrainian Civil-Military Relations ... ", p. 179. 
151 
"Military Reform in Ukraine: Start or Another False Start?", p. 10. 
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Obtaining draft deferments or evading the draft became far less difficult than it had 
been under the Soviet system. In late 1998 only 20 per cent of those eligible for military 
service ended up getting drafted as there were over twenty legally accepted reasons for 
deferment or exemption including higher education, medical unfitness (most common), and 
family status.152 Exemption certificates could also be purchased or draft boards bribed. 
Finally, if all else failed, potential draft evaders could simply not show up since very few 
criminal proceedings were instituted against draft dodgers: in Russia in 1996, for example, of 
31,000 potential conscripts who evaded the draft only 394 had criminal proceedings brought 
against them and only 87 were convicted. 153 
In essence, society was not willing to punish young men too harshly for avoiding 
service in an army where the living conditions were so spartan and the (in)discipline so brutal 
that potentially thousands of them were dying from non-combat causes every year. To make 
matters worse, the quality of the draftees who failed to avoid induction was very poor: from a 
quarter to one third of conscripts had not finished high school, as many as half were regular 
drinkers, a smaller but still significant proportion were drug and alcohol addicts, many had 
criminal records, and their overall level of health and fitness was very poor.154 
In both countries- but most obviously in Russia where the army was astonishing 
outsiders with its wretched combat performance, loathsome brutality, and complete inability to 
defeat the lightly armed Chechen resistance- what was happening to the armed forces was 
not reform but collapse. 
Conflict over defence reform: Russia. By the time of the parliamentary elections in 
December 1995, political conflict over the moribund defence reform had begun to grow as a 
result of the continuing debacle in Chechnya. On 16 February 1995 in his annual address to 
the Russian parliament President Yeltsin declared the situation in the armed forces 
"unsatisfactory" and demanded that urgent measures be taken for its reform. Then on 23 
February 1995 at a wreath-laying ceremony on Defenders of the Fatherland Day he reinforced 
that point saying that "the army is slowly beginning to get out of hand - the conflict in 
152 Konstantinov interview (R25), Moscow, December 1998. 
153 Kommersant Daily, 15 February 1997. 
154 Such reports are in no shortage in the Russian and Western press. These 
particular points were taken from the following: Jamestown Monitor Vol II, No 35 (19 February 
1997); Waters, "Crime in the Russian Military"; Krasnaya Zvezda, 11 April 1996; Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 24 July 1996; and "Military Reform in Ukraine: Start or Another False Start?" 
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Chechnya convinced us once more that we are late with reform of the army."155 
The reaction of the military to Yeltsin's urging on the course of defence reform was 
lukewarm at best. Questioned by journalists about reform Grachev pronounced blithely: "If 
there is money, there will be reform" -with the rather obvious implication that absent more 
funds there would be no reform.156 And indeed for another year virtually nothing more was 
said about reforming the armed forces. 
In fact, after simmering since the early 1990s, the military's pay crisis came to a head 
in 1995 after the government finally announced that it would index officers' pay to the inflation 
rate. The plan, however, quickly broke down when the ministry of finance offered a 28 per 
cent pay rise while the ministry of defence argued that a 208 per cent rise was the minimum 
necessary to bring pay back into line with pre-inflationary levels. In the end, the ministry of 
finance released only 10.5 trillion rubles for military pay for the whole year and by the middle of 
1995 the army had spent 80 per cent of its salary budget. The funds provided by the state 
treasury proved insufficient to cover even un-i'ndexed salaries for the whole year. 157 At first, 
the ministry of defence ceased paying officers' special allowances for children, rations, travel 
and miscellaneous items, then it began to default on basic pay as well. By January of 1996, 
80 percent of officers had gone without pay for five months or more, and it was estimated that 
on average officers were owed the equivalent of US$750 each in back pay.158 
This was the context in which in February 1996 Yeltsin demanded that Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin present a comprehensive proposal for the reform of the armed forces 
within ten days. When ten days passed and no military reform plan materialised the president 
simply announced that he would create a new commission on military reform. Both the 
government and the military had long since learned to ignore the president's bluster about 
"imminent military reform". 159 In any event it seems unlikely that Yeltsin in an election year 
was really serious about launching a comprehensive reform of the armed forces as that 
would have entailed painful decisions such as closing military bases and discharging 
155 Quoted in Shlykov, "The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform and 
Creation of Mobile Forces". 
156 Idem. 
157 Orr, Current State of the ... , p. 17. 
158 Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 March 1996. 
159 Pavel Felgengauer, "Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure", in Mikhail 
Tsypkin (ed.), War In Chechnya: Implications for Russian Security Policy, Monterey, CA: 
Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, 1996. 
hundreds of thousands of officers which would have cost votes among the military 
electorate.160 
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On 16 May 1996 at the height of the presidential campaign, Yeltsin decreed that the 
Russian military would be manned entirely on a professional basis by April 2000. On the one 
hand, the decree was absurd -as Lebed put it "It is a purely populist decree and nothing will 
be achieved ... "161 While General Igor Rodionov, called it "dangerous and irresponsible 
electioneering rhetoric that at best would never really be implemented and at worst could 
cause the final downfall of the Russian army."162 These were trenchant criticisms, since in 
truth the decree was based on no financial or military analysis. On the other hand it was a 
masterful political sneak attack that caught Yeltsin's opponents off-guard. It is a measure of 
how weary the Russian public had grown with the waste of young lives in military service that 
a patently hollow promise to end the draft could still be thought to generate votes. A few 
analysts like Dmitri Trenin at the Carnegie Foundation and the popular general Boris Gromov 
even endorsed the decree, though it seems theirs' was a more general support for the 
concept of professional armed forces rather than any confirmed belief in the practicality of the 
decree in question. 163 
In June 1996 Yeltsin also ousted the deeply unpopular Pavel Grachev from his position 
as minister of defence, as part of a bargain with Alexander Lebed who threw his support 
behind Yeltsin in the second round of the presidential elections in return for being named 
secretary of the Security Council and for the appointment of his ally General Igor Rodionov as 
minister of defence. 164 
No doubt these tactical manoeuvres contributed to Yeltsin's reelection but they did 
nothing to further the cause of reforming the armed forces. In fact, Lebed's tenure as defence 
16° For a discussion of the size and character of the military electorate see Sven 
Gunnar Simonsen, "Marching to a Different Drum? Political Orientations and Nationalism in 
Russia's Armed Forces", in Betz and Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State ... , pp. 53-54. 
161 Quoted in New York Times, 1 June 1996. 
162 Quoted in Felgengauer, "Russian Military Reform Ten Years of Failure". 
163 Both are quoted in the New York Times, 1 June 1996. Trenin argued that a 
volunteer force was a goal worth striving for while conceding that the Yeltsin decree was 
wildly unrealistic. Gromov contended that the Russian army "needs professionals rather 
than kids" adding that in this way there would be "less mothers' tears". 
164 In the first round of balloting in the 1996 presidential elections Lebed garnered 
third place after Yeltsin and Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov. He withdrew from 
the race before the second ballot and endorsed Yeltsin. 
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"supremo" was short-lived. He and Rodionov had only a brief time in which they floated a few 
ideas for changing the armed forces which boiled down to more or less what had been 
proposed before: consolidating the manpower of the multitude of undermanned divisions into 
fewer full-strength units and creating powerful, mobile rapid reaction forces. 165 There was 
general agreement on the desirability of professional ising the armed forces but again no plan 
or timetable for how this would be done. Lebed, however, was soon consumed with 
negotiating an end to the conflict in Chechnya and embroiled in a battle with members of 
Yeltsin's entourage which finally culminated in his dismissal in October 1996.166 
With Lebed gone Rodionov was without allies. "I stand on the sidelines as a spectator 
to the process of destruction of the army, and am unable to do anything about it", he lamented 
in January 1997.167 He was entangled in a conflict with Yuri Baturin, head of the newly created 
Defence Council which was tasked with overseeing the reform of the armed forces. 168 
Contrary to popular belief, the conflict was not over competing visions of reform. In fact, 
neither Baturin nor Rodionov ever produced anything but the sketchiest outline of a reform 
agenda. The gist of their conflict was more basic than that: Rodionov maintained that without 
money, there could be no reform of the armed forces, while Baturin argued that the military 
had to utilize as yet untapped reserves from the Soviet era to survive, make less demands on 
the federal budget and reform at the same time. 169 In his efforts to pressure the state for 
funds, Rodionov made dramatic pronouncements about the disastrous state of the army 
which embarrassed the government, such as when he told reporters that "if the military has 
165 Michael Orr suggested that Rodionov brought with him a "radical and well-thought 
out programme of reform". See Orr, Rodionov and Reform. To my mind, it is fair to say that 
Rodionov was a decidedly more capable military man than his predecessor with a superior 
intellectual approach. Nonetheless, though better argued the main points of his reform ideas 
seem not particularly different from those stated by Grachev. 
166 Lebed's dismissal came amid allegations that he was preparing a coup made by 
the Interior Minister, General Anatoliy Kulikov- who was named by Lebed as the main guilty 
party for the poor performance of the security services in Chechnya. See interview with 
Lebed in Nezavismaya Gazeta, 18 October 1996. 
167 Sovremennaya Politicheskaya lstoria Rossii: Litsa Rossii, (1985-1998), Vol. 2, 
Moscow: RAU - Korporatsiya, 1999, p. 676. 
168 Ironically, given that it became such a thorn in his side, the creation of a Defence 
Council which could take on a unified decision-making and policy-making role in defence was 
one Rodionov's main ideas for the basic direction of military reform. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
22 April 1995. 
169 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 17 January 1997. 
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been reduced to a desperate state, this is primarily the fault of the country's political 
leadership which has completely removed itself from the management of military reform."170 
Then in spring 1997, despairing at the rapidly worsening state of the armed forces and 
his inability to get the authorities to pay any attention to it, Rodionov stated boldly that without 
proper funding "after a certain period of time, Russia could near a threshold beyond which its 
missiles and nuclear systems would become uncontrollable."171 In hindsight an importunate 
gambit, Rodionov's voicing concern over the control of nuclear weapons was to no avail. 
Having generated some public sympathy he was not immediately fired but the writing was on 
the wall. 
In March 1997 he and Baturin held a joint press conference in order to quell reports of 
a serious falling out between the ministry of defence and the Defence Council and to outline 
yet another three stage reform programme for the armed forces. However, the tension 
between the two men was clearly evident. Each was trying to secure the support of the 
media- with Baturin the more successful performer. Ultimately, Rodionov and Chief of the 
General Staff Viktor Samsonov were publicly humiliated and fired by Yeltsin who judged their 
efforts at reform in a televised meeting of the Defence Council saying, "I am not simply 
dissatisfied. I am indignant over the state of reforms in the army and the general state of the 
armed forces ... The soldier is losing weight while the general is getting fatter."172 In essence, 
given a choice between spending more money on the potentially elaborate reforms likely to 
come from Rodionov or the minimalist, cheap approach championed by Baturin, Yeltsin 
chose the latter and with it a more tractable and carefully-spoken minister, General Igor 
Sergeyev. 
Conflict over defence reform: Ukraine. By July 1994 when Leonid Kuchma 
defeated Leonid Kravchuk in presidential elections the case for a comprehensive reform of 
the armed forces was clear to virtually everyone - except to the new state leadership which 
proved as tardy in getting down to seriously planning reform as its predecessor. On 2 
December 1994 Kuchma authorised the preparation by an inter-agency commission of the 
State Programme of Armed Forces Development to 2005.173 Two years later he evaluated 
170 Quoted in Orr, Rodionov and Reform. 
171 Quoted in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 February 1997. 
172 
"Yeltsin Sacks Military Brass", Reuters, 22 May 1997. 
173 Quoted in Anatoliy Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System 
Emerging from Chaos, Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 
Harmonie Paper 1, 1997, p. 15. 
the progress of development as follows: 
This is not work. It is the worst type of imitation ... Today we can only speak 
in future tense about the state programme for the buildup and development of 
the armed forces. 174 
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Yet the State Programme of Armed Forces Development to 2005 was adopted by the National 
Security and Defence Council only thirteen days later on 28 December 1996. It was approved 
by the president on 18 January 1997. The programme outlined the reform agenda for several 
main areas of national defence: the roles and missions of the armed forces; the organisation 
of the military; the defence budget; the plan for modernisation of weapons and equipment; the 
organisation and functions of the ministry of defence and the general staff; and, the 
organisation of the ground forces with priority placed on developing a rapid reaction (highly 
mobile) force. 
The major limitation of the programme was that much of it was prepared before the 
constitution was finished and in the absence of any overarching national security concept. 
Thus the programme put the cart before the horse, setting out what sort of armed forces the 
state would have before it had even been decided what the state wanted its military to do. In 
short, it was based on insufficient and inappropriate data concerning the politico-military 
situation as well as the economic limitations on defence spending. 175 
More generally, the main weakness of the military restructuring process was the 
consistent way in which long-term goals were sacrificed to short-term political or economic 
exigencies. The emphasis was on implementing limited reforms such as downsizing, or 
cosmetic ones like changing uniforms and insignia, but hardly any attention was paid to 
conducting a thorough review of the gee-strategic, socio-economic, scientific-technical and 
legal implications of restructuring the whole of the defence establishment. 
A number of factors lay behind the poor quality of the 1996 reform programme. 
However, the continuous squabbling between the president and the Verkhovna Rada was a 
main problem. By law it was parliament which had the sole authority to set out the structure, 
function and manpower limits on the armed forces. Moreover, parliament was responsible for 
the military budget. But, fearing that the parliament would obstruct the reform of the armed 
forces, the Rada was excluded from preparation of the programme which was eventually 
174 Uryadovyy Kuryer, 17 December 1996, cited in Grystenko, "Civil-Military Relations 
in Ukraine ... ", p. 3. 
175 The 1996 reform programme was comprehensively critiqued by experts of the 
Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies in "Military Reform in Ukraine: Start or 
Another False Start?", passim. 
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passed by presidential decree. Given their exclusion from the process of its design it was no 
surprise that the parliament felt no responsibility for its implementation. A second problem 
was the continued failure of the authorities to take responsibility for the process. The 
interdepartmental committee for military reform which drew up the programme was headed 
not by the prime minister or the secretary of the National Security and Defence Council (as 
one would expect of an inter-departmental reform programme), but by the minister of defence. 
"Nobody else was willing to assume responsibility for the solution of complex military 
problems. "176 
FROM THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTS OF 1997 TO THE REFORM PLANS OF 
1998-1999: THE CRISES DEEPEN 
By 1997, observers of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries were reminding themselves of an 
old truism: "The Soviet army is never as strong, or as weak, as it seems." The fact was, 
however, that both armies had become very, very weak indeed. Still reeling from its 
humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chechens the Russian army seemed to be redefining 
the meaning of "bottom of the barrel" falling ever deeper into degradation with no end in sight. 
The view that defence reform thus far had been a sham was ubiquitous in Russia. According 
to one interviewee: 
The military reform in Russia is a big hoax. All military reforms in other 
countries have amounted to the demobilisation of the old army and the creation 
of a new one which is based on a different recruitment mode, doctrine, etc. 
This has not been done in Russia. The old army has not been disbanded, no 
new one has been built, and meanwhile the military are decaying somewhere 
in between ... 177 
Or as a serving military officer put it: "There is talk of military reform but no real military reform 
is being carried out."178 By 1997 the urgency of beginning serious reform of the armed forces 
was undeniable. The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy gave this bleak assessment of 
the situation: 
The current state of the Russian armed forces can be described only as an 
accomplished catastrophe, which will develop into a national catastrophe very 
soon, unless the society and the state at long last put forth responsible efforts 
176 
"Military Reform in Ukraine: Start or Another False Start?", p. 19. 
1n 1 Russian Institute of Strategic Studies interview (R 17), Moscow, January 999. 
178 Navy Training Centre 2 interview (R14), Moscow, January 1999. 
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to ward off this impending threat. 179 
A range of opinion existed on what form the "catastrophe" might take. In the main, however, 
the quiet disintegration of the army was considered the most likely outcome. One interviewee 
spoke of a continued convergence of a sick and wasting military with a similarly sick and 
wasting society: 
Our army is becoming a bunch of gangsters just like the rest of our society ... 
The fact that soldiers have weapons and ammunition does not make them too 
distinct from civilians, since huge numbers of young Russians today have 
machine-guns - it is an open question whether the army has more machine-
guns than the society. In other words, the army is fully merging with society; 
they are two parts of the same body afflicted with the same diseases.180 
In Russia in response to the growing awareness of the crisis a public campaign to "save" the 
armed forces was launched in June 1997 by General Lev Rokhlin- a hero of the Chechen 
war who had become chairman of the Duma Defence Committee.181 Ever sensitive to the 
winds of political change, Yeltsin promptly signed a decree On Priority Measures to Reform 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and Improve their Structure in July 1997 that 
was meant to provide the basis of a meaningful military reform. 182 Following from this decree 
Russia's new minister of defence, General Igor Sergeyev, in time honoured fashion 
announced a new plan for the reform of the armed forces that differed only in a few minor 
details from the ideas of his predecessor. His reform plan entailed: 
1 I From 1997-1999- reductions in the total size of the armed forces to 1.2 million men. 
21 From 1999-2001 -the first stage of reorganisation in which the branches of service 
would be consolidated into Ground Forces, Air and Missile Space Forces, and the 
Navy. 
3/ From 2001-2005 - Completion of manpower reductions and further consolidation of 
the services into three arms: Air-Space forces, Air Defence Forces and Operational 
179 This statement of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy was published in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 January 1997. 
180 Russian Institute of Strategic Studies interview (R 17), Moscow, January 1999. 
181 For a review of Rokhlin's agenda see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Rokhlin Enters 
the Political Fray", Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1998, pp. 14-17. 
182 Presidential Decree No. 725s, 16 July 1997. An excerpt of the decree was 
published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 19 July 1997. It was discussed in some detail by Pavel 
Anokhin in Rossiiskiye Vesti, 18 July 1997, in an article translated as "Yeltsin Launches 
Controversial Military Reform", in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLIX, No. 29 
(20 August 1997), p. 1-7. 
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Forces (which would include ground and naval elements).183 
The main innovation of the plan was the favouring of the nuclear forces which would be 
integrated under a single command. Given Sergeyev's background in the strategic rocket 
forces the ascendancy of the nuclear forces was not surprising -just like Grachev's 
favouritism towards the airborne forces. 
In December 1997 Sergeyev gave an optimistic update on the first five months of his 
reform programme claiming that the first practical results had been achieved and that the 
transformation to "small, fully-manned and combat-ready armed forces with effective 
deterrence capabilities, a rational structure and number of personnel" was on track. 184 In fact 
he spoke too soon. The political battles in Moscow that followed in the wake of the August 
1998 financial meltdown meant that the reform package was badly neglected. 
Experts in Ukraine were hardly less scathing in their estimations of the deepening 
crisis of their armed forces. While thankful that their army, unlike Russia's, was at least 
spared the ravages of an interminable war, Ukrainian analysts could generate little optimism 
for their own situation. In some ways their problems were even more severe. In the words of 
an interviewee: 
We have come to a situation where the parliament adopts a budget with only 
enough money to pay for the salaries of the number of personnel they 
authorise which is not the same as the actual size of the military. The problem 
is they do not give any money for combat training, for the organisation and 
administration of the army, and they give only a tiny amount for procurement. 
At the same time, they do not give enough money for the retirement of 
servicemen. We calculate that they give seventeen times less per man than is 
the Western standard. If you are going to fund the army as it is now, in terms 
of size, what you need to pay is 5 to 7 billion US dollars. But what they get is 
300 million. This is just stupid, ridiculous. It is not even enough to sustain 
decent living standards for military servicepeople. Active military officers who 
have not received their salary are not able to sustain their families. NCOs have 
the same problem- maybe worse. Talk of reform is just irrelevant until this 
gap between what is needed and what is provided gets much smaller. 185 
It had also become obvious that the1996 State Programme of Armed Forces Development to 
2005- weak as it was- would never be implemented. Ukraine had tried to do the undoable: 
reform the military while having no agreement on objectives, key assumptions and their 
183 Mark Galeotti, "Russia's Military Under a New Master'', Jane's Intelligence Review 
(September 1997), p. 387. 
184 Igor Sergeyev, "Reform the Armed Forces by the 21 51 Century", Military News 
Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 12 (December 1997), pp. 1-3. 
185 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
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ramifications. Moreover, the continuing struggle for political power between the president and 
the parliament "intruded into every domain and trumped every other policy consideration."186 
As a result, neither the president nor government was in a position to provide support or 
direction to defence reform. The March 1998 parliamentary elections which saw the left wing 
majority in the Rada increased and the anti-NATO outcry caused by the Kosovo conflict 
provided further cause for delay. 
National Security Concepts of 1997. Nonetheless, despite the continuing 
degradation of the armed forces, the period 1997-1999 did see some further conceptual work 
that merits examining, notably both Russia's and Ukraine's national security concepts which 
are interesting not only in their national contexts but in contrast with one another. Like 
Ukraine, a main problem for reformers in Russia was the lack of any overarching perspective 
on what kind of armed forces were required and how they could be paid for. Both countries 
approved military doctrines long before setting out an overarching concept of national security 
-with the result that the military doctrines were inappropriate to the new situation. The 
national security concepts of 1997 were meant to rectify this problem. 
In May 1996 Yeltsin ordered the Security Council to draft a new National Security 
Concept. A draft was completed under the leadership of the council's secretary on 7 May 
1997 and after some months of debate was enacted by presidential decree on 17 December 
1997.187 The purpose of the National Security Concept was defined in the preamble: 
The Concept of the Russian Federation's National Security is a political 
document, which reflects a total combination of officially accepted views as 
regards specific goals and the appropriate state strategy aimed at ensuring 
individual, public and state security against political, economic, social, military, 
man-made, environmental, information and other internal and external threats 
(with due account taken of available resources and possibilities). The concept 
formulates the most important state-policy guidelines and principles, 
constituting a foundation for the elaboration of concrete programmes and 
organizational documents in the field of ensuring the Russian Federation's 
national security. 
In the four sub-chapters which followed, Russia's place in the world, its national interests, the 
main internal and external threats to its security, and the ways of coping them were all 
discussed. Some specific developments were noted as having a direct and negative bearing 
on Russia's national security: 
1/ the lack of success in creating a comprehensive security regime for Europe; 
186 Sherr, "Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces ... ", pp. 71-72. 
187 Presidential Decree No. 1300, 17 December 1997. The text was published in 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 December 1997. 
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21 the imminent enlargement of NATO which "threatens national security"; 
3/ the ineffectiveness of existing peacekeeping and international security mechanisms. 
It also stated that Russia's interests "are based on the national heritage and national values of 
the Russian Federation's peoples" and are ensured by Russia's "economic potential, that of 
the state's political and military organisation, as well as by the spiritual-moral and intellectual 
potential of Russia's multi-ethnic society." The main goals of the foreign policy of the state 
were said to be "consolidation of Russia's position as a great power and as one of the 
influential centres of the emergent multipolar world." 
Russia's strategic goals included: further integration of the CIS member states; 
expanding relations with other great powers; promoting international cooperation in fighting 
trans-national crime and terrorism; and, strengthening mechanisms for international collective 
security, particularly the UN Security Council where Russia plays an important role. 
"The main task of the armed forces of the Russian Federation is to ensure nuclear 
deterrence, which is to prevent both a nuclear and conventional large-scale or regional war, 
and also to meet its commitments towards allies." Nuclear forces should be sufficient that 
"planned damage will be caused to any aggressor state or a coalition of states." The 
document stated that Russia should have some capacity to project force abroad but noted 
realistically that the state "has a less impressive potential for ensuring the Russian 
Federation's security." 
Notwithstanding the concerns raised by a few Western analysts about the concept's 
apparent emphasis on restoring Russia's influence in the newly-independent states and the 
attention on nuclear forces as the ultimate guarantee of security, the really significant aspect 
of the concept was how vague and platitudinous it was. 188 The military needed a specific 
blueprint for reform; what it got was only a broad discursion on national security interests, 
priorities and responsibilities. 
Ukraine also needed to define its national security needs and objectives and a strategy 
for their resolution. By contrast with Russia, however, the National Security Concept of 1997 
(in combination with the Constitution of 1996) answered these questions to an extent sufficient 
to guide reform of the armed forces. The significance of the 1996 Constitution should not be 
underrated. Perhaps most importantly in the reform context was the enshrinement in the 
Constitution of the National Security and Defence Council which was tasked with coordinating 
and controlling the activities of different executive bodies in the sphere of national security and 
188 Mark Galeotti provided a scathing analysis in "Russia's National Security 
Concept", Jane's Intelligence Review, (May 1998), pp. 3-4. 
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defence. This gave the president a high-level advisory body - comprised of all the relevant 
departmental heads and the chairman of the parliamentary commission on "Questions of 
Security and Defence" -which could coordinate and oversee the implementation of defence 
policy not only in the ministry of defence but in the full range of power ministries. Crucially, the 
National Security and Defence Council was also supported by a solid military-civilian 
professional staff. 
Indeed it was experts of the National Security and Defence Council who wrote the 
National Security Concept which was adopted by parliament on 16 January 1997. The 
document impressed many analysts with its "clarity and realism". 189 It set out Ukraine's 
national interests which, though written in rather broad terms, represented a reasonable 
compromise between the competing agendas of the parliament and president. Essentially 
these interests consisted of creating a strong civil society and effective economy, increasing 
the effectiveness of state institutions, guaranteeing sovereignty and independence, and 
pursuing integration in Europe. The concept also mapped out a wide range of security 
threats. On the military side it noted the following as significant: 
1 I encroachment on the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; 
21 the buildup of foreign military forces on Ukraine's borders which might upset the 
existing balance of forces; 
31 the military and political instability of neighbouring states; 
41 the potential use of weapons of mass destruction against Ukraine; 
51 the distinct fall in the military capabilities of Ukraine's armed forces; 
61 the politicisation of its state military structures; 
7 I the existence of illegal paramilitary formations. 190 
It went on to note another rich inventory of main threats to security in other fields ranging from 
the political to the economic, social, and ecological which might provoke a military conflict. 
The concept stressed that the main danger to Ukraine stemmed from the weakness 
and underdevelopment of its society, political institutions and economy which might be 
exploited by a foreign actor. 191 Accordingly it called for the creation of effective mechanisms 
189 Sherr, "Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces ... ", p. 71. 
19° From an English translation of the concept found in Appendix B of Anatoliy 
Grystsenko's Reforming the Military in States of Transformation: The Case of Ukraine, 
Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, EFP Working Paper No. 4, 
2000, p. 119. 
191 Ibid., Part Ill. "Threats to the National Security of Ukraine", pp.118-119. 
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to prevent outbreaks of conflict, to localise them internally, to liquidate their consequences and 
prevent their exploitation from abroad.192 This, in turn, required the cost-effective coordination 
of action between law-enforcement agencies, internal security forces and those of the 
ministry of defence. Moreover, it required transparency and trust if politicians, society, the 
military and police forces were to cooperate in resolving a wide range of traditional and non-
traditional threats. Thus the provision of democratic control of the military was made an 
explicit part of the state's approach to ensuring its security. 
Undoubtedly the Ukrainian national security concept contained bromides not unlike 
those found in the Russian concept. Nonetheless, it is also clear that unlike the Russian 
concept it did contain more than platitudes. It showed that the Ukrainian defence 
establishment was at least beginning to think at the level of first principles. Moreover, it 
represented a welcome challenge to the Ukrainian military mindset which, like the Russian, 
was still reluctant to think of the army's involvement in resolving security matters within 
anything other than the context of general war. 
192 Ibid., p. 120. 
2.3: Security Policy-Making and Defence Reform- Comparative 
Conclusions 
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Most objective observers would agree that the former Soviet Union states had bigger 
problems in terms of defence reform than did the Central European states. Unlike Poland and 
Hungary, or even Ukraine, Russia's geography requires that military forces be spread over a 
very large area with long land frontiers, low population density and a multitude of border 
conflicts and potential flash points both internal and external. At the same time, the Russian 
economy in the 1990s declined more steeply than Poland and Hungary, though perhaps less 
than the Ukrainian, and began to recover later. Therefore, despite the fact that Russia's 
defence budget represented a large percentage of measurable GOP, it was in decline year 
after year throughout the 1990s and was always quite small in absolute terms relative to the 
size of the armed forces. The same downward tendency in the budget was observable in 
Ukraine but the percentage of GOP spent on defence was lower than Russia. By contrast, 
defence spending in both Poland and Hungary after a steep decline in the first half of the 
1990s began to rise again in the latter half. 
In this context of extreme financial constraint, the accomplishments of the former 
Soviet Union states should not be underestimated. Russia's completion of the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from abroad and the division of CFE quotas amongst the Soviet successor 
states were major tasks, as was Ukraine's unilateral nuclear disarmament. Indeed, Ukraine's 
difficulties in respect to military reform must be understood in light of the fact that they were 
not simply restructuring their armed forces but creating new, national armed forces based on 
a fragment of the Soviet military which lacked any developed administrative or command 
structures. 
Furthermore, though it is fair to say that the former Soviet Union states accomplished 
less reform than those in Central Europe, the main accomplishment of Poland and Hungary 
was more in avoiding the extreme examples of degradation in the armed forces that plagued 
Russia and Ukraine than in actualizing a profound change in their armies to a new level of 
effectiveness. That is to say, they avoided a negative result more than they achieved a 
positive one. 
In other words, it is important not to overstate the successes achieved by Poland and 
Hungary in terms of defence reform relative to those of Russia and Ukraine. The fact is that a 
year after their accession to NATO neither country possessed reorganised armed forces that 
could be considered satisfactorily effective. Still, it is also true that many Western countries 
also faced complex problems of reorganising their armed forces to meet a greatly changed 
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international security environment. At the same time, Poland and Hungary made significant 
contributions of soldiers, logistics and intelligence assets to UN operations and to NATO's 
operations in the Balkans. Thus, we can say that there were signs of progress intermixed 
with signs of persisting problems. 
The profound impact of NATO on this process had positive and negative 
consequences. On the positive side, NATO offered examples of good practice as well as 
advice and assistance at a crucial time. The importance of having a positive relationship with 
NATO- working toward eventual membership- as a motivator for Poland and Hungary to 
undertake reforms becomes obvious when compared to Ukraine and Russia. That said, the 
impact of NATO on reform planning in Ukraine was also growing toward the end of the 1990s. 
On the negative side, however, for most of the 1990s NATO was understood by the 
aspirant states and, to an extent by Ukraine, as an end in itself rather than as a means to an 
end. As a consequence of this, too often it seemed as if the real reform of the armed forces 
as a whole was being sacrificed in favour of investing in showcase exercises and special 
units in order to impress NATO. Unrealistic declarations of imminent purchase of big ticket 
weapons systems like fighter aircraft also fit in this category of unreasoned reform. 
When they were invited to begin NATO accession talks in 1997 there was a well 
founded fear that Polish and Hungarian elites would regard the NATO problem as solved and 
so their commitment to further reform would be diminished. While some diminution of 
intensity was observed, particularly in the level of spending, the worst-case scenario did not 
materialise. Indeed, there were signs of a new more thoughtful approach to defence reform 
based on an examination of first principles emerging. 
In this respect Poland appeared to be making more progress than Hungary. Polish 
defence spending was more stable than in Hungary and planning cycles were longer. 
Moreover, Poland worked out in more detail its concept of national security and military 
doctrine, as a result of which defence planners had more effective policy guidelines for the 
development of the armed forces. The problems encountered by the Hungarian Strategic 
Defence Review had a lot to do with the dilatory approach of its political elite towards passage 
of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. 
Both Russia and Ukraine entered the year 2000 with essentially unreformed armed 
forces in disarray. The processes of their reform had been driven more by the logic of 
disintegration of the old system rather than the creation of a new one. Both states 
encountered a vicious circle: it was hard to expect reforms to be generated by an army in a 
shambles, but the longer it remained in such a state the more urgent was the need for reform. 
In August 1999, however, the situation in Russia began to show signs that both the 
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internal political and economic constraints as well as the attitude of the elite towards reform 
was improving. The appointment of Vladimir Putin as prime minister, the start of the second 
military campaign to restore federal control over Chechnya, parliamentary elections resulting 
in a victory for Putin's supporters, Yeltsin's resignation and Putin's subsequent election-
confirmation as president resulted in an unusual degree of consolidation of the political class, 
and of a significant majority of Russian citizens, around the new leader. As one of Putin's 
main political tools and strongest partisans in the crucial first months of the transition of power 
in the Kremlin, the military played a major role in assuring his success. In turn, the new 
president began to show more resolve about addressing the problems afflicting the armed 
forces than did his predecessor. 
In January 2000 a new National Security Concept193 was adopted, followed in April 
2000 by a new Military Doctrine. 194 These documents were meant to provide guidance to the 
reform of the armed forces but essentially failed to do so, being still rather broad declarations 
of intentions based "on the lowest common denominators between several bureaucracies."195 
A new security mindset also emerged which in some respects was the exact opposite 
of the relative optimism of the early 1990s. Even though Russia was smaller than the Soviet 
Union, it still needed a strong army in the face of external and internal challenges to its 
geopolitical and economic interests. The security threats Russia needed to respond to 
include international terrorism inspired and supported by Islamic radicalism, NATO's eastward 
expansion, American challenges to Russia's influence in the other post-Soviet states, and 
overall US attempts at enforcing its hegemony in international relations. Russia should use its 
defence-industrial potential as an important engine of economic growth. The role and status 
of the armed forces in post-Soviet Russia needed to be upgraded. And the overwhelming 
need to restore Russia's external and internal security put the military and the security 
services at the centre of state-building. 
Whether or not Putin's words about substantive rebuilding of Russia's military power 
would prove more than rhetoric remained to be seen. Nonetheless, under Putin in the first 
year of his presidency efforts to work out solutions to the crisis in the armed forces did seem 
more systematic and purposeful, though the depth of this crisis was such that the inefficient 
and economically weak Russian state was likely to achieve only a limited degree of success 
193 Published in Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, 14 January 2000. 
194 Published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21 April 2000. 
195 Pavel Baev, "Putin's Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency", 
Security Policy Library 6-2001, Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 2001, p. 7. 
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in this area for the foreseeable future. 
After his reelection in 1999 President Leonid Kuchma also began some positive steps 
in Ukraine. He established an inter-agency working group to draw up a new State Programme 
on Armed Forces Reform and Development Until 2005196 which was markedly superior to its 
1996 predecessor in realism and practicality. First, it set out in decisive language the "urgent 
need" for reform created by the geopolitical situation as well as the decade long degradation 
of the army. Second, unlike its predecessor it was truly a state programme, drawn up not just 
by the ministry of defence but in consultation with the ministry of finance and in accordance 
with a "Long-Term Defence-Related Funds Allocation Forecast to 2015" .197 He also decreed 
the demobilisation of the National Guard transferring its units to the ministry of the interior and 
the armed forces. And he appointed an experienced and responsible reformer, Viktor 
Yushchenko, as prime minister. Yet the new reform programme was still no panacea and 
came under severe criticism: 
In our society we never talked about what type of army we needed to have. 
This led us to this situation we have now where the idea of what sort of army to 
have is formulated by the army itself. Whether it's necessary to have such a 
huge army as we have now is not discussed. On the other hand, we don't 
even have the capacity to provide basic social protection for the army as it is 
now. But the decision of the latest reform plan to the year 2005 is to increase 
the army by 1 0,000! This is crazy. How do we feed these people let alone 
provide them with some sort of training? Our pilots only fly two or three hours 
a year. We have no fuel for trucks. The only time we have for training is when 
NATO or defence attaches are involved. Otherwise nothing real happens. 198 
Moreover, the dismissal of Yushchenko in 2001 in the wake of the political conflict caused by 
the "Kuchmagate" allegations that the president had ordered the murder of a troublesome 
investigative journalist, Georgii Gong adze, also fed pessimism about the prospects of reform. 
SECURITY POLICY-MAKING AND DEFENCE REFORM AS A TEST OF CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
Chris Donnelly wrote that there are four principles which could serve as the start for 
addressing the core of the problem of defence reform: 199 
196 State Programme on Armed Forces Reform and Development Until 2005, Kiev: 
Press of Ukraine, October 2000. 
197 Sherr, "Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces", p. 75. 
198 Parfionov interview (U25), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
199 Christopher Donnelly, "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A 
framework for tackling the problem" NATO Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January 1997). 
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1/ "A country which has no problems of civil-military relations and democratic control is a 
country which has no democracy." 
By the time of their accession to NATO there is little doubt that Poland and Hungary were 
democratic states and their problems of civil-military relations were of a democratic nature_2°0 
Although problems remained in both countries- for example, in the continuing division of the 
Hungarian general staff and ministry of defence- the centre of gravity of defence policy-
making had shifted to the civilian political realm. The quality of defence policy could be 
questioned but not, for the most part, the legitimacy of the way in which it was formulated. 
The same cannot be said of Russia and Ukraine. In both countries the quality of their 
defence policy products was not the main question; rather, it was the quality of the democratic 
functioning of the state in general. In some cases, notably the Ukrainian 1997 National 
Security Concept and the State Program on Armed Forces Reform and Development Until 
2005, in fact, the sophistication of policy was high. What was lacking was evidence of strong 
civilian direction of the formulation of said policies outside of the narrow and non-transparent 
confines of the presidential administrations. 
21 "Every country will have a different solution to the problem which they will have to work 
out for themselves." 
Both Poland and Hungary encountered considerable difficulties in this respect. Their military 
and political elite expected - and most likely would have welcomed - NATO solving their 
problems for them. It took most of the 1990s for them to get over this expectation and begin 
to design their own solutions. 
Ukraine too showed a similar desire at times for NATO to simply tell them what they 
should be doing. A NATO official in Kiev, however, stressed that though they had tried hard to 
get the Ukrainian defence reform process put under the Partnership for Peace planning and 
review process, "ultimately, it is the Ukrainians' plan. We can assist here and there, offer 
advice and so on but they have to come up with it themselves."201 
Russia's military has a longstanding tradition of solving its own problems in its own 
way. That said, judging from the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine of 2000 it 
was not at all clear that Russia's leadership had learned much from ten years of transition: 
they were still resistant to looking at their defence needs and potentials from a first-principles 
200 I am aware of only a few serious commentators who voice a contrary opinion. 
Thomas M. Magstadt, "Flawed Democracies: The Dubious Political Credentials of NATO's 
Proposed New Members" Cato Policy Analysis, No. 297, 6 March 1998, is one example. 
201 Bachman interview (U9), Kiev, 25 January 2001. 
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perspective; preferring, it seemed, to continue trying to preserve -- or restore -the Soviet 
military system in a reduced form. Though a few military leaders accepted that the state of 
the economy would be a deciding factor in the type of armed forces the nation should have - a 
refreshing change from the traditional military view that the state's defence needs were a fixed 
constant that could be calculated only by experts in the general staff and that the responsibility 
of the state was to provide the necessary resources202 - even by the end of the decade few of 
its military leaders had internalised this fact. In other words, the army at the end of the 1990s 
still looked like a poor, shrunken, and angry version of the Soviet army and the prospects for 
change looked uncertain. In this respect, in comparison with Russian attitudes toward 
reform, the changes in Ukraine's approach at the end of the 1990s were impressive. 
3/ "Defence transformation, good civil-military relations and democratic control are 
problems which must be solved. They cannot be ignored or they will destabilize 
society." 
Despite fears that Polish and Hungarian elites would, with membership of NATO achieved, 
regard democratic control as being solved, the pressure to reform was not lessened so much 
as it shifted focus. As one Polish interlocutor pointed out, there is a big difference between 
having a relationship with NATO and being in NATO. The shift in both Poland and Hungary 
toward more realistic reform plans of ten- and twelve-year duration suggests that defence 
reform was being taken seriously. That said, there was still a possibility of a return to 
stagnation. In Hungary, in particular, an American advisory team felt it necessary to 
strenuously underline in their recommendations to the government: "What is most important 
is to develop a carefully thought-through and time-phased plan, AND WITH GREAT 
DISCIPLINE IMPLEMENT THE PLAN."203 
The need to reform in Ukraine and Russia was both more acute than in Poland and 
Hungary and delayed for longer. Only at the end of the 1990s were there signs of real steps to 
halt and reverse the ten-year decline of the armed forces, but even those signs were 
equivocal. In the end, the crises in the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces throughout the 
1990s reflected the crises of society at large. Similarly, the prospects for their reform 
depended ultimately on the course of reform more generally. It is possible that the new 
millennium might finally see a post-Soviet economic and political renaissance occur in 
202 See Orr, "Rodionov and Reform". 
203 From an extract of the Strategic Review Recommendations for the Government 
of Hungary, 10 December 1999, provided to me by MAJ GEN Wayne Knudsen: Knudsen 
interview (H9), Budapest, 1 January 2000. (The capitalization is as it appears in the report). 
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Ukraine and Russia but the road is not yet clear. 
4/ "Democratic control is a two-way process between army and society, not one 
where politicians simply dictate to soldiers." 
In Poland, while General Wilecki was chief of the general staff, it seems fair to say that there 
was no two-way street between the army and society. The general staff jealously guarded its 
prerogatives in the defence sphere, a task in which it was actively abetted by the president 
himself. By all accounts Wilecki's successor, General Szumski, is a different type of officer 
more open to two-way dialogue and the dominance of the president in the defence sphere has 
given way to the increasing authority of the Cabinet of Ministers. Hungary showed more 
worrying signs of its political elite maintaining a suspicious - even punitive - attitude toward its 
military commanders. 
In Ukraine and Russia by the end of the period under review it was still not possible to 
speak in terms of a two-way process between army and society. In both countries, to the 
extent that there was dialogue on reform it was between the armed forces and the presidency 
-a dialogue in which other political players such as parliament, let alone society at large, had 
essentially no voice. A Ukrainian interlocutor explained the problem as follows: 
This is a post-communist society with a tendency to totalitarianism; with 
oligarchic clans having the real power in practically all spheres of political, 
economic and social life. And we have strong remnants of the former Soviet 
thinking within the force structures. So we cannot speak about 
democratisation of the force structures- not real democratisation ... Our level 
of civilian control is the same as the level of our democracy. In this country we 
can see, hear and read practically everywhere that we are building a new 
country. But it sounds in Ukrainian like a new state. Nobody even talks about 
society. For the citizen the state is still a monster which stands above the 
people.204 
At a somewhat less abstract level, however, one of the main limiting factors on effective two-
way dialogue between army and society in states under review was the deficiency of civilian 
expertise in defence. But that is the subject of the next chapter. 
204 Belousov interview (U1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
Chapter 3: Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence 
In a democratic system elected politicians are ultimately the controllers of all policy decisions 
in the state, including those of the military. Their problem is to maintain and demonstrate the 
reality of that control, bearing in mind the vastness of the state bureaucracy and the necessity 
of "managing the expert problem". However, the concern of the politician with control 
sometimes conflicts with the concern of the administrator, and perhaps even more so the 
soldier in an operational context, with effectiveness. Most policy-implementers, military or 
civilian, are open to effective policy-guidance; what they object to are rigid procedures 
designed to realise the desire of politicians to control without knowing how to exercise their 
power. 1 These kinds of questions are highly germane to civil-military relations in the states 
under review; they are questions of management and effectiveness and how to properly 
handle the delegation of authority and responsibility. As such, they are not much different 
from questions asked throughout the public sector? 
However, to understand the concept of civilian control better it is useful to disaggregate 
the notion of policy: 
1 I General policy is the policy by which the government of the day is guided. It is the 
policy of the party in power, to which the people have given their approval through the 
power of the ballot box. It is an exclusively civilian matter. 
21 Executive policy is the form in which the government puts general policy into practical 
operation. As such, it must be based on something more than opinion and political 
rhetoric. That is, it must be based on rational analysis and for this purpose the 
government must consult with experts. With regard to defence policy this would 
naturally include experts from the ministry of defence, including the military leadership, 
but in order to mitigate the problem of political agency would also include outside 
experts. 
3/ Further down the policy chain is administrative policy whereby the minister puts into 
effect the will of the government. In working out a plan of action the minister will need 
1 For more on the problem of political control vs. administrative delegation, see: Peter 
Self, Administrative Theories and Politics: An Enquiry into the Structure and Processes of 
Modern Government, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1976, pp. 161-162. 
2 This is not to suggest that management of the ministry of defence is completely the 
same as, say, management of the ministry of health. The military profession is unique in 
that, in Richard Gabriel's words, "only it has the awesome responsibility of legitimately 
spending the lives of others in order to render its service." (See, Richard Gabriel, To Serve 
with Honour: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier, Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1982, p. 86.) That said, the distinction between civilian and military, 
particularly when looked at in terms of broad concepts of security where police and military 
functions are converging, is getting increasingly indistinct. 
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to consult experts both within and outside the ministry and advisory committees may 
be organized. Nevertheless, the main workhorse providing advice and assistance to 
the minister will be his professional staffs, both military and civilian. 
No civilian minister of defence, however bright and well-informed, could hope to control all the 
activities of the armed forces without support. The institution best suited to supporting the 
minister in the performance of his duties is the integrated defence ministry. According to 
Bland, 
This type of ministry combines the minister's office, the civil service 
bureaucracy, and the military high command and their separate but linked 
responsibilities in one establishment. An effective integrated ministry facilitates 
the exchange of ideas and information between these branches and aids in 
consensus building ... The effect is to provide the minister and the 
government with a coordinated source of contested advice and a single locus 
of administration where authority, responsibility and accountability are sharply 
defined.3 
In this chapter we are interested in the way ministries of defence function as the institutional 
setting for the working out of administrative policy in the states under veview. All of them 
faced considerable difficulty creating integrated ministries approximating that described 
above. More often than not, defence establishments built on the Soviet model proved 
inflexible to change. The delegation of tasks from higher levels to lower ones did not work well 
because of an institutional culture of avoiding responsibility for decisions. Internal cooperation 
was stymied by formal and informal divisions between general staffs and ministries of 
defence, and by attitudinal differences between civilian and military officials. 
The Central European states had somewhat more success than the former Soviet 
Union states in civilianising their ministries of defence, but the problems were similar in all the 
countries under review and were by no means solved by the end of the .1990s. 
Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile examining briefly the type of ministries 
which obtained in the Soviet-bloc. 
THE SOVIET-TYPE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 
Soviet-type ministries had essentially no civilians in responsible decision-making positions; 
the Soviet-type ministry was an almost wholly military institution. The socialist regimes in 
Eastern Europe were not concerned with questions of democratic legitimacy or 
accountability, in civil-military relations or in political life more generally. The legitimacy to 
make policy, for example, was a function not of a democratic process but of ideology. Since 
3 Douglas Bland, "Managing the 'Expert Problem' in Civil-Military Relations", 
European Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 38-39. 
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the senior leadership of the military was explicitly communist in political orientation (no other 
position, including political neutrality, was acceptable), there was no obvious superiority in 
legitimacy between a civilian Party apparatchik and a military man as minister of defence; 
either would do, but Soviet-type ministries of defence tended to be headed by men in uniform. 
Similarly, the issue of accountability was manifested in an utterly different political 
context. The armed forces were accountable to the government only superficially. The real 
focus of accountability was to the ruling Party. ·There was no need for a buffer between the 
armed forces and the Party; in the extreme view, the two achieved a kind of organic 
symbiosis and systemic interdependence that virtually precluded the existence of a division 
between the senior officer corps and the Party elite.4 
The Soviet-type ministry of defence did not have a distinctive three branch structure -
minister's office, civilian bureaucracy, armed forces command- meant to combine in one 
establishment the inter-related players in civil-military relations. It was instead a wholly 
military organisation made up of various separate services, directorates and administrations, 
as well as the general staff.5 
Civilian Influence: The lnstitutchiki and Mezhdunarodniki. Although civilians never 
deeply penetrated the structure of the Soviet ministry of defence, an avenue of civilian 
influence on defence policy began to open in the mid- to late-1980s. As part of his efforts to 
wrest control of defence policy from its traditional repository in the general staff, 6 Gorbachev 
permitted intellectuals from the Academy of Sciences (institutchiki: mainly from the Institute of 
USA and Canada and the Institute of World Economics and International Relations), and 
experts of the ministry of foreign affairs research department (mezhdunarodnikt) to offer an 
alternate view on defence and security policy than that offered by the military. Because they 
were not part of the defence bureaucracy it is debatable exactly how much influence these 
civilians enjoyed, but their relationship with the military is worth examining. 
The intrusion of civilian analysts into the defence policy debate was fiercely resisted by 
4 The most notable example of this view being William Odom. See, "The 
Party-Military Connection: A Critique", in Herspring and Volgyes, Civil-Military Relations in 
Communist Systems, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978. pp. 27-52. 
5 On the structure of the Soviet ministry of defence and the general staff see: Ellen 
Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military, Boston, MA: Allen and 
Unwin, 1985, pp. 15-17; and, Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: 
Continuity, Formulation, and Dissemination, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, pp. 216-
217. 
6 See Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political 
Thinking on Security", International Security, (Fall1998), pp. 124-163. 
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the military. In the military's view, these civilian analysts were self-promoting academic 
dilettantes who lacked the judgement and professional competence to make policy 
recommendations. Civilians were equally as scathing about the military. The army, wrote 
Aleksandr Prokhanov, was a "threatening, awesome force that has led to the militarisation of 
the world, to the militarisation of history, to the militarisation of life ... the source of all that is 
stagnant and conservative, of everything that rejects the new thinking, perestroika, and 
experimental models of behaviour for the nation and the state."7 
The military had a point about the competence of civilian defence analysts in the 
Soviet Union. The defence expertise of civilian analysts in Eastern Europe was generally low 
in comparison to their counterparts in uniform. Stephen Meyer suggested in 1985 that civilian 
analysts in the USSR should not be taken seriously because they lacked inside information 
and were mainly propagandists.8 
It needs to be emphasised, however, that the rise of civilian involvement in defence 
policy debates in the Gorbachev era was much more a political than an institutional 
phenomenon. Civilian defence analysts gave Gorbachev a supportive voice in internal policy 
debates over the unilateral draw-down of Soviet force levels. According to one analyst, they 
played a prominent role in Gorbachev's assertion of authority in doctrine and force posture 
which had been the exclusive purview of the military.9 But this never equated to a formal role 
for civilians in the defence establishment. 
The ministry of defence in Central Europe. Structurally, the ministries of defence 
in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states followed the Soviet pattern. About the Polish case, 
Michta concluded that "the communist-era system produced a consensus that matters of 
national defence were best left to the military."10 Similarly, Pecze wrote about Hungary: 
7 Literaturnaya Rossiya, 6 May 1998. Quoted by Benjamin Lambeth, "A Generation 
too Late: Civilian Analysis and Soviet Military Thinking", in Derek Leebaert and Timothy 
Dickinson, Soviet Strategy and New Military Thinking, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992, pp. 229-230. 
8 Stephen Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to Nuclear War'', in Graham T. 
Allison, Albert Carnesale and JosephS. Nye (eds.), Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for 
Avoiding Nuclear War, New York, NY: Norton, 1985, p. 169. 
9 Harry Gelman, The Soviet Turn Toward Conventional Forces: The Internal 
Variables at Play, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, R-3876-AF, 1989, p. 61. 
10 Andrew Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army After 
Communism, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 80. Michta said also that "the issue 
of civilian control over the general staff was not in question under communism because the 
defence ministry was, by definition, a military organisation staffed by active-duty officers ... ", 
The ministry of defence was staffed completely by military personnel. Those 
civilian politicians who were assigned to top positions in the ministry of defence 
were awarded a military rank commensurate with their new position regardless 
of their lack of any military education. 11 
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The main difference between the Soviet ministry of defence and the ministries in Central 
Europe stemmed from the lack of state sovereignty in the latter.12 As Janos Szabo, pointed 
out: 
Most experts agree that the armies of Central Europe as all the former 
Warsaw Pact armies were the limbs of a body called the Warsaw Pact, the 
trunk of which was the Soviet army and the brain of which was the Soviet 
general staff. These Central European armies with not too large differences, 
were not designed to carry out national security, but to carry out the Soviet 
will. 13 
With respect to the role of civilians in the ministry of defence the external domination of the 
Central European states also had concrete effects. Whereas in the USSR perestroika 
allowed some civilian analysts to enter the debate on defence policy, the same did not occur 
in Central Europe. In the Warsaw Pact, strategic decisions were made in Moscow, not in the 
national capital. Similarly, doctrinal debates took place in the Soviet general staff. There was, 
therefore, even less call for civilian strategists in Poland and Hungary than there was in the 
Soviet Union. 
In fact, the domination of defence decision-making by the Soviet general staff also 
impeded the development of Central European military skills in this area: "The lack of strategic 
planning capacity of the Hungarian ministry of defence and the general staff were only 
revealed when the country regained its independence in 1990."14 The same was true of the 
Polish general staff which "did not engage in strategic planning at all" under the old system.15 
p. 85. 
11 Zoltan Pecze, Civil-Military Relations in Hungary, Groningen, The Netherlands: 
Centre for European Security Studies, Harmonie Paper No. 2, February 1998, p. 7. 
12 Zoltan Barany discusses this issue in some detail in Soldiers and Politics in 
Eastern Europe, 1945-1990: The Case of Hungary, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 
pp. 17-23. 
13 Janos Szabo, "Facts and Problems of the Civilian Control of Armed Forces in 
Hungary", in Behind Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe, Budapest: 
Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996, p. 50. 
14 Pecze, p. 7. 
15 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 85. 
3.1: Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence- Central 
Europe 
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The problem of "civilianising" the ministry of defence in the post-communist context had three 
main aspects. First, there was the problem of finding a suitable civilian candidate for minister 
of defence. As Szemerkenyi pointed out: "The lack of civilian expertise in defence matters 
created a serious dilemma for the newly elected governments. They could appoint a minister 
of defence with democratic credentials, or one with knowledge of military issues" - but not 
both.16 
In 1990, the Hungarian government opted for the appointment of a civilian, Lajos Fur, 
with democratic credentials at the expense of a military man with real expertise. The Poles, 
on the other hand, took the opposite route, appointing a career military officer, Admiral Piotr 
Kolodziejczyk- who was acceptable to the military and considered reliable by the politicians -
to head the ministry of defence. 
By 1994, however, after experimenting with civilian ministers both countries reverted to 
appointing retired military men as minister of defence- Kolodziejczyk (for the third time) in 
Poland and retired army Colonel Gyorgy Keleti in Hungary. This process of "re-militarisation" 
of the ministry of defence prevailed until 1998, by which time civilian ministers were again in 
place in both countries. 
The second aspect of integration was the task of introducing civilian bureaucrats into 
the ministry of defence at lower levels. This was a more pernicious problem than finding a 
suitable civilian minister. The underlying reasons for the rather limited success of integration 
boil down to two main problems: a narrow (mis)understanding of civilian control by civilian 
and military elites; and, a dire shortage of civilians with expertise in the defence sphere. 
Political elites tended to interpret civilian control in the literal sense that civilians should 
be in control of the army (in an often vindictive way that was dismissive of the military's 
genuine and legitimate concerns). In Hungary, for example, Sherr quoting various politicians, 
characterised the attitude of political elites as follows: "We need to break the back of the 
general staff ... they need to know there is a strong master in the saddle ... they need to 
understand that even if politicians give stupid orders they must shut up and obey because 
politicians are elected ... " These types of comments, he concluded, were characteristic of a 
political establishment whose instinctual military policy was demilitarisation, not reform of the 
16 Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in 
Establishing Democratic Controls Over the Military ... , Oxford: Oxford University Press for 
the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 306, 1996, p. 11. 
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armed forces per se.17 
For their part, the military also tended to see civilian control through the filter of past 
communist indoctrination. This perception was aggravated in both countries by the practice 
of appointing civilians to staff positions in the ministry of defence merely for the sake of having 
civilians perform certain roles. Civilian officials' lack of training and experience made them 
noticeably less capable than their military counterparts. To the military, this caused 
considerable resentment and suspicion.18 
The outcome of these developments was to provoke the development by the military 
of more sophisticated smoke screens against civilian authorities, to create an atmosphere of 
uncertainty which impeded substantive civil-military cooperation, and to foster the building in 
the officer corps of a besieged fortress psychology. 
The third aspect of the problem of integration was the relationship of the general staff 
to the ministry of defence. Under the old system the general staff was the "brain" of the army 
while the ministry of defence had fairly limited functions. Certain functions like policy planning, 
logistics, military education, international cooperation, and so on were traditionally 
concentrated in the general staff. In a democratic system, since these are matters of public 
policy, they should be under the supervision of an integrated military-civilian ministry of 
defence. 
Transferring these functions from the general staff to the ministry of defence was quite 
a problem. The underlying reasons why are complex but centre on two main issues. First, 
the general staff resisted the diminution of its role. In a time of economic distress and given 
the low market value for military officers in the civilian world, members of the general staff 
tended to see civilianisation as a personal threat to their well-being. Second, the manner in 
which the reforms played out both motivated the military to resist civilianisation while providing 
them with the means to do so. 
The motivation to resist stemmed from the often antipathetic attitudes which military 
and civilian elites harboured towards each other: 
Defence reforms in Central Europe were hampered by the opposite political 
backgrounds of the military and the new political elites. Since the military 
personnel had inevitably been trained and educated under the Warsaw Pact 
system, the civilian elite detected political reasons behind the military's 
17 James Sherr, "Hungary", in Harald von Riekhoff and Natalie Mychajlyszyn, (eds.), 
Report on Specific Problems of Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary, Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence, January 1999, p. 84. 
18 Piotr Dutkiewicz, "Poland", in von Riekhoff and Mychaj!yszyn, Report on Specific 
Problems ... , p. 44. 
110 
slowness in implementing the reforms.19 
Military officers, for their part, saw the inordinate suspicion of civilian elites as questioning their 
loyalty to the nation. The introduction into the defence establishment of untrained civilians 
prompted them to see their duty as being to preserve the army from "degradation due to 
incompetent civilians" and avoiding having the military fall "subject to a knife wielded by 
someone ignorant of military realities". 20 
In addition to motivating the armed forces to resist the in'tegration of civilians, the way 
in which reforms were conducted provided many avenues to do so. In Poland, the conflict 
between Walesa and the Sejm allowed the general staff to scuttle reforms they did not like 
into the mid-1990s. A 1995 article in the newspaper Wrpost concluded that "The manner in 
which the general staff has played off the president and the prime minister has effectively 
brought the military an independence not found anywhere else in Central Europe."21 
A problem of public administration. Political elites did not anticipate these 
problems. As Szemerkenyi put it, "intra-ministerial and bureaucratic intrigues proved more 
intense than expected. Public administration represented a somewhat unexpected challenge 
to civil-military reform.'m Civilians in Central European defence establishments were 
perceived as too transitory to have real influence or to develop substantial expertise in their 
duties. Therefore, they were considered in military circles to be an unavoidable burden that 
must be endured, and whose negative influence on the armed forces must be mitigated. The 
attitude was that while civilians in the ministry of defence might, at best, be trained in general 
strategic studies and the broad aspects of security, they lacked the specific knowledge of 
military structures that would have enabled them to engage constructively in dialogue with the 
military.23 
The upshot of the situation was that neither Hungary nor Poland had adequately 
19 Szemerkenyi, p. 42. 
20 Szabo, "Facts and Problems ... ", p. 52. Szemerkenyi referred to this 
phenomenon as "Upton's disease: the expert military loses confidence in the factually 
incompetent civilians and wants to save itself from them. This disease has characterised 
Central Europe since the initial reforms in 1989-1990. See, Szemerkenyi, p. 71. 
21 Wrpost, 12 February 1995. Cited by Stefan Sarvas in "Professional Soldiers and 
Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(Fall 1999), p. 109. 
22 Szemerkenyi, p. 12. 
23 Dutkiewicz, p. 46. 
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integrated their ministries of defence by the end of the 1990s. Some progress has been 
made, but ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the situation had not changed substantially 
in the deep structures. 
A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE 
Finding a suitable civilian minister of defence in Poland and Hungary was a real problem for 
the new regimes. The problem had two aspects. First, the marked deficit of civilian expertise 
in defence matters meant that there were few politicians suited for the role by training and 
background. Second, the political divide between presidents and parliaments perpetuated an 
ambiguous chain of command and delayed the passage of crucial legislation defining the 
balance of powers of the various players in civilian control of the military, especially the 
minister of defence. 
The first civilian ministers of defence (ca. 1990-1994). In Hungary after the 
elections of 1990 a centre-right coalition government made up of the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum, the Independent Small-holders' Party and the Christian Democratic Peoples' Party 
took power. Both the prime minister and the new civilian defence minister were from the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum. The president, on the other hand, was a member of the 
strongest opposition party, the Alliance of Free Democrats. One. might have expected that a 
system of cohabitation with a president and prime minister from different parties would have 
lead to greater political conflict and instability than it actually did. In fact, Hungary's first post-
communist government under Prime Minister Joszef Antal I was, overall, one of the most 
stable in Central Europe and managed to serve out its full four-year mandate (1990-1994). 
Lajos Fur served as minister of defence for the duration of the Hungarian Democratic Forum's 
coalition government. 
On one level then, Hungary's transition to a civilian minister of defence could be called 
a success. A closer look at Fur's tenure, however, reveals a number of problems which 
prompt a rather serious caveat to the proposition that civilianisation was on track. First, the 
institutional separation of the defence ministry and the Hungarian Defence Force Command 
(general staff) in 1989, posed a major obstacle to the minister's effective supervision of the 
military. 
The rationale of the bifurcated Hungarian system was explained to a British ministry of 
defence management consultancy team in 1995 in the following way. First, the defence 
ministry functions as a sort of impact point between the parliament and the general staff on 
the one hand, and the Hungarian Defence Force on the other hand; thus it separates the 
military from the politicians. Second, the ministry of defence has an overview on the general 
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staff and the Defence Force and it supervises them by continuously watching them. 24 
The British team expressed doubts that the ministry of defence could really carry out 
these tasks "as it has only a limited role in the development of the defence policy and the 
Hungarian Defence Force can be made responsible only by the minister of defence." In 
conclusion, they argued that while government supervision of the military was legally 
supposed to be carried out by the defence minister, the structure did not always make it 
possible for him to carry out that task. 25 
Szenes described this as a problem of a "strong military commander contrasted with 
a weak civilian defence minister'', arguing that it was a perennial problem in Hungary's civil-
military relations. 26 The crux of the issue was that the 1993 Defence Act27 ascribed to the 
chief of the defence staff many key tasks and responsibilities; the minister of defence, on the 
other hand, was limited to exercising control only through the chief of defence. 
The second problem was that according to the 1989 Constitution, control over the 
Hungarian armed forces was shared by the minister of defence and the president. This 
arrangement of command authority was, in the opinion of many analysts, a tactic of the 
departing Hungarian Socialist Workers Party to keep as much power as possible out of the 
hands of the prime minister and minister of defence as both posts were expected to be taken 
by non-communists after the free elections in 1990. In this way, substantial powers would be 
retained by the president who it was expected would be a reformed communist. 28 
An additional reform in December 1989 saw the ministry of defence divided into a 
small ministry which would report to the minister, and a large defence staff which would report 
to the president. The weakness of the civilian minister was clearly evident in the way this 
24 From the "Summarizing Conclusions" of the report reprinted as Appendix A in The 
Hungarian Defence Force and Civil Control in the Reflection of British Transillumination, 
Budapest: Ministry of Defence, Department for Education and Science, 1997, p. 101. 
25 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
26 Zoltan Szenes, "The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in 
Hungary", in David Betz and John L6wenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Post-Communist 
Europe, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 83. 
27 Law CX of 1993 on National Defence, 7 December 1993, published in Magyar 
K6zl6ny, No. 186, 24 December 1993. Thanks to Nicholas Sarvari for summarising and 
translating the act. 
28 See, for example, Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and 
NATO Expansion, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 
NO. 39, 1995, p. 12. 
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separation was carried out. Before the move, the ministry of defence consisted of 1 ,348 
personnel. By 1992, the ministry of defence consisted of only 135 personnel.29 That is to say, 
only ten per cent of the pre-1989 ministry of defence personnel remained under the immediate 
authority of the civilian minister, the rest having been transferred to the defence staff. 
The conflict inherent in the divided authority over the military rapidly came to a head in 
October 1990 with the "taxi blockade" protest over rising fuel prices. Essentially, the Antal! 
government wanted to use the military to break up the taxi strike and restore transportation; 
the president, on the other hand, opposed any use of the military. Thus a situation arose 
whereby the intentions of the minister of defence were in direct conflict with the orders of the 
president as commander-in-chief. This was an untenable situation for the military command: 
in deciding to follow the orders of one side and not the other, the military would have 
effectively been making policy. 
The immediate crisis was resolved by the decision of the prime minister not to order 
the military into action against the strikers, but the problem continued to simmer through the 
next year. The commander of the armed forces, Lieutenant General Kalman Lorincz, 
eventually threatened to resign over the fact that the military had been turned into a battlefield 
between political authorities.30 
In August 1991, the defence minister made an attempt to break the deadlock by 
submitting a request to the Constitutional Court asking it to clarify the limits of presidential 
powers to command the armed forces. The decision of the court was in favour of the 
minister: the president had the right only to "direct" the armed forces and could not provide 
"leadership" except under specific crisis conditions; "leadership" of the armed forces was 
deemed to be the prerogative of the government.31 
In short, although Hungary moved quickly to appoint a civilian minister of defence who 
managed to last for four years in that position, peculiarities of the structure of the ministry of 
defence, the institutional separation of the ministry and the defence staff, and the competing 
authority of the president and government over the military, all combined to undermine the real 
authority of the minister. 
29 Figures are from Honvedelem '92, Budapest: Ministry of Defence, 1992, cited by 
Alfred A Reisch, "Military Affairs: The Hungarian Army in Transition", RFE/RL Research 
Report, Vol. 2, No. 10 (5 March 1993), p. 50. 
30 Budapest Domestic Service, 0700 GMT, 30 May 1991, FBIS-EEU, No. 91-064, 3 
April1991. 
31 Magyar Kozlony, No. 103, 26 September 1991, pp. 2,111-2,125, JPRS-EER, No. 
91-168, 13 November 1991. 
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Poland also adopted a mixed presidential-parliamentary system which led to a conflict 
arising between the president and the legislature over who would control the military. 
However, the greater strength of the reformed Polish communist party, the military's tradition 
of independence and political activism, and the fact that the president had a direct and popular 
mandate, caused this conflict to be longer and more contentious than was the case in 
Hungary. 
To a great extent, the weaknesses of Polish civilian control were attributable to the 
political compromises enshrined in the 1992 Little Constitution, 32 which was not superceded 
until 1997. The Little Constitution reflected the weakness of the 1989 parliament- elected 
under provisions which guaranteed control of the Sejm to the communists and their 
supporters - and the strength of the first democratically elected president, Lech Walesa. As 
such, it gave the president a decisive voice in matters of national security, including the 
selection of the minister of national defence, the chief of the general staff, and most other high 
posts within the military services. According to Michta, 
... these constitutional prerogatives became a powerful incentive for Walesa 
and the senior officers to bypass the institutions of the ministry of defence and 
often ignore the defence minister altogether. The 1992 Constitution in effect 
made the Polish military a player in Polish domestic politics.33 
A further legislative complication to civilianising the Polish ministry of defence was that until 
the passage of the 1996 Law on the Duties of the Office of the Minister of National Defence,34 
the ministry of defence was governed by the many times amended 1967 Law on National 
Defence. Under the latter law the minister controlled the armed ·forces through the chief of the 
general staff, the commanders of the military districts, and the service chiefs. Implicit in the 
1967 law was the assumption that the minister would be a high-ranking military officer.35 
In the early days of transition, the preference of the president to keep the military in his 
own camp and outside the orbit of the legislature, the constitutional and legislative regulations 
on the ministry of defence and a desire to "encourage widespread military involvement in the 
32 Mala Konstytucya z komentarzem, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo, 1993. The Little 
Constitution is analysed in Louisa Vinton, Poland's Little Constitution Clarifies Walesa's 
Powers", RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 35 (4 September 1992). 
33 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , pp. 79-80. 
34 This law was actually passed by the Sejm in June 1995 only to be vetoed by 
Walesa. It was signed by his Kwasniewski in January 1996. See, "Law Dated 14 December 
1995 Detailing Duties of the Minister of National Defence", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 10, 30 
January 1996, pp. 159-161, FBIS-EEU .. No. 96-120,30 January 1996. 
35 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 91. 
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restructuring process",36 led to the appointment of a military man, Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk, 
as minister of defence in July 1990. By January 1992, however, under Poland's third 
government in as many years, Jan Parys became the first civilian minister of defence. 
Parys' five-month tenure as minister of defence cannot be rated as much of a 
success. Indeed, the so-called "Parys Affair" of 1992 contributed greatly to the highly 
conflictual civil-military relationship that would prevail in Poland until at least the mid-1990s. 
Parys seems to have been especially unsuited to the role of minister of defence: 
Staunchly nationalist and anti-Soviet in his outlook, Parys took over the office 
with the anticipation that he was entering an institution riddled with former 
communists and possibly intelligence agents spying for Moscow. From the 
start he appeared to have assumed that there was no one in the Polish military 
that he could trust. By setting a hostile tone for civil-military relations, Parys 
became the focal point of a struggle for power between the president and the 
prime minister.37 
The "Parys Affair'' was part of a larger struggle between the government of prime minister Jan 
Olszeski and Walesa over the real extent of the president's powers in the sphere of defence. 
With regard to the minister of defence specifically, the conflict was over who would appoint 
the chief of the general staff. 
What set off the crisis was a meeting in April 1992 between Jerzy Milewski (a member 
of the Presidential Chancellery responsible for state security affairs), and General Tadeusz 
Wilecki. Allegedly, Milewski informed Wilecki that he was Walesa's favourite for the new chief 
of the general staff. Parys then accused Walesa of both usurping his authority as minister of 
defence, and of bribing Wilecki with the post of chief of the general staff if he, in turn, would 
back the idea of a strong presidency.38 
Ultimately, a special legislative commission was convened to look into the matter. It 
concluded that Parys' allegations were "unfounded and detrimental to the state's interests" 
and he was forced to resign.39 Wilecki was subsequently appointed chief of the general staff 
under the government of Hanna Suchocka in August 1992. 
According to Michta, the "Parys Affair'' helped to strengthen the position of the general 
staff (as the president's men) vis-a-vis the structures of the ministry of defence, thus making 
36 Eva Busza, "Transition and Civil-Military Relations in Poland and Russia", 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 29, No.2 (1996), p. 176. 
37 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 82. 
38 TVP, 1730 GMT, 6 April 1992, FBIS-EEU, No. 92-067, 7 April 1992. 
39 PAP, 1056 GMT, 15 May 1992, FBIS-EEU, No. 92-097, 19 May 1992. 
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the allegiance of the general staff a political prize. More importantly, the affair strengthened 
the perception among officers that the army faced a concerted onslaught from the civilians 
against which, Wilecki observed later on, the army had the "right to defend itself."40 
The period of re-militarisation (ca. 1994-1998). Poland's next minister of defence, 
Janusz Onyszkiewicz, was also a civilian. However, his dismissal in October 1993 after 17 
months in power marked the beginning of the remilitarisation of the ministry of defence.41 As 
minister of defence, Onyszkiewicz recognised that without clearly defined lines of authority 
Poland's constitutional framework leant itself to abuse by the president as he sought to exert 
control over the armed forces and to make the chief of the general staff his personal 
confidante. 42 
The fear was that continued conflict in civil-military relations might worsen Poland's 
chances for admission to NATO; according to a senior official of the ministry of defence: "The 
sole condition which will determine the accession of Poland to NATO is her willingness to 
accept and implement all the obligations which this entails, including civilian control over the 
Polish armed forces."43 Michta argued that Onyszkiewicz viewed the attempts to subordinate 
the general staff to the president's office as "a coup against Poland's vital national interest" -
i.e., accession to NAT0.44 
Onyszkiewicz' response to the crisis was to launch a comprehensive reform of the 
organisational structure of the ministry of defence in mid-1993. His other initiative was to 
oversee the drafting of the new "Organisational Regulations of the Ministry of Defence in 
Peacetime" which were introduced in September 1993. The gist of Onszkiewicz' reforms 
was to put the general staff firmly under the authority of the minister of defence, and to create 
a three-part integrated ministry of defence made up of the minister's executive office, an 
integrated military-civilian administrative bureaucracy, and the general staff. 
Unfortunately, the issuing of the new regulations coincided with the fall of Hanna 
Suchocka's coalition government. In the September 1993 parliamentary elections, the 
40 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 83. 
41 Onyszkiewicz, a mathematician and Solidarity activist, was one of two civilian 
deputy ministers of defence appointed under the government of Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki in 1990. He resigned that post in 1992 when Jan Parys took over the ministry. 
42 Onyszkiewicz interview (P1 0), The Hague, May 2001. 
43 Interview with unnamed Polish defence official by Piotr Dutkiewicz, quoted in 
Dutkiewicz, p. 47. 
44 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 87. 
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reformed communist party together with the Polish Peasant Party, came to power. One of 
their first acts was to announce sweeping changes in the senior leadership of the ministry of 
defence including the appointment of Admiral Kolodziejczyk as minister of defence for the 
third time in four years in October 1993. 
In November 1993, Koldziejczyk suspended implementation of Onyszkiewicz' 
regulations. Another sign of the re-militarisation process was the transfer of responsibility for 
military education from the ministry of defence back to the general staff. Military education 
had been seen as one of the important ways in which the attitudes of the military could be 
transformed over time; the control of military education was one of the first things transferred 
to the ministry of defence in the early stages of reform and losing control was a setback for 
the institutionalisation of civilian control. 45 
The rift between civilian and military personnel in the ministry of defence widened 
under Kolodziejczyk. The new minister, however, did not have an easier relationship with the 
president than any of his predecessors. In fact, it was around Kolodziejczyk that the most 
infamous scandal in Polish civil-military relations, the so-called "Drawsko Affair", centred. A 
one-time ally of the president, Kolodziejczyk and Walesa eventually had a bitter falling out 
which broke into the open at a luncheon for the senior military and ministry of defence 
leadership at the Drawsko Pomorski Training facility on 30 September 1994. At the luncheon 
Walesa expressed his opinion that the military command had lost confidence in the minister 
of defence. With Kolodziejczyk present, Walesa polled the officers present, including Chief of 
the General Staff Wilecki, as to whether Kolodziejczyk should be removed and expressed his 
intention of appointing a new minister who would be prepared to assist in the exercise of the 
president's prerogatives in the defence sphere. 46 
Essentially, the military were encouraged by the president to pass judgement on a 
minister of defence who had been elected. That the president incited this anti-democratic 
move is demonstrative of how strained civil-military relations had become as a result of the 
divided authority between the president and the Sejm. Ultimately, a special Sejm committee 
45 For an overview of Polish military educational reforms see, LCOL Piotr 
Sienkiewicz, COL Andzej Chijnacki and LCOL Slawomir Olezalek, "Practical and Personnel 
Conversion Aspects of Military Educational Reforms in Poland", in Military Higher Education 
(conference proceedings), Budapest: Ministry of Defence, Education and Sciences 
Department, 1999. 
46 TV Polania Network, 1830 GMT, 11 October 1994, FBIS-EEU, No. 94-197, 12 
October 1994; TV Polania Network, 1600 GMT, 14 October 1994, FBIS-EEU, No. 94-200, 17 
October 1994; and article by Pawel Wronski in Gazeta Wyborcza, 11 October 194, FBIS-
EEU, No. 94-197, 12 October 1994. 
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which criticised everyone at the luncheon recommended that the generals involved be 
disciplined, and that civilian control of the military be reasserted. 47 Instead, Walesa fired 
Kolodziejczyk. 
Hungary's experience of re-militarisation was similar to Poland's in its root causes, but 
less dramatic. Civilianisation of the ministry of defence, for all the problems of its practical 
implementation, had been a stated goal of the Antall Government from 1990-1994. The 
attitude of Hungary's second government, led by the reformed communist MSZP, was 
markedly different. Under this government the process of civilianisation was halted and then 
reversed. 
The appointment of retired army Colonel Gyorgy Keleti as minister of defence in May 
1994 was only the most obvious aspect of the re-introduction of military officers to the top 
decision-making posts in the ministry. According to Szemerkenyi, this was a demonstration 
of what happens "when the executive's commitment to civilianise the ministry of defence 
disappears."48 Similarly, the British ministry of defence study also concluded that "if 
civilianisation of senior ministry of defence posts is to take place and succeed, it will require 
the endorsement of the government and the commitment of the minister of defence and the 
defence collegium"- a commitment that the research was unable to detect.49 
There are several reasons for the new government's retreat from the process of 
civilianisation. Logically, the serious problems of the federal budget at that time and the 
substantial cuts this imposed on defence spending were a motivating factor. More important, 
however, seems to have been the essential disinterest of MSZP politicians in the issue of 
defence reform. An independent review of security policy in the 1990s claimed that the MSZP 
government simply could not conceive what kind of security challenges were facing the state, 
nor what kind of armed forces were needed.50 More succinctly, Janos Matus, a civilian 
bureaucrat in the ministry from 1995-1997 who was head of the department of Security 
Studies at the National Defence University when interviewed, suggested that "the [MSZP] 
47 From comments of a member of the special committee interviewed in Gazeta 
Poznanska, 26 October 1994, FBIS-EEU, No. 92-214, 4 November 1994. 
48 Szemerkenyi, p. 13. 
49 Directorate of Management Consultancy Services, Review of Parliamentary 
Oversight of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence and Democratic Control of the Hungarian 
Armed Forces, London: Ministry of Defence, 1996. 
50 Paraphrased from Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, The First Decade of 
the Independent Hungarian Security Policy, Budapest: October 1999, p. 49. 
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politicians simply neglected the military. They were focussed on NATO, but they recognised 
only the advantages of membership, not the responsibilities."51 
The second civilian ministers of defence (ca. 1994-1998). Hungary's return to a 
civilian minister of defence came in June 1998 with the appointment of Janos Szabo after 
parliamentary elections in May brought the FIDESZ-MPP party to power under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Victor Orban. As opposed to the MSZP, FIDESZ had a much better 
developed governmental programme on defence and security policy which was set out in the 
policy document At the Threshold of the New Millennium: Governmental Programme for a 
Civilian Hungary. 52 The Orban cabinet indicated that a primary task of the new government 
would be to strengthen civil control of the armed forces. 53 
Crucially, by 1998 the contest for power between the president and the government 
had long since been settled. The first step in resolving this issue was the aforementioned 
ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1991. Further constitutional amendments in 1992-1993 
and again in 1994 even more clearly defined the president's role as a titular- rather than 
operational - commander-in-chief and solidified the supremacy of the government and the 
minister of defence in the defence policy sphere. 54 
Notwithstanding the evident desire of FIDESZ-to redress the weaknesses of civilian 
control which had grown so manifest under the previous government, and the resolution of the 
presidential-governmental conflict, a number of problems persi·sted throughout the late 1990s. 
To a certain extent, criticism of the system in Hungary centred on the perceived personal 
weaknesses of the minister of defence, Janos Szabo. As one non-governmental activist on 
defence policy argued, "the new minister of defence is a civilian, however I can criticise him 
and the media criticises him because he is not professional at all."55 This perception of the 
minister of defence was also shared by officials within the ministry. One interviewee 
51 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
52 At the Threshold of the New Millennium: Governmental Program for a Civilian 
Hungary, Budapest: 1998; summarised and analysed in detail in The First Decade of the 
Independent Hungarian Security ... , pp. 76-83 .. 
53 Ibid., p. 82. 
54 A record of the constitutional reforms in the defence sphere can be found in: MTI, 
2107 GMT, 7 December 1993, FBIS-EEU, No. 93-236, 10 December 1993; the Constitution, 
especially Articles 19, Sections A, B and C, and Article 30, beth dealing with presidential 
prerogatives in defence are found in English and Hungarian in Constitutions of the Countries 
of the World, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1995 
55 Kiss interview (H8), Budapest, 3 Decemb,er 1999. 
expressed his view that: 
Unfortunately, the ministers in this ministry have never been serious persons. 
Everybody called the former minister the 'spokesman' because he didn't make 
any decisions, he just communicated with the press. The current minister 
doesn't even do that. 56 
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The unfavourable perception of the minister was probably deepened by the feeling that as a 
cabinet appointment the minister of defence was not considered particularly important. 
Szabo was not a FIDESZ member, rather he was a meber of the smaller Independent Small-
holders' Party which was in coalition with FIDESZ. Moreover, the minister was seriously 
hampered in the performance of his duties by the fact that he had virtually no permanent staff 
of his own: 
The minister has maybe five people who arrange his travel and telephones. He 
has maybe one advisor. Look at the phone book for how many people are 
under the minister. There is the head of the minister's secretariat, but this is 
not a real position -the others are typists. The advisory body of the minister 
has six places but only one person. 57 
In any event, while it was emphasised in interviews that formally the authority of the minister 
was unfettered, there were serious problems with the system in practice: 
I would say that we have all the institutions necessary for civilian control in the 
law. We have problems in the practice. . . The minister has the legal 
supervision over the defence forces, not only the general staff, but the whole 
military, but he does not use this competence. This is just the legal framework 
-what the minister can do. The other side of the issue is what he dares to do 
in practice. I think we have the legal framework for civilian control but this is 
just theoretical. 58 
Although civilian ministers of defence began to be re-appointed as early as November 1994 in 
Poland, the single most significant step in Poland's return to a civilian minister of defence was 
the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski as president in November 1995. With Walesa gone, 
the five-year campaign of manipulation of the top officials in the ministry of defence for the 
benefit of the presidency over the parliament began to come to an end. As opposed to 
Walesa, Kwasniewski was prepared to work with the Sejm so that the long-delayed Law on 
the Duties of the Office of the Minister of National Defence59 which reinforced the authority of 
56 Kelemen interview (H7), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
57 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
58 Kelemen interview (H7), Budapest, 2 December 1999 (emphasis added). 
59 
"Law Dated 14 December 1995 Detailing Duties of the Minister of National 
Defence", Dziennik Ustaw, No. 10, Warsaw, 30 January 1996, pp. 159-161, FBIS-EEU, 96-
120, 30 January 1996. The law had been vetoed by Walesa in November 1995. 
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the civilian minister of defence, as well as a new Constitution in 199760 which cut back the 
prerogatives of the president were passed. Finally, in October 1997 Janusz Onyszkiewicz 
the architect of the "Organisational Regulations" on which the Law on the Duties of the Office 
of the Minister of National Defence was based, was reappointed as minister of defence. 
The passage of the Law on the Duties of the Office of the Minister of National Defence 
was a major turning point in Polish civil-military relations. The main thrust of the law was to 
end the dualism of civilian and military structures of authority within the ministry which had 
undermined the minister for so long. Under the provisions of the new law, the civilian minister 
of defence was the head of the whole defence establishment, with the general staff being 
integrated into the ministry. The chief of the general staff was made a deputy minister 
subordinate directly to the civilian minister- not to the president. Both the military intelligence 
services and military education were put under the control of the minister. The minister's 
directives and decisions acquired the status of direct military orders for all active service 
personnel, including the chief of the general staff. Basically, the new law signalled 
unequivocally that the civilian minister of defence was the ultimate arbiter of all things that 
went on in his department. 
The 1997 Constitution limited the capacity of the president to interfere in the minister of 
defence's performance of his duties. It explicitly noted the principle of political neutrality of the 
armed forces and stated that they are "subject to democratic and civilian control."61 The sole 
task of the armed forces was to "protect the independence of the state and the indivisibility of 
its territory as well as to ensure the security and integrity of its borders."62 It also clearly 
stated that the president "in times of peace, shall exercise command over the armed forces 
through the minister of national defence."63 
The main beneficiary of the legal developments in Polish civil-military relations was the 
minister of defence, Janusz Onyszkiewicz. In contrast with his Hungarian counterpart, the 
new Polish minister of defence gained not only the legal and institutional levers necessary to 
control the ministry, but as someone who had been deeply involved in defence and security 
6° Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 2 April 1997, available on the Sejm website, 
http:/ikserp.sejm.gov.p!!english/konstytucya. 
61 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Art. 26, Sec. 2. 
62 Ibid., Art. 26, Sec. 1. 
63 Ibid., Art 134, Sec. 2. 
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issues since 1990, he also had intellectual expertise in defence. 64 
In summary, moving to a civilian minister of defence in Poland and Hungary was not 
simply a matter of declaration; rather it was a difficult process that took nearly ten years to 
achieve. Neither was it a straightforward process, as both countries experienced a period of 
re-militarisation. Crucially, we see that for civilianisation at the top level of the ministry of 
defence to succeed, it required the support of both president and parliament to enact the 
proper legislation and to avoid undermining the authority of the minister vis-a-vis his military 
advisors. Equally important, it was incumbent on new civilian ministers of defence to be pro-
active and actually lead their departments. 
In Poland, a particularly dynamic minister of defence working in a new legislative 
framework achieved positive results in imposing civilian control of the armed forces. In 
Hungary, on the other hand, a more passive minister, lacking sufficient staff and who may not 
have had the fullest support of his colleagues in cabinet, achieved much less impressive 
results. Ironically, this suggests that despite the far more serious and drawn-out 
transgressions of democratic civil-military relations in Poland, the resolution of the problem 
was more definitive there than it was in Hungary. 
"RAISINS IN BREAD": INTEGRATING CIVILIANS IN THE DEFENCE BUREAUCRACY 
If obtaining a civilian minister of defence was a problem in Poland and Hungary, civilianising 
the bureaucracy of the ministry of defence was an even more complex challenge with even 
less positive results. The need to civilianise was widely acknowledged: 
Appointing a civilian minister of defence may facilitate civilian control of the 
military, but it does not guarantee effective civilian control. The new minister of 
defence also had to introduce a civilian presence lower down in the 
bureaucracy. 65 
There have been some signs of progress. For example, as of late 1999, civilian personnel 
represented about 46 per cent of the Hungarian ministry of defence. In Poland the percentage 
was lower at 33.5 per cent, but nonetheless there had been a tangible increase in the civilian 
presence in the ministry of defence. 56 
64 Numerous authors credit Onyszkiewicz with having earned the respect of the 
Polish military. Michta wrote that "his tenure at defence won him uniform praise from both 
civilians and the military." (Michta, p. 97). 
65 Szemerkenyi, p. 11. 
66 Hungarian figure is from Szemerkenyi, p. 12; Polish figure is from an interview in 
the personnel department of the ministry of defence: Jarmuszko interview( P13), Warsaw, 
19 June 2000. 
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On the other hand, the real influence of these new civilian officials in the ministry of 
defence remains a matter of considerable debate. When asked in 1999 what were the main 
problems of integrating civilians in the Hungarian ministry of defence, one long-time observer 
replied "The short answer is that there is barely any integration."67 Similarly, in Poland it was 
estimated by one interviewee that "less than five per cent of real decision making posts in the 
ministry of defence are held by civilians."68 
One barrier to the integration of the defence bureaucracy was the low skill level of 
civilians in the defence sphere. Efforts to inject civilians into staff positions in the ministry of 
defence merely for the sake of having certain functions performed by civilians often backfired. 
Frequently, it led to situations where under-trained and inexperienced civilian managers were 
dominated by their more skilful military counterparts. These situations in turn generated 
tensions between the military and civilians which impeded the development of mutual respect. 
In the opinion of Dan Nelson, the problem of low civilian skill levels in the defence 
sphere may be"intractable".69 This is because governments initiated "only weak support" for 
the development of security studies in their national educational systems and, therefore, few 
experts were being educated for careers in the ministry of defence.70 
The lack of support for the development of security studies may be attributable in large 
part to the inability of the state to properly fund education in general. However, there are 
indications that civilian governments also did not hold civilian defence experts in high esteem. 
"I would say that the government tolerates civilian experts, or are just not very interested in the 
issue", was the conclusion an interlocutor in Budapest. While in Warsaw, ''The main problem 
in the last decade in this respect is the lack of understanding in the government of the need to 
have civilians in the ministry of defence."71 
Neither did the West put much effort into redressing the imbalance of expertise 
between military and civilians in the Partnership for Peace states: 
To have civilian control of the military Central European countries need first of 
67 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
68 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. This harsh estimate was only 
slightly at odds with the estimate of the personnel department of the ministry of defence that 
of some 325 top management posts in the ministry, 45 were held by civilians: Jarmuszko 
interview (P13), Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
69 Nelson interview (05), The Hague, May 2000. 
70 Sarvas, p. 114. 
71 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
all 'cannons' -that is civilian experts in the field. Western countries, despite all 
the talk on civilian control and despite all kinds of training in other fields (from 
banking through ecology) has (sic) an exception and does not do much to train 
Central European civilian experts in international security.72 
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Partnership for Peace emphasised military participation in training programmes and military-
to-military contacts, rather than partnership at the civilian bureaucratic level. The priority 
areas in Partnership for Peace were military-technical in nature: command, control and 
communications systems; standardisation; defence infrastructure; military education; 
exercises and training and so on. "The few token civilians who participated in some of these 
programmes only give the illusion of change in both NATO and partner countries."73 In other 
words, the skill level of civilians was growing very slowly while the familiarity of military 
personnel with NATO command structures, standard procedures and operational style was 
increasing rapidly through a host of training opportunities. 
The lack of civilian expertise in defence in Central Europe stems from the facts that 
traditionally civilians were not trained in defence in the Soviet era, that security studies still is 
not a course of study available in many civilian universities, and a generalised feeling among 
civilians that military issues are best left to the military themselves. A Hungarian deputy state 
secretary of defence summed the problem up: 
The problem of integration is a historical one. Within the Warsaw Pact, the 
defence sector was closed. There was no teaching of defence and security 
issues at civilian universities; defence expertise was concentrated in the 
military colleges and the general staff; it was absolutely impossible for civilians 
to be involved in defence. 74 
A major factor in the persistence of the problem was the very low level of support on the part 
of national governments for building a really knowledgeable group of civilian specialists. 
Poland is somewhat of an exception in Central Europe in this respect since in 1995 a National 
Security Faculty was formed at the University of Warsaw as a tripartite venture of the 
university, the National Security Bureau and the ministry of defence.75 
Attracting well-trained civilians into careers in the ministry of defence is proving very 
72 Krysztof A Zielke, "NATO Expansion and Civil-Military Relations" in Behind 
Declarations ... , p. 75. An interlocutor in Poland agreed that civilian defence officials had 
significantly less opportunity for training abroad under NATO or other bilateral programmes: 
Homziuk interview (P11 ), Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
73 Szemerkenyi, p. 67. 
74 Szabo 2 interview (H18), Budapest, 29 November 1999. 
75 Jazwinski interview (P12), Warsaw 12 June 2000. 
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difficult. In the post-communist era, a career in the military bureaucracy for a young, well-
educated Pole was not very attractive. In 1998, for example, there was not a single graduate 
from the National School of Public Administration (the main source of graduates for careers in 
the public service) employed by the ministry of defence.76 
A Hungarian civilian defence official described his frustration working at the ministry of 
defence: 
I spent two years in the ministry of defence from 1995 to 1997. My main 
problem was that civilians are not accepted by their military colleagues as 
knowledgeable experts on security issues. Most of the civilians in the ministry 
of defence are retired military officers and simply being a retired military person 
does not make them a civilian in mind-set. It is hard for them to accept 
civilians. . . I was told in the ministry of defence that they did not expect reliable 
expertise from me because I am a civilian and that my knowledge of American 
defence planning and so on was not valuable. So my knowledge was not paid 
attention to. It is very hard in this part of the world to accept a civilian as 
someone who can make acceptable proposals about the military_77 
An institutional culture which maintains a tradition that leaders must be officers and that 
civilians should not have command authority over military personnel, does not seem an 
attractive work environment for an ambitious young civil servant. On the other hand, there 
were indications in Warsaw that the barriers to civilianisation were more structural than 
attitudinal, 
The possible career path of young people in the ministry of defence compared 
to other ministries is rather poorer. The ministry of defence is still reluctant to 
absorb large numbers of young civilians - and the primary reason for that is 
not a negative attitude towards civilian control. But first of all it is the 
administrative problems it creates. The ministry of defence still has not 
developed a system that would enable a large number of civilians to continue 
their careers in the ministry. All these little regulations in terms of salary, 
sending people abroad, and everything else are aimed at officers. So the 
presence of civilians in this system causes bureaucratic problems. Therefore, 
in my opinion, it is first of all a problem of organisation and not a lack of will. 78 
There is another nuance to this problem: under the current personnel policy not only is it 
frustrating professionally to serve as a civilian in the ministry of defence, it can also be 
financially punitive. In Hungary, one interlocutor concluded: 
Why do we have so many military people within the system now? Its very 
simple: because of the salary. Many civilians join the ministry of defence and 
76 Dutkiewicz, p. 48. 
77 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
78 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
find that if they become an officer their salary will be one third higher.79 
In Poland, the situation was similar: 
It is a question of market competition. I believe that national security 
specialists could be brought into the ministry of defence but it is a question of 
salaries and the ministry is not in a good position in this respect. The average 
salary here is half or a third what it is in civilian life. So it is a question of 
possibilities. I have a personal experience of cooperation with civilians in the 
international department and it was pretty good - but a lot of people are leaving 
the ministry of defence now because of the money. We cannot attract 
experienced people here, only young students. If they have experience then we 
cannot afford them- we call them 'raisins in bread'.80 
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The prospects for educating civilians in defence issues were lower in Hungary than in Poland. 
Aside from the defence economics department of the Economics University in Budapest, as 
of late 1999 there were no courses in security studies at any civilian university.81 The main 
training centre for Hungarian civilians in defence issues is the National Defence University 
which began to admit civilian students to its department of security studies in September 
1997. By late 1999, approximately 45 out of a total 142 students in the department were 
civilian.82 
The opening of the National Defence University to civilian students can be seen in both 
a positive and negative light. It indicates that the ministry of defence was trying to solve its 
shortage of civilian expertise with the limited educational resources at its disposal. On the 
other hand, it suggests that the government as a whole did not take the problem sufficiently 
seriously if it had made essentially no effort to support security studies in the civilian 
educational system. 
In the short-term, the security studies programme may alleviate some of the problems 
caused by lack of civilian expertise in the ministry of defence. In the long-term it may 
contribute to the perpetuation of the problem. For one thing, several observers pointed out 
that political elites themselves are sceptical of civilian defence experts: "political parties have 
retired generals who advise them on the military; politicians do not trust civilian advice; they do 
not believe in civilian expertise; when they have a question, politicians only want to hear from 
79 Szabo 1 interview (H 17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
80 Osinski interview (P21 ), Warsaw, 13 June 2000. Moreover, within the ministry of 
defence military pay levels were 1.6-1.7 times higher than civilian pay levels: Jarmuszko 
interview (P13), Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
81 Moreover, the defence economics department consisted of only one faculty 
member: Jazwinski interview (P12), Warsaw 12 June 2000. 
82 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
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the military."83 
Yet, one of the main reasons for having civilians in the ministry of defence is to have 
the benefit of a diversity of viewpoints on matters of defence and security. If the politicians 
themselves do not appreciate any need for a diversity of viewpoints; and if they are content to 
leave the responsibility for training civilian experts to the military, in the same school as 
military officers, using the same methods and with the same professors; then what is the 
point of having civilian cadres in the ministry of defence anyway? 
A politicised process. Another potent barrier to the integration of civilians in the 
ministry of defence relates to the rather politicised appointment process. Some of Poland's 
problems in this respect have already been discussed in the context of appointing a civilian 
minister of defence. Naturally, the practice of making appointments to the ministry of defence 
based on political criteria rather than professional merit obtained at lower levels of the 
bureaucracy as well. Political appointees generated a lot of tension between the military and 
civilians in the ministry of defence. 
Within the bureaucracy there has been a very high turnover rate of civilian staff in both 
countries. Between 1990 and 1998 Poland had over 25 ministers and deputy ministers of 
defence, each representing different parties, and most unabashedly partisan. During Lajos 
Fur's tenure as minister of defence in Hungary, most of the senior leadership of the ministry of 
defence was civilian. Under Gyorgy Keleti, however, most of the senior, supposedly non-
political, civilian posts were taken over by military officers. Then again, under Janos Szabo 
the ministry of defence leadership returned to being mostly civilian. 
Aside from the period of re-militarisation, the really big problem of integration in Poland 
and Hungary has been the perception of the military that civilian appointments are politically 
rather than professionally motivated. In their view, not only did these new civilian bureaucrats 
lack any real expertise in defence, they were in the ministry of defence for too short a time to 
learn on the job, and because they were patronage appointees they were often not really 
interested in learning the job anyway: 
The biggest problem up to the latest election [1998] was that every new 
government tried to put its own people in the ministry of defence; the majority 
of them were not experts in any way- they were just family, cousins, friends, 
etc. Every new prime minister brings his own style of leading and his own 
people. Officials in the ministry of defence cannot connect with these people; 
its hard because there is not enough time to build up a new system if the 
people change with every election.84 
83 Matus interview (H11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
84 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
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Table 2· Military and Civilian Positions in the Hungarian Ministry of Defence 1990-199885 
Minister of Defence Minister of Defence Gyorgy Minister of Defence Janos 
Lajos Fur (MDF Keleti (MSZP Szabo (FIDESZ 
Government) 1990- Government) 1994-1998 Government) 1998-
1994 
minister of civilian military civilian 
defence 
Political State civilian civilian civilian 
Secretary 
Administrative civilian military civilian 
State 
Secretary 
Deputy State military military civilian 
Secretary 1 
Deputy State civilian military civilian 
Secretary 2 
Deputy State civilian civilian military 
Secretary 3 
Deputy State ------------------------------ military military 
Secretary 4 
One of the main problems is that the civilian bureaucracy is not treated as a neutral, 
professional body which serves regardless of the political party in power; rather it is a 
politicised body which turns over with each election. Such systems are hardly unknown in the 
West where there is considerable variation in the depth to which political appointments may 
go: when the American secretary of defence changes so does a large portion of the personnel 
of the defence department, whereas in the British system the bureaucracy tends not to 
change. In a country with a large talent-pool of bureaucrats accustomed to working in the 
security sphere a high turnover rate is not an insurmountable problem. In Poland and 
Hungary, on the other hand, which have only a shallow talent-pool of suitable civilian 
specialists, changing the bureaucracy with every new minister of defence is an extravagant 
luxury. 
Several of the interviewees in Hungary shared the impression that the civilian 
85 Data for Fur and Keleti from a table in Pecze, p .31; data for Szabo from 
Honvedelem '99, Budapest Ministry of Defence 1999, pp. 12-13. Two Deputy State 
Secretaries under minister of defence Janos Szabo are retired military officers: Dr Janos 
Szabo, Deputy State Secretary for Human Resources (former Vice-Rector of the Military 
Academy), and Dr Janos Karasz, Deputy State Secretary for Economic Affairs (a specialist 
in economics in the Ministry of Defence from the early 1980s). 
bureaucracy was too political: 
For the military it was a real shock that immediately after the transition civilians 
started to do all kinds of jobs in the ministry of defence. It was not democratic 
at all but very political. Ninety-nine per cent of the civilians in the ministry of 
defence were political appointees - they were cousins or brothers, neighbours 
and supporters of some politicians, that is all. .. this created a negative 
atmosphere. It was not easy for military officers to be subordinated to a 
civilian, especially if the civilian was an untrained appointee who didn't know 
anything ... To my mind this problem of political appointees is really difficult. 
Only the minister of defence and the administrative state secretary should be 
politicians. We still have that problem of young democracies, of replacing 
people all the time with political appointees, more than necessary, after each 
election for political reasons. It is still evolving, but the problem is not going 
away fast. 86 
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Another problem was that the military and civilians appeared to lack a common vocabulary. 
As was discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the concept of civilian control was 
understood by civilians and the military in different ways: 
In the West, the concept of civilian control is quite simple but in Hungary it 
means something different. The meaning is much more on control of the 
military by civilians, not a shared responsibility for defence. It is a difficult 
relationship. 87 
On the one hand, military officers have little experience of working with civilians in a 
democratic context. On the other hand, due to the lack of civilian expertise and a poor 
understanding of the concept of civilian control on both sides, civilian and military officials 
cannot communicate effectively. What Sarvas called a "symbolic blockage"88 meant that 
military and civilians used different terms to describe similar problems, thus hampering the 
development of good civil-military relations. As a Hungarian military officer put it: 
[Civilians] think that the military has its own interests, special military interests 
- ranks, positions, salary, a big defence structure, the largest number of 
personnel and so on ... And from the other side, we in the army can feel that 
civilians do not serve the interests of the military sphere; maybe they are 
serving the interests of the political parties, and political directions, different 
political directions ... 89 
A final reason for the slow pace of integration was also the resistance of the existing 
bureaucracy to change. An obvious source of this resistance was the fact that with the 
change of regime officers in Central Europe felt the effects of the transition profoundly. Both 
86 Nagy 1 interview (H 13), Budapest, 4 December 1999. 
87 Nagy 1 interview (H13), Budapest, 4 December 1999. 
88 Sarvas, p 114. 
89 Ujj interview (H21 ), Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
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socially and economically, military officers lost their formerly privileged positions. Ferenc 
Molnar, a Hungarian military sociologist and specialist on the effects of transition on the socio-
economic conditions of Central European armies, pointed out a large number of reasons for 
the loss of morale in the military including: the poor personal financial situation of officers, the 
lack of societal support for the military, an unpromising career path and so on.90 
The result was that while many junior officers left the military for better jobs in the 
civilian sector, senior officers whose socialisation in the Warsaw Pact system made them 
most resistant to change remained. This created a serious bottle-neck: 
Optimally, we should have a pyramidal rank structure but what we have is an 
upside-down pyramid because about half of all officers are major or lieutenant-
colonel in rank. It is at the lower level that we haven't enough ... Only after 
eight years did we start to think about the human side of reforming the armed 
forces. In the first years we did not do too much in this respect. .. It is a 
problem because the civilians have no experience. They have no idea what 
should be reformed and how to see some real changes in the system. And of 
course the generals are opposing change because many times it seems they 
want to say "its my place, its my chair, I don't want to change."91 
REFORMING THE GENERAL STAFF 
However, the most significant source of resistance to the effective integration and 
empowerment of civilians in the ministry of defence was the general staff. In Hungary and in 
Poland the dilemmas were more or less the same: under the old system the general staff 
was the "brain" of the army and many functions that should have been part of the ministry of 
defence such as planning and strategic analysis were concentrated there. Democratising 
civil-military relations, therefore, required that these functions be transferred to the integrated 
ministry of defence. 
Accomplishing this task, however, proved extremely difficult. Essentially the resolution 
of the problem had three complications: 
1 I civilians did not have the expertise to perform these tasks as well as the military; 
21 for various reasons, both personal and professional, the military did not want to 
relinquish their roles to the ministry of defence; and, 
3/ the weaknesses of defence legislation caused by the conflict between parliaments and 
presidents allowed them numerous ways of avoiding having to do so. 
Most of these complications have been discussed above. Accordingly, this section will focus 
90 Molnar interview (H 12), Budapest, 1-2 December 1999. 
91 Szabo 1 interview (H17), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
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on a few details of the problem which are illustrative of the trends already sketched. 
In Poland, the conflict between the general staff and the ministry of defence had at its 
centre General Tadeusz Wilecki, the chief of the general staff from August 1992 until March 
1997. According to Michta, "Polish institutional changes within the defence ministry in 1996-
1997 largely focussed on building a mechanism to constrain the chief of the general staff."92 
Given that the civilian bureaucracy in Poland was highly politicised and subject to a 
very high rate of turnover, the general staff was reluctant through most of the 1990s to 
relinquish its prerogatives in the policy-planning sphere and its operational control of the 
troops to the officials of the ministry of defence. Until Walesa's defeat in the presidential 
elections of 1995, the general staff proved very successful in playing the president and the 
parliament off against each other, and thus managed to retain an almost complete 
independence from the ministry of defence. 
The turning point was the 1996 Law on the Duties of the Office of the Minister of 
National Defence. This new law radically changed the organisational structure of both the 
ministry of defence and the general staff. Firstly, it made the general staff a branch of the 
ministry of defence under the direct authority of the minister. Secondly, it merged with other 
administrative structures or wholly eliminated the 52 organisational units of the old 
ministerial/general staff structures down to a more streamlined structure of 34 
administrations, offices and sections.93 
92 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 112. 
93 In addition to the minister of defence and his office, the civilian side of the ministry 
of defence consists of 14 departments and two bureaus: the Administrative Coordination 
Department, the Department of International Security, the Budget Department, the 
Department of Ordinance and Military Equipment Supply, the Economics Department, the 
Department of Infrastructure, the Personnel and Military Educational Department, the Control 
Department, the Legal Department, the Department of Development and Implementation, the 
Social-Education Department, the Department of the Defence System, the Department of 
Foreign Military Affairs, and the Department of Cooperation with NATO, plus the Press and 
Information Bureau and the Complaints and Interventions Bureau. 
The administrations which constitute the military side of the ministry of defence (i.e., 
those under the general staff) consist of 3 boards and 15 departments: the General Board, 
the Organisational Board, the Development Planning Board, the Strategic Planning 
Department, the Command and Training Systems Department, the Department of Logistics, 
the Mobilisation Department, the Command Department, the Material Department, the 
Territorial Defence Department, the Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Department, 
the Logistic Support Planning Department, the Operational-Strategic Department, the 
Training Department, the Technical Department, the Topography Department, the 
Department of Signals and Informatics, and the Military Health service Department. See, 
The Polish Defence Forces, Warsaw: Press and Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, 
1998, pp.10-11. 
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The really controversial outcome of the new legislation, however, was the creation of 
the Land Forces Command which became the command authority for the bulk of the armed 
forces in April 1997.94 The Land Forces Command was not subordinate to the chief of the 
general staff; rather it was directly subordinate to the minister of defence. Whereas 
previously the minister of defence could command the troops only through the chief of the 
general staff, now he could issue directives through a ministerial structure which bypassed 
the chief of the general staff. Effectively, the general staff became the planning and advisory 
branch of the ministry of defence and lost the operational control of the troops which had 
contributed to its former independence. 
Thus, the former independence of the general staff from the ministry of defence was 
greatly diminished in line with the new strength of the civilian minister. On the other hand, the 
reform may have gone too far. The control of the minister of defence now extended to a very 
low operational level. This suggests that the military's former independence was simply 
replaced by civilian micro-management. The threat, according to Michta, is that, "if the 
commands are not given the requisite freedom to implement orders and directives in a 
professional manner, civilian control of the military will have been taken almost literally to 
mean civilian command."95 
Though the root causes of the problem were similar in both countries, the conflict 
between the general staff and the ministry of defence was less openly dramatic, but also less 
definitively resolved in Hungary. Prior to the political compromises of 1989-1990 which led to 
the retreat of the communist Party from power, the ministry of defence and the general staff 
were integrated under the command of the minister of defence who was both the highest-
ranking military officer and a member of the government. The separation of the general staff 
from the ministry of defence, the declared intention of which was to isolate the armed forces 
from partisan political influences, could be seen as having been too successful: the general 
staff ended up becoming a buffer not just between the military and partisan politics, but also 
between the armed forces and the ministry of defence which made it very difficult for the 
government to implement its defence policy decisions.96 
94 Ibid., p. 18. 
95 Michta, The Soldier Citizen ... , p. 113. 
96 Rudolf Joo, The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: The Experience of 
Hungary, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Chaillot Paper No. 
23, February 1996, p. 48. There is of course another interpretation of the reasons behind the 
separation of the general staff from the ministry of defence (i.e., it was in order to preserve 
some control of the armed forces by the reformed Communist Party which expected to win 
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According to Zoltan Pecze, the institutional separation of 1989 gave the general staff 
the feeling that they were on an equal level with the ministry of defence. Senior military 
leaders preferred to view the ministry of defence as a provider of essential administrative 
needs, not as a superior.97 As opposed to the Polish case, however, the position of the chief 
of the general staff as the subordinate of the minister was made very clear under the National 
Defence Act. Therefore, the tactic of the general staff to avoid submitting to reforms they did 
not like was typically not open confrontation with the minister but passive resistance to 
direction 
It is true for the current chief of staff and for the previous ones that they don't 
know what civilian control is and they resist strongly when there are attempts 
to exercise civilian control. The previous chief of staff was dismissed because 
he resisted the current government's policies and individual orders. And then 
came another chief of staff who was told to be more loyal but my impression is 
that he also does not understand this whole idea and will cause problems - he 
already has caused problems. . . In Hungary, the commander bills himself as 
the strongest, most talented person in the company, regiment or whatever-
and they hold on to this idea. A commander is a commander because he is 
the best ever in his area. When they come to the top they still think this way 
and regard the ministry of defence as a challenge to be overcome, as 
incompetent, stupid people who have no military knowledge and have no right 
(not in the legal sense) to say anything about military matters. 
In 1996, some changes were made in various legal acts governing the armed forces, most 
notably to the National Defence Act and the Service Acts (Acts XLIII, The Service Status of 
Profesional Soldiers, and XLIV The Service Status of Conscripts of 1996) which addressed a 
variety of organisational, personnel and operational issues pertaining to the military but did not 
solve the underlying problems. In fact, one of the policies of the MSZMP government was to 
scrap plans for the merger of the military command and the defence ministry. 
Ultimately, all Hungarian governments paid lip service at least to resolving this 
problem. Even by the end of 1999, however, the chances of success were judged by several 
defence officials in Budapest to be fairly low: 
The first government made a resolution on integration in 1994, but that 
government left before it went through. The second government made some 
studies and promised to do this integration but never did. Now we have the 
third government trying which is, I am afraid, going to fail again. 98 
Indeed, in July 1999 the chief of general staff, General Ferenc Vegh, was forced to resign his 
the 1990 presidential election). The two propositions are not mutually exclusive. 
97 Pecze, p 39. 
98 Kelemen interview (H7), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
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post when a bitter dispute between him and minister of defence Janos Szabo over the 
government's plan to increase the control of the ministry of defence over the armed forces 
became public. Vegh accused Szabo of managing a 400-strong "shadow general staff' in the 
ministry of defence that advises decision-makers, while army commanders are pushed to the 
background.99 
The response of the ministry of defence was that "the general staff must merge with 
the ministry and not vice versa. We shall quash anyone who opposes the government 
programme." Szabo was also quoted as saying, "there are matters within the ministry that 
can be settled only through orders."100 Undoubtedly, the position of the ministry of defence 
that it and not the general staff should control the armed forces was correct. Nonetheless, the 
rhetoric of the minister which amounted to saying "shut up and obey!" was indicative of a 
worrying civil-military divide, internal tensions and operational disorders that cast doubt on the 
competence of the ministry's leadership. 
99 Matyas Szabo, "Hungarian Army Chief Resigns", RFE/RL Newsline Endnote, 16 
July 1999. 
100 Ibid. 
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3.2: Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence- Former Soviet 
Union 
The Russian military has played a more prominent role in its political system than the 
Ukrainian military. Indeed, in the early 1990s there was real concern about the potential of a 
military coup in Russia. At a time when leading members of the government like Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev in September 1992 were asking, "why is the military deciding highly 
important political questions? When tanks become an independent political force it is a 
catastrophe!", such fears did not seem wholly out of place. 101 
By the mid 1990s, however, when the Russian military showed little inclination to try 
toppling the regime the efforts of scholars shifted to explaining the paradox of Russian military 
"quiescence". 102 A prevailing view emerged that the military was essentially passive in the 
face of malign neglect. There had been no attempt at a military take-over because, despite 
ample cause, the senior command was too corrupted to lead one, the officer corps was too 
divided internally to join one, and the army as a whole was too weak- relative to the array of 
other armed formations which might oppose it- to carry one out without touching off a civil 
war. In short, it was posited that the military posed no immediate threat to Yeltsin's regime 
and appeared to be resigned to a fate of marginalisation and disintegration.103 
It is closer to the truth, however, to say that there was hardly any intention to put the 
Russian military under democratic civilian control in the Yeltsin era in the first place. The 
army was directly subordinate to an autocratic and erratic president who happened to be a 
civilian; that level of control was sufficient for the army and the president alike. From time to 
time, Yeltsin drew the army into his political fights- in putting down the opposition's revolt in 
Moscow in October 1993, then in attempting, first in 1994-96 and then again in 1999, to 
restore Moscow's control over the breakaway Chechnya. In tradeoff for its support, he gave 
the military high command carte blanche to make defence policy more or less as it saw fit, 
101 Izvestia, 30 June 1992. Earlier that year, in January 1992, First Deputy Minister of 
Finance Andrei Nechayev in an interview where cuts to the defence budget were being 
discussed pointed out, "we have to be clear-headed about this: we can't demobilise a million 
soldiers a month. If the authorities cut back the army too hastily, the army will cut back the 
authorities." Megalopolis-Express, 1 January 1992. 
102 David Mendeloff, "Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: The 'Paradox of 
Disintegration' and the Myth of a Military Coup", Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
Vol. 27, No.3 (1994), pp. 225-246. 
103 See, for example, David J. Betz, If they are ordered 'Die of hunger!' They will die, 
Glasgow: Institute of Central and East European Studies, Glasgow Paper No. 2, 1999. 
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provided its decisions did not conflict with any specific desires of the president or cost too 
much money. Wider society and politicians in the Duma, as one Russian politician observed, 
had virtually no role: "They do not interfere in military affairs, having put all problems of 
survival and reform under the control of the military themselves."104 
Although there is much in common between Russia and Ukraine in terms of the dire 
social and economic plight of the armed forces, the Ukrainian military has not played nearly so 
active and obvious a role in the political life of the country. In general, calm has prevailed in 
Ukrainian civil-military relations. This is not to suggest that Ukrainian understanding of the 
concept of democratic civilian control was any deeper or subtler than the Russian. On the 
contrary, in a mid-1997 interview Ukrainian defence minister General Oleksandr Kuzmuk 
expressed a very primitive understanding of the concept: "I am a member of the Cabinet of 
Ministers. I am also subordinate directly to the president, who is a civilian. I consider these to 
be sufficient controls. 105 
Yet, the dynamic in Ukraine was different from Russia. According to Sherr, the danger 
which the Ukrainian army posed to its society was not one of coup d'etat, but of uncoordinated 
action between it and other security forces, and waste of scarce resources. 106 In a country 
lacking funds for spending on, inter alia, health care, pensions and education, a swollen and 
corrupt security establishment that was unaccountable for its spending and actions 
contributed to, and indeed came to symbolise, the general impoverishment and instability of 
the state. 
In neither country did civilian integration in the defence establishment make much 
progress in the period under review. Let us look at the reasons why. 
104 An Assistant First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation interview 
(R12), Moscow, January 1999. 
105 
"One on One: Army Colonel General Oleksandr Kuzmuk, Ukraine's Minister of 
Defence", Defence News (26 May -1 June 1997), p. 30. In a NATO Review article in 1994, 
two analysts from the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research quoted an 
unnamed senior defence official making a similar statement: "In early 1994 one senior 
Ukrainian officer described to the authors the principle of democratic accountability in 
Ukraine's armed forces thus: 'The president is commander-in-chief of our armed forces. The 
president is a democratically elected civilian. Therefore we have democratic, civil control of 
the armed forces."' See, Vyacheslav Pikhovshek and Christopher Pett, "Transformation of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces", NATO Review, Vol. 42, No.5 (October 1994), pp.21-25. 
106 James Sherr, "Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine's Armed Forces: To What 
Ends? By What Means?" in Betz and Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State ... , p. 67. 
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THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE 
Infrequently through the 1990s in both Russia and Ukraine concern about the weakness of 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces prompted calls for the appointment of a civilian 
minister of defence. Yeltsin's last military reform plan called The Basic Principles 
(Conceptual Outline) of State Policy on Military Development up to 2005, which was signed in 
1998, reportedly dealt at length with establishing a civilian ministry of defence, anticipating that 
civilian control would make for better political and economic management of the armed 
forces.107 The Council on Foreign and Defence Policy- a Russian, non-governmental 
research and lobby group - also called for a "civilian defence ministry [that] could deal in 
greater detail with the social and political problems of the armed forces which seem to 
concern nobody now". 108 
Igor Pustovoy, a defence critic and Rada deputy who was formerly head of 
procurement in the ministry of defence was a strong advocate of a civilian minister in Ukraine. 
He argued that one of the main principles of armed forces reform had to concern the question 
of its control by the public. In his view, this presupposed the occupation of the minister's 
office by a civilian minister supported by a civilian bureaucracy.109 In fact, rhetoric about the 
desirability of a civilian minister of defence became reality in 1994 with the appointment to the 
post of Valeriy Shmarov, a prominent defence industrialist. However, this experiment with a 
civilian minister ended badly in 1996 with Shmarov's removal and replacement by a military 
man, General Oleksandr Kuzmuk. 
It is difficult to show evidence of much progress toward the goal of installing an 
effective civilian leader at the top of the ministry of defence in either Russia or Ukraine. In fact, 
for much of the military and political elite in both countries the concept of civilian management 
of defence remains alien and superfluous. 
Russia's ministers of defence. The obvious place to begin building an integrated 
civilian-military decision-making structure for the Russian army would have been with 
appointing a civilian as the country's first post-Soviet minister of defence. Aside from being a 
107 Presidential Directive 1 068-PR, 30 July 1998. The reform plan was never 
published. However, a summary appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 August 1998, and 
Kommersant-Daily, 5 August 1998. 
108 See "The Current State of the Armed Forces as an Impending Catastrophe" a 
statement of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
14 February 1997. 
109 
"Ukraine Needs a New Type of Armed Forces", English translation of a Ukrainian 
article by A Pavlov, in (WPS) Defence and Security, 17 December 1997. 
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clear indication of the intent of the new post-communist regime to put civil-military relations on 
a democratic footing, such a move would not have been impractical: there was at least one 
civilian, first deputy minister of defence Andrei Kokoshin, who could have filled the position. 
Nevertheless, with the appointment of General of the Army Pavel Grachev as minister on 7 
May 1992, the prolonged debate over whether or not to have a civilian minister of defence was 
brought to a close. 
In interview with Izvestia shortly after his appointment, Grachev himself explained why 
a civilian minister of defence would have been a premature development for Russia: 
Let us look at it with a clear head. Is this the right time in Russia's life to have a 
civilian at the helm of the ministry of defence? I will say frankly that people in 
the military would not understand it. Not just the brass, but the ordinary officers 
too, the lieutenants and captains. That is the first thing. And second, right 
now, when the army is flooded by so many problems, for goodness' sake let 
someone who has breathed its air all his life deal with them. 110 
At the time, Grachev's view had some merit. The army was in the process of adjusting to 
massive psychological blows in the early 1990s, not least the fact that the new Russian army 
had become just one of 15 separate armed forces each belonging to a newly-sovereign Soviet 
successor state. Russia was also not unlike other post-communist states which, as 
Szemerkenyi pointed out, faced a serious dilemma due to the lack of civilian expertise in 
defence matters: "They could appoint a minister of defence with democratic credentials, or 
one with knowledge of military issues"- but not both. 111 In a volatile political and socio-
economic milieu Grachev was a good compromise between continuity of leadership in the 
military sphere and loyalty to the new regime. He was also not unpopular with the military112 
and was trusted by Yeltsin as a result of his support during the August Putsch of 1991. It was 
not at all an unusual development in a post-communist context. Many other transition states, 
like Poland and Hungary, either began transition with a military officer as minister or reverted 
to one shortly thereafter. Indeed, at least one analyst indicated that Grachev was seen initially 
as a transitional minister who when the ground became more fertile would be replaced by a 
civilian. 113 
110 Izvestia, 1 June 1992. 
111 Szemerkenyi, p. 11. 
112 It was only later that Grachev came to be loathed by many in the military as an 
over-promoted, easily corrupted, incompetent. In the beginning, he was quite well regarded. 
See, the chapter on Grachev in Viktor Baranets, El'tsin i Ego Generalv, Moscow: 
Sovershenno Sekretno, 1998, pp. 155-271. 
113 Ibid., p. 197. 
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The situation only worsened, however, and the ground grew less, not more, hospitable 
to a civilian minister. It was increasingly clear by the mid-1990s that Grachev's longevity as 
minister had less to do with providing continuity of military leadership than it did with the highly 
personalised pattern of civilian control which Yeltsin had created. It seems that Yeltsin's 
understanding of civilian control was very simplistic: 
The president controls the army by appointing the minister of defence. Even 
though all Russia's defence ministers have been military they have served as 
the president's political appointees making sure that developments in the 
armed forces follow the directives of the president. Proceeding from his 
understanding of what the president wants, the minister appoints those 
generals to the top ministry of defence positions who are able to help him fulfil 
those tasks. This assures the loyalty of the ministry of defence leadership -
and of the armed forces as a whole- to the head of state.114 
Grachev's tenure was illustrative of the first and most important requirement of a minister of 
defence under Yeltsin: personal loyalty to the president. This relationship was symbolically 
underlined by Yeltsin on Defenders of the Fatherland day in 1996. At a ceremony in the 
Kremlin, Yeltsin awarded Grachev a gold medal with an image of himself on one side and the 
inscription "from the president of the Russian Federation" on the other. Handing the medal to 
Grachev, he said "this is not a state award. This is from me personally."115 
By July 1996 when, as part of a political bargain between Yeltsin and Aleksandr Lebed, 
General of the Army Igor Rodionov became minister of defence, few people lamented 
Grachev's passing. "Pasha Mercedes", as he had become known, was widely reviled. 
Rodionov, by comparison, was thought to be an excellent choice by most observers. "This is 
a man who merits respect," said Lev Rokhlin who went on at length about the many fine 
qualities of the new minister. 116 In December 1996, Rodionov, having reached the mandatory 
retirement age of sixty, became Russia's first "civilian" minister of defence. Yeltsin hailed this 
development as a "sign of the democratisation of Russia."117 
However, despite his ideas and energy for military reform he was not a very effective 
minister. He was widely acknowledged to be a brilliant military officer (having been head of 
the general staff academy from 1989 to 1996), but he never seemed to figure out how to 
114 Senior Researcher at the USA/Canada Institute interview (R16), Moscow, January 
1999. 
115 Baranets, p. 249. 
116 Rokhlin is quoted in praise of Rodionov in Sovremennaya Politicheskaya Istoriya 
Rossii: Litsa Rossii, 1985-1998, Vol. 2, Moscow: RAU - Korporatsiya, 1999, p. 676. 
117 Ibid., p. 676. 
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manage the cut-throat politics of the new Russia. By the autumn of 1996, his patron 
Aleksandr Lebed had been removed from all his official posts and Rodionov was without allies 
in powerful places. Quite quickly, the new minister of defence became embroiled in a conflict 
with Secretary of the Defence Council Yuri Baturin over defence reform and funding. What 
ensued was the bruising political battle that was discussed in chapter 2 - a battle that 
Rodionov was ill equipped to fight and ended with his humiliating dismissal in May 1997. 
Rodionov's time as minister confirmed the first rule of civil-military relations under 
Yeltsin- Lebed forced him on the president and so his loyalty could never be fully assured. 
And suggested a second: the minister must not bother the president with demands on the 
federal budget, or embarrass the government by talking too loudly about the degradation of the 
armed forces. 
The next minister of defence, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, seemed to have understood the 
rules better and was a better politician. The major distinguishing characteristic between him 
and Rodionov, wrote Oleg Odnokolenko, was that "he did not link the success of military 
reform to the amount of funding provided to the Russian army. The president and the 
government probably surmised that such a link existed, and that it was a very direct one, but 
the minister did not press the point."118 In return, when Sergeyev reached sixty years of age, 
Yeltsin decreed that he was exempted from mandatory retirement until the age of sixty-five 
and, therefore, Sergeyev could stay on as minister in uniform (although the decree would 
have to be renewed yearly). 
By the time Sergeyev was appointed, a civilian minister of defence for Russia had 
simply become a non-issue. Duma deputy and member of the defence committee Sergei 
Yushenkov was one of the few politicians to consistently call for a civilian minister of 
defence.119 Otherwise, few others pushed for it. This lack of interest stemmed in part from a 
recognition by Duma deputies that making proposals about the military in the face of the 
president's exclusive authority in the sphere of defence was futile: "Duma members will not 
and cannot do anything, since as soon as they make any proposals they get a kick in the neck 
from the president [Yeltsin], who thinks he has exclusive authority over the military."120 
It came as no surprise at the end of March 2001 when President Putin announced that 
118 Segodnya, 10 January 1998. 
119 See, for example, the article on his views about civilians in defence in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1 November 1994. 
120 Duma defence committee working group member interview (R11), Moscow, 
December 1998. 
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he would not renew the decree extending Sergeyev's exemption from retirement so that he 
could have continued to serve as minister of defence after turning 63 on April 20. In fact, most 
analysts felt the change was a long time coming since for several months prior a conflict 
between Sergeyev and Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin over proposed changes in 
the structure of the armed forces had paralysed the defence establishment.121 But what 
relatively few predicted was that the secretary of the Security Council, newly-retired FSB 
Lieutenant General Sergei Ivanov, would be the one tapped to take over. 
Ivanov was a noted Putin favourite and his star was obviously on the rise. But his old 
job heading the Security Council had a much higher profile than that of the minister of 
defence. Moreover, the appointment as minister of defence of a "civilian"- or at least 
someone from outside the armed forces - appeared to contradict an earlier statement of the 
new president who, answering questions at the Russian PEN Center on 3 December 1999, 
had already made clear his views on civilians in the ministry of defence: 
It may be that a civilian should be at the head of the ministry of defence. In a 
normal state. But we have a weak state, and to make up for this state's 
weakness we have people from armed structures in places where civilians 
ought to work. 122 
In fact, Ivanov's appointment as minister was no demotion. But neither did it represent a sea 
change in the attitude of the Kremlin towards the civilianisation of the ministry of defence 
despite some of the rhetoric to that effect at the time; rather, it was another step in Putin's 
efforts to restore the "vertical of power'' in the Russian state. Ivanov was a trusted partner of 
the president who had already proved his mettle as secretary of the Security Council in seeing 
through to completion a new national security concept and military doctrine. 
Furthermore, and in addition to his demonstrated grit, as Putin's "alter ego" in the 
ministry of defence, Ivanov represented a figure with whom even such fractious and openly 
ambitious generals as Kvashnin knew they could not trifle easily. On the other hand, as a 
starting point for the civilianisation of the ministry of defence, Ivanov's appointment amounted 
to very little since there was no further evidence of any intent to change the ministry of 
defence into a political rather than a military institution. 
In fact, the real significance of the move lay elsewhere. First, it suggested that Putin 
really was taking seriously the need to push through a radical reform of the armed forces over 
121 Aleksandr Golts, "Internal Strife in the Russian military: Plan Lands on Putin's 
Desk to Revamp the Armed Forces", ITOGI/Newsweek, (3 July 2000). 
122 Olga Kuchkina, "Ne khochu, chtoby v Rossii bylo ChP", Mirza Nedeliu 15, (4-11 
December 1999). 
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the potential objections of the general staff.123 Second, as Vladimir Shurygin wrote, it signalled 
that "the role and place of the ministry of defence in the state system is being drastically 
changed. After almost a decade of languishing in second-rank roles, the ministry is becoming 
one of the main institutions of the state ... From now on, the ministry of defence will once 
again be the main organ of strategic planning and state-building" .124 
Ukraine's ministers of defence. Even before the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine 
began taking steps towards the establishment of its own armed forces. The Declaration of 
Sovereignty passed by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in July 1990 asserted Ukraine's right to 
establish independent armed forces, its military neutrality, and its aspiration to be a non-
nuclear state. In further legislation it was declared that Ukrainians would only perform their 
military service in Ukraine. A permanent commission of the Rada on defence was formed 
and tasked with preparing the legal basis for an independent Ukrainian defence establishment. 
And, a ministerial portfolio with responsibility for defence, security issues and emergencies-
the main task of which was to liaise with the Soviet ministry of defence- was created. 125 
Notwithstanding these developments, Ukraine did not begin to actively assert its 
control over the military forces deployed on its territory until after the failure of the August coup 
in 1991. By that time, since it had already created a rudimentary legal basis for an 
independent military and taking into account the weakened grip of the central Soviet 
authorities, Ukraine was able to move quickly in nationalising Soviet military assets. With the 
Declaration of Independence of 24 August 1991, Ukraine laid claim to all the military assets 
and personnel of the Soviet army deployed on its territory. 
The problems encountered by Ukraine in turning the parts of the Soviet army on its 
territory into a national army instead of building a new army from scratch have already been 
discussed. Briefly, the factors underlying this decision were threefold. First, it was thought 
123 See Aleksandr Golts, "Civilian Goes to the Top, But Same Old Approach", Russia 
Journal (31 March-6April, 2001 ). Golts did not suggest that Ivanov was any more likely to 
succeed in his task of reforming the military than his predecessors. 
124 Zavtra, 24 April 2001. 
125 Some discussions of the pre-independence moves of the Ukrainian SSR towards 
creating an independent military include: Bohdan Pyskir, "The Silent Coup: The Building of 
Ukraine's Military", European Security, Vol. 2, No.1 (Spring 1993), p. 147; Taras Kuzio, 
"Ukrainian Civil-Military Relations and the Military Impact of the Ukrainian Economic Crisis", in 
Bruce Parrott (ed.), State-Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 159-162; and, Valeriy lzmalkov, "Ukraine and 
her Armed Forces: The Conditions and Processes for their Creation, Character, Structure 
and Military Doctrine", European Security, Vol. 2, No.2 (Summer 1993), pp. 282-283. 
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that the roughly 700,000 Soviet troops in Ukraine would be less likely to use force against the 
people if the new national authorities moved to assert control over them. A pacification 
campaign aimed at building the confidence of the troops and encouraging them to identify with 
Ukraine by guaranteeing their social rights, fulfilling their social needs and by treating them 
better than Soviet military units elsewhere in the Union was also launched in the lead-up to the 
December 1991 independence referendum. Second, building a national army equal in 
capability to the ready-made one already at hand seemed prohibitively expensive. Third, there 
was a perception among nationalists that one salient reason for the short existence of the 
independent Ukrainian National Republic in 1919 was the failure to create national armed 
forces. 126 
Building on the foundations of the Declaration of Sovereignty, the creation of an 
independent Ukrainian army was achieved inter alia through the Declaration of Independence, 
various pieces of other legislation, and the requirement of all servicemen to take an oath of 
loyalty to Ukraine. As part of the Declaration of Independence, the subordination of all Soviet 
troops to the Rada, as well as the creation of a ministry of defence were also resolved. In 
September 1991, the Law on Defence was passed which sketched the outline of a national 
security structure consisting of a ministry of defence, a defence council and a national 
security council (which were merged in 1995), the general staff of the armed forces, and the 
service chiefs. 
As in Russia, the Ukrainian president is the most powerful figure in the security 
structure. He is the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in which capacity he 
is solely entitled to take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the state in the 
event of actual or threatened attack, including the declaration of war and martiallaw.127 He is 
also the head of the National Security and Defence Council, which is the central co-ordinating 
body of the executive power in the sphere of defence.128 Thus, either directly as supreme 
commander or indirectly as the head of the National Security and Defence Council, the 
president is able to keep all activities of the military under his control, co-ordinate all activities 
of state organs in the defence sphere, issue guidance on military matters, appoint and remove 
the minister of defence (the minister is confirmed by parliament) and the high commanders of 
the armed forces. 
126 Parfionov interview (U25), Kiev, January 2001. 
127 Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996, Chap. 5, Art. 106, Paras. 16-21. 
128 Ibid., Chap. 5, Art. 107. 
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Given the extensive powers of the president in the defence sphere, the powers of the 
minister of defence are quite circumscribed. The defence minister is responsible for the 
immediate, day-to-day control of the armed forces, the administration of defence policy and 
drafting the defence budget proposal. However, he has no control over the appointment of 
senior officers since under the constitution that is explicitly the responsibility of the president. 
Moreover, the president, without the agreement of the minister of defence may appoint the 
chief of general staff. There is also no constitutional requirement that the minister of defence 
be a civilian. 
In general, the legal and constitutional system for civilian control in place by the early 
1990s in Ukraine was sufficient to regulate the defence sector reasonably well and to preclude 
any egregious abuse of power by the armed forces. What was missing was a developed 
mechanism for the effective civilian management of the armed forces through a civilian 
minister of defence assisted by an expert civilian and military staff. There was no provision in 
the law for the introduction of civilian administrators able to monitor the real situation in the 
military. Some mechanisms that would have allowed a civilian minister to control personnel 
policy in the military were curtailed by presidential prerogatives. And, as with the other 
countries in this study the pool of civilians qualified for leadership positions in the ministry of 
defence was extremely shallow. 
As was the case in Poland and Hungary, it is fair to say that questions of sound public 
administration of the armed forces were not foremost in the minds of Ukraine's leaders when 
the first minister of defence, General Kostiantyn Morozov, was appointed in September 1991. 
In the volatile political and security environment at the time, as with the appointment of 
Grachev in Russia, the appointment of a military man to head the ministry was not 
necessarily a bad move. Although he himself was an ethnic Russian, Morozov oversaw the 
administering of the military oath of loyalty to the soldiers of the newly independent state. By 
February 1992, nearly 80 per cent of the military had taken the oath. Those personnel who 
chose not to were expected to resign from the military if they intended to reside in Ukraine, or 
to leave Ukraine if they wished to continue military service in another country129 
As a result of this process, by the spring of 1992 Ukraine had secured effective control 
over the parts of the former Soviet military machine on its territory. That this transformation 
occurred peacefully and rapidly was a remarkable achievement that depended on a few key 
factors: The civilian leadership was strongly united behind the move, while Moscow was 
unable as a result of its own disorientation to put up much resistance. But much of the credit 
129 Pyskir, pp. 140 & 147-149. 
145 
is due to Morozov's energetic and effective management of the process, especially in light of 
the fact that a majority of senior officers opposed the creation of the Ukrainian armed 
forces. 130 
Notwithstanding this success, Morozov remained in office only until October 1993 
when he was compelled to resign after a vigorous disagreement with President Leonid 
Kravchuk over the Massandra meetings between Ukraine and Russia over the fate of the 
Black Sea Fleet. Morozov felt that Kravchuk had made too many concessions to the 
Russians. He wrote in an open letter to the president that if they were carried out he would 
disclaim all responsibility for Ukraine's defence in the south.131 
Morozov's successor, Vitaliy Radetskiy, was also a general. However, his impact on 
the ministry was less profound than Morozov's. Basically, during his tenure the reform of the 
military continued to stagnate. Radetskiy's main virtue- loyalty to President Kravchuk-
eventually caused his downfall. Suspected of having encouraged military officers to support 
Kravchuk in the July 1994 presidential elections, he was dismissed by the new president, 
Leonid Kuchma. 
In August 1994 Kuchma chose a long-time civilian colleague from the defence 
industrial sector, Valeriy Shmarov, to take over the ministry of defence. Expectations for 
Shmarov were high; he was relatively young (50 years old), a former deputy director of the 
Ukrainian National Space Agency, and a former deputy prime minister. In his own words: "At 
present, the economy is not healthy and it has an impact on the army. So, it was the 
perception [of the state leadership] that the military should be headed by an individual with 
economic expertise who can balance the state's capabilities and the need to ensure 
protection of the country which prompted my appointment."132 Since military reform had 
stalled under his predecessor it was hoped that the new civilian minister would be better able 
to solve the economic problems of the military. 
All told, Shmarov had a reasonably promising start. By all accounts there was no 
130 The opposition of senior military figures was reported by John Jaworsky, who 
cited an interview with Morozov as the source of this information in "Ukraine's Armed Forces 
and Military Policy" in Lubomyr A Hajda (ed.), Ukraine in the World: Studies in the 
International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, Cambridge, MA: 
Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University, 1998, p. 226. 
131 
"Defence Minister Morozov Voices Opposition to Black Sea Fleet Accord", UN IAN, 
9 October 1993. 
132 Quoted by Anatoliy Grytsenko in Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System 
Emerging from Chaos, Groningen, Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, 
Harmonie Paper 1, 1997, p. 28. 
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passive resistance on the part of the military to having an effective civilian minister.133 Yet, by 
February 1996, Shmarov was suing the Ukrainian newspaper Vechirniy Kyiv for defamation. 
The paper had accused him of inciting a revolution among the military with the intention of 
destroying the Ukrainian armed forces and the independence of Ukraine. Among other points, 
it was argued that the minister had formed a "shadow general staff which has developed an 
anti-patriotic military policy", and that Shmarov "tried to deceive Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma, showing him documents that generals signed under pressure". According to the 
paper the source of these allegations was a group of generals who opposed Shmarov's 
restructuring of policy and reforms. 134 
Ukraine's experiment with a civilian minister of defence came to an end in July 1996 
with Shmarov's forced resignation amid scandal and recrimination. According to Grytsenko, 
the move was "obvious, understandable, predictable and rather belated.135 Why? Various 
reasons were speculated for his dismissal. By one account, the dismissal was a move by 
Kuchma to appease right-wingers in the Rada who disapproved of Shmarov's support for 
Ukraine's non-nuclear status. In return, they were to support the appointment of Prime 
Minister Pavlo Lazarenko. Another version held that it was done to appease left-wingers who 
disapproved of Shmarov's moves towards NATO, though the scenarios are not mutually 
exclusive. 136 
What is clear, however, is that internally the ministry of defence under Shmarov was 
bitterly divided and deadlocked. Ultimately, Shmarov failed to meet the high expectations set 
for him; he implemented relatively few reforms of the ministry; and, as will be discussed 
below, he made little attempt to introduce other civilian staff in the ministry. These failings had 
less to do with the fact of his being a civilian than with his personality which generated 
conflicts between him and the senior leadership of the military. 137 Shmarov did not attempt to 
133 I am not aware of any opinion polls in the military on this question. However, most 
of the analysts cited here conclude the same, as have all the military officers whom I have 
interviewed. 
134 Marta Kolomayets, "Shmarov Defamation Case Halted as Language Becomes 
the Issue", Ukrainian Weekly, No. 20, Vol. LXIV (19 May 1996). 
135 Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos, p. 
31. 
136 RFE/RL Newsline, 9 July 1996. 
137 Polyakov, interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. Shmarov failed, according to 
another interviewee, because he "was simply not competent enough in the military sphere 
when he was appointed.": Belousov interview (U 1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
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hide his lack of respect for his military subordinates. Reportedly, his leadership style 
consisted of "gathering the generals in his office twice a week in order to haul them over the 
coals."138 In return, the generals refused to offer the minister the support required for his 
initiatives in the ministry to take effect. 
Lieutenant General Oleksandr Kuzmuk was the next to be appointed Ukraine's 
minister of defence. This act was widely seen as a setback for the development of civilian 
control of the military. But it should be acknowledged that at least all Ukrainian defence 
ministers left their posts quietly and the military was never the object of such involved political 
machinations as was the Russian army. Moreover, though it was a setback for the first 
civilian minister of defence to have been a failure, Shmarov was proving to be a destabilising 
factor in civil-military relations. In that respect, Kuzmuk's appointment was timely in defusing 
increasing tensions between the military and political leadership. 
The problem, however, went deeper than whether or not a civilian was at the head of 
the ministry of defence. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian ministries of defence were 
structured in a way that would permit a civilian minister to exercise his authority effectively. 
Virtually no other civilians of any consequence were employed by the ministry in responsible 
positions and the division of powers and functions between the general staff and the minister 
were ill defined in legislation and in practice. In short, without substantive changes of the 
underlying structure, the presence of a Ukrainian civilian minister constituted little more than 
well-meaning rhetoric. In fact, according to one interlocutor Ukraine was not ready for a 
civilian minister: 
At present, the practice of high level appointments in the ministry of defence 
and other ministries is usually on the basis of political intrigues that are 
absolutely non-transparent for the public. The nominee's affiliation with 
particular political groupings and individuals is the most important factor. This 
raises the concern that a civilian minister of defence appointed by the president 
will stay beyond the control of any other agents of state power. In particular, 
the minister may be beyond the scope of control of the legislature, which will 
lead to an over concentration of power in the hands of the president.139 
Numerous interviewees pointed to the basic problem that the highly concentrated presidential 
control over the military made the question of a civilian minister something of a moot point: 
The main problem we have in our system is with the society. Ukraine doesn't 
have a civil society. We don't have a civilian system. The president is the only 
civilian with any control over the armed forces. Therefore, it doesn't matter 
138 Pavel Baev, "Ukraine's Army Under Civilian Rule", Jane's Intelligence Review 
(January 1996), p. 9. 
139 Belousov interview (U1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
whether we have a civilian minister or not because the control is so 
personalized anyway. Take Shmarov, for example. His appointment didn't 
work. We had a civilian person at the head of the ministry of defence but we 
didn't have a civilian minister. He didn't have any civilian structures in the 
ministry of defence.140 
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Ukrainian parliamentarians were also critical of Shmarov's appointment for much the same 
reasons, considering that it was a mistake because the necessary conditions were not in 
place. What was needed was a strong military officer who knew the army and its problems in 
order to accomplish all that needed doing in terms of military reform. And, moreover, they felt 
that the security threat to Ukraine was not external, but internal- to and from the president.141 
As of January 2001 it appeared that Ukraine was edging again toward the replacement 
of the minister of defence by a civilian. However, the structure of the ministry of defence in 
both Russia and Ukraine was still not conducive to civilian-military integration. The key 
missing condition for civilian control, in the words of a Ukrainian interviewee, was the "creation 
of a civilian service for the ministry of defence and the armed forces that would strengthen 
control of the defence sector."142 Let us look at this issue next. 
INTEGRATING CIVILIANS IN THE DEFENCE BUREAUCRACY 
As in Poland and Hungary, finding a civilian minister of defence was only one side of the 
problem faced by Russia and Ukraine. Integrating civilian decision-makers in the defence 
bureaucracy was an even bigger problem. 
Russia's first deputy minister of defence for questions of military-technical 
policy. Until it was restructured in mid-2000, in the Russian ministry of defence there were 
two first deputy ministers of defence, one was the chief of the general staff, the other was an 
appointed civilian responsible for the ministry of defence's relations with the military-industrial 
complex. The first civilian to hold the rank of a first deputy minister of defence was Andrei 
Kokoshin -a former deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada- appointed in 
1992. Kokoshin remains the only civilian to have had much influence over the Russian 
defence establishment from within the ministry of defence. Moreover, he was until recently 
the only civilian to have been seriously put forward as a candidate for minister of defence (in 
140 Nemyria interview (U23), Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
141 Domansky interview (U12), Kiev, December 1998; Kriuchkov interview U19, Kiev, 
December 1998; Mukhin interview (U22), Kiev, December 1998; and, Yukhyvets interview 
(U33), Kiev, December 1998. (All conducted by Dr Natalie Mychajlyszyn, Carleton University, 
Canada). 
142 Belousov interview (U1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
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February 1992 by the "Democratic Russia" and "Soldiers for Russia" movements). 
Unfortunately, Kokoshin was not a catalyst for the further civilianisation of the ministry 
of defence. In theory, the first deputy minister of defence was supposed to represent the 
military-industrial complex in the ministry of defence, lobby for the ministry of defence in the 
parliament, and supervise the arms trade. These tasks, however, overlapped with the duties 
of other officials in the ministry of defence, were defined vaguely, or were clearly impossible to 
achieve. In the case of the first mission, the persistent failure of the ministry of defence to pay 
invoices owing to military industries for past production gradually undermined Kokoshin's 
good relations with industrialists. At the same time, the army already had a chief of 
armaments with the same responsibility as the first deputy minister, confusing the situation 
even further. Neither of them had much money, but industry was more accustomed to 
dealing with the chief of armaments. 143 Taken together, these factors seriously compromised 
Kokoshin's ability to do his job effectively and reduced his influence in the ministry of defence. 
His second job, to lobby for the ministry of defence in the Duma, was even more 
unfeasible. Kokoshin was, as far as the army was concerned, supposed to have good 
relations with the Duma (particularly in comparison to Grachev), but he was unable to get any 
money out of them for the ministry of defence. This inability to deliver the goods undercut his 
credibility. "Sometimes I wanted to go into Kokoshin's office and ask him: 'Andrei 
Afanas'evich, here you are all these years telling cheerful stories about new weapons, so why 
is the army crying that all they have in their hands is rusty old iron?" commented a general 
staff officer. 144 
Finally, Kokoshin had practically no way of supervising the arms trade. Too many 
more powerful people in Russia were interested in this lucrative business for it to be 
controlled by a first deputy minister of defence. 
As in most large organisations, one good indicator of the influence of the deputy 
minister within the ministry of defence was the size of his staff. When Kokoshin's post was 
first created, in addition to regular military adjutants, he was to have a staff of twenty civilian 
aides, each equivalent to a lieutenant-general. In fact, the numbers in his office never reached 
this level and, according to one insider, gradually began to fall, to twelve, eight, and then to 
only four civilian staff members. Finally, the remaining civilian staff were demoted from "aide 
to a deputy minister" to "chief specialist" - equivalent to only a colonel or lieutenant-colonel. In 
143 Senior Researcher at the USA/Canada Institute interview (R16), Moscow, January 
1999. 
144 Baranets, p. 198. 
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the ministry of defence, there are hundreds of officers at the rank of chief specialist. "Thus 
the actual influence of the civilian staff of the first deputy minister was cut down to a size 
which corresponded to the military's idea of what the desirable role of the civilian first deputy 
minister of defence should be."145 
On the other hand, a serving military officer, also a chief specialist in the ministry of 
defence, who was in a position to work with Kokoshin's staff, put a different spin on the story: 
Kokoshin brought in a whole bunch of civilian idiots with him. After a year he 
had to fire them himself and replace them with military officers. They were 
inefficient and arrogant. They were like loose cannons, you couldn't manage 
them, you could only fire them. They just didn't care about anything. 
Corruption was a big issue. The sphere they were operating in - dual use 
technology, arms sales, German money for housing -they started a lot of 
'shadow projects'. It just didn't work. I liked Kokoshin but dealing with his office 
was a pain in the neck.146 
In 1996, by a decree of the president, the first deputy minister of defence was also named a 
state secretary of defence. The role of the state secretary, however, was, and is still, poorly 
defined. According to a former assistant first deputy prime minister, it equated to a formal role 
as "the Tsar's eye in the ministry of defence, or a 'Commissar' if you will. But his real 
influence is very small."147 
Theoretically, the state secretary had a degree of independence from the minister 
because he had the right to represent the ministry of defence in the Duma and the presidential 
administration. In practice though, the relevance of the state secretary as a representative of 
the ministry of defence depended on the personality of the minister. Grachev, for example, 
would never go into the Duma, which gave Kokoshin a wider and more stable representative 
role. Sergeyev, on the other hand, reputedly enjoyed the political work and spent quite a lot of 
time in the Duma which marginalised that function of the civilian first deputy minister. After 
the restructuring in mid-2000 the job of state secretary was disconnected from the duties of 
the civilian first deputy minister and transferred to a military officer- namely the former 
commander of the Moscow Military District, General Igor Puzanov. 
Summing up, the first deputy minister of defence did not have a lot of bureaucratic 
weight in the ministry of defence. The ministry of defence bureaucracy regarded Kokoshin as 
145 Senior Researcher at the USA/Canada Institute interview (R16), Moscow, January 
1999. The interviewee served as a civilian staffer in the ministry of defence in the early 
1990s. 
146 Directorate of International Military Cooperation interview (R1 ), Ottawa, March 
1998 & Moscow, January 1999. 
147 An Assistant First Deputy Prime Minister interview (R12), Moscow, January 1999. 
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an outsider and employed a number of means to marginalise him. His successor, Nikolai 
Mikhailov- a former top executive of NPO-Vimpel, a corporation specialising in anti-ballistic 
missile and space defences -was thought to be closer to the military which considered him 
one of their own: "he wears shoulder-loops [flaps of fabric for holding an officers shoulder 
boards] under his jacket."148 Outside of questions of the military-industrial complex, however, 
Mikhailov probably had no more influence than did Kokoshin. Indeed, none of the military 
officers interviewed seemed to know what Mikhailov was supposed to do. As one senior 
naval officer put it, "the only civilian official in the ministry of defence I have ever heard of is 
Mikhailov, but none of us know what his duties are or what he is doing." Another naval officer 
claimed more simply that "I am not aware of any role played by civilians in the military 
organisation."149 
A portentous change was Putin's creation of a new post in the ministry of defence-
the deputy minister for finance- to which he appointed a female civilian, Lyubov' Kudelina. 
Throughout the 1990s the ministry of defence had been severely criticized for the poor quality 
of its accounting and finances. Two of Kudelina's predecessors were dismissed under a 
cloud of scandal. And a criminal case was launched against the former chief military financier 
Colonel General Georgiy Oleinil.150 In the Yeltsin years, the finance ministry, as the enforcer 
of economic policies involving acute cutbacks in military spending, became in some respects 
the most important implement of civilian control. In her previous position as the top ministry of 
finance official in charge of defence spending Kudelina had won respect for her 
professionalism and tough-mindedness. Thus it was reasonable to expect a crackdown on 
the kind of creative accounting in the ministry of defence for which General Oleinil had been 
brought to book. On the other hand, while still with the ministry of finance, Kudelina also 
acquired a reputation for insisting on maximum secrecy of the military budget. Actually, 
members of the Duma defence committee said that Kudelina was the main obstacle to a 
more transparent budget. 151 In other words, the move suggested a crackdown on corruption 
but not more public scrutiny of defence spending. 
148 Senior member of the USA/Canada Institute interview (R15), Moscow, January 
1999. 
149 Navy Training Centre 1 interview (R5), Moscow, January 1999, and Navy Training 
Centre 2 interview (R14), Moscow, Januar·y 1999 
150 WPS Russian Military Analysis, No. 39 (6 April 2001 ). 
151 According to Brian Taylor in "The Duma and Military Reform," PONARS Memo 
No. 154 (October 2000). 
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Ukraine's deputy minister for procurement and armaments and the head of the 
general staff foreign relations department. As was noted above, Ukraine's only civilian 
minister of defence showed little interest in setting up an integrated military-civilian ministry. 
Why Shmarov tolerated his isolation as the only high-ranking civilian official in the ministry of 
defence is unclear. Nonetheless, the facts are clear. Only two senior civilian executives were 
appointed during his tenure: Anatoliy Dovhopolyi as deputy minister for procurement and 
armaments and Oleksandr Urban as head of the general staff foreign relations department. 
Neither Dovhopolyi nor Urban had so high a public profile as Kokoshin did in Russia, 
nor did they make much of a mark on the ministry of defence. Indeed, they were openly 
criticised by their peers in the ministry for their lack of knowledge of military issues.152 Since 
Chief of the General staff Anatoliy Lopatin was able to tell a meeting of military instructors in 
1994 that "the civilian defence minister is incompetent in his work", 153 and still kept his job until 
February 1996, this should not come as a surprise. All in all, the fact that in addition to the 
minister there were two civilians in high posts in the ministry of defence had little effect on the 
quality of civilian control. There was never a critical mass of civilian bureaucrats that would 
have allowed for mutual support in the Ukrainian ministry of defence. 
Given the absence of genuine civilian expertise in military issues, the government 
expected military professionals to maintain "civilian" control of the armed forces: 
Ironically, the Cabinet of Ministers allows serving officers to maintain control 
over the military, partly because they are considered the only real experts in 
this field, underlining the need for establishing firm democratic civilian control 
over the armed forces. 154 
Under Kuzmuk's leadership of the ministry of defence there are no civilian executives in the 
ministry of defence at all. 155 
The rank and file of the ministry of defence. Throughout the 1990s according to 
the Russian research group "Panorama", the only civilians of any consequence in the ministry 
152 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
153 Baev, "Ukraine's Army ... ", p. 9. 
154 Frank Cook and Yvan Zayets, "Ukraine and its Armed Forces: A New Actor on the 
European Stage", Report to the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly, AS 253 DSC (99) 8, November 1999, p. 15. 
155 The ministry of defence website (http:www.niss.dod.gov.ua) lists only military 
officers at the deputy ministerial level. 
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of defence were Kokoshin and Mikhailov.156 According to the deputy chief of the department of 
contract workers and civilian employees, although as of late 1998 the ministry of defence 
employed a little more than half a million civilians, they were "not meant to have command 
authority over military personnel."157 Aside from clerical and janitorial duties, these civilians 
performed a range of support roles in the armed forces such as scientific personnel in 
research facilities and defence laboratories, provided specialised technical service and repair 
on certain equipment, or were teaching staff at military universities and institutes. But, "they 
do not occupy any key positions and the entire decision-making process is in the hands of the 
military."158 As another officer explained it: 
If someone is in the chain of command they must have a rank. It is a wartime 
system. When you are at war you get a rank. Maybe our system is still in the 
Cold War, but you can't change the system, even from the inside. Guys like 
Kvashnin have so much power, and they don't want civilians. There is a 
stereotypical position in the military about civilians: Why do we need them? 
They don't know anything. 159 
The situation was basically the same in Ukraine. The civilian defence establishment of the 
ministry of defence counted 157,000 personnel in 1997, decreasing to approximately 90,000 
people as of 2000 in line with the overall reduction in the size of the ministry. 160 The positions 
they filled, however, were mainly in the personnel, medical, financial, economic, educational 
and administrative departments, but these areas remained firmly in the control of mostly 
retired military officers. 161 As far as decision-making positions were concerned, 
There is no role for civilians in the ministry of defence because there are no 
civilians in the ministry of defence. And there are no ideas for putting civilians 
in the structure; only a few discussions. The army is very closed and 
bureaucratic. To get someone from the society inside the military system with 
the power to control how it works is not acceptable to the military. Moreover, 
this issue is not pushed by politicians. The centrists, social democrats, etc., 
have put forward the notion of having military reform, of having a professional 
156 Pavel Gazukin, Vooruzhenye Sily Rossiiskoi Federatsi: Biograficheski 
Spravochnik, Moscow: Panorama, 1996 and 1998 editions. 
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158 Open Society Institute interview (R7), Moscow, January 1999. 
159 Directorate of International Military Cooperation interview (R 1 ), Ottawa, March 
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armed forces and so on. But this is only at the level of declaration.162 
In the West, although it is increasingly difficult to draw a line between civilian and military 
occupations, there is a key difference between civilian and military personnel. Civilian 
personnel are intermediaries between the military and government, and between the military 
and society. Their effectiveness, and hence their career prospects, are determined by how 
well they play this mediating role. If they perform well, they can rise within the bureaucracy to 
the highest levels. This cannot be the case in the Russian or Ukrainian ministries of defence 
where to occupy a high position one must have a military rank. "If civilians are always 
subordinate to military officers, and if a civilian wants to make a career in the ministry of 
defence, he literally has to turn himself inside out to represent the interests of the military."163 
Obviously, under such circumstances civilians cannot play an independent role and 
mediate between the interests of the military and the government, or society as a whole. 
Therefore, according to an interlocutor in Kiev, civilians have ... 
. . . no role. No influence. There are no influential civilians in the ministry of 
defence. There are some civilians in low-key positions but there are zero at 
the top. There are few remarks about the development of civilian control in the 
laws that say civilians should occupy certain positions. According to the law 
on defence the armed forces have a minister of defence - he could be a 
civilian, but he could not be. There is no legal requirement either way, neither 
is it set out anywhere what positions in the ministry should be held by civilians 
or military.164 
The fact that there was no legislation beyond general labour law governing the rights and 
responsibilities of civilian personnel in the Russian or Ukrainian defence establishments made 
the problem particularly intractable. In the absence of appropriate laws specifying who should 
be given what authority, it is difficult to imagine significant civilian appointments in the ministry 
of defence of either country. On the other hand, there is no ban on civilian appointments to 
important ministry of defence positions, such as the chief of a main administration, but in 
practice matters of staffing are decided by the ministry of defence leadership on the basis of 
their own internal rules. 
In Ukraine as well there are reports that the poor socio-economic situation in the 
military was a generator of conflict in the ministry between civilian and military employees. 
According to one interlocutor, civilians were advocating civilian control of the military only 
because in the process of reforming the military civilians in the defence establishment would 
162 Parfionov interview (U25), Kiev, January 2001. 
163 Open Society Institute interview (R7), Moscow, January 1999. 
164 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
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obtain permanent work, higher salaries and the same pension that military personnel already 
received. 165 Jaworsky has also claimed that the armed forces were further demoralised by 
downsizing because the civilian side of the defence establishment had suffered less from the 
budget and personnel cutbacks of recent years. 166 
The influence of academia on the defence policy debate and in terms of preparing 
civilian defence experts was judged to be minimal in both Russia and Ukraine. Perhaps 
reflecting the USSR's centralisation of foreign and security policy expertise, more civilian 
defence experts could be found in Moscow than in Kiev. Even still, said one Russian 
interviewee, 
The influence of academics is clearly insufficient. First, the existing potential of 
the academic community in military affairs is not utilised fully. Second, the 
military have their caste-bound tradition of not entrusting civilians with military 
matters. And third, the academic community has very limited resources 
(especially for fundamental research) because of the government's neglect, 
and it is preoccupied with its own survival.167 
Or, in the succinct words of another interlocutor, "The academic community has no impact on 
policy. There are just a few people there who understand anything about military matters and 
they are like so many cockroaches in a jar, who cannot get out and are eating each other."168 
In Kiev, the defence community is small but reasonably vibrant and in some cases, 
such as the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, very publicly active. 
Nonetheless, the problems were very similar to those in Russia. 
Not one civilian in the ministry of defence has a decision-making role. There 
are 300,000 soldiers and 100,000 civilians but they do not influence policy. We 
need to train civilian experts for the ministry of defence but we don't.169 
In other words, there were few civilians in the Russian and Ukrainian defence establishments 
at the end of the 1990s, little indication that more were likely to be introduced, and very few 
facilities existed for the education of civilian specialists in defence. 
165 Military Personnel Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interview (U1 ), 
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DEALING WITH THE GENERAL STAFF 
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, a powerful general staff was a characteristic 
feature of the Soviet defence establishment. This powerful body dominated defence policy 
planning and monopolised the defence expertise of the state. In practice, the chief of the 
general staff could be as influential or more than the minister of defence. Both Ukraine and 
Russia struggled with the advantages and disadvantages of inheriting a general staff. 
Understanding the inner workings of the ministry of defence requires understanding the 
relationship between the minister of defence and his nominal subordinate, the chief of general 
staff. 
In a democratic system it is fundamental that a minister of defence have unfettered 
access to all the information necessary to make sound policy choices. In the West, this is 
achieved through an integrated ministry of defence which clearly delineates which functions of 
the ministry are political (a civilian responsibility), administrative (a shared civilian and military 
responsibility) and operational command (a military responsibility). In Russia and Ukraine 
these distinctions are far from clear. For one thing, the distinction between the structures and 
personnel of the general staff and the ministry of defence is not intuitive for military officers 
socialised in the Soviet system where the defence establishment was a homogenous military 
organisation .170 
Nowadays, there are no glaring structural or legal contradictions between the powers 
of the minister of defence and the chief of general staff in either Russia or Ukraine. In both 
countries the chief of general staff is defined in the law as a deputy minister of defence and, 
therefore, subordination to the minister is implied. The problems lie in the avenues of political 
control and influence over the military and, as in Poland and Hungary, especially in the inter-
relationship of the chief of general staff, the minister of defence and the president. 
In some ways, the term ministry of defence is misleading because it implies the 
existence of a bureaucratic structure that acts as a buffer between the armed forces and the 
state authorities whereas in actual fact no such buffer exists in Russia or Ukraine. Indeed the 
distinction between political, administrative and operational command functions loses its 
meaning in a ministry where there are virtually no civilian decision-makers. In the opinion of 
one Russian interlocutor, "there is no such thing as a civilian ministry of defence, it is just a 
170 Take, for example, the case of the Main Directorate for International Military 
Cooperation headed by General lvashov in the Russian ministry of defence. Is it subordinate 
to the general staff or the minister of defence? In theory, to the minister. In practice, lvashov 
reported to whoever was the stronger at any particular time: Directorate of International 
Military Cooperation interview (R 1 ), Ottawa, Canada, March 1998, & Moscow, January 1999. 
157 
cover for the army. In fact, there is no ministry of defence. The minister of defence has a 
staff of twelve people ... its all an enormous bloc made up of military directorates. The 
defence minister and his staff are more like supervisors."171 
In Russia in particular it is difficult to deconstruct the exact nature of the relationship 
between the chief of general staff and the minister of defence because there are numerous 
contradictory indicators. In the law, there was no question that the chief of general staff is the 
subordinate of the minister and is tasked with the operational control of the armed forces. 
The question is how real was the minister's supremacy over the chief of general staff? The 
answer for both Ukraine and Russia was: as real as the president decided it should be. One 
might then ask, why does the president not simply subordinate the chief of general staff 
directly to himself as supreme commander of the armed forces and cut the minister out of the 
chain of command entirely? 
In Russia, such a plan was rumoured to have been in the works in late 1994 and early 
1995.172 It was proposed that the general staff would be separated from the ministry of 
defence and attached to the presidential administration. The general staff would then act as 
the overall command for all the armed services - not just the army - leaving the minister of 
defence with responsibility only for the logistics and administration of the army and for 
relations with the legislature. 
In the end, nothing came of the idea and the general staff remained an integral part of 
the ministry of defence. One may speculate on reasons why the plan was not adopted. By 
one account, the move was strongly advocated by Lebed who thought it would eliminate the 
inefficient command over the multitude of military formations that were making the war in 
Chechnya so complicated to fight. 173 Perhaps, its association with Lebed tainted the idea in 
the mind of the president. It might also have been the case that the president was unwilling to 
allow the concentration of command over all the military formations in the state under a single 
authority, which would not have fitted well with Yeltsin's divide and rule leadership style. 
Another potential reason was that if the minister and the chief of general staff were mutually 
dependent on each other and also totally beholden to the president, a kind of extra-legal check 
and balance on both of their powers emerges. Neither could too openly criticise the other 
171 Felgenhauer interview (R24), Moscow, December 1998. 
172 See Segodnya, 13 January 1995; Kommersant-Daily, 17 January 1995; and, 
Moskovskie Novosti, 15-22 January 1995. 
173 Directorate of International Military Cooperation interview (R 1 ), Ottawa, March 
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without fear that they would both lose their jobs. Moreover, neither would be able to use the 
forces of the ministry of defence as a power-base against the president. 
Given the evident concern of the Ukrainian president about internal threats it is not 
unlikely those considerations would pertain in Kiev also. Nonetheless, there are subtle 
differences in the Ukrainian approach to this question. Until August 1997, when the division of 
responsibility between the ministry and the general staff was finally set out by presidential 
decree, the ministry of defence was a poorly concealed battleground between the minister 
and the chief of general staff. 
As minister of defence, Shmarov tended to intrude into professional military matters 
while General Anatoliy Lopata, his chief of general staff, tended to pursue his own political 
agenda. Lopata was the first casualty in the feud between the two when Kuchma dismissed 
him in February 1996. Allegedly, the cause was Lopata's "making public of what amounted to 
state secrets" during a public dispute with the minister over the size of the armed forces, but 
rumours of internal plots to remove him had already been circulating for over a year. 174 (Five 
months later Shmarov was himself dismissed.) By some accounts, the vague division of 
functions worked in the favour of the minister who tried to delay clarification of the respective 
competencies of the minister and the chief of general staff. Bearing in mind the immaturity of 
his own administrative apparatus, Shmarov might have felt that if any strict delineation of 
functions were carried out on the basis of competence he might be compelled to concede so 
much authority to the general staff as to make his position merely symbolic.175 
According to the presidential decree On the Division of Responsibilities of the Minister 
of Defence of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,176 the functions 
of the ministry of defence and the general staff were delineated roughly as follows: 
1/ The ministry of defence, inter alia, is responsible for military-political leadership and 
administrative support of the armed forces day-to-day activities, the implementation of 
state policy in defence matters, participates in the formulation of the defence budget, 
and reports to the Cabinet of Ministers on the implementation of the budget. 
21 The general staff is the body through which the president executes command and 
control of the armed forces. It is responsible for defence planning and the operational 
174 RFE/RL Newsline, 13 February 1996. 
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command and control of the armed forces. 177 
On the face of it, the decree made it somewhat clearer that the ministry of defence was 
responsible for mainly administrative matters and the general staff for operational matters. 
What it did not make clear was the subordination of the chief of general staff, since the decree 
entitled the president to appoint the chief of general staff without the minister's consent and, 
moreover, implied that the president was the direct superior of the chief of the general staff. 
Nonetheless, since the appointment of General Kuzmuk as minister of defence such 
distinctions have grown less important as a balance of sorts was achieved between the 
minister and the Chief of General Staff General Shkidchenko. However, as Grytsenko pointed 
out, what was achieved was not a civil-military balance, but a military-military balance. 178 This 
suggests that Ukraine has some of the forms of a democratic system of civil-military relations 
without much of the substance. However, it was only when a civilian minister was in place 
that the weakness of the substance was strongly revealed. 
177 Taken from The State Programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Reform and 
Development until 2005, pp. 40-41. 
178 Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos, p. 
31. 
3.3: Civilian Integration in the Ministry of Defence- Comparative 
Conclusions 
160 
Civilianising the bureaucracy of the defence establishment in all the states under review 
proved to be a gravely difficult task. In Central Europe as of late 1999 the process of 
integration had really only just begun. Even still, the skill gap between military and civilian 
officials was still quite apparent in the region and may, indeed, have been growing as military 
officers acquired more and more expertise through contact with NATO, while their civilian 
counterparts had much less access to training opportunities at home or abroad. 
Russia and Ukraine made hardly any progress in integrating civilians in their ministries 
of defence in the period under review. The differences between Russia and Ukraine in this 
respect pertained more to their starting conditions. Russia inherited a bigger, more 
sophisticated but also more entrenched and cumbersome defence bureaucracy than Ukraine. 
Politics in both countries, however, shared most of the same democratic deficits, while the 
understanding of the concept of democratic civil-military relations was rudimentary and elite 
appreciation of the need for civilians in the defence establishment was low (though rhetorically 
more seems to have been made of the issue in Ukraine). 
By no means, however, were these problems exclusive to the former Soviet Union 
states. Generally, the slow progress in creating integrated military-civilian ministries of 
defence can be blamed on both sides of the civil-military equation. On the civilian side, it was 
only in the late 1990s that governments began to articulate reasonably clear defence policy 
programmes. It should be no surprise then, that civilian control was weak. When presented 
with a clear and unambiguous programme, such as the integration of civilian decision-makers 
in the ministry of defence, the military really only has two choices: obey or not obey. 
Overwhelmingly, professional military officers in Eastern Europe preferred to obey legitimate 
orders, especially if there was a legal and institutional framework to monitor their activities and 
punish any transgressions appropriately. Absent any specific plan, however, as was the case 
for most of the 1990s, the military had a multitude of choices: do nothing, do what they thought 
the civilians wanted, or do what they thought was best. Naturally, if there was no compelling 
reason not to, they tended to choose the last option. In other words, civilians were not 
exerting their right to control the defence establishment preferring, for the most part, to leave 
figuring out the problems of the army to the army itself. 
A major problem for civilians was that they had few opportunities to acquire the 
necessary expertise and knowledge to take on a more active role in the ministry of defence as 
the equal of their military colleagues. With the exception of Poland, all the governments in the 
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study invested little or no effort into training that rare breed: the civilian defence expert. 
Western training programmes, meanwhile, were also not much help as they tended to focus 
on military-technical needs. 
In Central Europe the politicised appointment process of civilians in the ministry of 
defence also aggravated the problem and generated considerable ill-will toward civilians in the 
minds of many military officers; though more generally it can be said that scepticism about-
or open hostility towards - civilian defence expertise was endemic amongst much of the 
military and the political elite in the region. 
The instability of the political scene was a major factor in the poor showing of civilian 
integration. On the one hand, the battle for control between presidents and parliaments 
compromised the ability of both to exert control over the military. On the other hand, 
particularly in Central Europe, the short active period of the election cycle also limited the 
amount of time civilians had available to learn on the job. In short, the military came to view 
civilians as transitory, politically partisan, not very well-informed and not very interested in the 
job -quite often it was a true characterisation. 
Finally, civilians had a sometimes narrow understanding of the concept of civilian 
control which facilitated the emergence of a rather hostile atmosphere of antipathy between 
civilians and the military in the defence bureaucracy. This, in turn, hampered efforts at real 
cooperation between the two. It is a bit like the "chicken and egg" paradox: did the military's 
passive resistance to civilian direction fuel the civilians' distrust of their motives, or did the 
civilians' distrust of the military provoke the military to resist out of a sense of resentment? 
For soldiers, the integration of civilians and the tensions that created presented them 
with a real dilemma: did their loyalty to the nation and to their profession mean that they 
should try to prevent the degradation of the army as a result of the ill-conceived reforms of an 
incompetent civilian elite? Was it their duty to save the civilians from themselves? Moreover, 
at a bureaucratic level, the integration of civilians posed problems for ministries of defence 
where the legislation and internal regulations on defence personnel were never designed with 
civilian officials in mind. 
The military also carried other heavy burdens in all the countries in the study. On the 
one hand, society saw the army as a serious financial drain on the state. On the other hand, 
civilian governments were rarely willing to take up the responsibility for civilian control of the 
army because that would impose on them a difficult and politically dangerous obligation to 
explain to the populace why expenditure on the military was necessary even in a time of great 
fiscal tightness. 
Yet, this is precisely what was needed. The military needed competent civilians on its 
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side if it was going to obtain the long-term financing it needed to modernise. Civilians needed 
a reasonably efficient army, not least in the Central European states to serve as a tangible 
symbol of their deepening integration into Western structures, notably NATO. 
A well-organised, integrated military-civilian ministry of defence is the best way to 
create such a symbiosis. By late 1999, both Poland and Hungary were still some distance 
from this goal. Russia and Ukraine, however, appeared even further away. Neither country 
had much success with a civilian minister of defence: Russia did not even try it until 2000 
(assuming one sees Ivanov as a civilian); while Ukraine's single experiment with a civilian 
minister backfired. 
Below the level of the minister, neither country made much progress in installing 
civilian executives in the defence bureaucracy. In Russia, a very capable, well-known civilian 
defence expert was gradually marginalised in the ministry and his authority reduced such that 
his real influence was, in the end, small. His replacement had lower aspirations and took care 
not to ruffle the feathers of his military peers, but he too was forced out of the ministry of 
defence. A senior civilian bureaucrat from the ministry of finance was transferred to the 
defence ministry but for a variety of reasons it is difficult to characterise this as the beginnings 
of a wave of such appointments. In Ukraine, even less progress was made: Two 
unremarkable civilian executives held fairly marginal positions for a few years; they left and 
were replaced by military officers. 
Among the rank and file of both ministries the relatively large size of the civilian side of 
the defence establishment belied the negligible impact of civilian employees on decision-
making. In fact, a substantial portion of civilian employees were simply retired military 
personnel supplementing a pension. 
Finally, the general staff in both countries appeared to act as a brake on integration by 
guarding its dominance of policy-planning and its monopoly of defence expertise. In both 
cases, the president played an instrumental role in perpetuating the conflict between general 
staff and ministry of defence for partisan political reasons. 
One may conclude about civilian integration in the ministries of defence of Russia and 
Ukraine quite simply: there was almost none. Nor do the trends point to positive improvement 
in the near future. It was possible, even likely, that Ukraine would continue to pay lip-service to 
the notion of building an integrated ministry of defence for as long as its political leadership 
favoured ever closer links with NATO. But on the substantive issues progress seemed 
unlikely without radical changes in the country's economic fortunes and political climate. 
The situation was fundamentally the same in Russia. Although it too was 
experimenting with a nominally civilian minister by 2000, his suitability for the post was based 
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on personal loyalty to the president not democratic credentials and his success will be 
determined by his skilful employment of the subjective control mechanism of actively 
monitoring military loyalty, rewarding those who exhibit it and punishing those who do not. 
These trends were well established in the 1990s. 
Chapter 4: Agencies of Civilian Oversight 
Democratic states employ a number of mechanisms in order to control, manage and give 
guidance to their defence establishments. One of those mechanisms was examined in the 
previous chapter: having a civilian minister of defence and qualified civilians working within the 
ministry of defence helping to formulate security policy options for decision-makers and 
seeing to the implementation of policy. Another is having civilian officials outside the ministry 
of defence performing similar duties as part of legally-constituted bodies of civilian oversight. 
That is to say, that in having a democratic system of civil-military relations, the presence of 
civilians in the ministry of defence is only one side of the coin. The other side is having 
effective institutions of civilian oversight in the parliament, the presidency and the government. 
With respect to the present chapter four institutions are of specific interest: 
1 I Parliamentary defence committees, particularly the effectiveness of their budgetary 
oversight; 
21 Personnel directorates or commissions on higher military ranks within the 
administration of the president which advise the head of state on the exercise of his 
prerogative to award higher military ranks; 
3/ Security Councils which serve as the main inter-agency body for policy coordination 
between the security services, other key ministries, and top government officials; 
4/ Military lnspectorates which check up on the activities of the armed forces. 
Not all the states in the study created all these institutions in the 1990s. Hungary, for example, 
had still not established a standing security council by the time of its accession to NATO. 
Similarly, military inspectorates varied from country to country in composition, in leadership 
and to whom they reported. And the real importance of the commissions on higher military 
ranks depended greatly on the relative strength of the presidency vis-a-vis the parliament in 
the political systems adopted by Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. Moreover in all of 
the states various ad hoc commissions on such issues as defence reform and military 
finance also played a significant role in the exercise of civilian oversight from time to time. 
But this is merely to acknowledge the obvious: the institutional architecture of civilian 
control varies to some degree from one country to another, even in the long established 
democracies. On a more general level though, it is fair to say that the existence of 
democratic civil-military relations depends on the existence in one form or another of the 
institutions noted above- and, with a few caveats, they were created in all the states under 
review. Yet creating said institutions and imbuing them with legal force was very much the 
easy part of the job. Szemerkenyi wrote of the Central European states in 1996, 
Legal control may be in the hands of civilians, but effective control depends on 
the advisors and close associates of the top-ranking leadership in the 
ministries of defence: largely military personnel. In these circumstances, 
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civilian oversight of the military is becoming virtual oversight.1 
That is to say breathing life into the system, enabling it to give real substance to the notion of 
civilian control was very much the more difficult task. Accordingly, the current chapter will 
focus more on the process of strengthening the agencies of civilian oversight than on the act 
of their legal establishment. In practice, this means seeking answers to two key questions. 
First, what is the composition of the agencies in question? Are they staffed by military 
personnel or by civilians? In short, can they really be called "civilian" agencies? In all the 
states under review, but particularly in Russia, serving or retired military officers tended to 
dominate in such agencies making this question exceedingly pertinent. Second, what is the 
effectiveness of the agencies (most importantly the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight 
of the defence budget)? Does their membership possess the knowledge and expertise to 
conduct its affairs well? Do they have credible, independent expert staffs to support their 
work? Is the budget sufficiently detailed to allow real review? If so, do the agencies have the 
expertise to understand it? Indeed, even if civilians in these agencies have the legal 
wherewithal to exert control do they actually have the desire to do so? 
CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE IN THE SOVIET ERA 
The process of Soviet defence decision-making has already been discussed in the 
introduction to previous chapters. There is little to add, therefore, except to reiterate the basic 
facts. In the Soviet system civilians did not exercise democratic control over their armed 
forces because the structures of the various communist parties were not formed according to 
any notions of democratic accountability or legitimacy, nor did they give credence to the 
concept of an open civil society. The leading organs of the communist party -the Politiburo 
and the Central Committee -were not democratically elected; they were made up essentially 
by a system of cooption from the top. 
In such a context parliaments were mere window-dressing -a rubber-stamping 
facade for a political system that utterly lacked transparency and political responsibility. 
Constitutional checks and balances were altogether missing. The armed forces, like every 
other societal institution, were dominated and closely monitored by a single political authority 
which placed no value on the norm of public accountability. To the extent that the state 
scrutinised the pattern of resource allocation to military purposes this activity took place in 
secret within such bodies as the Commission of the Presidium of the USSR Council of 
1 Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk: Progress in 
Establishing Democratic Controls Over the Military ... , Oxford: Oxford University Press for 
the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 306, 1996, p. 72. 
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Ministers for Military-Industrial Questions and the Defence Industry Department of the 
Communist Party's Central Committee Secretariat.2 In short, in terms of public scrutiny of 
defence policy and the military budget all the post-communist parliaments were starting from 
zero. 
The office of the military inspectorate, however, merits some examination because it 
is somewhat foreign to Western armies which either never fully adopted or have since moved 
away from a classical general staff system. The Russian military inspectorate has its roots in 
the traditions of the Imperial armed forces, having been created by Peter the Great at the 
beginning of the 181h century, but was preserved in Soviet practice. The ostensible function of 
the military inspectorate was to check up on the training, maintenance and readiness of 
military forces. At times the inspectorate served as an alternate avenue for the political 
leadership of monitoring the activities of the military from outside the chain of command. At 
other times the office was subsumed by that of the minister of defence. Yet the inspectorate 
also played another important function in the Soviet system: allowing trusted older generals to 
move out of the chain of command into relatively powerless but respected and comfortable 
sinecures, thereby permitting younger generals to move into senior leadership positions. 
Security Councils are also to some extent unusual in the Western countries which 
quite often have provisions for the establishment of a war cabinet for crisis situations, but not 
a standing council as such. The current Russian and Ukrainian councils also differ from 
analogous Western institutions such as the American national security council in that their 
remits extend beyond narrow security issues to political, economic and foreign policy 
questions much more broadly. 
2 See, Julian Cooper, "Management of the Defence Industry: The Soviet Union", in 
Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power USA/USSR, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 325-326. 
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4.1: Agencies of Civilian Oversight- Central Europe 
Before looking at the Hungarian and Polish agencies of civilian oversight it is necessary first to 
point out a final difference between the two countries that has had considerable impact on 
their development: the nature of their legislative-executive relations. Although both Poland and 
Hungary adopted mixed presidential-parliamentary constitutional models, the relative strength 
of their presidents vis-a-vis their parliaments differed considerably. In the Polish system the 
president is directly elected by the people while the Hungarian president is elected by the 
parliament. The much greater constitutional prerogatives of the Polish president in the sphere 
of defence and security reflected this qualitative difference in electoral mandate. The Polish 
president had a limited authority over the formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, in particular 
from 1994 until the passage of the 1997 Constitution when he had complete discretion over 
the selection of the defence, foreign affairs and interior ministers. He also had the deciding 
voice in the content of strategic defence policy. 
The effect of political instability. The upshot of this difference in executive-
legislative relations was the relatively stable political scene in Hungary throughout the 1990s 
compared with the highly volatile Polish situation. The crux of the problem in Poland was the 
battle between President Walesa and successive Polish governments dominated by former 
communists. The core of Walesa's political agenda appeared to be preventing the return of 
the reformed communist party to power by all means available. This over-arching concern 
relegated civil-military reform to a subsidiary goal at best. It also led Walesa to try and 
maximise his powers, including control of the armed forces, vis-a-vis other political actors no 
matter what damage was done to democratisation of civil-military relations. Indeed, by early 
1995, in an effort to keep the military out of the hands of parliament, Walesa told the Sejm that 
"military people should run the military". 3 
In short, Walesa made every effort to concentrate control of the armed forces in the 
presidency which he saw as the only way of ensuring that former communists did not gain 
control over the country's military and foreign policy. Failing that, the president's preference 
was that the military remain independent of both president and parliament. Naturally, this 
situation allowed the military considerable leverage in Polish politics and a high degree of 
independence from civilian control - a situation which did not begin to change until the election 
of Aleksander Kwasniewski as president in 1995. 
3 Quoted by Jeffrey Simon in "Forging a Civilian Chain of Command for Poland's 
Military", Transition, 15 December 1995, p. 40. 
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Table 3: Comparing Political Turnover in Poland and Hungary 
I Poland Ill Hungary I 
Prime President Minister of Chief of Prime President Minister of Chief of 
Minister Defence general Minister Defence general 
staff staff 
19 1/Tadeusz 1/ Gen. 1/ Gen 1/ Miklos 
89 Mazowiecki Wojciech Florian Nemeth 
Jaruzelski Siwicki 
19 21 Lech 21 Adm Piotr 1/ Gen 21 Jozef 1/ Arpad 1/ Lajos 1/Gen 
90 Walesa Kolodziejcz Zdzislaw Antall Goncz Fur Kalman 
yk Stelmasz Lorincz 
uk 
19 2/ Jan 
91 Bielecki; 3/ 
Jan Olsewski 
19 4/Waldemar 3/Jan 21Gen 
92 Pawlak; 5/ Parys; 4/ Tadeusz 
Hanna Janusz Wilecki 
Suchocka Onyszkiewi 
cz 
19 6/Waldemar 5/ Adm Piotr 
93 Pawlak Kolodziejcz 
yk 
19 71 Joszef 6/ Jerzy 3/ Gyula 21Col 
94 Olesky Miliewski Horn (ret.) 
Gyorgy 
Keleti 
19 3/ 71 Zbigniew 
95 Aleksander Okonski 
Kwasniewsk 
i 
19 8/ 8/ Andrzej 2/Gen 
96 Wlodzimierz Karkoszka; Ferenc 
Cimoszewicz 9/ Vegh 
Stanislaw 
Dorzanski 
19 10/ Janusz 3/Gen 
97 Onyszkiewi Henryk 
cz Szumski 
19 4/Viktor 3! Janos 
98 Orban Szabo 
Hungary had a somewhat analogous problem in the early 1990s which boiled down to a 
dispute between President Arpad Goncz, Prime Minister Joszef Antall, and Minister of 
Defence Lajos Fur over who had ultimate authority over the armed forces. The conflict came 
to a head in October 1990 when taxi drivers protesting a hike in the price of fuel launched a 
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blockade of the country's roads. The prime minister and defence minister wanted to use the 
military to break up the roadblocks, but the president as commander-in-chief ordered the 
military to stay in their barracks. This constitutional conflict was submitted to the 
Constitutional Court which ruled on 23 September 1991 that the president was entitled only to 
give guiding principles to the military, not direct orders. In peacetime, direct orders can only 
be given to the military by the government through the minister of defence.4 
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE 
It is an axiom of democratic civil-military relations that citizens play a role in the formulation of 
public policy and ensuring that it is implemented faithfully. A strong civil society does not limit 
itself to maintaining a strong and representative parliament for this task- an independent 
media, for example, also provides a forum for public debate on the crucial issues of the day-
but parliament is the main avenue through which it exercises oversight of its defence 
establishment. In respect to the issue at hand, parliamentary defence committees bear the 
weightiest responsibility. They need to be intellectually and practically capable of judging 
developments in the defence sector independently of the government and the executive. They 
must also perform detailed oversight of the military budget- their strongest power. At the 
same time, parliamentarians must understand that it is not their place to command the 
military. The logic of active military operations- emergencies by definition- will not allow 
time for parliamentary debate; operational direction of the armed forces is rightly the 
responsibility of the government working in concert with its military leadership. 
In other words, parliament must walk a fine line, balancing the demand for general 
oversight of policy while resisting the temptation to micro-manage the armed forces. It must 
also perform detailed oversight of the budget which means it must know where funds are 
being allocated, for what reasons, and be able to judge that monetary inputs are justified by 
security outputs. Though their different constitutional models produced different stresses on 
civil-military relations, both the Hungarian and Polish legislatures experienced considerable 
difficulties in achieving the required balance. For the most part the legal architecture of 
parliamentary oversight was in place at an early stage; breathing life into the system was a 
more difficult matter. 
The Polish defence committee. Leslie Holmes wrote of hybrid constitutional models 
like Poland's that "Since the government is more or less equally answerable to both the 
4 Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, The First Decade of the Independent 
Hungarian Security Policy, 1989-1999, Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 
October 1999, pp 21-23. 
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president and the parliament, it can be caught in the crossfire between the two if there is a 
major conflict, which in turn can result in policy-making stalemate."5 As was seen in previous 
chapters, the reform of the Polish military and the restructuring of civil-military relations was 
very much a victim of such a stalemate under the presidency of Lech Walesa. 
The Little Constitution adopted on 17 October 1992 failed to set out a clear division of 
powers between the president and the parliament. It granted the president extensive powers 
in the field of foreign and security policy.6 At the same time it charged the government with 
the responsibility for the realisation of foreign and security policy. 7 As a consequence, the 
factual meaning of presidential oversight vis-a-vis that of the parliament was quite murky. 
From the beginning of transition the president had played a major role in the selection 
of some members of cabinet, but in 1994 Prime Minister Pawlak acceded fully to presidential 
demands that he have sole discretion over the selection of the heads of the security ministries 
(defence, internal and foreign affairs), thus producing an odd situation whereby three 
ministries were partly excluded from the authority of the prime minister.8 
Among the many problems caused by this state of affairs was that the prerogatives 
entrusted to the president with regard to the oversight of the armed forces were accompanied 
by only crude tools for the exercise of that oversight- such as the veto or the right of 
legislative initiative. The intention of the constitutional measures strengthening the president 
was to insulate the armed forces from the roiling and unstable Polish political scene with its 
rapid changeover of governments. The effect, however, was to aggravate the turmoil creating 
a political milieu in which the salient importance of effective parliamentary oversight of 
defence was diminished in the minds of the military's leadership, in society generally, and in 
5 Leslie Holmes, Post Communism: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1997, p.174. 
6 Article 32, paragraph 1 states "The President shall exercise general supervision in 
the field of international relations"; similarly Article 34 states "The President shall exercise 
general supervision with respect to the external and internal security of the State". From the 
Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992 (in English), Warsaw: Sejm Publishing Office, 1993. 
7 Article 52, paragraph 8 of the Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992 states "The 
Council of Ministers, in particular, shall ensure the external and internal security of the state." 
8 Article 61 of the Constitutional Act of 17th October 1992 states "The Prime Minister 
shall lay a motion to appoint the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of National Defence and of 
Internal Affairs after consultation of the President." Previous prime ministers had not 
interpreted the words "after consultation" to mean giving the president sole discretion over 
who was appointed. After Pawlak, however, constitutional lawyers could maintain that 
presidential authority over the security ministers was a matter of established constitutional 
practice. 
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the minds of parliamentarians in particular. 
The Polish parliament exercises oversight on security matters mainly through the work 
of the Sejm Committee on National Defence. However, the functional capacity of the 
committee to carry out its work during the period under review was deeply handicapped by a 
number of practical factors. The rapid turnover of governments, especially between 1989 and 
1993 when the simple proportional electoral system meant that the legislature was made up 
of a myriad of weak political parties, was a main problem. 
Another more intractable problem was the insufficient quantity and quality of expert 
staff available to assist and advise the committee. A year after Poland's accession to NATO, 
the defence committee still had no dedicated advisory body. There was a Sejm research 
department with a staff of approximately seventy people tasked with preparing answers to 
specific questions for individual parliamentarians and ministerial committees on various 
issues. But the foreign affairs section of the research department consisted of only four 
persons, only one of whom was designated to handle defence matters.9 The defence 
committee itself had a secretariat of four persons, three of whom fulfilled administrative and 
clerical functions while only the fourth (a retired general) acted as an advisor. 10 
The morale, motivation and competence of members of parliament to perform 
oversight roles in the defence committee was also an issue. As one Polish analyst put it: 
It happens that some members of parliament just end up as members of the 
defence committee but have no particular interest in or knowledge of the area. 
There is not a long tradition here of involvement of civilians in defence issues 
so it is a very simple problem: lack of information made worse by lack of 
experience. Sometimes, parliamentarians try to get that experience and 
knowledge. But in my opinion definitely there is still space for improvement of 
their work. 11 
According to another interviewee, the life experience of Polish politicians tended to tell them 
that the military was a "hermetic institution that should be left to itself."12 A few 
parliamentarians recognised the need for a more pro-active interest in defence matters but 
improvement has been slow. 
Even by 2000 the number of politicians with experience in the defence sphere was 
9 Research Bureau, Chancellory of the Sejm interview (P2), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
10 Zietarski interview (P30), Warsaw, 20 June 2000; Ciesluk interview (P6), Warsaw, 
20 June 2000. 
11 Jazwinski interview (P12), Warsaw 12 June 2000. 
12 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
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very limited. Invariably, those who did have some knowledge ended up as members of the 
defence committee. As a result, around one third to half of the committee had some defence 
background -for example, former ministers and other high officials of the ministry of defence 
such as Janusz Onyskiewicz and Bronislaw Komorowski - or at least showed a desire to 
deepen their knowledge. Unfortunately, the trend was for the parliament to rely on this small 
group for discussion of defence matters while largely ignoring military issues in the wider 
assembly. So, in general there was still a restricted public debate on security.13 
In the mid-1990s, at the National Defence Academy in Warsaw a higher defence 
course was made open to defence committee members, civilian personnel of the ministry of 
defence and other civilian agencies where necessary. The course was designed for 
developing defence awareness in civilian officials with no military background. Extremely 
flexible in delivery time - the course ranged from as little as five to as much as seventy hours 
in length -the subject matter of the course was still quite limited. In the opinion of some of 
the instructors it seemed to be enough to give the participants an overview of the defence 
system but only at a very general level. Moreover, the focus tended to be on the local official 
rather than the parliamentarian. "Our motto is that the most important thing is to create 
cooperation between the military and the local administrations because it is there that most of 
the problems are located: stationing of troops, transporting of arms and dangerous goods, 
local employment, and so on", said one course organiser.14 Another criticism aimed at the 
quality of the higher defence course was that it suffered from the same problems as the whole 
of the military education system which is not flexible enough to adapt to new procedures while 
at the same time it preserves many aspects of "old thinking". 15 
As was discussed in the last chapter, the passage of the 1996 Law on the Duties of 
the Minister of National Defence and the 1997 Constitution significantly increased the authority 
of the minister of defence while diminishing the authority of the president. Nevertheless, what 
did not occur as a result of this strengthening of the minister of defence was a commensurate 
strengthening of parliamentary oversight. The minister added to his portfolio considerable 
powers but without being subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny. The continued weakness 
of the parliament provoked Michta to question whether the army, while firmly under civilian 
13 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
14 National Military Academy interviews (P8), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
15 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
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control, was at risk of becoming merely a "bureaucratic extension of the government. .. "16 
The Hungarian defence committee. The experience in Hungary shows both 
contrast and continuity with that of Poland. On the one hand, (as was noted above), for the 
most part the constitutional dilemma between the executive and the legislative powers with 
respect to the oversight of the armed forces was settled in favour of the parliament by the 
constitutional court in September 1991. Indeed, the parliament has very well-founded and 
extensive authority over the armed forces to the point of micro-management. Szenes wrote 
that this situation caused tremendous problems for the army, particularly with regard to the 
deployment of foreign and national armed forces abroad and at home. By law, only the 
parliament is authorised to resolve such issues. So, for instance, the ministry of defence 
must seek parliamentary approval for such mundane matters as foreign military units coming 
to Hungary to participate in military exercises, or Hungarian troops going abroad for the same 
purposes. Similar proceedings are required even in a state of emergency or under the threat 
of war. "These regulations", wrote Szenes, "are not suitable in the new political, security and 
military environment and do not meet the flexible military cooperation requirements of 
NAT0."17 
Or as Zoltan Martinusz put it, "the authority and influence of the parliament is often 
wasted, side-tracked by issues of lesser importance in the greatest detail while it allows 
issues of key importance to pass with only the most perfunctory attention."18 
As in Poland, the real competence of the committee to perform effective oversight of 
the military was quite low. In the words of a deputy state secretary for defence "Civilians on 
the parliamentary security and defence committee have very low skill levels in the area of 
defence issues. They are simply not well versed in this area."19 The majority of interviewees 
in Budapest in a position to observe the activities of the committee admitted a very low opinion 
of its work. As one put it: 
I do not have a high opinion of the defence committee. They are unable to 
exercise effective control. From what I see they usually debate some 
proposition of the ministry of defence or the general staff but they do not have 
16 Andrew A Michta, The Soldier Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army After 
Communism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 113. 
17 Zoltan Szenes, "The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in 
Hungary", in David Betz and John Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Postcommunist 
Europe, London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 81. 
18 Martinusz interview (H1 0), The Hague, May 2001. 
19 Szabo 2 interview (H18), Budapest, 29 November 1999. 
the knowledge and capacity to judge matters the ministry deals with effectively. 
It does not mean that they do nothing but I think that practically they have only a 
marginal role; sometimes it could be more than marginal, but in general 
because the membership of the committee has no staff- actually it has only 
one lawyer and nobody else, just some typists -they are not prepared for 
exercising effective control. They also have no theoretical knowledge so they 
do not know what they should be controlling.20 
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As this interviewee indicated, the lack of expertise of the membership as well as the 
inadequacy of its support and advisory staff was a main problem with the Hungarian defence 
committee. So too was the fact parliamentarians on the defence committee were, in the 
polite words of Tamas Wachsler, "not elected from the first line of representatives from the 
political parties."21 Efforts to improve the standard of competence proved rather 
unsuccessful. Officials in the ministry of defence and elsewhere in the defence community 
expressed considerable frustration that, although a short, modular training program on 
security issues akin to the Polish higher defence course was designed before the 1998 
elections for parliamentarians and their staff to be delivered at the National Defence University 
on weekends or evenings, "MPs did not have time or did not want to attend and it did not work 
To the extent that individual members of the Hungarian defence committee had 
access to expert advice it was not through the committee itself (which had no advisory staff) 
but through the structures of their political parties. The problem with this was that advisors to 
political parties were chosen in large part because they identified with the political program of 
the party and tailored their advice and proposals on that basis. So from this point of view the 
exercise of their expertise was quite restricted. A further problem was that such advisors 
tended to be long-retired former military officers most of whom lacked familiarity with modern 
military thinking and spoke no foreign languages.23 
Moreover, the membership of the defence committee tended to be dominated by 
2° Kelemen interview (H7), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
21 At the time he wrote this Wachsler was a member of the defence committee, later 
he became the administrative state secretary of defence. See his contribution to Behind 
Declarations: Civil-Military Relations in Central Europe, Budapest: Institute for Strategic and 
Defence Studies, 1996, p. 17. 
22 Szabo 2 interview (H18), Budapest, 29 November 1999; Nagy 1 interview (H13), 
Budapest, 4 December 1999. 
23 From Peter Deakin Zoltan Szenes (ed.), The Hungarian Defence Force in the 
Reflection of British Transillumination, Budapest: Ministry of Defence, Department for 
Education and Science, 1997, p. 45. 
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retired military officers. One reason for this was that former military officers saw the defence 
committee as an area where they could contribute usefully to the work of parliament. Another 
was that, like their Polish counterparts, Hungarian politicians tended to relegate former 
officers to the defence committee both because they were perceived to have the requisite 
expertise and because the defence committee was not considered an especially interesting 
post by most other politicians.24 Unfortunately, retired military personnel serving in parliament 
generally did not act as generators of alternative ideas and plans to those provided by the 
military; rather than providing knowledgeable critique, more often than not, they behaved as 
spokesmen or lobbyists for the military's plans in parliament.25 
Budgetary oversight in Poland and Hungary. The main function of parliament in 
the system of civil-military relations is to exercise detailed oversight of the military budget. On 
this issue the opinion of many interviewees in Warsaw and Budapest was split on how 
effective that oversight was. In Warsaw, for example, an official of the budgetary department 
of the ministry of defence maintained that, notwithstanding many problems in the past, by the 
late 1990s the committee paid close attention to the military budget: 
The defence committee analyses the draft budget [usually submitted in 
September] very carefully and they are tough guys. The ministry of defence 
organises about one hundred pages of detailed information for the committee 
debates on the budget. They discuss the assumptions and details in all the 
subsections of the draft budget. The army chiefs, service commanders, and 
ministry officials have to speak to the committee. After the discussions are 
finished the committee sends their findings to the committee of public spending 
which presents the whole government spending plan to the parliament. Then 
the president has to approve it. After that the budget holders can use their 
funds. The last part of the process is in December.26 
The short approval period for the Polish budget from analysis of the first draft in September to 
presidential approval in December would suggest that parliamentary oversight was 
superficial. Yet the notion that the parliament practised fairly stringent control over the budget 
was echoed in other interviews. According to an official in the National Security Bureau: "The 
committee asks many questions of the ministry of defence [about the budget] and the ministry 
of defence must answer to parliament. I would say that the committee is fairly effective in this 
24 From Winfried Dunkel in Szenes (ed.), The Hungarian Defence Force ... , p. 51. 
25 Thomas Szayna and F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Military Reform After 
the Cold War: Implications for the United States, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, p. 26. 
26 Firlej interview (P9), Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
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respect."27 While the director of the ministry of defence's legal department spoke positively as 
well: 
I think the defence committee is quite effective. They have a big influence on 
the matters which concern them. They discuss the projects of the 
government. They discuss the budget. They monitor how we in the ministry 
implement the budget. I don't know how they could have more control; really 
they have enough power to do all their jobs. 28 
No doubt one reason why scrutiny of the budget seems to be taken more seriously by Polish 
parliamentarians than the exercise of more general oversight is due to the clear primacy of 
the Sejm vis-a-vis the president on fiscal matters. As opposed to more general defence 
policy questions the president can only sign the budget or send it to a constitutional tribunal for 
adjudication - but he may not veto it in whole or in part. As a result, the president is not in a 
position to force the government on matters of defence expenditure. 
In Hungary, on the other hand, judgments on the state of the military budget and the 
quality of parliamentary oversight were highly critical. With respect to the actual planning of 
the military budget it was widely agreed that the process was under military control. Said one 
interlocutor, 
The system is still very rigid and important changes in the budgetary process 
have not taken place. The planning is almost the same as it was in socialist 
times. We feel the practical difficulties of this. On the one hand we are 
supposed to make all sorts of plans but the plans cannot be realised because 
when we go to ask for money it becomes clear that we do not have any. My 
guess is that the planners simply do not have the economic data to make 
proper decisions on defence spending. The starting point in the budget is what 
they received last year. Army units ask for money but there is no serious 
analysis of what they need, or why. 29 
In other words, the Hungarian defence committee had great difficulty auditing defence 
spending. There was no defined mechanism for controlling spending objectively in order that 
funded programs were in harmony with political guidelines. The budget was not transparent, 
nor was it very detailed: "It is not precise enough to make judgements. There are only some 
big sums for big purposes, no real details" said one interviewee. Even as late as 1997 the 
budget of the ministry of defence was reported to have been not more than six pages in 
27 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
28 Pinkowski interview (P25), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
29 Matus interview (H 11 ), Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
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length.30 The structure of the budget, moreover, did not allow effective evaluation of inputs in 
relation to outputs because it was itemised by spending on institution (eg., central 
administration, background institutions, logistics, and so on) rather than by programme. In 
fact, the budget in 1997 included under a single item -"Hungarian Home Defence Forces" -
two thirds of the entire defence expenditure! Reportedly, due to the extensive defence 
reforms the general staff was unable to offer any further detail.31 In short, the Hungarian 
defence committee was unable to effectively evaluate whether they were getting good value 
for their money in defence spending. 
One should not, however, overstate the Polish parliament's greater effectiveness than 
the Hungarian parliament in the sphere of defence oversight. Within the limitations of the data 
provided them , parliaments have been reasonably effective at controlling the implementation 
of the budget, particularly major acquisitions of equipment. Since 1995 there has been a 
State Audit Office in Hungary controlling the economics of the defence forces, monitoring 
spending in the defence budget and reporting directly to the parliament. While in Poland the 
National Audit Office performs the same role. Therefore, in general, parliament was able to 
assess whether the budget was fulfilled according to the law. But this is the easier side of 
civilian budgetary oversight. 
Parliament is also supposed to ensure that military funding complies with national 
security goals and with other budgetary priorities. As such, parliament must be able to debate 
the purposes for which funds are allocated and be assured that the spending estimates of the 
proposed budget are reasonable and justified. This is the more difficult side of budgetary 
oversight. 
In both Poland and Hungary, however, such levels of sophistication still remained 
beyond the means of parliament on the eve of their accession to NATO. In practice, in both 
countries military personnel worked out defence spending priorities, developed the defence 
budget, estimated the level of expenditure required, and saw to the implementation of the 
budget. Parliament could follow-up retroactively what the military did with its funding, 
sometimes revealing fiscal abuse- "control through scandal", one interlocutor called ie2 - but 
it lacked the expertise to seriously challenge military thinking at any level or to develop 
30 Martinusz interview (H1 0), The Hague, May 2001. Szemerkenyi claimed in 1996 
that the budget submission was actually only one page long. See Szemerkenyi, p. 28. 
31 Zoltan Pecze, Civil-Military Relations in Hungary, 1989-1996, Groningen, 
Netherlands: Centre for European Security Studies, Harmonie Paper 2, 1998, p. 58. 
32 Piatkowski interview (P24), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
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alternate policies to those recommended to them by the ministry of defence. 
Indeed, in the opinion of some analysts, legislators quite often did not know what 
issues were important and worthy of attention or what questions to ask to get such 
information. 33 A Hungarian analyst commenting on the effectiveness of his nation's defence 
committee outlined a relationship of mutual incomprehension between military and civilian 
officials: 
I regularly attend the sessions of the defence committee and I experience that 
opinions clash there during the debates in the following way: a political 
standpoint is described, to this the soldiers present say- and they may be right 
- that it is already a military area, a professional issue and policy should not 
penetrate. If soldiers state their views about certain issues politicians say this 
is not the soldier's task, it belongs to the field of policy.34 
PRESIDENTS IN THE SYSTEM OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
As noted above the main difference between the Polish and Hungarian systems of civil-
military relations was in the nature of their executive-legislative relations. In democratic states 
the head of state plays an important role in the system of civil-military relations - normally as 
the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. However, the practical powers which 
accompany the title commander-in-chief differ from one state to another depending on 
constitutional practice. In Poland, the president enjoys broad powers over the armed forces, 
especially issues relating to the appointment of senior personnel. In Hungary, the president 
plays a more symbolic role with effective control of appointments lying with the government. 
As with parliamentary oversight there is a balance to be achieved in executive-
governmental relations concerning the armed forces. Taking different paths, Poland and 
Hungary encountered somewhat different problems. In Poland, the concentration of power at 
an early stage in the hands of the presidency undermined the influence of the government and 
helped to stalemate needed reforms. The story there is one of reducing presidential 
prerogatives and slowly bringing into line the government's responsibility for the defence 
establishment with the power to direct its development. In Hungary, by contrast, the president 
had few prerogatives after September 1991. The problem, as discussed above, was that the 
government devolved too much of its control functions to a weak parliament unable to 
exercise them in a timely and efficient manner. 
The Polish presidency. In Poland military contestation of civilian policy was fostered 
33 Eg., Ben Lombardi, "An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe", Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (March 1999), p. 24. 
34 From Sandor Kucson in Szenes (ed.), The Hungarian Defence Force ... , p. 55. 
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by the wider disagreement among civilian political elites over whether parliament or president 
would dominate the political system. To the extent that the military was able to articulate its 
preference on the matter it tended to see its corporate interests as being better served under 
a presidential model. Accordingly, particularly during the tenure of General Wilecki as chief of 
the general staff, as was discussed in the previous chapter, the army leadership showed a 
partisan support for President Walesa. In this sense, the change of leadership from Walesa 
to Kwasniewski in presidential elections in 1995 was a highly significant event presaging 
broader changes in legislation that reduced the power of the presidency vis-a-vis that of the 
government and reined in the independence of the general staff. 
On the other hand, even after these changes the Polish president retained major 
powers over the armed forces. Under the Constitution of 1997 and other normative acts the 
president: 
1 I executes general leadership of the field of state security; 
21 is the highest "supervisor" of the armed forces; 
31 decides on the armed forces development program, plans for the defence of the state 
and coordinates the nation's defence strategy; 
41 awards officers' commissions and general officers' ranks, appoints the chief of the 
general staff and the commanders of the army, navy and air force; 
51 is head of the National Security Council. 
The problems of working out the practical meaning of the president's "general leadership" of 
the defence sphere has already been discussed, as has the president's influence over the 
defence reform programme and military doctrine in chapter two. Let us look then at the 
impact of the president's constitutional prerogatives concerning the appointment of senior 
ranks in the armed forces. 
In Poland after the 1997 Constitution, the president retained the capacity to award 
higher military ranks in all the uniformed services (military, border guard, police, fire services, 
etc.) to persons proposed by the prime minister and the minister of defence. The president 
could not appoint senior commanders without the authorisation of the minister of defence. On 
the other hand, the president was not required to promote the officers proposed by the 
minister and might refuse to promote an officer at his own discretion. Moreover, in the case 
of the chief of the general staff and the commanders of the military services (army, navy, air 
force) the president did not require any proposal at all from the prime minister or minister of 
defence. Who would be the chief of the general staff and the service chiefs was entirely the 
choice of the president. 
According to one of his advisors in the National Security Bureau, in the Polish system 
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of civil-military relations the president is meant to be the representative of the armed forces in 
government and in society. "When the soldiers need some help then it is the president's 
responsibility to see that they get it. He is their commander, supervisor and protector."35 
Essentially, the president is not meant to be a passive, ceremonial figurehead. On the 
contrary, he is supposed to play an active role in the direction of the armed forces. "Our 
president is not like the queen", explained an interviewee. "He has a role in defence but not 
over the whole defence system. . . Of course our constitution, like all constitutions, is general 
and it will have to be established by practice how things will work in the future but the 
president should be influential".36 
This situation of cohabitation put the capacity of the executive and legislative powers to 
compromise and cooperate with each other at a premium. Under Walesa, compromise and 
cooperation was all but impossible and the president had too much influence over the defence 
system to the detriment of the reform of the armed forces. Under Kwasniewski confrontation 
was greatly muted: "The president would like to have more power with respect to the military 
but the government says that it has all the responsibilities as concerns defence and that the 
person who has the responsibility should have the power also."37 
A year after Poland's accession to NATO the debate over the respective 
competencies of the president vis-a-vis the government in the sphere of defence was still on-
going. A draft Law on the Competencies of State Organs in the National Security System of 
Poland was being debated in the defence committee that was expected to finally clarify such 
issues as the division of responsibility for defence between the president and the government 
(Council of Ministers) and the practical meaning of the president's "supervision over the 
armed forces" as opposed to the government's "responsibility" for the defence establishment 
of the state.38 Although the law had not yet been passed, the trend by mid-2000 was more 
and more toward matching responsibility for the defence system with the power to command 
it, thus implicitly strengthening the government over the president. 
The National Security Bureau is a subordinate body of the Office of the President 
designed to assist the president in the performance of his duties in the defence sphere. It is 
headed by a state secretary who also serves as secretary of the National Security Council 
35 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
36 Pinkowski interview (P25), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
37 Pinkowski interview (P25), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
38 Pinkowski interview (P25), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
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(discussed further below). Within the bureau there are a number of divisions: 
1/ The cabinet of the head of the National Security Bureau; 
21 an advisory group; 
3/ an undersecretary of state; 
4/ the National Security Council Department; 
51 the Department for the President's Supervision of the Armed Forces; and, 
6/ a number of ad hoc groups focussed on specific problems of defence.39 
For the moment let us concentrate on the main divisions: the department for the president's 
supervision of the armed forces and, later, the national security council department. The 
former department is responsible for advising the president on a wide range of general and 
specific matters including the following: general overview of the armed forces, its 
organisational structures and chain of command; preparing analytical papers relating to 
bringing the armed forces into line with NATO standards, civil democratic control of the 
military, and changes in the legislative basis of defence; inspecting and assessing the 
education, training, maintenance, operational readiness, etc., of the armed forces; advising on 
the promotion of senior officers, and appointment of the top commanders of the armed forces; 
and, awarding of medals and other honourable decorations.40 Thus, the department for the 
president's supervision of the armed forces appears to combine the functions of a military 
inspectorate with advisory and protocol functions. 
The Hungarian presidency. By contrast with Poland, in Hungary after September 
1991 the prominence of the president in the system of civil-military relations was not a major 
issue. According to the Constitutional Court in 1991: "The function of the president of the 
Republic as the commander-in-chief is a constitutional function and is not a ... position or 
rank. Accordingly, the commander-in-chief is not a superior in the chain of command of any 
of the armed forces." 41 Unlike the Polish president the Hungarian president is meant to be a 
ceremonial figurehead. The president has the authority to appoint senior military personnel, 
but such appointments have to be countersigned by the prime minister and the minister of 
defence who thereby take political accountability for them. Formally, appointments are the 
prerogative of the president but the expectation and practice is that the president merely 
39 Staron interview (P28). Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P15), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
40 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P15), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
41 Nepszabadsag, 26 May 1992, JPRS-EER, No. 92-088 (1 0 July 1992). 
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confirms the selections of the minister of defence for promotion to high military rank. The 
president also appoints the chief of general staff, but only on the proposal of the minister of 
defence who initiates and manages the appointment process.42 
In line with the comparatively restricted role of the president in the Hungarian system, 
by 1995 the Military Office of the President amounted to no more than a few officials whose 
functions were almost exclusively protocol. 43 The president did not have a military 
inspectorate reporting to him, not even in the somewhat watered down form possessed by the 
Polish president. In fact, Hungary did not create a state military inspectorate as such. 
Instead, the inspection function is one of the responsibilities of the chief of general staff. 
It would be a mistake, however, to imply that the Hungarian system was better than 
the Polish one merely because it was less susceptible to the policy stalemates that afflicted 
Poland as a result of the conflict between its executive and legislative authorities. Hungary 
had a different problem. The ministry of defence was not a plum political posting in the 
Hungarian cabinet and, therefore, was usually given over to the junior party in a coalition 
government. Taking into account this fact, in addition to the deficiencies of parliamentary 
oversight noted previously and the weak role played by the president, the ministry of defence 
tended to be beyond consistent oversight from any quarter and was therefore vulnerable to 
being treated as the personal fief of the minister and his political party. 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILS 
National security councils have been important and controversial institutions in all the states 
under review. Important, because where they exist they have tended to become the locus of 
decision-making in the sphere of defence. Controversial, because they were often vaguely-
defined in constitutional and legislative terms and because of a perceived linkage to the 
powerful defence councils of the old system which were thought to have had too strong an 
ideological content. 44 
In fact, security councils are often seen as a "Russian" innovation which perhaps adds 
to their controversy. 45 This is not without reason since security councils in the robust 
"Russian" form are unusual in the West. Their elite membership and closed nature putting 
42 Kelemen interview (H7), Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
43 Szenes interview (H20), Glasgow, 20 March 2000. 
44 See Jozsef Feher in Szenes (ed.), The Hungarian Defence Force ... , p. 92. 
45 Nagy 1 interview (H13), Budapest, 4 December 1999. 
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them beyond easy public scrutiny, and the way they tend to acquire de facto decision-making 
powers can make them seem contrary to the principle of transparency. Moreover, most 
mature democracies do not require strong agencies for policy-coordination because they 
have civil services that usually are able to coordinate policy between ministries informally or in 
ad hoc inter-ministerial groupings without compromising effectiveness. 
In the post-communist context, however, public administration rarely possessed the 
maturity to coordinate policy on this basis. Arguably, this puts a premium on agencies such 
as security councils. Yet Poland and Hungary took different approaches to the issue, with the 
former creating a strong National Security Council while the latter eschewed this potent form 
of policy coordination in favour of a diverse collection of less powerful institutions. 
Nonetheless, by the end of the decade neither country was really satisfied with the structures 
they had chosen. 
Poland's National Security Council. From the very beginning of Poland's 
democratic transformation in 1989 there was a general conviction among politicians that the 
president should play a main role in the resolution of defence matters. As such the president 
was equipped with special powers with regard to the armed forces. In particular, it was 
decided that the president would play a main role in the determination of the state's strategic 
security goals and how they would be realised. These powers were enshrined in the 1992 
Little Constitution and then reiterated in a less robust form in the 1997 Constitution. According 
to a well-respected insider, however, the point was not to increase the powers of the 
president per se; rather, it was to heighten the powers of the chairman of the National Security 
Council- a post held by the president.46 
That is to say, the National Security Council was meant from the beginning to play an 
important role in the defence sphere. Politicians accepted the council as the main architect of 
security policy and both the 1992 Principles of Polish Security Policy and the Security Policy 
and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland were enacted by the president in his 
capacity as chairman of the council. The attractiveness of the council in the Polish system of 
presidential-parliamentary cohabitation lay in its broad composition which included the 
following: president, prime minister, chairmen of the Sejm and the Senate, defence minister, 
interior minister, finance minister, foreign affairs minister, chairman of the central bank, and 
the head of the National Security Bureau. In addition there was a Permanent Political Advisory 
Group to the council made up of representatives of the parliamentary opposition that, while not 
46 A subtle but important difference. See Marian Kowalewski, "An Organisational 
Model of Civilian Control Over the Army in Polish Circumstances", Warsaw: NATO research 
Fellwoship Report 1995-1997, 10 June 1997, p. 20. 
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part of the council itself, allowed some opposition input to policy debates. 
The staff of the National Security Council were provided by the National Security 
Bureau of the Office of the President, specifically its national security council department 
which, according to a staffer, played the role of "executive body of the National Security 
Council. .. an advisory body and part of the secretariat of the president. [It] plays a monitoring 
and advisory role."47 Judging from its listed functions, however, the national security council 
department did play an important agenda setting role. Among its more important functions 
were: 
1/ organisation of National Security Council meetings; 
21 preparation of briefing materials for the president and the head of the National Security 
Bureau, including preparation of meeting agendas, decision and discussion papers; 
3/ monitoring the preparedness of internal and external security units and submitting 
reports to the council; 
4/ advising the president and the head of the National Security Bureau on all aspects of 
the Polish foreign and security policy; and, 
5/ participating in inter-agency working groups on defence and foreign policy issues.48 
The vast majority of staffers in the national security council department at the time interviews 
were conducted were retired or serving military officers seconded from the ministry of 
defence. It did not seem, however, that military personnel felt beholden to the ministry of 
defence. That is they did not believe that their career prospects were in any way limited by 
the degree to which they identified with or lobbied for the armed forces and its institutional 
priorities in the workings of the council. Indeed staffers typically had no intention of returning 
to regular military service. 49 
At a higher level of abstraction, the story of the Polish National Security Council fits the 
pattern of civil-military developments in that country more generally. In the early years of 
transition the voice of the president was supreme in defence matters. The minister of 
defence was a member of the Council of Ministers and subject to the authority of the prime 
minister, but at the same time he was also supervised by the president who had power over 
47 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P15), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
48 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P15), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
49 At the time interviews were conducted at the National Security Bureau in June 
2000 there was only a single civilian staff member. Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 
2000; Kaminski interview (P15), Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
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his appointment. In other words, the minister of defence was subordinate to the president. 
This relationship, in turn, was reflected in the National Security Council where the minister 
held the post of vice-chairman under the president. 
Towards the latter part of the 1990s, however, pressure was growing to reduce the 
power of the National Security Council - and by implication the power of the president. 
Parliamentarians pointed out that the council was barely mentioned in the 1997 Constitution 
which stated only that: "The advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal 
and external security of the state shall be the National Security Council."50 As such, it did not 
merit such extensive powers. 
A year after Poland's accession to NATO it seemed possible that the council would be 
shut down. 51 What would replace it was unclear. In 1994 under Prime Minister Pawlak a 
Committee for Defence Affairs was established within the Cabinet of Ministers with 
responsibility for the coordination and management of ministries involved in defence. It 
consisted of a small sub-cabinet of ministers, the most important being the minister of 
defence, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of finance. The legal basis of the 
committee was an act of the cabinet of ministers and its head was appointed by the prime 
minister. But it had no permanent staff; support and advice was provided to the committee by 
the general advisors of the prime minister and by advisors of particular ministers. Moreover, 
since its establishment, the coordination role of the committee has gradually diminished and it 
has become mainly an advisory body. 52 
Hungary's profusion of councils. Like Poland, under the old system Hungary had a 
defence council that managed the inter-agency coordination of governmental policies on 
security matters that were not easily resolved under a single ministerial portfolio due to the 
size and complexity of the issue or because of institutional conflicts. Unlike Poland, after the 
change of regime the Hungarians chose not to preserve the defence council. Instead, there 
was a constitutional provision for the creation of a National Defence Council or "war cabinet" 
during times of emergency, while for the purposes of inter-ministerial policy coordination there 
have been a number of ad hoc agencies housed within the prime minister's office as well as 
in the cabinet. 
Article 19 of the Hungarian constitution identifies parliament as the supreme 
50 Article 135 of the Constitutional Act of 2 April 1997. 
51 Staron interview (P28), Warsaw, 12 June 2000; Kaminski interview (P15), 
Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
52 Kierwinski interview (P18), Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
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instrument of the state in the defence sphere: ultimately, only parliament is empowered to 
decide the main issues such as the declaration of a state of war and subsequently to 
terminate hostilities. The article also authorises the parliament to establish the National 
Defence Council in times of national emergency. Once established, the council is presided 
over by the president and includes the speaker of the parliament, the leaders of the parties 
represented in parliament, the prime minister and other members of the government, as well 
as the chief of staff of the armed forces. The council exercises numerous emergency powers 
including authorising the employment of the Hungarian defence forces internally or externally. 
In some superficial ways the National Defence Council resembles a security council, notably 
in its broad and high-level membership and wide decision-making powers. But it is not a 
standing body; rather, it is only formed in time of extreme emergency, has no permanent staff 
of its own, no real policy-coordination role except in wartime, and its decisions are valid only 
for the duration of the emergency that precipitated its formation. 
In fact, Hungary has never had cause to form the National Defence Council. Shortly 
before the Kosovo crisis in 1999 the government formed instead another institution -the 
National Security Cabinet- as the main decision-preparing and decision-making body for the 
duration of the crisis. The National Security Cabinet is one of several subordinate bodies of 
the Council of Ministers which includes a Government Cabinet and an Economic Cabinet. 
The membership of the National Security Cabinet fluctuates but typically includes the foreign, 
defence, interior, finance, justice, and national security ministers. According to some analysts 
it also includes the chief of defence staff and is led by the prime minister. 53 Other sources, 
however, indicate that it is headed by the interior or defence minister and the chief of defence 
staff is not mentioned. 54 
Both Hungarian and foreign observers have long recognised the serious problems 
caused by the lack of a high-level policy-making committee that could link the defence 
ministry with the foreign and other ministries and the top civilian leadership. As was 
discussed in chapter three, without such a committee Hungary had great difficulty working out 
an overarching security and defence policy bridging the gap between foreign affairs and 
defence. The National Security Cabinet was a step in the right direction but insufficient on its 
own. The various cabinets of the Council of Ministers are only meant to facilitate in-cabinet 
53 Szenes, "The Implications of NATO Expansion ... "in Betz and Lowenhardt (eds.), 
Army and State ... , p. 80. 
54 For example, the website of the OECD at 
http://www1.oecd.org/puma/sigmaweb/acts/cogprofiles/hun-cog.htm 
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discussions of policy issues on many priority areas of government including national security. 
They have no decision-making powers of their own; they formulate positions on various 
security and make recommendations for decisions of the government. Moreover, as a 
subordinate body of the Council of Ministers, the cabinet also has no expert staff of its own 
relying instead on the resources of the individual ministers. 
There was a final institution created in Hungary in 1998 for the coordination of defence 
policy- specifically the updating of the 1993 National Security Principles and the Basic 
Principles of National Defence - the secretariat for security and defence policy in the office of 
the prime minister. The secretariat for security and defence policy was one of three headed 
by the National Security Advisor, Bela Gyuricza, until his death in spring 1999.55 Its aim was 
to coordinate national security policy and ensure that future changes in the defence sphere be 
conducted on the basis of thorough analysis as opposed to the ad hoc and spontaneous way 
it had happened in the past. After Gruricza's death, however, the influence of the secretariat 
was greatly diminished; its policy-coordinating role became negligible and its secretary came 
to operate more as an advisor to the prime minister on security matters. 
55 The other two directorates under Gyuricza were Defence Coordination (mainly for 
civil emergencies) and National Security Information Analysis (civil and military intelligence). 
After Gyuricza's death the secretariat has been headed by Reka Szemerkenyi. 
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4.2: Agencies of Civilian Oversight- Former Soviet Union 
The Russian and Ukrainian political systems bear more in common than do those of Poland 
and Hungary. Both countries adopted strong presidential constitutional models. In both, 
presidents have a direct electoral mandate, have strong legislative powers (i.e., they may 
issue decrees which carry the force of law provided they do not contradict existing legislation), 
have the decisive voice on cabinet selection and survival, and control security policy 
formulation. Civilian control of the defence establishment in both countries is overwhelmingly 
a matter presidential concern and precludes intervention from other political actors. The 
predominance of presidential authority over the armed forces in both countries has produced 
a situation wherein the vertical of civilian control from president to the armed forces is strong 
while oversight from other societal agents - notably the parliament- is greatly 
underdeveloped. Moreover, owing to the rather limited number of expert civilians in the 
vertical chain it is difficult to call even the strong presidential oversight of the military truly 
"civilian". 
In the previous chapter we saw that there were, and still are, almost no civilian 
executives in the Russian or Ukrainian ministries of defence of any consequence. In this 
chapter we will see that the military is represented in, or heads, all the main bodies of 
"civilian" oversight- defence committees, security councils, military inspectorates and, 
indeed, presidential administrations thus calling into question the reality of "civilian" control of 
the armed forces. 
Presidential dominance of civil-military relations. The political systems of both 
Ukraine and Russia have been characterised by strong, long-serving presidents able to rule 
by decree, volatile and weak legislatures dominated by the left which were unable to put much 
of a brake on presidential prerogative, and rapid turnover especially of prime ministers, but 
also of ministers of defence and chiefs of general staff (particularly in Ukraine). 
The legislative basis of the defence establishment in both countries has been 
discussed at a general level in previous chapters. At this point it is worthwhile revisiting that 
discussion with a more specific focus on the legal architecture of civilian oversight and, in 
particular, on the relation of the executive and legislative powers in the sphere of defence. 
In Russia, the defence establishment is regulated in three main documents: the 1992 
Law on Defence, the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and the 1996 Law on 
Defence According to the 1992 law on defence, the president and the parliament were 
accorded roughly approximate powers. The president was named commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces, but responsibility for such issues as the direction of state military policy and 
doctrine, deciding the size and structure of the military, overseeing promotions, discharges 
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and awards of high military posts within the military, ordering partial or complete mobilisation 
of the armed forces and declaration of a state of war, were shared. The president was in 
control of the "nuclear button", but parliament had a say in defining the conditions under which 
nuclear arms could be employed. 56 
The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation - enacted after the October crisis of 
that year- substantially changed that balance. It became the sole prerogative of the president 
to: appoint and remove the army's high command57 ; to introduce martial law and states of 
emergency throughout the Russian Federation or in individual localities with notification of the 
Federation Council (the upper house of parliament)58 ;, and to approve the military doctrine of 
the state.59 
The Federation Council retained a level of influence over military developments under 
the new constitution - mainly the capacity to confirm the introduction of martial law or a state 
of emergency by the president, as well as the right to decide on the possibility of employing 
the armed forces outside the territory of the Federation.60 However, as the president 
controlled the military doctrine and military policy which defined what would constitute a state 
of emergency, in practice he had little need to ask the Federation Council to confirm any 
decisions, including both Chechen wars. The Duma was left with virtually no powers except 
passing and providing oversight of the federal budget and adopting laws on various matters 
concerning defence and on issues of war and peace. 61 
The updated 1996 Law on Defence merely confirmed the centralisation of control over 
the military in the hands of the president already implied by the Constitution. The powers of 
the president listed in the law were extensive, accounting for twenty paragraphs. 62 The 
Federation Council merited four paragraphs, retaining the right to "confirm" declarations of the 
56 Law of the Russian Federation On Defence, No. 3532-1, 24 September 1992, 
Chap. 2, Arts. 4 & 5. 
K. 
1-20. 
57 Constitution of the Russian Federation, 12 December 1993, Chap. 4, Art. 83, Para. 
58 Ibid., Chap. 4, Art. 87, Para. 2. 
59 Ibid., Chap. 4, Art. 83, Para. G. 
60 Ibid., Chap. 5, Art. 102, Paras. A-C. 
61 Ibid., Chap. 5, Art. 106. Paras. A & F. 
62 Federal Law On Defence, No. 61-F3, 31 May 1996, Chap. 2, Art. 4. Sec. 2, Paras. 
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president on martial law and states of emergency, passing the federal budget, overseeing the 
passage of laws by the Duma on matters of defence and war and peace, and deciding on the 
use of military force abroad. 53 The State Duma's powers were covered in only two 
paragraphs (3 lines) covering the passing of the federal budget and the passage of laws on 
defence.64 
A new law entitled On Control of the Military Organisation of the Russian Federation 
was drafted by a group of experts working for the Duma defence committee in the latter half of 
the 1990s. While proceeding from the premise that the president would continue to provide 
the main focus of civilian control of the military, the draft envisaged strengthening the role of 
the legislature in terms of supervising the budget process as well as through the 
establishment of a parliamentary "Commission on Civilian Control". By the end of the Yeltsin 
presidency, however, the draft still remained a working document and had not been formally 
introduced or discussed in the legislature. 55 
In the period under review Russia has had both a Defence Council and a Security 
Council playing policy-preparing, policy-coordinating and advisory roles in the system of 
defence management. 56 The interrelation of these institutions, whose responsibilities and 
authority overlapped considerably, is complex and will be discussed further below. At this 
point it bears mentioning, however, that both councils were executive bodies headed by the 
president and were in no way accountable to parliament. 
The legal establishment- by presidential decree- of the State Military Inspectorate 
occurred in autumn of 1996.67 Initially the inspectorate was designated an independent sub-
department of the presidential administration. In 1998, however, the military inspectorate was 
63 Ibid., Chap. 2, Art. 5, Sec. 1, Paras. 1-4 
64 Ibid., Chap. 2, Art. 5, Sec. 2, Paras. 1&2. 
65 The draft law is discussed in detail by one of its authors in Yuri Ivanov, "Legal, 
Political and Budgetary Aspects of Civilian Control of the Military in Russia", in Betz and 
Lowenhardt ( eds. ), Army and State ... , pp. 13-18. A copy of the draft was published in 
Parlamentskii Kontrol' nad Voennoe Sferoi v Novykh Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh, Moscow: 
Tsentr Politicheskikh i Mezhdunarodnykh lssledovanii, 1998, pp. 155-170. 
66 The statute enacting the Security Council was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6 
May 1992; the Defence Council statute can be found in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 27 July 1996. 
67 The enactment of the State Military Inspectorate was announced in Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 5 November 1996, but in actual fact it did not exist in law until the promulgation of the 
Presidential Decree On Measures to Strengthen State Direction of Military Development in 
the Russian Federation, No. 946, 28 August 1997. 
transferred to the authority of the secretary of the Security Council. 
Table 4· Comparing Political Turnover in Russia and Ukraine 
Ukraine Ill Russia 
Prime Presidents Ministers Chiefs of Prime Presidents 
Ministers of Defence General Ministers 
Staff 
1991 11 Leonid 11 General 11 Georgii 11 Boris 
Kravchuk Kostyantyn Zhivitsa Yeltsin 
Morozov 
1992 11 Leonid 11 Yegor 
Kuchma Gaidar 
21 Viktor 
Chernomy-
rdin 
1993 21 Yukhym 21 General 21Anatoliy 
Zviahilsky Vitaliy Lopata 
Radetskiy 
1994 31 Vitaliy 21 Leonid 31 Mr 
Masol Kuchma Valeriy 
Shmarov 
1995 41 Yevheny 
Marchuk 
1996 51 Pavlo 41 General 31General 
Lazarenko Oleksandr Oleksandr 
Kuzmuk Zatynayko 
1997 61 Valeriy 
Pustovoite-
nko 
1998 41 General 31 Sergei 
Volodymyr Kiriyenko 
Shkidche 41 Yuri 
n-ko Primakov 
1999 71 Viktor 51 Sergei 2Niadimir 
Yushchenko Stepashin Putint 
61 Vladimir 
Putin 
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Ministers Chiefs of 
of General 
Defence Staff 
11General 11 General 
Pavel Mikhail 
Grachev Kolesnikov 
21General 21 General 
Igor Viktor 
Rodionov Samsonov 
31 General 31 General 
Igor Anatoli 
Sergeyev Kvashnin 
t Yelts1n stepped down on 31 December 1999; Putin was appointed actmg president and then confirmed 
in March 2000 presidential elections. 
The Constitution of Ukraine sets out the range of responsibilities and authority of the 
various players in its system of civilian control. The system is very similar to Russia's, 
particularly in respect to the concentration of powers in the presidency. The President of 
Ukraine: is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in which capacity he appoints and 
dismisses the high command of the armed forces and other military formations and 
"administers" in the spheres of national security and defence68 ; heads the National Security 
68 Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996, Art. 106, Para. 17. 
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and Defence Council of Ukraine69 ; and, confers high military ranks. 70 Some of the president's 
powers are shared with the Verkhovna Rada, notably the declaration of a state of war or 
emergency in Ukraine or in individual localities necessitating the employment of armed 
force. 71 
The General Military Inspectorate, which is not mentioned in the constitution, is a 
subordinate body of the presidential administration with no links to parliament. It was 
established in 1995 by a decree of the presidenf2. 
Constitutionally, the authority of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the defence sphere 
would appear somewhat stronger than that of the Russian parliament. In addition to its 
control of the budget, the remit of the Rada includes: determining the principles of domestic 
and foreign policy73 ; confirming the general structure and numerical strength, and defining the 
functions of the armed forces, the security service and other military formations74 ; approving 
decisions on providing military assistance to other states, on sending units of the armed 
forces abroad, or on admitting units of armed forces of other states on to the territory of 
Ukraine.75 At the same time, the constitution contains significant ambiguities. It states that 
the Rada approves "national programmes of economic, scientific and technical, social, 
national and cultural development, and the protection of the environment"76 , explicitly leaving 
out programmes of military development. 
Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council is also described in the constitution, 
according to which it is the coordinating body of the president on national security and defence 
issues. That is to say, the council is an executive body under the chairmanship of the 
69 Ibid., Art. 106, Para. 18. 
70 Ibid., Art. 106, Para. 24. 
71 Ibid., Art. 106, Paras. 19 & 21. 
72 Alexander Parfionov, Rol' Struktur lspolnitel'noi Vlasti v Sisteme Grazhdanskogo 
Kontrolya za Vooruzhennymi Silami v Ykraine, Kiev: Ukrainian Centre for International 
Security Studies, 2000, p. 4. 
73 Constitution of Ukraine, Art. 85, Para. 5. 
74 Ibid., Art. 85, Para. 22. 
75 Ibid., Art. 85, Para. 23. 
76 Ibid., Art. 85, Para. 6. 
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president who controls the composition of its personnel and enacts by presidential decree 
decisions taken in council?7 
As of 2000, the Ukrainian parliament had only begun drafting a law on civilian control of 
the military sphere.78 
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE 
As was discussed in the last chapter on Poland and Hungary, parliaments play a crucial role 
in the system of civilian control of the military. They are the main vehicle for societal scrutiny 
of the activities of the armed forces and they oversee the military budget. To an even greater 
extent than Poland and Hungary, the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments were unable to 
perform their oversight function in the 1990s. In general, one might say that the problems 
which plagued parliamentary committees in the former Soviet Union states were in the same 
categories as those encountered in Central Europe but at a greater level of intensity: the 
Russian and Ukrainian presidents arrogated to themselves even more power than the Polish 
president, while at the same time the inexperience, lack of expert assistance and de-
motivation of parliamentarians also undermined their effectiveness. 
Defence committees: general oversight. In some respects, the reasons for the 
Russian and Ukrainian failure to exercise effective oversight of their respective defence 
establishments were practical, resembling the problems encountered by Poland and Hungary 
- neither committee possessed permanent advisory bodies to assist them in their duties. 
Instead, they have relied on the expertise of individual members, analytical reports of the 
ministry of defence, their parliamentary staffs or whatever research organs might be available 
from their political parties. 
In general, analytical support to the Ukrainian defence committee was considered to 
be "unsatisfactory".79 As of 2000, the committee had twelve clerical staff and twenty-one 
members, about a quarter of whom had a military background. The committee itself had no 
analytical staff of its own, relying instead on the analytical sections of the ministry of defence 
77 Ibid, Art. 107. 
78 Parfionov, Rol' Struktur lspolnitel'noi Vlasti, p. 13. 
79 The effectiveness of the committee is discussed in some detail in "Democratic 
Civilian Control Over the Military in Ukraine: The Path from Form to Substance", National 
Security and Defence, No. 11 (2000), pp. 33-36. The "unsatisfactory" quote is from Heorhiy 
Kriuchkov, a People's Deputy of Ukraine and former head of the defence committee, quoted 
in the journal on page 33. 
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and occasionally outside agencies like the National Institute of Strategic Studies.80 The same 
applied to the Russian defence committee which also had no permanent analytical staff, 
relying as well on analytical reports of the ministry of defence or on ad hoc advisory groups of 
outside experts such as the one that worked on the draft law on civilian control. 81 In the 
words of the deputy chairman of the defence committee, Alexei Arbatov, not only in the 
defence committee but also in the budget, tax, finance and banking committees the number of 
" ... people with an understanding of defence questions are an insignificant minority ... "82 
As in Poland and Hungary, due to the scarcity of defence expertise the trend in the 
Russian and Ukrainian parliaments was to rely on a small group of members with military 
backgrounds for discussion of defence matters while the wider membership largely ignored 
such issues. In the Russian Duma, with the exception of a few civilians like Alexei Arbatov 
and Andrei Kokoshin, this group centred on the '"Duma Generals' -retired military men 
elected as deputies who are the only members possessing any expertise in defence ... "83 
Indeed, most of the defence committee's chairmen have been military officers, including 
Colonel (ret.) Sergei Yushenkov, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Lev Rokhlin, Colonel-General (ret.) 
Edward Vorobyev, Major-General (reserves) Roman Popkovich, and General of the Army 
Andrei Nikolayev. 
The situation in Ukraine bore some similarity with a number of prominent "soldier-
politicians" serving in the Rada, including former minister of defence General Vitaliy Radetskiy, 
former Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Lopata, and General Vilen Martirosyan among 
others. 84 However, such individuals did not always end up as members of the defence 
committee, prompting one close observer to lament: 
In Ukraine, the parliament has some ability to oversee the military but not much 
and not very strong. Part of the problem is the type of people we have on the 
committee here. In Russia they have people like Nikolayev, Kokoshin, Arbatov 
80 Porokhnyavi interview (U28), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
81 Duma defence committee working group member interview (R11 ), Moscow, 
December 1998. 
82 Quoted by 0. A. Bel'kov, "Rol' Parlamentskogo Kontrolya za Deyatel'nost'yu 
Cilovykh Struktur v Rossii", in Parlamentskii Kontrol' nad Voennoe Sferoi. .. , p. 217. 
83 Duma defence committee working group member interview (R11), Moscow, 
December 1998. 
84 V.A. Grechaninov, "Sostoyanie i Napravlleniya Sovershenstvovaniya 
Demokraticheskogo Kontrolya had Voennoi Sferoi v Ykraine", Parlamentskii Kontrol' nad 
Voennoe Sferoi. .. , p. 262. 
and so on but here we don't have any such military experts. The past head, 
Kriuchkov, had some ability but no one does now. Although the committee 
passed a lot of laws, basically it is quite weak.85 
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Leaving aside the question of the competence and wherewithal of the defence committee to 
perform a substantive oversight role, another problem was the reluctance of many 
parliamentarians to get involved in scrutinising military issues. In Russia, a point was made 
by one interlocutor that because becoming fully knowledgeable about defence policy would 
make the member of parliament a bearer of state secrets - and hence subject to stricter 
limitations on foreign travel - many were simply unwilling to take on a more concrete role in 
defence oversight: 
If you get the clearance [to view secret material], you become a bearer of state 
secrets, which would give some petty clerk the power to bar you from foreign 
travel, and who would want to give up one's vacation on Bali?86 
There was general agreement among interviewees in Moscow and Kiev that the defence 
committee system worked very simply. In Russia, "The defence committee acts like a 
military lobby by trying to get the government to allocate more funds to the military, and in 
exchange tries to gain some influence in the military."87 From time to time, the Duma was in a 
position to exercise some authority over the military through specific acts of legislation. When 
this occurred, such as when the Law on Alternative Service was being debated, according to 
a former member of the Security Council, "the military lobbied hard to bend the legislation in 
their own interest, and sometimes used their allies to kill those bills they did not like."88 
Moreover, "the low professional level of most legislators makes it impossible for them to make 
serious, well-thought-out policy decisions, which results in the ministry of defence virtually 
85 Grechaninov interview (U 13), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
86 Russian Institute of Strategic Studies interview (R17), Moscow, January 1999. 
Another Russian researcher, Andrei Pikayev from the Carnegie Endowment (Moscow 
Centre), at a conference of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces 
in Brussels (5-8 July 2001 ), quibbled with the author about this estimation. He argued that 
parliamentarians after Yeltsin had some access to secret material. He acknowledged, 
however, that progress was still very slow on this front, amounting to "baby steps". 
87 Senior member of the USA/Canada Institute interview (R 15), Moscow, January 
1999. Another interviewee concluded that the defence committee which was "ninety percent 
made up of generals" was "in practice an effective military lobby in the Duma ... ": Member of 
Duma international affairs committee interview (R1 0), Moscow, January 1999. Indeed, the 
point that the defence committee acts as the lobby of the military was also made strongly in 
Yu. Fedorov, "Grazhdanskii i Politicheskii Kontrol' Nad Vooryzhennymi Silami b Rossii: 
Osobennosti i Mekhanizmy", in Parlamentskii Kontrol' nad Voennoe Sferoi. .. , p. 190. 
88 Security Council interview (R 13), Moscow, January 1999. 
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dictating to members of parliament decisions on how the armed forces and defence industry 
should develop."89 
In Ukraine, "The parliament rubber stamps what the military develops and brings to the 
Cabinet of Ministers or the administration of the president various projects or problems for 
their decision."90 In other words, the existence of a defence committee that would work 
systematically on civilian oversight was 
... a long way off, because if you look at the personnel of the committee -
particularly its chairmen - you see that they are not trained or experienced with 
the military in any way. This causes from the very beginning a kind of 
inequality. It is not a body that can provide any sort of critical judgement. It 
really just represents the military in parliament. 91 
The opinion of serving military officers on the work of the parliament is telling. According to a 
Russian senior naval officer, "The parliament plays no role in controlling the armed forces. 
The parliament can always make the military's life more miserable, though."92 Similarly, a 
senior Ukrainian army officer concluded that "parliament can screw things up and make them 
more complicated."93 In effect, parliaments in Russia and Ukraine actually seemed in some 
ways to undermine the loyalty of the military to the new order. Due to the financial constraints 
on the military budget they were forced to withdraw military benefits like free metro passes 
and income tax exemptions. In Ukraine the officer quoted above continued, 
parliament really earns the military's anger in a lot of ways because they have 
voted to reduce the priveleges formerly allowed to officers like rest homes, 
subsidised housing, subsidised bills, travel and allowances etc. Such 
cutbacks have reduced my salary by about twenty-five per cent- this really 
generates a lot of resentment in the army.94 
In Russia, the periodic efforts of the Duma to restore some of the benefits of military service 
usually stayed in the realm of populist rhetoric and were not translated into public policy. "In 
the end," concluded a Moscow researcher, "the military need the politicians primarily for the 
money, little as there is of it, and are accumulating resentment against them for their 
1999. 
89 Senior Researcher at the USA/Canada Institute interview (R16), Moscow, January 
90 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
91 Nemyria interview (U23), Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
92 Navy Training Centre 1 interview (R5), Moscow, January 1999. 
93 Partnership for Peace Directorate interview (U2), Kiev 25 January 2001. 
94 Partnership for Peace Directorate interview (U2), Kiev 25 January 2001. 
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systematic neglect of the army's needs. Relations between these politicians and the military 
are those of a mutually unpleasant neutrality."95 
The effectiveness of defence committees in both countries, however, was undermined 
at an even more fundamental level: the overwhelming concentration of authority over the 
armed forces in the presidency made parliamentary oversight a moot point. Defence 
committees could, in theory, discuss any aspect of defence policy which interested them, but 
their practical capacity to do anything about it was essentially limited by the legal restrictions 
on their authority. 
In Russia, even on an issue as publicly unpopular as the first war in Chechnya, the 
Duma was unable to exert much pressure on policy. Russia's laws on defence give the 
Duma little to no accountability over the formulation of military policy at any level. Neither the 
ministry of defence, nor any other "power ministries," are required to report to parliament on 
their activities; the minister of defence is subordinate to the president and reports to him, not 
the legislature. The committee has a purely declarative role. Its members, can point to 
problems in the army, and criticize the government's defence and security policy, but they 
have little authority; any decisions they might take carry at best moral weight if they do not 
accord with the policies of the president. 
Even the freedom of the parliament to pass new legislation on defence is 
circumscribed because it must not contradict the military doctrine which carries legal force 
and thus acts as something akin to a military constitution. Parliament may pass legislation on 
defence issues, but only in accordance with the dictates of military doctrine which, of course, 
is determined by the president. 
The powers of the Verkhovna Rada with respect to the military are also quite limited. 
"In fact, it does not operate a single lever of influence on the power structures."96 According to 
the constitution, the Rada does not have power over the approval of long-term development 
programmes in the military sphere, does not give consent to key appointments in the ministry 
of defence, does not play any role in the personnel policy of the armed forces, and does not 
have oversight of the combat readiness of the military.97 
95 Senior Researcher at the USA/Canada Institute interview (R16), Moscow, January 
1999. 
96 
"Democratic Civilian Control Over the Military in Ukraine: The Path from Form to 
Substance", p. 33. 
97 Idem. 
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According to a committee staffer, relations between the ministry of defence and the 
committee are workable: 
When we need their input it is provided. They provide detailed analyses and 
support the activities of the committee. With respect to the minister, relations 
are also OK. The committee cannot demand that he testify or give reports, but 
neither has it ever tried to. When required the ministry of defence will send a 
deputy minister. 98 
On the other hand, according to another interviewee, "the real effectiveness of the parliament, 
its influence, for example when there were parliamentary hearings on military reform, is a 
matter of real debate. The level of sophistication of debate is very low. The main point for the 
ministry of defence to talk to the parliament at all was to lobby for more money."99 Legally and 
in practice "only the presidential structures have control over the military and force structures. 
Parliament has no real control. Even the nomination of the minister is the prerogative of the 
president. .. The ministry of defence is responsible primarily to the president, to a certain 
extent to the cabinet of ministers, and to the ministry of finance."100 
Defence committees: budgetary oversight. In democratic theory, to achieve 
civilian control parliaments must have substantive and detailed, not just perfunctory, 
parliamentary oversight over security policy and spending; "a parliament which is limited, or 
which limits itself through lack of interest, to a rubber-stamp role in the oversight of defence is 
a clear indication of poor civilian control."101 Neither the Ukrainian nor Russian parliament 
exercised substantive and detailed oversight of security policy and defence spending in the 
period under review. While there is a constitutional provision for parliamentary oversight of 
the budget in both countries, in reality this mechanism does not work. Opinion on why this 
was the case was virtually the same in Moscow and Kiev. According to a Russian analyst, 
when the budget is in such poor condition as nowadays, the issue of control 
loses its meaning. Secondly, while the constitution does provide for the 
parliament's role, there is no developed system for legislators to effectively 
carry out the task of budgetary control - a system which would compel the 
98 Porokhnyavi interview (U28), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
99 Nemyria interview (U23), Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
100 Belousov interview (U 1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
101 Marco Carnevale, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces", NATO Review, (March 1997), p. 33. 
military to inform the lawmakers about their plans for military development, and 
to persuade them to support their proposals and fund them. 102 
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Ukrainian analysts voiced almost the same concern that the level of spending on defence was 
so inadequate as to make budgetary scrutiny by parliament "irrelevant".103 
Indeed, the detail of the military budget was insufficient to allow thorough analysis by 
parliamentarians. In Russia from 1994-1997 the budget consisted of only seven articles on 
appropriations for the ministry of defence, military pensions and military programs of the 
ministry for nuclear energy. According to 1998 amendments of the Law on Budgetary 
Classification, the defence budget must contain at least 130 open positions. The military 
budget was also supposed to show the distribution of appropriations to the military by 
function, by the types of armed forces being supported with what types of weapons, as well 
as by its main missions and so on; but it did not. From 1998-2000, the budget of the ministry 
of defence contained only 3 main articles: maintenance of the armed forces (alone counting 
for up to 90 per cent of the total), mobilisation readiness, and programs of the nuclear 
ministry. This level of secrecy effectively denied the parliament any real opportunity to 
exercise oversight of the military budget and opened the way for the ministry of defence to 
manipulate appropriations. 
Analysts in Ukraine offered similarly sober assessments of the capacity of the 
Verkhovna Rada to perform detailed oversight. In a lengthy paper on parliamentary control of 
the military in Ukraine, Vadim Grechaninov dwelled for only two paragraphs on the question of 
budgetary scrutiny saying: 
The main work of the committee is control of the military budget. But. .. ; the 
capacity of such control from the committee is, on the whole, extremely 
insignificant.104 
Another interviewee noted that the Rada reviewed only the "military budget at large and in 
general, not at all in detail- there is practically no transparency in defence spending."105 In 
fact, the Ukrainian system of budgeting fits well with the broader tendency to reform by 
declaration noted in previous chapters. According to a Western defence attache with five 
years experience in his post in Kiev: 
102 Duma defence committee working group member interview (R11), Moscow, 
December 1998. 
103 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
104 Grechaninov, "Sostoyanie i Napravleniya Sovershenstvovaniya ... ", p. 253. 
105 Parfionov interview (U25), Kiev, January 2001. 
They have here what I call a system of budgeting by decree: 'The army will 
work!' Who cares how it happens. That's their problem. This means that the 
budget is virtually meaningless. It doesn't reflect how much money the army 
will get or how it will be spent. Let me give you an example of my assistant 
who was a conscript in the army and told this story. He and a couple of 
soldiers were told by an officer that a particular wall had to be painted. They 
weren't given brushes or paint or any direction how to do it. That was their 
problem. They were ordered to do it and they had to figure out how. That, in 
microcosm, is how the whole system works. 106 
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In Russia throughout the 1990s there was a lot of concern about the role of "soldier-
politicians" in the legislature. Such as, for example, during the 1995 parliamentary elections 
when Grachev ordered 123 military officers to run for office in order to "represent the interests 
of the military" in the Duma. 107 Although the legal right of serving Russian officers to serve in 
the Duma is strange to Western observers, it did not represent a particularly potent threat to 
Russian democracy. The "soldier-politicians" represented a very small percentage of Duma 
deputies and since they were divided among nearly every political party did not represent a 
coherent military bloc in the legislature. Moreover, with one exception (the chairman of the 
Duma defence committee) they did not hold any of the senior positions in the house. The real 
threat of military men in politics was more subtle. They undermined the ability of the Duma to 
exercise its only real means for control of the military: review of the defence budget 
To the extent that budgetary oversight was carried out in the Duma it was performed 
not by civilians but by the military itself through its retired members in the Duma. The system 
worked very simply: a few mainly military members of the Duma defence committee would 
study a classified defence budget containing data not open to normal members of the 
legislature, work on it with the ministry of defence, and submit generalized conclusions to the 
other members of the legislature with regard to the adoption of the budget as a whole. After 
approval, the same mainly military members of the committee would monitor spending on the 
basis of classified data they received from the ministry of defence, which normal members 
would never see.108 
The situation was made even more complex by the fact that the process of defence 
appropriation was very tricky. There were actually three defence budgets, each controlled by 
a different body: the federal budget voted for by the Duma which would become law; the real 
106 Williams interview (U23), Kiev, 25 January 2001. 
107 Jacob Kipp, The Russian Military and the 1995 Parliamentary Elections: A Primer, 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Foreign Military Studies Office, October 1995, p. 16. 
108 Fedorov, pp. 189-190. 
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budget allocated to the ministry of defence by the ministry of finance, and the actual spending 
of the ministry of defence. Legally, failure to implement the budget was a crime, but no one 
was ever charged because the government simply did not have the money to fulfil all its 
obligations. The ministry of finance disbursed whatever funds really existed and then the 
military spent what it got as it saw fit. In the end, "the system works with the kind of quality 
which can be expected in a situation where the government does not have the means to 
implement the budget. At the current level of defence spending, there is not much control to 
do."1og 
PRESIDENTS IN THE SYSTEM OF CIVILIAN CONTROL 
Without doubt, control over the security forces in Russia and Ukraine stems unambiguously 
from the president and his administration. Indeed, to the extent that civilian control of the 
armed forces exists at all, it is because the president is a civilian and the power of all other 
agencies derives, directly or indirectly, from his office. "Generally speaking", said one 
Russian interviewee, "the ministry of defence is not under the authority of the government: it is 
directly controlled by the president."110 While in the words of an Ukrainian interlocutor: 
The president has built up an impenetrable chain of command over the power 
structures. It goes directly from the president through the National Security and 
Defence Council staff and on to the power ministries. In this vertical line of 
executive command and control there is no room even for input from the 
cabinet of ministers.111 
Control functions of the presidential administration. Within the Russian and Ukrainian 
presidential administrations there existed a range of comparable institutions for exercising 
control of the military: a national security advisor, a commission on higher military ranks, and 
a general military inspectorate. In Russia, the military branch of the personnel directorate of 
the presidential administration also played a small role in the military appointment process, 
and the military branch of the main control directorate had responsibilities focussed mainly on 
fiscal accountability and the military-industrial complex. 112 
The position of national security advisor has been a powerful one in both countries. In 
Ukraine, Volodymyr Horbulin had a strong influence as adviser to the president and as 
109 An Assistant First Deputy Prime Minister interview (R12), Moscow, January 1999. 
110 Open Society Institute interview (R7), Moscow, January 1999. 
111 Grechaninov interview (U13), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
112 An Assistant First Deputy Prime Minister interview (R12), Moscow, January 1999. 
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secretary of the National Security and Defence Council from 1994 until December 1999 when 
he was replaced as secretary of the council by Yevheny Marchuk, a retired general and 
former presidential candidate. Indeed, some interviewees suggested that Horbulin's influence 
over defence policy was not diminished by losing the secretariat of the council. He retained 
his post as advisor to the president, and much of the staff who reported to him as secretary of 
the council were simply moved to the presidential administration.113 That said, according to 
Parfionov, the national security advisor played no real role in the system of civilian control. 114 
In Russia, on the other hand, the post of national security advisor had some influence from 
1993 to 1998 when it was held by Yuri Baturin. But after Baturin's dismissal from all his posts 
in 1998 the post was subsumed by the head of the presidential administration (General of the 
Army Nikolai Bordyuzha who held the post from December 1998 to March 1999). 
Less is known about the activities of the commissions on higher military ranks which, 
while important, tended to go about their work outside of the public eye. In Russia until March 
1997 the commission on higher military ranks was also headed by Yuri Baturin, at which point 
the functions of the commission were transferred to the authority of the newly-appointed vice 
premier, Anatoliy Chubais, who had been ordered by the president to take responsibility for the 
direction of military reform. Then, in 1999, the functions were transferred again to the Security 
Council under the direction of its secretary. Yeltsin's byzantine machinations to keep the 
commission on higher military ranks out of the hands of his political enemies testifies to its 
importance as a mechanism for control of the armed forces. 
In Ukraine the actual exercise of the president's power over military appointments was 
exercised through the National Security and Defence Council. 115 Military inspectorates 
provided another important lever of presidential control over the armed forces. The Ukrainian 
General Military Inspectorate amounted to around forty (mostly military) personnel as of 2000 
under the command of a colonel general. The primary function of the inspectorate was to 
inspect and oversee the activities of all the armed services and report on their readiness to 
113 Belousov interview (U 1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. A NATO official resident in Kiev 
also pointed out that being replaced as secretary of the National Security and Defence 
Council was not necessarily a demotion for Gorbulin: Melnyczuk interview (U21 ), Kiev, 24 
January 2001. 
114 Parfionov, Rol' Struktur lspolnitel'noi. ... , p. 4. 
115 Military Personnel Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interview (U 1 ), 
Kiev, 23 January 2001. This department manages the appointment of military attaches in 
Ukrainian embassies. 
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the president. However, opinion on the effectiveness of the inspectorate is divided. Sherr 
wrote: 
The inspectorate, resting on subordinate inspectorates and on information-
analysis departments in each armed service, is a potent institution, and it 
provides the president with an effective means of supervising military 
structures as well as making their activity more transparent. 116 
Yet, in the estimation of an interviewee in Kiev, the role of the general military inspectorate 
was merely to be, 
used as the army's golden parachute. It's a way to let old retired generals keep 
their cars and privileges and to stay involved in things. It's a total replica of the 
old communist system whereby older comrades kept a hand in the system as 
inspectors. They kept their privileges and so on, but they were removed as 
rivals for the new cadres. 117 
The British defence attache's assessment of the inspectorate points a way to understanding 
this contradiction. "The inspectorate is slightly a mystery to us," he said. "They seem to be 
feared by the rest of the ministry. I assume they have some impact, but not very much I 
think."118 The key words here are feared and not very much impact. The inspectorate can 
hardly have much impact in an army facing as dire a crisis as Ukraine's. After all, it would not 
take very much effort to reveal grievous standards of readiness, training, maintenance and 
morale in virtually any unit of the armed forces. On the other hand, the findings of the 
inspectorate could be used as a pretext for disciplining a particular commander who was in 
disfavour with the president for some other reason. 
Such was likely the case with the navy commander-in-chief Vice-Admiral Volodymyr 
Bezkorovainy. In October 1996, the inspectorate found the performance of Bezkorovainy 
unsatisfactory and asked him to resign. According to the head of the inspectorate, General 
Valeriy Hubenko, Bezkorovainy's failings included allowing the Russian-controlled fleet to 
conduct exercises in Ukrainian waters "whenever and wherever it pleased" and he criticized 
the commander's performance in ensuring the navy's battle worthiness. 119 Nevertheless, the 
timing of the resignation, on the eve of a reported breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian talks on 
the status of the fleet, fuelled speculation that the real cause was Bezkorovainy's too public 
disagreement with concessions made in the negotiations. In other words, the inspectorate 
116 James Sherr, "A Fresh Start for Ukrainian Military Reform", Survival, Vol. 43, No. 1 
(Spring 2001 ), p. 118. 
117 Nemyria interview (U23), Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
118 Littleboy interview (U20), Kiev, 1 February 2001. 
119 Jamestown Monitor, 29 October 1996. 
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was feared as an instrument for presidential censure of individual commanders for reasons 
having little or nothing to do with the operational readiness of the forces under their command 
-which were uniformly bad throughout the armed forces. 
The Russian State Military Inspectorate was approximately double the size of the 
Ukrainian inspectorate with some 100 personnel of which eighty were seconded from the 
security services. 120 It too was empowered to inspect all of the security services, not only 
those of the ministry of defence. The establishment of the inspectorate in 1996 was 
connected with efforts to reinvigorate the process of defence reform; it was hoped that the 
inspectorate would not only perform political control of the armed forces, but also control its 
reform. In fact, the idea of a State Military Inspectorate outside of the ministry of defence was 
mooted by Igor Rodionov in 1995 prior to his appointment as minister of defence. In his view, 
an inspectorate was warranted because, 
The defence ministry ... taking advantage of the lack of real oversight is 
deceiving the political leadership and the country's public as regards the 
combat readiness and progress and quality of the reform of the armed 
forces. 121 
In fact, the inspectorate did not live up to these hopes. The political leadership was not 
deceived, as Rodionov wrote, by the military as to the real state of the moribund military 
reform or the critical weakness of the armed forces. By 1995 anyone who could read a 
newspaper knew how dire the situation was in the military; they simply did not consider it of 
sufficient importance relative to the other crises facing them to take action. When the 
inspectorate uncovered double bookkeeping in the interior ministry and reported it to the 
president, Yeltsin upbraided the minister, Sergei Stepashin, while at the same time decorating 
him with a state order. In other words, like Ukraine, when and what the president might do 
with information provided him by the inspectorate was entirely a matter of his own 
discretion.122 
Presidential control of the military in both Ukraine and Russia is clearly strong and 
effective. What is less clear is the extent to which presidential control can be equated with 
civilian control. Generally speaking, it can be said of the various controlling agencies of the 
presidential administration that they could be led by either a civilian or a military man 
depending on the will of the president. And, indeed, certain civilians such as Baturin in Russia 
12° Fedorov, p. 204. 
121 Quoted by Steven Main in The State Military Inspectorate, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, C 93, December 1996. 
122 Russian Institute of Strategic Studies interview (R 17), Moscow, January 1999. 
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and Horbulin in Ukraine have exercised great influence. Yet, at the same time, in Russia the 
numerous members of the security services serving in the presidential administration - such 
as General Alexander Korzhakov (head of the presidential security service from 1991-1996), 
General of the Army Mikhail Barsukov (commandant of the Kremlin from 1992-1995; director 
of the FSB in 1995-1996), and General of the Army Nikolai Bordyuzha (head of the presidential 
administration from December 1998 to March 1999) - leant it a strongly military flavour. 
Similarly, according to experts of the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, the 
predominance of active or retired servicemen in the structures of the Ukrainian presidential 
administration pointed to the "military nature" of presidential control in their country as well. 123 
SECURITY COUNCILS 
Through the 1990s security councils in both Ukraine and Russia have attracted considerable 
interest as they slowly evolved de facto powers seemingly beyond their constitutional remits. 
The Russian Security Council, created on 7 July 1992 by a decree of the president entitled On 
Procedures for Implementing Decisions of the Russian Federation Security Council, was 
originally supposed to be a consultative body on matters of national security, but gradually it 
became the main inter-agency coordinating body for the security services and seemed to 
acquire de facto decision-making powers, although legally it had no mandate for decision-
making. The Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council - under the uninterrupted 
direction of Volodymyr Horbulin from 1994 to December 1999- experienced a similar 
evolution. 124 Constitutionally, it too was an advisory body assisting the president in the 
exercise of his control functions; in practice, the council became one of the most influential 
and effective state structures.125 
Russia's Security Council. The influence of the Security Council fluctuated 
throughout the course of the 1990s. In its early days it was far from obvious that the Security 
Council would perform any serious functions. Indeed, by August 1993 Vitaly Marsov, writing in 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta claimed that Marshal Yevgeni Shaposhnikov was resigning his post as 
secretary of the council after only three months because he had realised that, 
first of all, what was required of him was political loyalty to the president and a 
minimum of activity, and that the Security Council is nothing more than a part 
123 
"Democratic Civilian Control Over the Military in Ukraine: The Path from Form to 
Substance", p. 18. 
124 Parfionov, Rol' Struktur lspolnitel'noi. .. , p. 5. 
125 Idem. 
of the president's staff that is intended only to organise conferences between 
Boris Yeltsin and the heads of particular departments ... 126 
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By the mid-1990s, however, the Security Council was becoming a major player in the defence 
sphere attracting the attention of domestic and foreign analysts of military-political matters in 
Russia. Much of that attention centred on the potential of one figure- Aleksandr Lebed, a 
challenger for the presidency in the 1996 elections who served as secretary of the council 
from June to October 1996- to use his position as secretary of the council to take on the 
mantle of "security Tsar". 
However, only a month after Lebed's appointment Yeltsin created the highly 
comparable Defence Council. The similarity in mission, structure and composition of the 
councils prompted many to wonder why Russia needed two such institutions.127 Two 
theories were proposed to explain this situation. The first was that there was a functional 
division of labour between the councils. As Vladimir Klimenko -the chief of staff of the 
Defence Council - outlined it, the council would concentrate solely on "questions of military 
structure and military reform, separating these tasks from the whole issue of national security 
into a separate problem."128 The work of the Defence Council and the Security Council were 
to be interconnected, with the Security Council defining the security interests and 
requirements of the Russian Federation, while the Defence Council worked out how the 
armed forces would meet those requirements. 
The second theory was that the Defence Council was created to ensure that Lebed 
did not acquire too much power. Yeltsin co.uld award Lebeda high position while, at the same 
time, the powers of his office were transferred to a more reliable functionary. The trouble with 
this theory, which has become accepted lore, is that while some powers were transferred 
from the Security to the Defence Council, the powers of the Security Council secretary were 
also strengthened in some important respects: most importantly he was given the power to 
control the personal staffs of the heads of all the ministries and agencies having to do with 
security matters.129 
126 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 August 1993. 
127 The composition of the councils was exactly the same: president (chairman), 
secretary of the council, prime minister, head of FSB, minster of interior, minister of defence, 
security minister, minister of foreign affairs, head of border troops, and minister of finance. 
128 Quoted in M. A Smith, The Defence Council of the Russian Federation, 
Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, C 95, March 
1997. 
129 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12 July 1996. 
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In short, the evolution of the Security Council defies easy interpretation. Lebed was 
never able to manipulate the powers of his office to really acquire the status of "security Tsar" 
because he was too busy trying to negotiate a settlement to the war in Chechnya. At the 
same time, the extent of his potential powers did arouse insecurity among other state officials 
who helped engineer his downfall.130 In this respect, the establishment of the Defence 
Council was likely connected in part with a desire to neutralise Lebed's growing power. 
Certainly, the abolition of the Defence Council in 1998, only two years after its creation, with 
Lebed safely gone, would tend to confirm this thesis. 
When Andrei Kokoshin took over as secretary of the Security Council on 3 March 1998 
there was talk about Russia having taken a step toward achieving real civilian control of the 
armed forces. By this time, Kokoshin was already the head of the State Military Inspectorate 
which became a branch of the Security Council. In combining the two agencies it was 
thought that a kind of "super, civilian minister of defence" who could control all the security 
services would be created. Moreover, as a public politician, Kokoshin, while remaining 
subordinate first of all to the president, would also be open to influence from the Duma and the 
public. It is difficult to say whether this is what Yeltsin intended when he appointed Kokoshin, 
but it seems unlikely; after only six months as secretary, Kokoshin was fired by Yeltsin for no 
stated reason and replaced by Nikolai Bordyuzha. 
As a body of civilian control, however, the Security Council was not likely to be very 
effective, under Kokoshin or anyone else, for the simple reason that it was not really a civilian 
body - a substantial portion of its membership and most of its staff were from the security 
services. For example, of the roughly 70 ranking officials who have been members of the 
council since its inception in 1992, at least 25 were officers from the security services. Out of 
a total of ten secretaries, there have been four generals and one colonel (Putin). And of those 
five, two have been in active service (Nikolai Bordyuzha from the Border Guards and Sergei 
Ivanov from the FSB). 
The military inspectorate branch of the Security Council was almost completely 
staffed by the security services themselves. In 1998, a general, Nikolai Barsukov was its 
130 In October 1996 Lebed's most serious rival, Interior Minister Anatoli Kulikov, in 
tandem with the FSB and FAPSI, launched a mini-coup against him. Accusing Lebed of 
planning a takeover, he severed inter-city communications on the night of 16-17 October and 
mobilized 100,000 interior troops to detain him. No charges were ever proven, but they 
provided sufficient pretext to oust him from his post as secretary of the Security Council. Far 
from being punished by Yeltsin for staging this coup, Kulikov was rewarded by being made 
the deputy prime minister for security affairs. See, Stephen Blank, Towards the Failing 
State: The Structure of Russian Security Policy, Sandhurst, UK: Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, Royal Military Academy, F56, November 1996, p. 2. 
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head while eleven of its thirteen inspectors were also generals.131 Finally, the majority of the 
Security Council's 207 staff (as of 1997) were military officers posted there from the security 
services whose long-term career prospects depended on how well they protected the 
interests of their home ministry.132 
A Russian defence analyst who in 1990 worked with Kokoshin writing proposals for 
the creation of the Security Council commented in late 1998 on the effectiveness of the 
council as a body of civilian control: 
... it is not working nowadays. Actually, it is unclear why the president created 
it at all. It seems its establishment was connected with the idea of creating the 
post of civilian minister of defence. But today the president won't let anyone 
but himself control the power ministries.133 
Basically, the Security Council under Yeltsin was an agency tailor-made for departmental 
lobbying between the power ministries, not for the exercise of civilian oversight. 
The Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council. The evolution of Ukraine's 
National Security and Defence Council was less dramatic than the Russian Security Council. 
More consistency in leadership- Volodymy Horbulin, as noted above, was secretary from 
1994 to December 1999- as well as the more general level of calm that prevailed in Ukrainian 
civil-military relations contributed to this smoother development. 
Its powers are somewhat broader than those of the Russian Security Council. 
According to the Law on the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine of 5 March 
1998, the council is responsible for the coordination and realisation of the control of the 
executive in the sphere of security and defence. In its meetings the council discusses and 
prepares recommendations for presidential decision on a wide range of defence matters 
including concepts of national security, military doctrine, reform programmes, military 
finances, military readiness, and so on.134 In short, the council is responsible for coordinating 
policies and assisting the president in exercising the myriad functions in the defence sphere 
entrusted to him by the constitution. Indeed, the National Security and Defence Council is an 
integral part of the presidential administration - unlike the Russian Security Council which, in 
theory if not in practice, is kept at arm's length from the presidential administration. 
131 According to an article about Barsukov in Kommersant-Daily, 24 December 1998. 
132 Belkin interview (R22), Moscow, December 1998. 
133 Duma defence committee working group member interview (R11), Moscow, 
December 1998. 
134 Parfionov, Rol' Struktur lspolnitel'noi. .. , pp. 5-6. 
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The membership of the council includes the president, the secretary of the council, the 
prime minister, the head of the security service, the minister of interior, the minister of 
defence, the minister of foreign affairs, and others. As of late 1999, due to the continuing 
domination by men in uniform of the top posts in the "power-ministries" the 15-strong 
membership of the council had a certain military flavour with seven of its members being in 
uniform. 135 
The staff of the council, however, "is much more civilian", according to a former staffer 
(a military officer). "Especially the economic and foreign relations directorate have more 
civilians. They have retired military too. But the council employs mostly civilians."136 The 
civilian staff are employed by the council directly, while the military personnel are paid by the 
council though they wear military uniform. Importantly, the staff are independent. According 
to the same staffer: 
The staff of the National Security and Defence Council are independent. There 
was no pressure on me to defend the ministry of defence as an advisor. I was 
totally independent. The military people, even in the military inspectorate, are 
independent.137 
Moreover, the quality of work coming out of the council, as was discussed in chapter two, 
particularly the 1997 National Security Concept, was of a high standard. 
On the other hand, by the end of 1999 it was clear that all was not well with the 
workings of the National Security and Defence Council. It is telling that the most influential 
experts on the council staff, such as Anatoliy Grytsenko who worked on the National Security 
Concept, felt it necessary to leave. After publishing his analytical report "Military Reform in 
Ukraine: Start or Another False Start?",138 the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political 
Studies found itself in a cold war with the armed forces. The military were offended by the 
energy and argumentation of their civilian "opponents" and their proposals.139 The 
confrontation between the generals and the state leadership on the one side and the outside 
defence experts on the other was hard to hide. In any such confrontation two outcomes are 
135 
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136 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev. 22 January 2001. 
137 Polyakov interview (U27), Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
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possible: either the truth will be born out in time, or each side will go its own way ignoring 
productive cooperation. At the end of the 1990s the latter outcome seemed the more likely. 
Other analysts pointed to a sea change in the strength and influence of the council at 
the end of the decade. Until 1999, it had the National Institute of Strategic Studies under it 
doing the scientific and analytical work on military reform and other issues. But then the 
institute was transferred to the presidential administration. "This means that today the 
National Security and Defence Council has practically no analytical capacity. It has some 
people on its staff but they are mostly bureaucrats. They cannot analyse what is going on in 
the army, the security structures and so on. Practically, the presidential administration 
controls all the military reform and the security sector in general."140 
140 Belousov interview (U 1 0), Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
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4.3: Agencies of Civilian Oversight- Comparative Conclusions 
Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine all encountered difficulties in creating truly effective 
agencies of civilian oversight. In general, the legal establishment of control agencies was 
accomplished at an early stage. Yet, in practice, civilian oversight has been quite weak. 
Parliaments, in particular, proved lacklustre. Parliaments may have had the legal right 
to perform general and budgetary oversight of the defence sector, but for practical and 
political reasons failed to do so. On the other hand, such as in Hungary, they tended to use 
their authority over the armed forces in order to micro-manage its affairs - to meddle in details 
of trifling importance while dealing in a perfunctory way with matters of great consequence. 
Defence committees, which bore the weightiest responsibility with respect to the discharge of 
parliamentary oversight, ended up performing an altogether different role - instead of being 
the avenue through which civilian society exercised its voice in defence matters, they tended 
to act as the military's lobby in the legislature. Parliaments to some extent, especially in 
Central Europe, exercised control over the implementation of the military budget, and were 
able to determine how much money was spent in total and (more or less) on what, but at the 
same time proved utterly unable to judge that monetary inputs were justified by security 
outputs. 
To some extent the reasons for this ineffectiveness were ubiquitous in all the countries 
in the study. Parliaments lacked sufficient analytical support for their work; they were 
extremely inexperienced in defence issues; in general, the level of detail in budget 
submissions was insufficient to allow really sophisticated analysis; and, moreover, many 
parliamentarians lacked a strong interest in the material. In other words, the accountability of 
the armed forces to civilian authorities, their openness to public scrutiny, and the ability of 
political authorities to sanction their behaviour were weak and ineffective in all the states under 
review, but more so in Russia and Ukraine than in Poland and Hungary. But let us look at the 
issues raised systematically. 
Who controls what? Legislative-executive relations and parliamentary 
oversight. It has been said that one of the main factors influencing whether democracy 
functioned smoothly or was riddled with conflict in the post-communist states was a state's 
constitutional form: "Constitutions with the best outlook for promoting stability provide a clear 
delineation of authority over cabinet ministers and the primacy of the legislature over the 
president in the passage of laws."141 The same may be said of civil-military relations; indeed, 
141 Matthew Shugart, "Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Communist Europe", 
Transition (13 December 1996), p. 6. 
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conflict over who should control the military- parliament or president- rather than the 
desirability of civilian control per se, was the main issue in Poland and Hungary, Russia and 
Ukraine with the partial exception of Hungary. 
In this respect the countries under review represent the full spectrum of possible 
models from strong parliamentary in Hungary, mixed presidential-parliamentary in Poland, to 
strong presidential in Russia and Ukraine. In Hungary after the ruling of the Constitutional 
Court in September 1991 the prominence of the president in the system of civil-military 
relations was no longer a major issue. In Poland, by contrast, the battle between President 
Walesa and successive Polish governments was a major issue in civil-military relations giving 
the military considerable independence from civilian control up until 1996-1997, after which 
the balance seemed to be tipping in favour of the government. 
In Russia and Ukraine, however, the overwhelming concentration of authority over the 
armed forces in the presidency made parliamentary oversight a moot point- irrelevant even. 
The vertical chain of control from president to armed forces was very strong in both countries. 
On the other hand, due to the presence of so many military officials in this chain it is hard to 
see this control as truly "civilian". Moreover, the closed nature of this strong form of 
presidential control of the armed forces was effectively impenetrable by any other societal 
actors seeking to perform scrutiny of the armed forces. 
Control not command- general oversight vs micro-management. In an effective 
system of democratic civil-military relations, civilian authorities - particularly in parliament-
need to perform general oversight of defence matters while resisting the temptation to micro-
manage the armed forces. With respect to the countries under review, there was again a 
spectrum of models. Let us look at the extremes. 
At one end, in Russia and Ukraine, the system worked very simply: the president 
appointed a defence minister who was accountable directly to him without interference from 
parliament. General Yuri Popov (ret.), a prominent independent military expert, testified at an 
international conference on civil-military relations held in Moscow in 1998 to the "excessive, 
almost absolute, concentration of formal political authority over military affairs in the hands of 
one person -the president of the Russian Federation, whose real activity as commander-in-
chief is very weak", and a "tight curtain of secrecy, as a result of which society has no way of 
knowing how military-political decisions are made and implemented, while the decisions 
themselves acquire an anonymous and irresponsible character."142 
142 Yuri Popov, "Grazhdanskii Kontrol' i Voennaya Reforma v Rossii", in Grazhdanskii 
Kontrol' nad Vooruzhennymi Silami. lnostrannyi Opyt i Spetsifika Rossii, Materialy TACIS-
proekta (1997-1998), Moskva: Russkii put', 1999, p. 149. 
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At the other end of the spectrum there was Hungary, where the parliament had very 
well-founded and extensive authority over the armed forces to the point of micro-
management. This situation caused tremendous problems for the army, particularly with 
regard to the deployment of foreign and national armed forces abroad and at home. 
Who controls whom? Managing the expert problem. Feaver wrote that, "Civilian 
competence, in the general sense, extends even beyond their competence in a particular 
sense."143 By this, he meant to draw attention to the fact that civilians often have great 
difficulty controlling specialised, technically-sophisticated organisations like the armed forces 
because they lack deep knowledge of the issues involved. 
This was a major problem in all the Eastern Europe because civilian authorities tended 
to lack sources of independent, non-military advice on defence matters. Only Poland took a 
relatively pro-active approach to increasing the defence expertise of parliamentarians and 
their civilian staffs, but progress there was glacially slow. 
The trend in all the parliaments, though perhaps mostly in the Russian Duma, was to 
rely on a small group of deputies with military backgrounds for discussion of defence matters 
while the wider membership largely ignored such issues. In this context it is reasonable to 
ask, who is controlling whom? As Donnelly noted, "if all advisors to defence policy-makers 
are military, and policy-makers are ignorant of military realities, then the army, not the 
government, is controlling defence policy."144 
Budgetary Oversight: We know what we spend but not why we spend it. 
Budgetary oversight is not mere accounting, it is a process of ensuring that military funding 
complies with national security goals and with other budgetary priorities. In this respect, 
progress among the countries in the study was mixed. In Poland, opinion was that control of 
the budget was fairly stringent. In Hungary, on the other hand, judgments on the state of the 
military budget and the quality of parliamentary oversight suggested it was quite superficial. In 
Russia and Ukraine, the disaster in state finances generally tended to make parliamentary 
control of the budget dubious from the beginning. That said, the level of transparency of the 
defence budget was clearly inadequate in all the countries under review- with the partial 
exception of Poland. 
143 Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the 
Question of Civilian Control", Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 
150. 
144 Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework ... " 
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On the other hand, through audit bodies civilian authorities in Poland and Hungary 
were able to control military spending at least in some limited degree: they knew what they 
had authorised to be disbursed to the ministry of defence and could control how it was spent 
in broad categories - sometimes revealing fiscal abuse. But they lacked the expertise to 
judge whether they were getting good value for money for their defence dollars. 
The weaknesses of budgetary oversight in Russia and Ukraine were of a different 
magnitude. In most countries, the budget is a real funding plan for the nation for the next 
twelve months. In Russia and Ukraine, on the other hand, the budget throughout the 1990s 
was more of a statement of intent which few people expected the authorities would actually 
fulfill. In other words, defence budgets were, for the most part, completely fictitious: they did 
not represent what the military would actually get nor did they explain how funds would 
actually be spent. The last time the defence appropriations in the Russian defence budget 
were fulfilled in real spending was 1993. 
The situation was fundamentally the same in Ukraine. In short, the abysmal state of 
the federal budget in general meant that there was not all that much oversight to be done in 
the defence sector. To a great extent, the ministry of finance became the main enforcer of 
fiscal discipline in the armed forces in both countries. But this control was similarly 
intransparent to public scrutiny. Indeed, as Sherr noted, "transparency is simply the ability to 
measure and see. When People's Deputies fail to challenge the ministry of defence's claim 
that the defence budget meets 38 per cent of minimal requirements, is this because they 
endorse the claim or because they have no basis for judgement?"145 The latter would seem 
to be indicated. 
Security councils: control, but not civilian control. Stepan wrote that the 
leadership of the national security councils which serve as fora for high-level discussion of 
security and defence matters must be civilian: "The very point is that such a council be 
democratically controlled by civilians, and that the military participate as advisors to the civilian 
leadership."146 
In both Russia and Ukraine national security councils evolved into the most powerful 
centres of defence decision-making. Conceivably, given that they possessed strengths 
where other oversight bodies, notably parliament, possessed weaknesses - high level 
145 Sherr, "A Fresh Start?", p. 118. 
146 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Publishers, 1988, p. 141. 
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membership, de facto decision-making powers, substantial expert staffs and so on - they 
could have played a main role in the exercise of civilian oversight. 
In fact, as was discussed when Andrei Kokoshin took over as secretary of the Security 
Council there was talk of a kind of "super, civilian minister of defence" who could control all 
the security services having been created. In practice, however, the exercise of civilian 
oversight by national security councils was never a priority. Judging from its membership, the 
Russian council was hardly a civilian body in the first place. In essence, national security 
councils served as venues for inter-agency bargaining between the "power ministries" over 
resources and missions and for the exercise of the president's authority over the armed 
forces - not as bodies of civilian control. 
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Conclusion 
The problem of civil-military reform in Eastern Europe was not a matter of preventing direct 
military intervention in politics; rather it was a problem of how democratically-elected civilians 
could exercise efficient management, direction and oversight of their armed forces in a way 
that did not undermine development in other sectors of the polity and economy. Two broad 
patterns were evident in how civil-military reform progressed in the countries in the study. In 
Poland and Hungary, there has been a slow, difficult and still incomplete process of adopting 
new norms of democratic civil-military relations. In March 1999 these countries received 
recognition of their advances by their admission to NATO. In Ukraine and Russia, by contrast, 
the transition of the state to some form of democratic governance in general, and the 
transition to some form of democratic civil-military relations in particular, has been halting, 
marked by significant crises and setbacks which still must be resolved. 
That said, it is important to recognise that the gap between Russia and Ukraine, on the 
one hand, and Poland and Hungary on the other, is not so large as to invalidate comparison: 
as Donnelly noted," ... there is not a single Central and East European country which has a 
civil-military relationship which it can consider satisfactory ... "1 In other words, while Poland 
and Hungary accomplished much in terms of reforming civil-military relations, they also had 
much left to accomplish at the end of the period under review. Similarly, while Russia and 
Ukraine made less progress, this is not to say they made no progress. In Ukraine, the 1997 
National Security Concept and the 1999 State Programme on Armed Forces Reform and 
Development Until 2005 betrayed a significantly more mature and pro-active approach to 
solving the problems of the armed forces than had been the case before. In short, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, there has been some improvement in Ukrainian civil-military relations, 
albeit tentative and dependent on more general developments in the polity and economy 
which may still undermine the progress made. 
Russia entered the new century with an unreformed military and with civil-military 
relations in disarray. Just as in many other areas, developments in civil-military relations in 
the 1990s were shaped more by the logic of disintegration of the old state than by the logic of 
new state-building. A vicious circle formed. It was hard to expect productive and consistent 
efforts toward development of stable democratic civil-military relations from a state in a 
shambles. At the same time, because the military has always occupied a special place in 
1 Christopher Donnelly, "Civil-Military Relations in the New Democracies", in David 
Betz and John Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, London & 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001, p. 9. 
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society, it was impossible to create an efficient state without building sound civil-military 
relations. Russia's shift to a more authoritarian type of government in 1999, and the signs 
that the new president was more resolved about addressing the problems afflicting the armed 
forces than was his predecessor, represented an attempt to find an exit from this vicious 
circle. However, the authoritarian relapse represents only one of many factors of Russian 
politics. The shape of the new Russian state and of the system of civil-military relations will be 
determined in the course of intensive struggles, involving major political forces and many 
citizens; international events will have a great impact, too. 
It is also important to recognise that all the states in this thesis faced fundamentally the 
same problems in terms of civil-military reform. First, they had to reform their obsolete armed 
forces, bringing them into line with the new economic and strategic realities of the post-Cold 
War world. Second, they had to create new bureaucratic structures for their defence 
establishments in which civilians played the key policy-making roles. Third, they had to 
strengthen political institutions tasked with oversight of the armed forces. 
In each of these areas the onus of reform was chiefly on the civilian side of the civil-
military equation. That is to say, it was not a problem of changing the attitudes and behaviour 
of the military towards civilian and political society so much as it was a problem of changing 
the attitudes of civilian and political society towards the military. Put differently, it was 
incumbent on civilians to actually empower themselves to perform civilian control of the 
military. Civilian authorities had to take responsibility for military policy decisions. They had to 
actively participate in the formulation of defence policy and monitor its implementation. And 
they had to learn to provide substantial and detailed oversight of the military through various 
legally-constituted bodies of civilian control. Let us look at the key issues raised. 
Reforming the armed forces in Eastern Europe was a major undertaking, which was 
by no means complete by the end of the 1990s. Though it is fair to say that the former Soviet 
Union states accomplished less reform than those in Central Europe, the main 
accomplishment of Poland and Hungary was more in avoiding the extreme examples of 
degradation in the armed forces that plagued Russia and Ukraine than in actualising a 
profound change in their armies to a new level of effectiveness. In other words, they avoided 
a negative result more than they achieved a positive one. 
By the time of their accession to NATO there is little doubt that Poland and Hungary 
were democratic states and their problems of civil-military relations were of a democratic 
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nature.2 Although problems remained in both countries- for example, in the continuing 
division of the Hungarian general staff and ministry of defence- the centre of gravity of 
defence policy-making had shifted to the civilian political realm. The quality of defence policy 
could be questioned but not, for the most part, the legitimacy of the way in which it was 
formulated. 
The same cannot be said of Russia and Ukraine. In both countries the quality of their 
defence policy products was not the main question; rather, it was the quality of the democratic 
functioning of the state in general. In some cases, notably the Ukrainian 1997 National 
Security Concept and the State Programme on Armed Forces Reform and Development Until 
2005, in fact, the sophistication of policy was high. What was lacking was evidence of strong 
civilian direction of the formulation of these policies outside of the narrow and non-transparent 
confines of the presidential administrations. 
Civilian ising the bureaucracy of the defence establishment in all the countries being 
studied proved to be a gravely difficult task. In Poland and Hungary as of late 1999 the 
process of integration had only just begun. The skill gap between military and civilian officials 
was quite apparent and may, indeed, have been growing as military officers acquired more 
and more expertise through contact with NATO, while their civilian counterparts had much 
less access to training opportunities at home and abroad. 
There were few civilians in the Russian and Ukrainian defence establishments at the 
end of the 1990s, little indication that more were likely to be introduced, and very few facilities 
existed for the education of civilian specialists in defence. Among the rank and file of both 
ministries the relatively large size of the civilian side of the defence establishment belied the 
negligible impact of civilian employees on decision-making. In fact, a substantial portion of 
civilian employees were simply retired military personnel supplementing a pension. 
The Central European states had somewhat more success than the former Soviet 
Union states, but their problems were by no means solved. Moving to a civilian minister of 
defence in Poland and Hungary was not simply a matter of declaration; it was a difficult 
process that took nearly ten years to complete. Neither was it a straightforward process, as 
both countries experienced a period of re-militarisation. Crucially, we saw that for 
civilianisation at the top level of the ministry of defence to succeed, it required the support of 
both president and parliament to enact the proper legislation and to avoid undermining the 
2 I am aware of only a few serious commentators who voice a contrary opinion. 
Thomas M. Magstadt, "Flawed Democracies: The Dubious Political Credentials of NATO's 
Proposed New Members" Cato Policy Analysis, No. 297, 6 March 1998, is one example. 
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authority of the minister vis-a-vis his military advisors. Equally important, it was incumbent on 
new civilian ministers of defence to be pro-active and actually lead their departments. 
In general, in all four states, with the partial exception of Hungary, military contestation 
of civilian policy was fostered by the wider disagreement among civilian political elites over 
whether parliament or president would dominate in the political system. This was a very 
serious issue in the former Soviet Union states- where presidential dominance of the political 
system effectively excluded other societal agents from the system of civilian control -though 
it was also an issue in Poland until approximately 1996-1997. 
Parliamentary control of the armed forces was especially lacklustre. In general, 
parliaments lacked sufficient analytical support for their work; they were extremely 
inexperienced in defence issues; the level of detail in budget submissions was insufficient to 
allow really sophisticated analysis; and, moreover, many parliamentarians lacked a strong 
interest in the material. In other words, the accountability of the armed forces to civilian 
authorities, their openness to public scrutiny, and the ability of political authorities to sanction 
their behaviour was weak and ineffective in all four states, but more so in Russia and Ukraine 
than in Poland and Hungary. 
The independent variables in the study suggest two distinctive trends or modalities of 
reform. In Central Europe, there was a strong tendency amongst reformers to try and simply 
adopt the forms of democratic civil-military relations without seeking to understand the logic 
behind them: reforms were designed without understanding, and they were implemented 
because NATO required them, not because they were seen as intrinsically necessary. The 
result was a "politics of mimicry", a process of imperfect copying of liberal-democratic norms 
of civil-military relations which resulted in systems of civil-military relations which were liberal-
democratic in form but idiosyncratic and sui generis in practice. 
In the former Soviet Union there was a different trend of increasing centralisation of 
authority over the armed forces in the hands of the executive. Particularly in Russia, the need 
to build democratic civil-military relations was derided as Western patronising and meddling 
by many in military circles; while in a time of profound budgetary crisis the armed forces were 
left to fend for themselves absent any effective civilian scrutiny or interference except that 
exercised infrequently by the head of state in his capacity as commander-in-chief. The result 
was a "politics of exclusion", the systematic denial of any role in civilian oversight of the armed 
forces of all political and societal actors excepting the president and his administration. 
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This dichotomy of mimicry and exclusion dovetails with the "insider" and "outsider'' 
status of the countries under review. 3 On the one hand, Poland and Hungary (as "insiders") 
saw entering NATO as integral to a broader return to the "European fold" and their 
comparatively successful transformations were supported by the expansion of NATO and the 
prospect of inclusion in the European Union. On the other hand, Russia and Ukraine (as 
"outsiders") seemed to be growing more and more distant from the "New Europe" by the end 
of the 1990s. 
The profound impact of NATO on civil-military reform in the countries in the study had 
positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, NATO offered examples of good 
practice as well as advice and assistance at a crucial time. Whether or not their political and 
military elite internalised the reasons for reform, working toward NATO membership acted as 
a powerful motivator for Poland and Hungary to undertake certain normative changes in their 
systems of civil-military relations. 
To some extent, the impact of NATO on reform planning in Ukraine was also growing 
toward the end of the 1990s. In Russia, however, the impact of NATO was quite negative-
indeed, the Russian politico-military approach to the Alliance obstructed a major restructuring 
of the armed forces away from a Cold War, preparation-for-war-with-NATO paradigm. 4 As an 
"outsider'' looking in, Russia viewed NATO with distrust. The still unresolved puzzle for 
Western policy-makers, and for reformers in Russia, has been how to overcome this distrust. 
In the Central European states after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact neither the 
political nor military elite had much experience with strategic issues. As a result of the 
backlash of this new elite against anything smacking of the old ways, their strategies came to 
be largely inspired by Western ideas. This is in contrast to the former Soviet Union states 
which had much more experience in strategic thinking and had less desire to adopt Western 
ideas in preference to their own, homegrown military traditions. In short, political and military 
3 These terms are taken from John Lowenhardt, Margot Light and Stephen White's 
research project entitled The Outsiders: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the New 
Europe (project grant L213252007) which is part of the ESRC's "One Europe or Several" 
Programme. 
4 Sherr pointed to the significant impact of inertia on the attitudes of the Ukrainian 
military elite as well, noting the" ... glaring discontinuity between the priorities put forward in 
the country's official national security concept and a situation where 'sitting in classes, 
Ukrainian officers are rehearsing a situation in which a coalition of western and southern 
states comprising 50 divisions attacks Ukraine"'. James Sherr, "Civil-democratic Control of 
Ukraine's Armed Forces: To What End? By What Means?", in David Betz and John 
Lowenhardt (eds.), Army and State in Post-Communist Europe, London & Portland, OR: 
Fran Cass, 2001, p. 7 4. 
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elites in Warsaw and Budapest were much more inclined to adopt new norms of behaviour 
from NATO than those in Moscow. 
It must also be recognised, however, that for most of the 1990s NATO membership 
was understood by Poland and Hungary as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end. 
Their military and political elite expected - and most likely would have welcomed - NATO 
solving their problems for them. It took most of the 1990s for them to get over this expectation 
and begin to design their own solutions. Ukraine too showed this desire at times for NATO to 
simply tell them what they should be doing. Moreover, the Partnership for Peace programme 
was, in some respects, detrimental to the development of democratic civil-military relations in 
Central Europe. It focussed on military to military contacts between member and aspirant 
states and on providing training opportunities for military officers thus highlighting and helping 
to deepen the skill gap between military and civilian officials in the defence establishment 
which has been such a problem. 
Despite repeated statements that one of the government's priorities was military 
reform, the Russian military at the end of the 1990s was essentially a poor, shrunken, and 
angry version of the Soviet Army. It was not at all clear that Russia's military leadership had 
learned much from ten years of transition: they were still resistant to looking at their defence 
needs and potentials from a first-principles perspective, let alone adopting Western 
behavioural norms they saw as patronising and ill-suited to Russian conditions; preferring, it 
seemed, to continue trying to preserve- or restore- the Soviet military system in a reduced 
form. 
Fundamentally, civil-military relations reform could not be effected if elites did not want 
it to be. In Russia especially, but also in Ukraine, it appears that neither military nor civilian 
elites were particularly committed to building a liberal-democratic civil-military relations 
regime. In the hostile political atmosphere which characterised both states in the 1990s it 
proved preferable for presidents - as the main stake-holders in civilian control -to have a 
partisan military- provided it was partisan in their favour. For military elites similarly, it was 
preferable to build personal relationships with the president as that was seen as a more 
effective means of protecting the military budget. 
In the end, the crises in the armed forces reflected the crises of society at large. At a 
time of massive economic distress making substantial reforms in the armed forces was very 
difficult. Similarly, where the political system was characterised by deep conflict between 
civilian political actors achieving a broad consensus on the desirability and direction of civil-
military reform was nearly impossible. On the economic side, improvements came earlier in 
Central Europe than in the former Soviet Union states. On the political side, Poland did not 
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see a major change until the passage of the 1997 Constitution which drastically curtailed the 
prerogatives of the president in the sphere of civilian control of the military. 
In Ukraine and Russia the need to reform was both more acute than in Poland and 
Hungary and delayed for longer. Only at the end of the 1990s were there signs of real steps to 
halt and reverse the ten-year decline of the armed forces, but even those signs were 
equivocal. It seems significant, however, that these signs of progress appeared only when 
there emerged signs of improvement in the economy. This would accord with the experience 
of Central Europe where economic improvements by the mid-1990s began to permit some 
modest steps to redressing the material decline of the armed forces. Nonetheless, the major 
sources of doubt about future developments in civil-military relations in Russia and Ukraine 
stem mainly from the still uncertain political environment and the dubious commitment of their 
political elite to the rules of a democratic game. 
On a more methodological point, it bears pointing out the salience of interviews as a 
research technique in the area of civil-military relations. There is much written material 
available to the researcher in this area; legislation on defence is published and often 
translated into English, structures of the ministry of defence are quite often laid out in official 
publications, doctrines and concepts are usually also available. The problem in all the states 
in the study is the gap between the rhetoric about the way things are supposed to work- the 
formal system- and the way things actually work- the informal system. Interviews with 
people in the system or local experts with considerable experience in the area is effectively 
the only way for the researcher to figure out the underlying dynamic of the national system of 
civil-military relations. 5 
FALSE DICHOTOMIES: A NEW DIRECTION FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS RESEARCH 
AND THEORY 
Traditionally, the study of civil-military relations has been a study of dichotomies: civilian vs. 
military; general oversight vs. micro-management of the armed forces; policy-makers vs. 
policy-implementers; Huntington's "professionalism" model vs. Janowitz' sociological one; 
and so on. These dichotomies are all, to a large extent, false and misleading both in the post-
5 Many Western military officials, for example some officials at NATO, defence 
attaches, or advisors like those at the NATO Liaison Office in Kiev, have an excellent 
understanding of the issues from first-hand experience. On the other hand, they are rarely at 
liberty to use all this information for scholastic purposes. In other words, participant 
observation in the civil-military reform process might be the best way to get to the heart of 
the matter, but this option is not practically feasible for the academic researcher. 
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communist context of the Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine and, perhaps, in a more 
general context as well. 
What sort of questions of civil-military relations are being asked in the democratic 
states nowadays? In many, the status of homosexuals in the military has excited an 
occasionally acrimonious debate between civilian and military authorities, as has the 
integration of women in combat units. The question of how civil-military relations may be 
optimised in peacekeeping operations is also a main problem which raises the issue of who 
is in control. In Canada and the UK, for example, the department of foreign affairs is 
becoming the prime-user of the military and they are starting to effect what kinds of 
capabilities the forces build. This occurs below the level of parliamentary oversight and is 
increasingly formalised as policy advisors from foreign ministries are attached at lower and 
lower levels (brigade, national contingent, and even battalion). There are, moreover, serious 
questions, especially in the United States, as to whether senior military figures have usurped 
too much authority over military-political decisions. Nonetheless, for the most part the main 
concern in civil-military relations is over how far the armed forces need to reflect the society 
they serve, not over how the armed forces need to be controlled. 
Indeed, the issue of civilian control of the military is looking increasingly anachronistic 
in the democratic states. The need for effective civilian control in the West nowadays is 
understood mostly in terms of preventing (largely fiscal) irresponsibility and avoiding the evils 
of bureaucracy, not for preventing military takeovers. Yet if, as Douglas Bland has argued, the 
modern problems of democratic civil-military relations are those confronting societies in which 
the political power of the military has effectively been curbed, 6 then what makes the control 
and management of the defence establishment any different from other sectors of state 
activity where the prevention of fiscal irresponsibility, avoiding the evils of bureaucracy, and 
obtaining good value for money are also germane? Increasingly little, it seems. 
This, combined with the shift in focus from questions of control to questions of 
management and effectiveness suggests that civil-military relations theorists should be 
looking less to the fields of political science and sociology and more to the field (or sub-field) 
of public administration for theoretical insights. As a start, it is useful to look at the two main 
approaches to the study of any public policy: the political and the managerial. The former is 
concerned with questions of accountability and the control of policy. The latter approach 
6 Douglas Bland, "Protecting the Military From Civilian Control: A Neglected 
Dimension of Civil-Military Relations", in Ernest Gilman and Detlief Harold (eds.), Democratic 
and Civil Control Over Military Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives, Rome: NATO 
Defence College Monograph Series, No. 3 (1995), p. 108. 
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emphasises more the rules for the effective organization of action. The two approaches meet 
in that they are both concerned with the structure of formal authority, but otherwise they cover 
different ground. Extant theory has tended to focus on the control of policy while ignoring the 
mechanics of administration. The present study suggests there are good grounds for shifting 
the analytical focus of civil-military relations research to a managerial approach and a 
concentration on the civilian side of the civil-military spectrum. 
In this respect, applying the sort of scheme outlined below used by scholars of public 
administration for evaluating the effectiveness of public bodies begets useful insights. Any 
effective public organisation possesses: effective outside political control; flexible 
organisation; good leadership and management; internal delegation of responsibilities; 
meritocratic personnel management; internal cooperation; continuous review and research 
into objectives, methods and results; a professional morale antipathetic to bureaucratic 
methods; effective publicity; and, widespread public understanding through interest, criticism 
and control.7 Under such a scheme applied to civil-military relations, outside political control 
remains a primary criterion but, rather than being the sine qua non of civil-military relations, it 
is only one of a number of areas of concern. 
Essentially, this has been the main thrust of this dissertation. In the states discussed 
here, each of the above noted points was a problem. More often than not, Central and East 
European armies based on the Soviet model were inflexible and resistant to organisational 
change. Similarly, the delegation of tasks from higher levels to lower ones did not work well 
because of an institutional culture of avoiding responsibility for decisions. The practice of 
avoiding culpability for failure by continuously seeking further clarification for each decision 
was endemic. Internal cooperation was stymied by formal and informal divisions between 
general staffs and ministries of defence. Systems of meritocratic promotion were a fair way 
off due to an enduring norm of senior officers acquiring proteges and advancing their 
interests. Strategic planning and review was very much a new and unfamiliar activity for 
armies accustomed to receiving directives in minute detail from the general staff in Moscow. 
And public understanding and respect for the military was at a low ebb in many of the post-
communist states, signalling, inter alia, a dismal record of public relations. 
The aim of a new model of civil-military relations should not be to overturn Clausewitz' 
dictum "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other 
7 E.N. Gladden, The Essentials of Public Administration, Third Edition, London: 
Staples Press Ltd., 1964, p. 69. 
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means"8 In other words, a wholesale rejection of the extant theoretical edifice of civil-military 
relations is not required. In the postmodern context the military takeover seems no longer a 
main concern, but that does not mean the threat is entirely gone. 
The experience of Poland and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine would indicate, however, 
a necessity to modify the traditional paradigm of civil-military conflict to a paradigm of civil-
military integration. Whereas extant theory directs our attention to how the armed forces and 
politicians can be kept at arm's length from each other, the issues in Central and Eastern 
Europe have been about how soldiers and civilians can work together to achieve the highest 
"value for money" in planning the security and defence of their country. Essentially, this is a 
problem of effective public administration, not of civilian control per se. 
That is, the contemporary problem of civil-military relations is a problem of competent 
management of a vital state function that is no longer vastly dissimilar from other state 
functions characterized by delegated responsibility. As such it may be addressed using 
techniques of public administration designed to evaluate the effectiveness of public policy in 
other fields. It is to be hoped that the present study has demonstrated some of the potential 
of this approach. 
8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 402. 
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Persons interviewed 
Some of the interviewees listed below are not fully identified by name. In the case of some 
interviewees this is because one of the author's research partners in Russia was arrested by 
the FSB and charged with treason; the case is still being heard in court at the time of writing. 
Although the role of the author in the case is seemingly no longer an issue, it seems prudent 
to be cautious about identifying some interviewees now- though they agreed to be quoted at 
the time of the interviews. Those interviewees from Russia who are fully identifiable were 
either interviewed at the ministry of defence on a semi-official basis, are not at risk of 
mistreatment, or have reconfirmed their willingness to be quoted. Other interviewees are not 
fully identified for non-specified reasons of their own. In general, however, my experience was 
that most interviewees were open, helpful, and prepared to be identified in the text. 
Many interviews were taped and transcribed. Detailed notes were taken on all. In a 
few cases, "interviews" were conducted by email- these are noted as such. Otherwise, the 
interviews were semi-structured personal interviews ranging from as little as ten minutes, 
particularly with high-ranking officials and politicians, to as much as an hour and a half. In 
general, interviewees were asked the same questions with some variation for national 
context. In many cases, however, specific interviews were highly focussed- i.e., most of the 
questions in the ministry of defence personnel department tended to be about personnel 
issues. 
Most of the interviews were conducted in Warsaw, Budapest, Kiev and Moscow. 
Some, however, were conducted at various conferences, symposiums and workshops to 
which I was invited or organised. In such cases, the interviews tended to be less formal, 
though in all cases interviewees were informed who I was, why I was asking the question and 
permission was requested to quote. 
Some interviewees, such as Leonid Polyakov, Zoltan Szenes, and Wladyslaw Staron 
were met with on several occasions and might better be called extended dialogues. 
Interviews with the Ukrainian parliamentarians serving on the defence committee of 
the Rada- Domansky (U12), Kriuchkov (U19), Mukhin (U22), Razumkov (U29), and Yukyvets 
(U33) -were not conducted by me. These interviews were conducted by Natalie 
Mychajlyszyn (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada) as part of the Canadian Department of 
National Defence's Democratic Civil-Military Relations (DCMRP) research programme. 
When I proved unable to get in contact with Ukrainian parliamentarians she graciously 
provided notes to these interviews which were cited in note #141 in chapter 3.2. These 
interviews are marked in the list that follows: ***. 
HUNGARY 
H1 A member of the NATO Integration Department, Ministry of Defence of Hungary, 
Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
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H2 Deaki, LCOL Endre. Plans and Policy Division, NATO Headquarters, Kiev, January 
2001. 
H3 Gazdag, Dr Ferenc. Director, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest, 2 
December 1999. 
H4 Jobbady, MAJ Zoltan. Assistant to Dr Janos Szabo, Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 29 
& 30 November 1999. 
H5 Joo, Ambassador Dr Rudolf. Permanent Representative of Hungary to the International 
Organisations in Geneva, Switzerland, by email, February 2001. 
H6 Kecskemethy, LTC Klara Siposn. Head of Military Higher Education Department, 
Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
H7 Kelemen, LTC Laszlo. Professor, Legal Department, National Defence University, 
Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
H8 Kiss, Ilona. Program Manager, Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute, Open Society 
Institute, Budapest, 3 December 1999. 
H9 Knudsen, MAJ GEN Wayne (United States Army ret.). Team Leader-Hungary, Cubic 
Applications, Inc., Budapest, 1 January 2001. 
H1 0 Martinusz, Zoltan. Institute for Central and East European Strategic Studies (former 
Head of the Department of Planning and Policy, Ministry of Defence of Hungary), The 
Hague, Netherlands, May 2001. 
H 11 Matus, Professor Janos. Head, Department of Security Studies, Miklos Zrinyi National 
Defence Uiversity, Budapest, 30 November 1999. 
H12 Molnar, MAJ Ferenc. Professor, Sociology Department, National Defence University, 
Budapest, 1-2 December 1999. 
H13 Nagy, Laszlo, Professor, Department of Security Studies, National Defence University, 
Budapest, 4 December 1999. 
H14 Nagy, COL Gabor. Defence Attache, Embassy of the Republic of Hungary in the 
Hague, The Hague, Netherlands, May 2001. 
H 15 Sardi, Peter. Under State Secretary, Office for Foreign Relations, Hungarian National 
Assembly, by email, January 2001. 
H16 Siklosi, Peter. Senior Government Adviser, Foreign and Security Policy State 
Secretariat, Office of the Prime Minister, Budapest, Hungary, by email, January 2001. 
H17 Szabo (1 ), LTC Laszlo. Head of Planning Section, Defence Policy Department, 
Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 2 December 1999. 
H18 Szabo (2), Professor Dr Janos. Deputy State Secretary for Human Resources, 
Ministry of Defence, 29 November 1999. 
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H19 Szabo (3), Zsuszanna. Assistant to Dr Janos Szabo, Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 
29 November 1999 
H20 Szenes, BGEN Zoltan. Deputy Chief (ACOS LOG), NATO HQ AFSOUTH, Glasgow, 
20 March 2000. 
H21 Ujj, LTC Andras. Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, National 
Defence University, Budapest, 1 December 1999. 
H22 Vasoczki, Zsuzsa. Head, Department for NATO Affairs, Ministry of Defence of 
Hungary, Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
POLAND 
P1 A member of the International Security Department, Ministry of Defence of Hungary, 
Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
P2 A member of the International Affairs Group, Research Bureau, Chancellory of the 
Sejm, Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
P3 Busz, CPT Artur, Head of International Law Division, Legal Department, Ministry of 
Defence, Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
P4 Czmur, COL Stefan. Senior Expert, Force Policy Division, Strategic Planning 
Directorate, General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
P5 Czarnecki, COL Waldemar. Head, Force Policy Division, Strategic Planning 
Directorate, General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
P6 Ciesluk, Tadeusz. Secretariat of the Defence Committee, Chancellory of the Sejm, 
Warsaw, 20 June 2000. 
P7 Daca, LCOL Adam. Head, Planning Division, NATO Department, Ministry of Defence, 
Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
P8 Faculty and students of the National Military Academy, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 
14 June 2000. 
P9 Firlej, Elzbieta. Main Expert, Budget Department, Ministry of National Defence, 
Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
P1 0 Grozdow, Maria. Legal Advisor, Social and Education Department, Ministry of 
Defence, Warsaw, 16 June 2000. 
P11 Homziuk, Aldana. Main Specialist, Personnel Department, Ministry of Defence, 
Warsaw, 19 June 2000. 
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P12 Janovic, LCOL. Education and Culture Division, Social and Education Department, 
Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 16 June 2000. 
P13 Jazwinski, Dr Kzysztof. Director, National Security Faculty, Institute of International 
Relations, Warsaw University, Warsaw, 12 June 2000. 
P14 Jarmuszko, COL Stanislaw. Personnel Department, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 19 
June 2000. 
P15 Kaminski, Slawomir. Main Civilian Expert, National Security Bureau, Office of the 
President, Department of the President's Supervisory of the Armed Forces, Warsaw, 
12 June 2000. 
P16 Karkoszka, Andrzej. Head of Think Tank, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, Geneva, Switzerland, November, 2000. 
P17 Koziej, BGEN Stanislaw. Director, Defence System Department, Ministry of Defence, 
Warsaw, 20 June 2000. 
P18 Kierwinski, Andrzej. Director, Secretary of the Committee for Defence Affairs of the 
Council of Ministers, Chancellery of the Prime Minister, Department of Defence Affairs, 
14 June 2001. 
P19 Krolikowski, Dr Hubert. Senior Defence Analyst, CEC Government Relations, 
Warsaw, 20 June 2000. 
P20 Kurek, MAJ Jan, Main Specialist, NATO Integration Department, Ministry of Defence, 
Warsaw 13 June 2000. 
P21 Onyszkiewicz, Janusz, Member of Parliament, The Hague, Netherlands, May 2001. 
P22 Osinski, COL Kysztof. Deputy Director, NATO Integration Department, Ministry of 
Defence, Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
P23 Peksa, COL Rafal. Social and Education Department, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 
16 June 2000. 
P24 Piatkowski, Krystian. Director for International Cooperation, Polish Chamber of 
National Defence Manufacturers, Warsaw, 14 June 2000. 
P25 Pinkowski, Jakub. Director of Legal Department, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 12 
June 2000. 
P26 Rusek, COL Henryk. Chief of Civic Education Division, Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 
16 June 2000. 
P27 Sodolski, MAJ Grzegorz. Chief of Section for Cooperation with NATO, Ministry of 
National Defence, Warsaw, 13 June 2000. 
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P28 Staron, LCOL Wladyslaw. Main Military Expert, National Security Bureau, Office of the 
President, Department of the President's Supervisory of the Armed Forces, Warsaw, 
12 June 2000. 
P29 Wisocki, COL. Chief of Social Services Division, Social and Education Department, 
Ministry of Defence, Warsaw, 16 June 2000. 
P30 Zietarski, Jacek. Secretariat of the Defence Committee, Chancellory of the Sejm, 
Warsaw, 20 June 2000. 
RUSSIA 
R1 A chief specialist in the Directorate of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of 
Defence, Ottawa, Canada, March 1998, & Moscow, January 1999. 
R2 A member of the Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defence, 
Ottawa, Canada, March 1998 & Moscow, January 1999. 
R3 A member of the Department of Organisation and Analysis, Russian Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow, January 1999. 
R4 A member of the Department of Military-Political Studies, Institute of the USA and 
Canada, Moscow, January 1999. 
RS A member of staff of the Navy Training Centre 1, Ministry of Defence, Obninsk, 
January 1999. 
R6 A member of the Inter-regional Foundation for Military Reform, Moscow, January 1999. 
R7 A member of the Law and Administration Program, The Open Society Institute, Soros 
Foundation, Moscow, January 1999. 
R8 A member of the Naval Science Committee, Chief Naval Staff of the Russian 
Federation, Moscow, January 1999. 
R9 A member of the Press Service, Ministry of Defence, Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
R10 A member of the State Duma Committee on International Relations, Moscow, January 
1999. 
R11 A member of the State Duma working group for the drafting of the "Law on Civilian 
Control of the Armed Forces", Moscow, December 1998. 
R12 An Assistant First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Moscow, January 
1999. 
R 13 A ranking official of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, January 1999. 
R 14 A senior instructor of the Navy Training Centre 2, Ministry of Defence, Obninsk, 
January 1999. 
R15 A senior member of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Moscow, January 1999. 
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R 16 A senior researcher at the Institute of the USA and Canada, Moscow, January 1999. 
R 17 A Senior Researcher at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Moscow, January 
1999. 
R18 Akbarov, COL Kamil. Deputy Chief of the Department of Military Education, Ministry of 
Defence, Moscow, December 1998. 
R 19 Babich, Dmitri. Foreign Affairs Editor, Moscow News, Birmingham, June 2000. 
R20 Baev, Pavel. Senior Researcher, International Peace Research Institute (Norway), 
Glasgow, March 2000. 
R21 Bayba, Dr Oleg. CSSD Research Fellow, Birmingham, June 2000. 
R22 Belkin, Alexander, Deputy Executive Director, Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, 
Moscow, December 1998. 
R23 Bennett, Jenni. NATO Documentation Centre for European Security, Moscow, January 
1999. 
R24 Felgenhauer, Pavel. Defence Correspondent, Segodnya, Moscow, December 1998. 
R25 Konstantinov, COL Vladimir. Acting Chief, Main Organisational Department of the 
Russian General Staff, Moscow, December 1998. 
R26 Kulagin, Vladimir. Professor, Moscow State Institute for International Relations, 
Birmingham, June 2000. 
R27 Levanov, COL Sergei. Deputy Chief of the Department of Contract Workers and 
Civilian Personnel, Ministry of Defence, Moscow, December 1998. 
R28 Matveyev, Captain 2nd Rank (N) Sergei. Department of International Relations, Ministry 
of Defence, Moscow, December 1998. 
R29 Parkhalina, Tatiana. Head of NATO Documentation Centre, Moscow, December 1998. 
R30 Shlykov, Vitaly. Council Member, Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (Moscow), 
Geneva, Switzerland, November 2000. 
R31 Trenin, Dmitri. Deputy Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(Moscow Centre), Moscow, December 1998. 
R32 Uzhanov, COL Alexander. Press Service, Ministry of Defence, Moscow, December 
1998. 
R33 Yakushev, COL Serguei. Defence Attache, Russian Embassy to the UK, Birmingham, 
June 2000. 
UKRAINE 
U1 A member of the Military Personnel Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev, 23 
January 2001. 
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U2 A member of the Partnership for Peace Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Kiev, 25 
January 2001. 
U3 A member of the Conventional Forces Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev, 29 
January 2001. 
U4 A member of the Information and Press Service, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 
Ottawa, Canada, February 1997. 
US A senior lecturer of the Kiev Military Humanitarian Institute, Ministry of Defence of 
Ukraine, Ottawa, Canada, February 1997. 
U6 A member of the Principal Operations Directorate, General Staff of the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine, Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
U7 A member of the Social-Humanitarian Department, Armed Forces Academy of 
Ukraine, Ottawa, Canada, March 1998. 
US Appatov, Dr Semyon, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Studies, Odessa 
University, Los Angeles, CA, March 2000. 
U9 Bachman, COL George. Military Liaison Office, NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine, Kiev, 
25 January 2001. 
U1 0 Belousov, Leonid. President, Ukrainian Centre for International Security Studies, Kiev, 
24 January 2001. 
U 11 Dergachov, Oleksandr. Editor in Chief, Political Thought, Kiev, Ukraine, 26 January 
2001. 
U12 ***Domansky, Anatoliy. Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Member of the Parliamentary 
Committee on National Security and Defence, Kiev, December 1998. 
U13 Grechaninov, MGEN Vadim (ret.). President, Atlantic Council of Ukraine, Kiev, 24 
January 2001. 
U14 Greene, LCDR James. Russia/Ukraine Branch, Cooperation and Regional Security 
Division, NATO International Military Staff, Kiev, 25 January 2001. 
U 15 Grytsenko, Anatoliy. President, Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, 
Kiev, 1 February 2001. 
U16 Hughes, COL Robert. Defence Attache, US Embassy, Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
U17 Kaminsky, Dr Evhen. Head of Department of American Studies, National Academy of 
Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev, 29 January 2001. 
U18 Klympush, Ivanna. Acting Director, East-West Institute, Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
U19 ***Kriuckkov, Georgiy. Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Head of the Parliamentary 
Committee on National Security and Defence, , Kiev, December 1998. 
U20 Littleboy, CPT(N) Martin. Defence Attache, British Embassy, Kiev, 1 February 2001 . 
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U21 Melnyczuk, Natalie. Head, NATO Information and Documentation Centre, Kiev, 24 
January 2001. 
U22 ***Mukhin, Professor Volodymyr. Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada, Deputy 
Chairman of the Committee on National Security and Defence, Kiev, December 1998. 
U23 Nemyria, Hryhoriy. Director, Institute of International Relations, Centre for European 
and international Studies, Taras Shevchenko University, Kiev, 31 January 2001. 
U24 Olynyk, COL Stephen (US Army ret.). Consultant on national security to the Ukrainian 
government, by email, January 2001. 
U25 Parfionov, Alexander A Executive Director, Ukrainian Centre for International Security 
Studies, Kiev, 24 January 2001. 
U26 Perepelitsiya, Hrihoryi. Head, Military Department, National Institute of Strategic 
Studies, Kiev, 25 January 2001. 
U27 Polyakov, Leonid. Director, Military Programmes, Ukrainian Centre for Economic and 
Political Studies, Kiev, 22 January 2001. 
U28 Porkohnyavi, Yuri B. Deputy Head of the Secretariat of the Rada Committee on 
National Security and Defence, Kiev, Ukraine, 24 January 2001. 
U29 ***Razumkov, Olexander. Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence 
Council, Kiev, December 1998. 
U30 Syvak, Oleksii. National Security and Defence Council Staff, by email, February 2001. 
U31 Wenmakers, Rob. Land Forces Analyst, International Staff, NATO Defence Planning 
and Operations Division, (member of Joint Working Group), Kiev, 25 January 2001. 
U32 Williams, CDR Rick. Defence Attache, Canadian Embassy, Kiev, 26 January 2001. 
U33 ***Yukyvets, Olya. Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, Member of the Parliamentary 
Committee on National Security and Defence, , Kiev, December 1998. 
U34 Zhurets, Sergij. Journalist, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Kiev, Ukraine, 26 January 
2001. 
OTHERS 
01 Bland, Douglas. Chair of Defence Management, Queen's University, by email, 
throughout 2000-2001. 
02 Donnelly, Chris. Special Adviser for Central and East European Affairs, Office of the 
NATO Secretary General, NATO Headquarters, Glasgow, March 1999. 
03 George, Bruce. Member of Parliament, Chairman, House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee, Birmingham, June 2000. 
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04 Homan, MGEN Kees. Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations Clingendael, The Hague, Netherlands, November 1999. 
05 Nelson, Daniel. Professor of Civil-Military Relations, George C. Marshall European 
Centre for Security Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, November 2000. 
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